State v. Luckett , 336 Mont. 140 ( 2007 )

No. DA 06-0224
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2007 MT 47STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM BENJAMIN LUCKETT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC-05-0767,
Honorable Susan P. Watters, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Brad L. Arndorfer, Arndorfer Law Firm, P.C., Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Pamela Bucy, Assistant
Attorney General; Jessie Lundberg, Legal Intern, Helena Montana
Dennis Paxinos, County Attorney; Laura E. Watson, Deputy County
Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 10, 2007
Decided: February 21, 2007
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Defendant William Luckett appeals the order of the Thirteenth Judicial District
Court, Yellowstone County, finding that a police officer had the requisite particularized
suspicion necessary to make an investigative stop of his vehicle. We affirm.
¶2 We state the issue as follows: Did the District Court err in denying Luckett’s
motion to dismiss based on its finding that the arresting officer had particularized
suspicion to conduct an investigative stop of Luckett’s vehicle?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 On February 11, 2005, around 7:20 p.m., Deputy Reyna of the Yellowstone
County Sheriff’s Department was patrolling the area of the Pelican Truck Stop near
Billings, Montana. Deputy Reyna observed two men, later identified as Luckett and
Harold Creighton, standing in the parking lot, drinking beer. Three other men later
joined Luckett and Creighton in the parking lot. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Reyna
observed either Luckett or Creighton place his beer on the ground and enter a Ford
Crown Victoria. Luckett was later identified as the driver of the Crown Victoria. Deputy
Reyna followed Luckett as Luckett drove onto Interstate 90. Deputy Reyna testified that
he followed Luckett to “make sure they were okay” as he had just witnessed the two men
drinking beer.
¶4 Once on Interstate 90 Deputy Reyna followed Luckett, who was headed west
towards Laurel, Montana. The other men in Luckett’s group also were driving on
Interstate 90 and were in a white pickup truck that was traveling between Deputy Reyna
and Luckett. Despite the white pickup truck between him and Luckett’s Crown Victoria,
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Deputy Reyna was still able to observe Luckett’s driving. In particular, Deputy Reyna
observed Luckett driving at 50 miles per hour in a 75 miles her hour speed zone while
weaving and also crossing the fog line on at least two occasions. Luckett exited Interstate
90 at Laurel where Deputy Reyna proceeded to initiate a traffic stop. Based upon his
contact with Luckett, Deputy Reyna believed Luckett was under the influence of alcohol.
¶5 Luckett was subsequently charged with driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI) and careless driving. Luckett filed a motion to dismiss arguing lack of
particularized suspicion. The District Court denied the motion. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Luckett subsequently entered a guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the
District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. Luckett timely appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal proceeding is a question of
law which we review to determine whether the district court’s conclusion of law is
correct. State v. Trombley, 2005 MT 174, ¶ 5, 327 Mont. 507, ¶ 5, 116 P.3d 771, ¶ 5
(citing City of Missoula v. O’Neill, 2004 MT 328, ¶ 5, 324 Mont. 124, ¶ 5, 102 P.3d 21,
¶ 5). When the question is one of particularized suspicion, the district court’s
determination in that regard is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Trombley,
¶ 5 (citing State v. Steen, 2004 MT 343, ¶ 5, 324 Mont. 272, ¶ 5, 102 P.3d 1251, ¶ 5).
DISCUSSION
¶7 Did the District Court err in denying Luckett’s motion to dismiss based on its
finding that the arresting officer had particularized suspicion to conduct an
investigative stop of Luckett’s vehicle?
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¶8 Luckett contends that the District Court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss
because Deputy Reyna did not possess the necessary particularized suspicion to justify an
investigative stop. A peace officer may stop a vehicle that is observed in circumstances
that create particularized suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense. Section 46-5-401, MCA. To determine
whether such particularized suspicion exists, the State must show: (1) objective data from
which an experienced officer could make certain inferences, and (2) a resulting suspicion
that the occupant of the vehicle in question is or has been engaged in some wrongdoing.
State v. Britt, 2005 MT 101, ¶ 8, 327 Mont. 1, ¶ 8, 111 P.3d 217, ¶ 8. Whether
particularized suspicion exists is a question of fact dependent on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the investigative stop. Britt, ¶ 8. We evaluate the totality of
the circumstances by considering the quantity, or content, and quality, or degree of
reliability, of the information available to the officer. Britt, ¶ 8.
¶9 The District Court found that Deputy Reyna did have particularized suspicion to
stop Luckett’s vehicle and based its finding on the following facts: Deputy Reyna saw
Luckett and another man drinking and observed them get into the Crown Victoria.
Deputy Reyna then observed Luckett’s slow rate of speed on Interstate 90. Finally,
Deputy Reyna observed Luckett weaving on the Interstate and specifically, crossing the
fog line on two separate occasions. Based on these facts, the District Court found that
Deputy Reyna had particularized suspicion to stop Luckett and investigate his suspicions.
¶10 Luckett makes several generalized arguments. First, Luckett claims he was
driving slowly because “with $3.00 gas many people drive at 50 miles per hour.” Luckett
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also contends that Deputy Reyna’s stop was a “random check” for alcohol. Luckett
further argues that “[t]here was a vehicle between the officer and Mr. Luckett’s vehicle
traveling 50 mph but the officer didn’t stop that one.” Luckett lastly contends that
Deputy Reyna’s sole justification for the investigative stop was based on observing
Luckett and Creighton drinking beer at the Pelican Truck Stop and thus, Deputy Reyna’s
stated reason was merely a pretext to investigate whether Luckett was under the influence
of alcohol.
¶11 We note that Luckett fails to ever properly apply the applicable standard as to
whether particularized suspicion exists here—that is, the totality of the circumstances
surrounding Deputy Reyna’s stop of Luckett’s vehicle. We find nothing in the record to
substantiate Luckett’s claims. Rather, it is clear that Deputy Reyna stopped Luckett
based on witnessing Luckett and Creighton drinking, the two men subsequently driving
away in the Crown Victoria while driving at a noticeably slow rate of speed on Interstate
90, the vehicle weaving along the highway, and the vehicle crossing the fog line.
Moreover, Deputy Reyna testified that although there was another vehicle between him
and the Crown Victoria, he was nevertheless able to fully observe Luckett’s driving. The
record further indicates that Deputy Reyna had over four years experience in law
enforcement and had completed multiple training sessions through the Montana Law
Enforcement Academy, including training in DUI detection. Given the objective data
presented by the State through the observations of Deputy Reyna, which gave rise to his
suspicions that Luckett was engaged in some wrongdoing, the District Court’s finding
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that there was particularized suspicion for conducting an investigative stop was not
clearly erroneous.
¶12 In addition to arguing there was no factual basis for a finding of particularized
suspicion, Luckett also seeks relief under the holding of State v. Lafferty, 1998 MT 247,
291 Mont. 157, 967 P.2d 363, that merely crossing the fog line, on its own, did not
support a finding of particularized suspicion. Lafferty, ¶¶ 17-18. Here—unlike in
Lafferty—Deputy Reyna testified, based on his training and experience, that he not only
observed Luckett crossing the fog line, but also driving at an abnormal speed, weaving,
and that he had previously witnessed Luckett and Creighton drinking beer. Lafferty is
clearly distinguishable.
¶13 Luckett further argues that this case is similar to State v. Jarman, 1998 MT 277,
¶¶ 15-16, 291 Mont. 391, ¶¶ 15-16, 967 P.2d 1099, ¶¶ 15-16, where we held an officer
did not have particularized suspicion to conduct an investigative stop of an individual
solely based on the officer’s observations of the individual talking on a pay phone on a
cold night in a high crime area, driving away, and leaving the pay phone off the hook.
We agree with the State that Jarman is distinguishable from the case at bar because in
Jarman the behavior the officer observed did not connect the defendant to the crimes the
officer suspected. Jarman, ¶ 15. Here Deputy Reyna’s observations directly connected
Luckett to a possible DUI violation.
¶14 Luckett finally advances State v. Lee, 282 Mont. 391, 938 P.2d 637 (1997), for the
proposition that an officer’s observation of a vehicle traveling 35 miles per hour in a 70
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miles per hour speed zone is insufficient to establish particularized suspicion. 1 In Lee,
we held that information provided by a citizen informant alone, with no other objective
data observed by law enforcement, does not support a finding of particularized suspicion.
Lee, 282 Mont. at 396, 938 P.2d at 640. Lee is clearly not on point with the case at bar as
there is no citizen informant here and Deputy Reyna personally observed the events that
preceded the investigative stop. Thus, we will not address Luckett’s argument with
respect to Lee.
CONCLUSION
¶15 Although Luckett claimed he was not drinking, Deputy Reyna observed Luckett
and Creighton drinking beer at the Pelican Truck Stop. Deputy Reyna further watched
Luckett and Creighton shortly thereafter drive onto Interstate 90. While on Interstate 90,
it is uncontroverted that Luckett was driving abnormally slow for the conditions, crossed
the fog line, and was weaving. Accordingly, we hold the District Court’s finding that
Deputy Reyna had particularized suspicion to conduct an investigative stop of Luckett’s
vehicle was not clearly erroneous.
¶16 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
1
In his brief, Luckett erroneously claims that Lee involved a 70 miles per hour
speed zone. In actuality, Lee involved a 55 miles per hour speed zone. Lee, 282 Mont. at
393, 938 P.2d at 639.
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We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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