Clark v. United States , 24 L. Ed. 518 ( 1877 )

Mr. Justice Bradley

delivered the opinion of the court. .

The first objection made to the claim is, that the contract was not in writing, as required by the act of". June 2, .1862, entitled “ An Act to prevent and punish fraud on the part of officers intrusted with the making of contracts for the government.” 12 Stat. 411. This act provides: —•

“ Sect. 1. That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War,- of the' Secretary of the Navy, and of the Secretary of the Interior, immediately after the passage of this act, to canse and require every contract made by them severally on behalf of the government, or by their officers under them appointed to make such contracts, to be reduced to writing, and signed by the contracting parties with their names at the end thereof, a- copy of which shall .be filed by the officer making and signing the said contract in the ‘ returns office ’ of the Department of the Interior (hereinafter established for that purpose), as soon after the contract is made as possible,”and within thirty days, together with all bids, offers, and proposals to him made' by persons to obtain the same, as also a copy of any advertisement he may have published inviting bids, offex-s, or proposals for the same ; all the said copies and papex-s in relation-to each contract to be attached together by a ribbon and seal, and numbered in regular order numerically, according to the number of papers composing the .whole return.”

The act further provides that the officer shall affix ak affidavit to his return, and makes it a misdemeanor to neglect mak-ihg his return, and directs the heads of departments''to'-furnish printed instructions and forms of contracts, &c.

It is contended on the part of the government that this act is mandatory and binding both on the officers making contracts and on the parties contracting with them; whilst the claimant insists that it is merely directory to the officers of. the government, and cannot affect the validity of contracts actually made, though hot in writing. The Court of Claims has heretofore held the act .to be mandatory,' and as requiring, all contracts made with the departments named to be in conformity with it. The arguments by which this .view has been enforced by that court are of great weight, and, in Our-judgment, conclusive. The facility with" which the government may be pillaged by the presentment of claims of the most extraordinary charactei*, if allowed to be sustained by parol evidence, which can always be produced to any required extent, renders it highly desirable that all contracts which are- made the basis of demands against the government should be in writing. Perhaps the primary object of the statute was to impose a restraint upon the officers themselves, and prevent them from making reckless engagements for the government; but the considerations referred to make it manifest that there is no class of cases in which a statute for preventing frauds and perjuries is more needed- than in this. And we think that the statute in question was intended to operate as such. It makes it unlawful for contracting officers to make contracts in any other way than by writing signed by the parties. This is equivalent to prohibiting any other mode of making contracts. Every man is supposed to know the law. A party who makes a contract with an officer without having it reduced to writing is knowingly accessory to a violation of duty on his part. Such a party aids in the violation of the law. We are of opinion, therefore, that' the contract itself is affected, and must conform to the requirements of the statute until it- passes from the observation and control of the'party, who enters into it. After that, -if the officer fails to follow the further directions of the act with regard to affixing his affidavit and returning a copy of the contract to the proper office, the. party is not responsible for this neglect.

We do not mean to say that, where a parol contract has befen wholly or partially executed and performed on one side, the party performing will not be entitled to recover the fair value of his property or services. On the contrary," we think that he will be entitled to recover such value as upon an implied contract for a quantum meruit. In the present .case, the implied contract is such as arises upon a simple bailment for hire ; and the obligations of the parties are those which are incidental to such a bailment. The special contract being void, the claimant is thrown back upon the rights which result from the implied contract. This will cast the loss of the vessel upon him. A bailee for hire, is' only responsible for ordinary diligence and-liable for. ordinary negligence in the care of the property bailed.- This- is not only the common law, but the general law, on the subject. See Jones, Bailm., p. 88; Story, Bailm., sects. 398, 399; Domat, Lois Civiles, lib. 1, tit. 4, sect. 3, pars. 3, 4; 1 Bell, Com., pp. 481, 483, 7th ed.

As negligence is not attributed to the employés of the government in this case, the .loss of- the vessel, as before stated,' must fall on the owner.

Of course, the claimant is entitled to the value of -the use of his vessel during the time it-was in the hands of the government agents, which, as. shown by the findings, was the period of eight days. This value, in the absence of any other evidence on the subject, may be fairly assumed at what was stip-. ulated for in the. parol contract. Though not binding or conclusive, it may be regarded as admissible evidence for that purpose. Neither party thought fit to adduce any other. The cases bearing on this subject are collected in Browne’s Treatise on the Statute of Frauds, sects. 117 — 130; but they mostly refer to the .question whether the contract, .though void by the Statute of Frauds, can be regarded' as conclusive evidence of. the quantum meruit. Whether or not it is admissible as some evidence, though not conclusive on either party, is apparently not inuch discussed; though it seems to us that it may fairly be deduced from the tenor of the cases that the evidence is admissible. At all events, that is our view. . As a declaration of the parties, it is entitled to some' credence.

The stipulation in this case, as appears by the findings,was for $150 per day. This would make the amount of the claim $1,200. For this amount the claimant is entitled to a decree.

If objected that' the petition contains no count upon an implied contract for quantum meruit, it may be answeredj that the forms of pleading in the Court of Claims are not of so strict a character as to preclude the claimant from recovering what is justly due to him upon the facts stated in his petition, although due in a different aspect from that in which his demand is conceived.

The other objection relied on by the government in this case is,, that the claimant had no valid title to the steamer as against the United States, having obtained her from the Confederate government, in'. 1863, in payment for supplies furnished to the. Quartermaster’s Department-^of that government. This objection cannot be sustained. When the contract was made, with the claimant, the vessel was in Mexican waters, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The claimant-was applied' to for- its ' use. It was agreed that he. should be compensated. No. question was made about his title, and it is not suggested that he was guilty of any concealment or suppression of the truth in regard to it. Under these circum-stances, it would be bad faith on the part of' the government, after getting possession of the steamer and getting it within its jurisdiction, under pretence of hiring it of the claimant, to set up that he had no title to it. This is so obviously in accordance with the justice of the case, that we deem it unnecessary, to make any further observations on the subject. •

The decree of the Court of Claims must be reversed; and the cause remanded with directions to enter a judgment in accordance with this- opinion j and- it is So ordered.