Williams v. Bankhead , 22 L. Ed. 184 ( 1874 )

86 U.S. 563 (____) 19 Wall. 563

WILLIAMS ET AL.
v.
BANKHEAD.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. A.H. Garland, for the appellants.

Messrs. Clark and Williams, contra.

Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case James Bankhead obtained a decree for $8000 due him from James H. Branch, and for the specific application by way of payment to him on said decree of $3666.66 due to Branch's estate, for the reimbursement of money paid by the latter on a plantation which he had mortgaged to Bankhead, but for which he had never acquired full title. The State court of Desha County, in a suit brought therein, had decreed that the plantation must be delivered back to the vendor, and that the latter must refund the amount paid on it, which was the sum above stated. The State court, on a cross-bill filed by Branch's widow, had also decided that the reimbursement-money was in equity payable to her as her separate property under a marriage settlement. But the Circuit Court in this case, in which the widow was not a party, decreed that the same fund should be paid to Bankhead, to whom Branch had mortgaged the plantation, and, in case it was not paid by the vendor in a certain time, the plantation should be sold to raise the amount due on the mortgage. The excuse for not making the widow a party was that she did not reside in Arkansas and could not be served with process.

The parties actually before the court were one McNiell, the personal representative of Branch, Bolton, the devisee of the vendor of the plantation, and Williams, the tenant in possession of the plantation, who had rented it from the widow of Branch, she having retained possession under the alleged marriage settlement. On the other hand, the defendants contended (and that is one ground of appeal) that Bankhead was a party to the proceedings in the State court and was bound by the decree there made. This, however, was controverted by him.

The other ground is that the widow of Branch is an indispensable party in this case.

As to the first ground, it is undoubtedly true that Bankhead would be bound by the decree of the State court if he was a party to the proceedings. But he alleges that he was not a party, and the proof on the subject is not sufficient to show that he was a party. The record of the proceedings in the Desha County Court (since the war) was put in evidence, and is before us. It contains nothing to show that Bankhead, or his copartners, were parties to the suit, except the bare title of the cause at the head of one or two orders, in which the names of George McGregor, in one case, and George McGregor et al. in another, appear as defendants. Neither the original petition nor complaint, the process, nor anything else that would give light on the subject, is contained in the record as given to us. In the answer of McNiell to Bankhead's amended and supplemental cross bill, which was struck from the files, it is positively alleged that he and his partners were made parties to the proceedings in the Desha County Court as non-resident defendants, and that a regular order of publication for their appearance was made and published, and that they actually knew of the suit and took part in it. But these allegations were not responsive to the bill, and we have nothing else on the subject sufficiently explicit to show the truth of the case.

The other ground of appeal, namely, that the widow was an indispensable party, presents a more serious question. On the one hand it is said that, not being a party, her rights were not concluded; and that the only inconvenience arising from proceeding with the case without her was the double liability to which Bolton and the administrator of Branch became exposed by having to pay her and Bankhead both, under contrary decrees of different courts. The general rule as to parties in chancery is, that all ought to be made parties who are interested in the controversy, in order that there may be an end of litigation. But there are qualifications of this rule arising out of public policy and the necessities of particular cases. The true distinction appears to be as follows: First. Where a person will be directly affected by a decree, he is an indispensable party, unless the parties are too numerous to be brought before the court, when the case is subject to a special rule. Secondly. Where a person is interested in the controversy, but will not be directly affected by a decree made in his absence, he is not an indispensable party, but he should be made a party if possible, and the court will not proceed to a decree without him if he can be reached. Thirdly. Where he is not interested in the controversy between the immediate litigants, but has an interest in the subject-matter which may be conveniently settled in the suit, and thereby prevent further litigation, he may be a party or not, at the option of the complainant.

In the present case, if the question were one of mere personal liability on the part of Bolton, McNiell, and Williams, it might have been admissible to proceed without making the widow of Branch a party, inasmuch as she was not a resident of Arkansas, and could not at the time be made a party in the Circuit Court without being served with process in the district of Arkansas or voluntarily appearing to the suit. The act to further the administration of justice, by which an order of publication for the appearance of non-resident defendants is provided for, if it would apply to the case, had not then been passed. But this is not a case of mere personal liability. It concerns the disposal of a specific fund, in which the widow claims an interest. If the sum of $3666.66 mentioned in the decree is not paid, the plantation is directed to be sold in order to raise the amount of Bankhead's claim. And this plantation is in the possession of the widow by her tenants. She is to receive the rents and profits thereof until her claim is satisfied by the payment of the said sum of $3666.66 and the interest due thereon, awarded her by the Desha County Court. Her interests, therefore, are directly affected by the decree.

Under these circumstances we think that she was an indispensable party. The decree, therefore, must be REVERSED, and the cause remanded to be proceeded in

ACCORDING TO LAW.