Frank v. Harding , 290 Mont. 448 ( 1999 )


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  •  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    No. 98-247
    
    1998 MT 215
    ______________
    JAKE and ESTHER FRANK d/b/a
    ROCKING J. RANCH,
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,
    v.
    NEV HARDING,
    Defendant and Respondent
    OPINION and ORDER
    ______________
    ¶1 Nev Harding (Harding), the respondent in this appeal, has moved this Court to
    strike Exhibits A through D attached to the opening brief of the appellants Jake and
    Esther Frank (the Franks), d/b/a Rocking J Ranch. Pursuant to our order of August
    18, 1998, the Franks have responded. They oppose Harding's motion and move that
    the Exhibits at issue be judicially noticed. For the reasons stated below, we grant
    Harding's motion, in part, and deny the Franks' motion.
    ¶2 The case underlying this appeal was brought in the Thirteenth Judicial District
    Court, Carbon County, by the Franks against Harding; they sought judgment for
    amounts allegedly owed them by Harding and relief from threats allegedly leveled by
    him against them. Harding did not timely answer the complaint and the Franks
    obtained entry of his default, followed by a default judgment. Thereafter, Harding
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    moved to set the default judgment aside. The District Court held a hearing on the
    motion and Harding presented evidence surrounding the circumstances of his failure
    to answer the complaint timely. The court did not allow the Franks to present
    evidence, but did allow their counsel to make an offer of proof as to the testimony he
    would have offered. The court granted Harding's motion to set aside the default
    judgment and the Franks timely filed a notice of appeal. The sole issue raised on
    appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting Harding's motion to set aside.
    ¶3 The Franks' opening brief on appeal was filed on June 23, 1998. Attached thereto
    are Exhibits A, C and D, all of which are newspaper articles. Exhibit B, also
    attached, is the process server's proof of service with narrative statement attached.
    Harding moves to strike all four of the referenced Exhibits--together with all
    statements and arguments based thereon in the Franks' opening brief--on the
    grounds that they are not part of the record on appeal and are included for the
    improper purpose of prejudicing this Court against him. We observe at the outset
    that Exhibit B, the process server's proof of service and attached statement are of
    record--having been filed February 11, 1998--and we do not discuss that Exhibit
    further.
    ¶4 The Franks respond, first, that the newspaper articles are attached to allow this
    Court "to evaluate the parties to this appeal." In this regard, we need observe only
    that the issue on appeal--whether the trial court erred in setting aside the default
    judgment--obviously does not require this Court to "evaluate the parties;" it
    requires us only to apply the law in determining whether the District Court erred in
    setting aside the default judgment. Exhibits A, C and D are totally and entirely
    irrelevant to our consideration of that issue and it is clear that counsel can only have
    attached Exhibits A, C and D for an improper purpose.
    ¶5 Relying on Matter of Establishment & Org. of Ward Irr. Dist. (1985), 
    216 Mont. 315
    , 321, 
    701 P.2d 721
    , 726, the Franks also contend that it is permissible to
    "supplement" the record on appeal with judicially recognizable material and that
    the articles are proper subjects for judicial notice. Ward Irr. Dist. is readily
    distinguishable, however, on several grounds. First, we considered the survey
    descriptions and maps at issue there under the express authority of the Commission
    Comments to Rule 201(b), M.R.Evid., which permit judicial notice of "published
    maps or charts." Second, the Montana Water Code specifically provided that, in the
    water rights adjudication process, maps and descriptions were acceptable articles of
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    evidence to prove a water right. Ward Irr. Dist., 216 Mont. at 321, 701 P.2d at 726. In
    the present case, neither of those bases is even arguably present and, indeed, the
    Franks' counsel makes no effort to argue that the newspaper articles are judicially
    recognizable under Rule 201(b), M.R.Evid. Furthermore, the alleged "facts"
    contained within the newspaper articles are, as noted above, totally irrelevant to the
    issue raised for our consideration in this appeal.
    ¶6 Finally, the Franks argue--relying on 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 88 (1994)--that
    "[n]ewspaper articles and television stories are regularly judicially noticed by federal
    courts." While it is true that § 88 cites to two federal district court cases wherein
    newspaper articles apparently have been judicially noticed, the section also cites to a
    federal circuit court of appeals case refusing to take judicial notice of the truth of a
    newspaper article. Thus, § 88 can hardly be said to support the Franks' assertion
    that federal courts "regularly" take judicial notice of newspaper articles. Moreover,
    Rule 201(b), M.R.Evid., is applicable here.
    ¶7 In summary, it is clear that Exhibits A, C and D are improperly attached to the
    Franks' brief. Nor is it conceivable that the Franks' counsel, an attorney with some
    15 years' experience in the practice of law, did not recognize the impropriety of
    attaching such nonrecord and totally irrelevant matters to his clients' brief on
    appeal. In this regard, we long have cautioned counsel about such practices, stating,
    for example, that " '[w]e strongly condemn this practice by counsel for appellants [of
    attempting to introduce extraneous evidence by the 'back door' via attachment as
    appendices to their brief] and use this occasion to warn other parties to future appeals
    that this practice will not be tolerated.' " See Downs v. Smyk (1979), 
    185 Mont. 16
    , 25,
    
    604 P.2d 307
    , 312 (quoting Farmers State Bank of Conrad v. Iverson (1973), 
    162 Mont. 130
    , 133-34, 
    509 P.2d 839
    , 841). This practice wastes the time and resources of
    both opposing counsel and this Court and, had Harding requested sanctions in this
    regard, they likely would have been granted.
    ¶8 The Court having fully considered the matters before it,
    ¶9 IT IS ORDERED that Harding's motion to strike Exhibits A, C and D to the
    Franks' opening brief is GRANTED and we will not consider those Exhibits or any
    statements or argument in the Franks' opening brief which rely on those Exhibits;
    and
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    ¶10 IT IS ORDERED that the Franks' motion for judicial notice of Exhibits A, C
    and D is DENIED.
    ¶11 The Clerk is directed to mail a true copy of this Order to counsel of record for
    the parties.
    ¶12 DATED this 1st day of September, 1998.
    /S/ J. A. TURNAGE
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/ JIM REGNIER
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Document Info

Docket Number: 98-247

Citation Numbers: 1998 MT 215, 290 Mont. 448

Judges: /s/j.A.turnage, Gray, James, Jim, Karla, Leaphart, Nelson, Regnier, William

Filed Date: 2/11/1999

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024