Insurance Co. v. Young's Administrator , 23 L. Ed. 152 ( 1875 )

90 U.S. 85 (____) 23 Wall. 85

INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
YOUNG'S ADMINISTRATOR.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. W.D. Davidge, for the company, plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Henry Beard and William Todd Otto, contra.

Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

The question presented for our determination is whether the findings warrant the judgment. The facts found lie within a narrow compass.

Several objections, some of them technical, have been taken by the counsel for the plaintiff in error to the judgment rendered. We shall confine our remarks to one of them. It is fundamental, and goes to the right, justice, and law of the case. The receipt of the 5th of June was the initial step of the parties. It reserved the absolute right to the company to accept or reject the proposition which it contained. There was a necessary implication, that if it were accepted the response and acceptance were to be by a policy, in conformity with the terms specified in the receipt as far as they extended, and beyond that, in the usual form of such instruments as issued by the company. But it was clearly within the power of the company, under the condition expressed, wholly to reject the application, without giving any reason; or to accept the proposition with such modifications of the terms specified, and of the usual conditions of such policies, as it might see fit to prescribe. The entire subject was both affirmatively and negatively within its choice and discretion. The acceptance was a qualified one, and there was none other.

It was by a policy departing from the terms specified in the receipt in the particulars before mentioned but containing as to the conditions imposed otherwise, nothing beyond what was usual in such cases. At this stage of the business, the company was not bound according to the receipt, because it had not agreed to a part of the terms specified, and those terms were material and of the essence of the proposition. Clearly the company never did agree to those terms. What it would have done if the applicant had refused, as he might have done, to take the policy it is not material to consider. It is enough that the company did not so agree.

This court has no power to make such an agreement for it. The indispensable element of the consent of one of the parties is shown not to have existed. The contrary appears by the policy transmitted to the agent. The consent of the applicant appears, but that alone is unavailing. That fact, in any sound legal view of the case, is as if it were not. In the analysis of the case the receipt, for the reasons stated, must be laid out of view.

This brings us to the examination of the controversy as respects the policy of insurance. Here the position of the parties is reversed. The applicant assented to the proposition contained in the receipt, but the company did not. The company assented to the policy, but the applicant never did. The mutual assent, the meeting of the minds of both parties, is wanting. Such assent is vital to the existence of a contract. Without it there is none, and there can be none. In this case it is not established by any direct proof, and there is none from which it can be inferred. This is not controverted. If it be alleged there was fault on the part of the agent, for which the company is responsible, in not communicating promptly and fully with the applicant upon the arrival of the policy, there are several answers to the imputation. Such fault, viewed in any light, cannot be taken as the legal equivalent of the assent of the applicant to the terms of the policy. But no such fault is shown. The applicant knew that the company was not bound, and would not be bound until it chose to become so, and that it had the right to do what it did. It was his duty to keep up the necessary communication with the agent by calling upon him when the answer from the office in New York might have been expected to arrive, and if he intended to be absent, by giving the agent his address during his absence, and taking from him a promise to communicate the result as soon as the reply was received.

It does not appear that he took any step whatever in this way. Neither he nor his personal representative, therefore, had any reason to complain. If he had received notice of the proposition made through the policy it would have been at his option to give or refuse his assent. He was certainly in nowise bound until such assent was given. Until then, there could be no contract on his part, and if there was none on his part, there could be none on the part of the company. The obligation in such cases is correlative. If there is none on one side there is none on the other. The requisite assent must be the work of the parties themselves. The law cannot supply it for them. That is a function wholly beyond the sphere of judicial authority. As the applicant was never bound, the company was never bound. The policy was, therefore, no more a contract than the receipt. Both had the same fatal defect, the want of the assent of one of the parties.

Even where the parties supposed they had agreed and it turned out there was a misunderstanding as to a material point, the requisite mutual assent as to that point being wanting, it was held that neither was bound.^[*]

The deceased paid nothing. The contest is an effort on that side to gather where he had not sown. The law involved is expressed by the phrase "it takes two to make a bargain."

In this view of the case, irrespective of the other considerations which have been urged upon our attention, we hold that the facts found do not warrant the conclusion reached.

JUDGMENT REVERSED, and the case REMANDED, with directions to enter a judgment

IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.

NOTES

[*] Baldwin & Forbes v. Mildeberger, 2 Hall, 176, a case at law; Coles v. Browne, 10 Paige, 526, a case in equity; see also Calverley v. Williams, 1 Vesey, Jr., 210, and Crane v. Partland, 9 Michigan, 493