United States v. Hector Tovar , 719 F.3d 376 ( 2013 )


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  •      Case: 12-40557    Document: 00512267228     Page: 1   Date Filed: 06/07/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 7, 2013
    No. 12-40557
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    HECTOR HUGO TOVAR,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    Before KING, DAVIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:
    Following a motion hearing and bench trial, the district court convicted
    Hector Tovar of possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of
    marijuana in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), interstate travel in aid of
    racketeering activity in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1952
    , and possession of an
    unregistered firearm (a short-barrel shotgun) in violation of 
    26 U.S.C. § 5861
    (d).
    Tovar challenges his conviction on three grounds. Specifically, he argues that:
    (1) double jeopardy bars this case because he was convicted for related conduct
    in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; (2) the district court erred in denying
    his motion to suppress certain evidence and statements obtained during and
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    following a search of his home; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support
    his conviction. We AFFIRM.
    I.
    The relevant criminal conduct1 involves three key players:
    1.     Defendant Tovar, a “broker” who arranged the transportation of
    marijuana and cocaine from Texas to Pennsylvania;
    2.     Ramon Anthony “Vex” Nunez (“Nunez”), a wholesale drug
    distributor in Allentown, Pennsylvania; and
    3.     Carlos Mejia (“Mejia”), a driver who transported marijuana from
    Texas to Pennsylvania.
    Tovar and Nunez met through a third party in the summer of 2008, while
    Nunez was in Texas “looking for a source for marijuana.” At that meeting,
    Tovar and Nunez agreed that Tovar would deliver marijuana to Nunez in
    Pennsylvania; the parties discussed logistics and settled on a price.
    Tovar coordinated four specific shipments of marijuana from Texas to
    Pennsylvania in late 2008 and early 2009. First, in late 2008, Tovar arranged
    for the delivery of a 300-pound load of marijuana to Nunez in Pennsylvania.
    Mejia drove the cargo, and Tovar was present at the time of delivery. Second,
    in December 2008, Tovar rented a truck and U-Haul camper for Mejia to
    transport another load of marijuana to Nunez.                Tovar did not travel to
    Pennsylvania for that trip. Third, in January 2009, Tovar—accompanied by his
    family—arrived in Pennsylvania with another load of 200-300 pounds of
    marijuana. Tovar and his family stayed in the region while Nunez sold the
    1
    We describe the facts as presented at Tovar’s bench trial, viewing them—as we
    must—in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Turner, 
    319 F.3d 716
    , 720
    (5th Cir. 2003).
    2
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    drugs; Nunez then split the sale proceeds with Tovar. Finally, in February
    2009, Tovar coordinated with Nunez to deliver another load of marijuana to
    Pennsylvania, with Mejia acting as the driver. Officials stopped Mejia in Rusk
    County, Texas, and seized 306.6 pounds of marijuana on February 25, 2009.
    Tovar continued to transport drugs (specifically, cocaine) to Nunez in
    Pennsylvania after Mejia’s arrest. He coordinated shipments for Nunez from
    about March 2009 to August 5, 2009, when Nunez was arrested.
    After their arrests, both Mejia and Nunez cooperated with authorities.
    A special agent obtained an arrest warrant for Tovar and a search warrant for
    his residence on January 25, 2010.          State, local, and federal authorities
    executed the warrants at approximately 6:00 a.m. the next morning. Officers
    entered Tovar’s residence, placed him in handcuffs, and performed a search of
    his home. In the course of the search, officers located and seized a shotgun in
    a closet. Before he received a Miranda warning, Tovar admitted that he had
    obtained the gun from a cousin for the purpose of self-protection. Officials later
    determined that the gun was stolen, unregistered, and had been altered, with
    a pistol grip replacing the stock and a cut-off barrel.
    Officers brought Tovar to the station after his arrest. A special agent
    advised Tovar of his Miranda rights, and Tovar signed a statement of rights
    form. Tovar then agreed to participate in an interview, in which he told two
    special agents that he served as a “broker” between Mejia and Nunez. He
    admitted that he had rented a U-Haul trailer for Mejia to transport marijuana
    and that he had personally transported marijuana to Pennsylvania in January
    2009. Tovar denied any knowledge of the February transaction, during which
    Mejia was arrested with 306.6 pounds of marijuana. With respect to the
    3
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    shotgun that officers found at his residence, Tovar again indicated that he had
    borrowed it from his cousin, and stated that he had not modified the gun in any
    way since he received it. At some point during the interview, officials allowed
    Tovar to meet with his wife. Tovar never asked to terminate the interview, and
    did not request a lawyer.
    Federal grand juries in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the
    Eastern District of Texas indicted Tovar on December 16, 2009 and January 26,
    2010, respectively. The Pennsylvania indictment focused on Tovar’s cocaine
    trafficking. It charged Tovar with six counts: one count of conspiracy to
    distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , four
    substantive counts of distribution of 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation
    of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), and one count of aiding and abetting in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    . A jury found Tovar guilty of four counts in the Pennsylvania
    indictment, including the conspiracy count, and the Pennsylvania district court
    sentenced Tovar to 200 months’ imprisonment.2
    The Texas indictment focused on Tovar’s marijuana trafficking. It charged
    Tovar with four counts:3
    Count 1:      conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100
    kilograms of marijuana from December 19, 2008, until
    February 25, 2009, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    ;
    Count 2:      possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of
    2
    The Third Circuit affirmed the Pennsylvania district court’s conviction and sentence
    on January 17, 2013. United States v. Tovar-Sanchez, No. 11-3810, 
    2013 WL 174355
    , at *2 (3d
    Cir. Jan. 17, 2013).
    3
    The Texas grand jury first indicted Tovar on slightly different counts. On the
    government’s motion, the district court dismissed the first Texas indictment without prejudice,
    and the government obtained a new indictment with the above-listed counts on July 21, 2010.
    4
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    marijuana on January 24, 2009, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1);
    Count 3:    interstate travel in aid of racketeering activity on or about
    January 24, 2009, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1952
    ; and
    Count 4:    possession of an unregistered firearm (short-barrel shotgun)
    on January 26, 2010, in violation of 
    26 U.S.C. § 5861
    (d).
    The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held a motion hearing and
    bench trial on November 8, 2011, after Tovar had been convicted and sentenced
    in the Pennsylvania case.
    Tovar made two motions relevant to this appeal. First, he moved to
    dismiss all counts on double-jeopardy grounds.       Second, Tovar moved to
    suppress evidence seized during the search of his home, as well as statements
    that he made during and subsequent to the search.
    The district court proceeded with Tovar’s bench trial before ruling on his
    motions, reasoning: “I am going to allow the government to put on evidence to
    meet its burden of persuasion [on Tovar’s double-jeopardy motion], which is
    probably going to be most of the same evidence as to the guilt-or-innocence
    phase; and I don’t see a reason to do it twice.” The government presented
    several witnesses, including Nunez, Mejia, law enforcement officials involved
    with the investigation of Tovar’s case, and a drug analysis expert.         The
    government also offered physical and documentary evidence, including the gun
    obtained in Tovar’s residence, hotel receipts, and records obtained from U-Haul,
    which generally corroborated Tovar’s involvement in the trips from Texas to
    Pennsylvania.
    After hearing the evidence, the district court considered Tovar’s double-
    jeopardy and suppression motions. It granted Tovar’s double-jeopardy motion
    5
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    to dismiss with respect to Count 1, denied it with respect to Counts 2–4, and
    denied Tovar’s motion to suppress. Ultimately, the district court found Tovar
    guilty on Counts 2–4 and sentenced him to 90 months’ imprisonment followed
    by a four-year term of supervised release.4 Tovar timely appealed.
    II.
    Tovar makes three arguments on appeal. First, he asserts that the
    district court erred in denying his double-jeopardy motion with respect to the
    non-conspiracy counts (Counts 2–4). Second, Tovar argues that the district
    court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the
    search of his home, as well as all statements that he made to law enforcement
    during and subsequent to the search. Finally, Tovar contends that the evidence
    is insufficient to sustain his conviction on Counts 2–4. We address each
    argument in turn.
    A.
    The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person
    4
    Specifically, the district court sentenced Tovar as follows:
    P      Count 2: 90 months’ imprisonment (concurrent with all counts of the Texas
    indictment, 70 months consecutive and 20 months concurrent with Tovar’s
    Pennsylvania sentence), four years’ supervised release (concurrent with all
    counts and cases), and a $100 special assessment;
    P      Count 3: 60 months’ imprisonment (concurrent with all counts of the Texas
    indictment, consecutive with Tovar’s Pennsylvania sentence), three years’
    supervised release (concurrent with all counts and cases), and a $100 special
    assessment; and
    P      Count 4: 90 months’ imprisonment (concurrent with all counts of the Texas
    indictment, 70 months consecutive and 20 months concurrent with Tovar’s
    Pennsylvania sentence), three years’ supervised release (concurrent with all
    counts and cases), and a $100 special assessment.
    6
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    shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
    U.S. Const. amend. V. This constitutional guarantee “protects against a second
    prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” Brown v. Ohio, 
    432 U.S. 161
    ,
    165 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see United States
    v. El-Mezain, 
    664 F.3d 467
    , 546 (5th Cir. 2011), as revised (Dec. 27, 2011), cert.
    denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 525
     (2012).
    The defendant “bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
    claim of double jeopardy.” United States v. Deshaw, 
    974 F.2d 667
    , 670 (5th Cir.
    1992) (citation omitted). “If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the
    government to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    indictment charges a crime separate from that for which the defendant
    previously was placed in jeopardy.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    The longstanding test for determining whether two statutes constitute the
    “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes arises from Blockburger v. United
    States, 
    284 U.S. 299
     (1932). There, the Supreme Court explained that “where
    the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
    provisions, the test to be applied . . . is whether each provision requires proof of
    a fact which the other does not.” 
    Id. at 304
    . A court applying the Blockburger
    test must “focus[ ] on the statutory elements of the offense. If each requires
    proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied,
    notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the
    crimes.” Iannelli v. United States, 
    420 U.S. 770
    , 785 n.17 (1975); see also United
    States v. Agofsky, 
    458 F.3d 369
    , 371 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Under the Blockburger
    test, each offense must contain an element not contained in the other; if not,
    7
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    they are the same offense . . . and double jeopardy bars subsequent punishment
    or prosecution.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
    Here, Tovar argues that the Texas charges address “the same conduct as
    charged and punished” in the Pennsylvania conspiracy. Because the district
    court dismissed Count 1—the Texas conspiracy charge—we need only consider
    whether the substantive offenses (Counts 2–4: possession with intent to
    distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, interstate travel in aid of
    racketeering activity, and possession of an unregistered firearm) are the “same
    offense” as the Pennsylvania conspiracy under the Blockburger test.5
    “It is settled law that conspiring to commit a crime is an offense wholly
    separate from the crime which is the object of the conspiracy.” United States v.
    Threadgill, 
    172 F.3d 357
    , 367 (5th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Felix, 
    503 U.S. 378
    , 391–92 (1992); Deshaw, 
    974 F.2d at 671
    . This court has applied this
    settled law in a host of similarly situated cases. For example, in United States
    v. Kalish, we considered “whether the double jeopardy clause bars the
    government from first prosecuting a defendant for conspiracy to commit a
    crime, and then, in a separate proceeding, charging the same defendant with
    an underlying substantive offense which may have been the object of that
    conspiracy.” 
    734 F.2d 194
    , 196 (5th Cir. 1984). We answered no, explaining:
    The present case does not involve the prosecution of two conspiracy
    5
    Tovar devotes a meaningful portion of his brief to the factors set forth in United States
    v. Rabhan, which govern our determination of whether a defendant participated in a single
    conspiracy or multiple conspiracies for double-jeopardy purposes. 
    628 F.3d 200
    , 205 (5th Cir.
    2010). Rabhan has no force at this stage in the case, however, because the district court
    dismissed the Texas conspiracy charge. As a result, we need not evaluate the overlap between
    the Texas conspiracy and the Pennsylvania conspiracy.
    8
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    charges; it concerns a conspiracy prosecution followed by a charge
    for the underlying substantive offense. The appropriate standard
    for determining whether double jeopardy bars separate
    prosecutions, therefore, is the Blockburger test. See United States
    v. Phillips, 
    664 F.2d 971
    , 1005–06 [(5th Cir. 1992)]; United States
    v. Dunbar, 
    611 F.2d 985
     [(5th Cir. 1980)] (en banc court specifically
    adopting the panel’s use of the Blockburger test as the proper
    method to analyze this type of double jeopardy claim). And under
    the Blockburger test, the offenses of conspiracy to commit a crime
    and the crime itself are separate offenses. Iannelli v. United States,
    
    95 S. Ct. 1284
    , 1293–94 n.17 (1975).
    
    Id.
     at 198–99. Likewise, in Deshaw, we emphasized that the “overt acts
    charged in a conspiracy count may also be charged as substantive offenses, for
    the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself.” 
    974 F.2d at 676
    . We
    concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar “substantive marihuana
    counts and [interstate travel in aid of racketeering activity] counts” charged
    subsequent to an acquittal on a conspiracy charge. Id.6
    With these cases in mind, even if Tovar’s marijuana possession, interstate
    travel in aid of racketeering activity, and gun possession were a direct product
    of the Pennsylvania conspiracy, Tovar’s double jeopardy argument fails. The
    6
    See also United States v. Longoria, 202 F. App’x 700, 701 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished,
    but persuasive) (“A substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit that crime are not the same
    offense for double jeopardy purposes. Longoria’s argument that being charged with, convicted
    of, and punished for the conspiracy and substantive counts subjected him to double jeopardy
    does not establish plain error.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. Martinez-Gill,
    No. 92-5626, 
    1994 WL 395053
    , at *7 (5th Cir. July 7, 1994) (unpublished, but persuasive) (“In
    the instant case, the count charging the offense of conspiracy required the government to prove
    that Hernandez voluntarily joined a conspiracy, which is not an element of the offense of
    heroin distribution. At the same time, the offense of heroin distribution requires the
    government to prove that the defendant distributed heroin, which is not an element of the
    offense of conspiracy. The government may therefore prosecute both crimes without running
    afoul of the double jeopardy clause. Hernandez’s double jeopardy claim is without merit.”
    (internal citations omitted)).
    9
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    government could have charged Tovar with the otherwise-unprosecuted
    substantive offenses arising out of the Pennsylvania conspiracy even after it
    obtained a guilty verdict on the conspiracy charge.                      Moreover, applying
    Blockburger, the Pennsylvania conspiracy charge and Counts 2–4 in the Texas
    district court case depend on proof of different statutory elements. Unlike
    Counts 2–4 in the Texas case, the Pennsylvania conspiracy charge required the
    government to show that Tovar made an illegal agreement. Conversely, unlike
    the Pennsylvania conspiracy charge, Counts 2–4 required the government to
    prove that Tovar possessed and intended to distribute marijuana, engaged in
    interstate travel, and possessed an unregistered firearm, respectively.7
    For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Tovar’s motion
    to dismiss Counts 2–4 on double jeopardy grounds. We turn next to Tovar’s
    suppression arguments.
    B.
    When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review
    factual findings for clear error and the ultimate questions of constitutionality
    de novo. United States v. Scroggins, 
    599 F.3d 433
    , 440 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
    United States v. Perez, 
    484 F.3d 735
    , 739 (5th Cir. 2007)). “A finding is clearly
    erroneous only if the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been committed.” 
    Id.
     (citing United States v. Hernandez, 
    279 F.3d 302
    , 306 (5th Cir. 2002)). We afford particular deference to factual findings
    7
    Tovar also makes a collateral estoppel argument in passing, but his argument is
    without force. “The collateral-estoppel effect attributed to the double jeopardy clause may bar
    a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier
    prosecution involving the same facts. But this does not establish that the Government ‘must
    . . . bring its prosecutions . . . together.’ It is entirely free to bring them separately, and can
    win convictions in both.” United States v. Dixon, 
    509 U.S. 688
    , 705 (1993).
    10
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    when “denial of the suppression motion is based on live oral testimony . . .
    because the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
    witnesses.” 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v. Gibbs, 
    421 F.3d 352
    , 357 (5th Cir.
    2005)). Moreover, we must view the evidence “most favorably to the party
    prevailing below,” unless such view “is inconsistent with the trial court’s
    findings or is clearly erroneous considering the evidence as a whole.” 
    Id.
     (citing
    United States v. Shabazz, 
    993 F.2d 431
    , 434 (5th Cir. 1993)). Thus, we will
    uphold the district court ruling “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence
    to support it.” 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 
    190 F.3d 668
    , 671 (5th Cir.
    1999)). Tovar makes two suppression arguments, which he did not urge at oral
    argument. We address them briefly in turn.
    1.
    First, Tovar asserts that the search of his home was unlawful because
    neither the relevant search warrant nor the affidavit on which the warrant was
    based included sufficient reliable information to establish probable cause, and
    the Leon good-faith exception did not apply.8 See United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 921–25 (1984). This argument fails in light of the thorough and
    8
    We apply a two-part analysis when a party challenges a seizure pursuant to a search
    warrant. United States v. Allen, 
    625 F.3d 830
    , 835 (5th Cir. 2010). First, we ask whether the
    seizure falls within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
    Id.
     That “inquiry is
    confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer
    would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” 
    Id.
    (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the good-faith exception is met, “this court affirms
    the district court’s decision denying the motion to suppress.” 
    Id.
     Only when the exception
    does not apply do we proceed “to the second step and determine[ ] whether the magistrate
    issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for believing there was probable cause for the
    search.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks and citation omitted). Probable cause simply requires “a fair
    probability” that evidence of a crime will be found and should be a “practical, common-sense
    decision.” Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238 (1983).
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    specific information contained in the affidavit in support of the search warrant,
    which includes but is not limited to:
    P      A four-and-a-half page description of the qualifications of the
    special agent assigned to the investigation;
    P      A description of the GPS coordinates and physical characteristics
    of Tovar’s residence;
    P      The allegation that Tovar resided at the address and operated
    narcotics trafficking activities there;
    P      The observation that, in the agent’s experience, narcotics
    traffickers tend to keep evidence of their unlawful activities in their
    homes.
    P      Statements by a named informant (Nunez) in Pennsylvania who
    admitted that Tovar had provided him with kilograms of cocaine;
    P      The allegation that agents discovered a check in Tovar’s name in a
    safe owned by Nunez. “Nunez told [A]gents that the account was
    set up by [Nunez] and [Tovar] so that [Nunez] could deposit money
    directly into [Tovar’s] account.”
    P      A description of several recorded phone calls between Tovar and
    Nunez, in which the two discussed cocaine supply and deliveries;
    P      Nunez’s positive identification of Tovar in a photo lineup;
    P      A traffic stop conducted in Pennsylvania, which revealed bricks of
    cocaine contained in a vehicle registered to Tovar;
    P      Statements by Nunez that Tovar had previously provided him with
    marijuana; and
    P      Receipts confirming Nunez’s statements regarding trips that Tovar
    had taken for the purposes of drug trafficking.
    After reviewing the warrant and supporting affidavit, the district court
    explained:
    When you take a look at this affidavit, it’s very detailed.
    Agent Moore gives his qualifications. He goes into detail on
    12
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    trafficking and then goes into extensive detail, starting at
    paragraph 6, on probable cause dealing with the prior arrest of Mr.
    Nunez, the check and so forth that Nunez turned over, the phone
    calls recorded from Nunez to Mr. Tovar on Nextel, numerous
    conversations being listened to, Nunez being shown a photo lineup
    and identifying Tovar as the broker and also the person known as
    “Hugo.”
    So, there is extensive background and factual basis for the
    magistrate judge to conclude. But more for purposes of this
    analysis, any officer who received that warrant with that affidavit,
    it’s not bare bones; and the officer would be justified in relying on
    the magistrate’s probable cause determination and on the technical
    sufficiency of the warrant.
    It’s objectively reasonable. It’s not lacking in indicia of
    probable cause. It doesn’t contain any obviously false statements
    made intentionally with reckless regard for the truth, no indication
    the magistrate judge wholly abandoned his judicial role. It’s not
    lacking particularity; it’s not just some general house somewhere
    in Cleveland[, Texas].
    And therefore – and, in fact, it’s not just merely indication –
    or information provided from some unknown or unidentified
    informant. There were substantial details provided by Nunez,
    substantial details confirmed with these phone calls, the records
    from the officer in Pennsylvania with not only the name but also
    the address and driver’s license numbers of Mr. Tovar showing his
    trips to Pennsylvania.
    So, I find there is no evidence of the magistrate judge being
    intentionally or recklessly misled, no evidence that the magistrate
    wholly abandoned his role, no evidence that the warrant was
    facially deficient. And, so, I find . . . that the Leon good faith
    exception would apply.
    We agree with this assessment. The search warrant and accompanying
    affidavit include far more than mere boilerplate, and afford us no reason to
    conclude that the magistrate judge abandoned his role in reaching a neutral
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    probable cause determination. Likewise, a well-trained officer could, in good
    faith, rely on the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination. Accordingly,
    the district court did not err in applying the good-faith exception and denying
    Tovar’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained at his home.
    2.
    Second, Tovar argues that certain statements he made to the police were
    inadmissible fruit of a poisonous tree.        This argument also fails. “[T]he
    exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction at trial of all evidence that is
    derivative of an illegal search, or evidence known as the ‘fruit of the poisonous
    tree.’” United States v. Hernandez, 
    670 F.3d 616
    , 620–21 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (quoting United States v. Singh, 
    261 F.3d 530
    , 535 (5th Cir. 2001)). The central
    question in applying the exclusionary rule is not whether the evidence would
    have been discovered “but for” a constitutional violation, but rather whether the
    evidence is derived from exploitation of the illegality. See Wong Sun v. United
    States, 
    371 U.S. 471
    , 487–88 (1963); see also Scroggins, 
    599 F.3d at 446
     (“This
    ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine is limited to evidence ‘derived from the
    exploitation of an illegal search or seizure.’” (quoting United States v. Dortch,
    
    199 F.3d 193
    , 200 (5th Cir. 1999))).
    Verbal statements, in addition to physical evidence, are subject to the
    exclusionary rule. Wong Sun, 
    371 U.S. at
    485–86. “[V]erbal evidence which
    derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest . . .
    is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of
    the unwarranted intrusion.”       
    Id. at 485
    . In determining admissibility, the
    Supreme Court considers the degree of free will exercised by the defendant and
    balances the cost of “exclusion [that] would perpetually disable a witness from
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    testifying about the relevant and material facts” against the need to deter
    unconstitutional conduct in the future. United States v. Ceccolini, 
    435 U.S. 268
    ,
    276–78 (1978).
    Tovar made statements to the police at two relevant times: (1) during the
    search of his residence, before he received a Miranda warning,9 and (2) once he
    was transported to the station, after he received multiple Miranda warnings.
    Tovar argues that police obtained his first statements unlawfully, as he was
    already under arrest when officers questioned him during the search of his
    residence. Thus, he asserts that these first, unlawfully obtained statements
    tainted the later admissions that he made during his interview at the station.
    Assuming arguendo that Tovar’s first statements were unlawfully
    obtained, the central question is whether Tovar’s subsequent post-Miranda
    admissions were voluntary—that is, not a product of coercion or duress—and
    “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” Wong Sun, 
    371 U.S. at 488
    ; see Brown v. Illinois, 
    422 U.S. 590
    , 602–04 (1975). Tovar does not
    meaningfully argue that the interview was involuntary,10 so the only question
    9
    Tovar also argues that all statements he made before he received Miranda warnings
    are inadmissible. But the government never relied on those statements to prove its case. At
    the outset of trial, the prosecutor stated: “At this time I am going to not concede that pre-
    Mirandized statement. I’m just not going to submit that as a basis for the admissions that are
    appropriate for the court to hear to come in.” After some dialogue, the court stated: “All right.
    So, those will be considered excluded.” The prosecutor responded: “Well, not presented.” The
    prosecutor maintained this position throughout the duration of the trial, and did not rely on
    the statements. Therefore, there is no need to consider whether admitting those statements
    would have been in error.
    10
    Tovar’s brief includes a one-line claim that his statements were involuntary, but he
    offers no specific evidence of coercion or duress. The district court specifically held that
    Tovar’s statements were voluntarily made, noting:
    And, so, there is a question were the statements voluntarily made. So,
    the test here would be whether the confession was extracted by threats or
    15
    Case: 12-40557        Document: 00512267228           Page: 16     Date Filed: 06/07/2013
    No. 12-40557
    before us is whether Tovar’s statements were a product of free will under Wong
    Sun. The relevant factors are: “[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the
    confession, the presence of intervening circumstances . . . and, particularly, the
    purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct . . . .” Brown, 
    422 U.S. at
    603–04 (citations omitted).
    The district court carefully evaluated each Wong Sun factor, and we agree
    with its analysis. We will not repeat it here, except to emphasize that the facts
    surrounding the initial (presumed) misconduct weigh strongly against
    suppression in this case. There is no evidence that the special agents exploited
    Tovar’s initial, pre-Miranda statements to obtain his later, post-Miranda
    admissions. Cf. Missouri v. Seibert, 
    542 U.S. 600
    , 604, 620–21 (2004) (requiring
    suppression where police used a two-step strategy to obtain a pre-warning
    statement, and then a post-warning statement that can be used at trial); Oregon
    v. Elstad, 
    470 U.S. 298
    , 305 (1985) (noting that defendant’s arrest, made without
    probable cause, had a “quality of purposefulness” in that it was an “expedition
    violence. No indication of any threats or violence here. We had, I think, three
    officers in the room. The first officer, I think, testified about they gave him
    something to drink first and then started questioning him after giving him his
    Miranda rights.
    ...
    Defendant is intelligent. All of the intelligence – all of the evidence I’ve
    had so far is that he seems to be intelligent, able to speak English, understands
    his rights, able to read. From that point of view, I think that it’s voluntary,
    keeping in mind the burden I think on the government at this point is
    preponderance of the evidence that it’s voluntary. No evidence of improper
    promises or inducements. No indication that he asked for an attorney and they
    continued questioning him. So, I find that he was properly read his – given his
    Miranda rights, he actually signed it, and that the statements he made
    afterwards were not a result of duress or coercion, were not a result of improper
    promises or inducements, and were not made after a request for counsel.
    We agree.
    16
    Case: 12-40557        Document: 00512267228          Page: 17     Date Filed: 06/07/2013
    No. 12-40557
    for evidence” admittedly undertaken “in the hope that something might turn
    up”).11 The statements that Tovar made during the search of his residence,
    before he received Miranda warnings, were different in scope and substance
    from the admissions that he made during his interview, such that the later
    statements were not—as in Brown, 
    422 U.S. at
    595–96, 605 and Dunaway v.
    New York, 
    442 U.S. 200
    , 227 n.20 (1979)—“clearly the result and the fruit of the
    first.”
    For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Tovar’s motions
    to suppress. We next consider whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain
    Tovar’s conviction.
    C.
    When a defendant challenges a bench-trial conviction on sufficiency-of-the-
    evidence grounds, we focus on “‘whether the finding of guilt is supported by
    substantial evidence, i.e., evidence sufficient to justify the trial judge, as the trier
    of fact, in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.’”
    United States v. Esparza, 
    678 F.3d 389
    , 392 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 1455
     (2013) (quoting United States v. Turner, 
    319 F.3d 716
    , 720 (5th Cir.
    2003)). We “should not weigh evidence, nor should [we] determine the credibility
    of witnesses.” Turner, 
    319 F.3d at
    720–21. Rather, we must “view all evidence
    in the light most favorable to the government and defer to all reasonable
    inferences drawn by the trial court.” 
    Id.
     (quoting United States v. Mathes, 
    151 F.3d 251
    , 252 (5th Cir. 1998)).
    11
    Where, as here, there is no evidence of a two-step strategy as described in Seibert,
    “‘[t]he admissibility of postwarning statements [ ] continue[s] to be governed by the principles
    of Elstad.’” United States v. Courtney, 
    463 F.3d 333
    , 338 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Seibert, 
    542 U.S. at 622
    ) (modifications in original).
    17
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    No. 12-40557
    Tovar challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding all of the counts
    on which he was convicted (Counts 2–4). We consider each in turn.
    1.
    Count 2 charged Tovar with possession with intent to distribute over 100
    kilograms of marijuana in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).12 “To establish a
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), ‘the government must prove knowing
    possession of the contraband with intent to distribute.’”                United States v.
    Skipper, 
    74 F.3d 608
    , 611 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Cardenas, 
    9 F.3d 1139
    , 1158 (5th Cir. 1993)). The government may prove knowledge by
    either direct or circumstantial evidence, and possession may be actual or
    constructive. Id.; United States v. Resio-Trejo, 
    45 F.3d 907
    , 911 (5th Cir. 1995).
    Tovar argues that the government failed to establish knowing possession.
    Specifically, he asserts that the “government’s case is based solely on the
    statements of a self-interested cooperating co-defendant and the proximity of Mr.
    Tovar to the marijuana,” which is “insufficient to show knowing possession.”
    Tovar further asserts that the government can prove neither actual possession
    (because he had no marijuana in his possession at the time of his arrest) nor
    constructive possession (because the contraband was contained in sealed
    compartments inside a vehicle, which requires the government to demonstrate
    additional circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge).
    Tovar cannot succeed in light of the record evidence. The government
    offered specific testimony from both Nunez and Mejia that Tovar actually
    possessed the marijuana in question during at least two of the four trips, which
    12
    Specifically, the indictment charged Tovar with possession with intent to distribute
    marijuana on or about January 24, 2009. Tovar does not seek to exclude evidence of the loads
    transported in late 2008, December 2008, or February 2009 despite this date limitation.
    18
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    No. 12-40557
    the court found credible.13 This evidence, standing alone, is enough to sustain
    the verdict.14 United States v. Mendoza, 
    522 F.3d 482
    , 489 (5th Cir. 2008)
    (“Evidence consisting entirely of testimony from accomplices or conspirators is
    sufficient.”) (citing Turner, 
    319 F.3d at 721
    )); see United States v. Westbrook, 
    119 F.3d 1176
    , 1190 (5th Cir. 1997) (“As long as it is not factually insubstantial or
    incredible, the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator, even one who has
    chosen to cooperate with the government in exchange for non-prosecution of
    leniency, may be constitutionally sufficient evidence to convict.”). Moreover,
    Tovar himself admitted during his interview that he drove at least one load to
    Pennsylvania and that he acted as a “broker,” providing Mejia with a truck and
    trailer to transport the drugs. This, especially when viewed in tandem with the
    corroborating documentary evidence in the record, is more than sufficient to
    show that Tovar had knowing possession—actual and constructive—of the
    marijuana.
    2.
    Count 3 charged Tovar with interstate travel in aid of racketeering
    activity in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1952.15
     In the context of this case, the
    government had to prove: (1) that Tovar traveled in interstate commerce; (2)
    with the specific intent to promote, manage, establish, or carry on—or distribute
    13
    Tovar does not expressly argue that the government failed to prove his involvement
    with a sufficient weight of marijuana, that is, 100 kilograms.
    14
    Thus, we need not engage in a constructive possession analysis, and the government
    need not establish any additional circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.
    15
    As with the marijuana charge, the indictment charged him with interstate travel in
    aid of racketeering activity on or about January 24, 2009. Again, Tovar does not seek to
    exclude evidence of the loads transported in late 2008, December 2008, or February 2009
    despite this date limitation.
    19
    Case: 12-40557    Document: 00512267228      Page: 20    Date Filed: 06/07/2013
    No. 12-40557
    the proceeds of—unlawful activity; and (3) that Tovar committed a knowing and
    willful act in furtherance of that intent, subsequent to the act of travel in
    interstate commerce. E.g., United States v. Logan, 
    949 F.2d 1370
    , 1380–83 (5th
    Cir. 1991).
    Tovar makes two cursory arguments to challenge his conviction on
    Count 3. First, he asserts that “the record is devoid of evidence that anyone
    traveled the interstates at Mr. Tovar’s direction to deliver to him illegal drugs.”
    This argument fails because the record is, in fact, replete with evidence that
    both Tovar and Mejia—acting at Tovar’s direction—traveled from Texas to
    Pennsylvania to deliver drugs to Nunez. That the delivery was from Tovar, not
    to him is of no moment to the legal analysis. Second, Tovar argues that “any
    drug activity did not constitute a continuous course of conduct.” This too fails,
    as the district court’s factual findings make it clear that Tovar was associated
    with an ongoing criminal venture:
    It is quite clear from the evidence of Nunez and Mejia that he was
    up there to promote or manage or carry on the sale of the
    marijuana or the transport of marijuana . . . . Business enterprise
    can’t be sporadic. But here we have testimony of numerous trips;
    so, I find that it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
    defendant had the specific intent to promote, manage, establish, or
    carry on or distribute the proceeds of an unlawful activity.
    Considering the deference owed to the verdict, there is sufficient evidence to
    sustain Tovar’s conviction on this count.
    3.
    Count 4 charged Tovar with possession of an unregistered firearm (a
    short-barrel shotgun) in violation of 
    26 U.S.C. § 5861
    (d). The elements of this
    charge are that: (1) Tovar knowingly possessed a firearm, as described in the
    20
    Case: 12-40557     Document: 00512267228      Page: 21   Date Filed: 06/07/2013
    No. 12-40557
    Texas indictment; (2) that it was a firearm (here, a shotgun with a barrel length
    of less than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches); (3) Tovar was
    aware of the characteristics of the firearm; (4) that the firearm was or could
    readily be put in operating condition; and (5) that the firearm was not registered
    to Tovar. See Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. (Criminal) § 39:24 (6th ed. 2013).
    Again, Tovar makes two relatively summary arguments. First, he argues
    that the government failed to show knowing possession of the firearm because
    the firearm was secreted.     But Tovar himself admitted, after he received
    Miranda warnings, that he obtained the gun from his cousin. This is sufficient
    to show knowing possession.
    Second, Tovar argues that the government failed to show that he knew
    the firearm had features that brought it within the scope of the statute. We
    have held that “[w]hen a shotgun’s length is immediately apparent and
    externally visible to anyone observing it, the government’s ability to prove
    knowledge should not be an onerous task.” United States v. Reyna, 
    130 F.3d 104
    ,
    109 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997) (“‘The fact that a shotgun’s length is obvious and
    apparent is . . . a means of proving knowledge.’” (quoting United States v.
    Edwards, 
    90 F.3d 199
    , 205 (7th Cir. 1996))). In an unpublished, but persuasive,
    case, we have held that a factfinder may infer a defendant’s knowledge based on
    the obvious characteristics of a firearm. See, e.g., United States v. Williamson,
    170 F. App’x 889, 890 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The shotgun was in evidence and could
    be inspected by the jury. Its barrel was 10 inches long and its overall length was
    only 16 and one-half inches long. Such characteristics would be readily apparent
    and externally visible. . . . A rational jury could have concluded that Williamson
    knew of the characteristics of his weapon that made it a ‘firearm’ subject to
    21
    Case: 12-40557     Document: 00512267228      Page: 22   Date Filed: 06/07/2013
    No. 12-40557
    registration under § 5845(a)(1) and (2).” (internal citation omitted)).
    Tovar asserts that the government did not meet its burden to prove that
    he knew about the illegal features of the shotgun (namely, its length). At oral
    argument, Tovar relied on testimony by government witness Special Agent
    Christian Bockman, to make his point. According to Tovar, even Special Agent
    Bockman “did not find [the shotgun’s too-short length] to be readily apparent on
    its face.” Counsel said that Special Agent Bockman’s testimony indicated that
    the shotgun barrel appeared to be manufactured, not sawed-off, and that he “had
    to measure it to determine it was too short.” Our review of the trial transcript
    paints a different picture. Agent Bockman testified that the cut of the barrel
    was “smooth,” such that the gun appeared to have been modified with some kind
    of machinery (as opposed, for instance, to a hacksaw), but that fact says nothing
    regarding whether the barrel was obviously too short. Moreover, Special Agent
    Bockman did not say that he “had to measure” the barrel to see if it was too
    short. Rather, when asked “did you have an occasion to measure that weapon
    to make sure that it was not the legal length?” Special Agent Bockman
    answered, “Yes, sir. When I first got to the ICE office, I measured the weapon;
    and it was underneath the legal limit.” This testimony in no way implies that
    Special Agent Bockman could not tell that the shotgun barrel was too short with
    his naked eye; it simply indicates that he measured it to determine precisely how
    short it was.
    The district court heard Special Agent Bockman’s testimony and carefully
    examined the weapon itself. It concluded that the length of the shotgun was
    immediately apparent:
    And it is also quite evident from just looking at the shotgun
    that it is sawed off or short. Anybody who handled that shotgun
    22
    Case: 12-40557     Document: 00512267228      Page: 23   Date Filed: 06/07/2013
    No. 12-40557
    once or picked it up would have known. It’s not a close call. It’s not
    a half inch missing off the barrel or quarter inch or something like
    that. It’s not a stock that was cut down just a couple of inches so a
    child – what they call a “youth model.” It’s not that. It’s cut – the
    stock is basically gone completely and it just has a pistol grip and
    the barrel is cut down so that it is basically an inch or so past the
    cylinder in which the – or chamber in which the rounds are fed.
    . . . I’m going to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant did know of the characteristics, i.e., knew that it was a
    short-barreled shotgun and that it was an overall short weapon.
    Considering the district court’s reasonable assessment of the visible qualities of
    the shotgun, Tovar’s argument is without merit.      See Reyna, 
    130 F.3d at
    109
    n.6. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to convict Tovar on Count 4.
    CONCLUSION
    Because Tovar’s double-jeopardy, suppression, and sufficiency-of-the-
    evidence arguments are without merit, we AFFIRM.
    23
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-40557

Citation Numbers: 719 F.3d 376, 2013 WL 2459855, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 11568

Judges: King, Davis, Elrod

Filed Date: 6/7/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (34)

United States v. Singh , 261 F.3d 530 ( 2001 )

United States v. Perez , 484 F.3d 735 ( 2007 )

United States v. Rabhan , 628 F.3d 200 ( 2010 )

United States v. Robert W. Edwards , 90 F.3d 199 ( 1996 )

United States v. William N. Logan, Jr. And Eddie Stanley , 949 F.2d 1370 ( 1991 )

Missouri v. Seibert , 124 S. Ct. 2601 ( 2004 )

United States v. William George Dunbar, M. D. , 611 F.2d 985 ( 1980 )

United States v. Pedro Resio-Trejo , 45 F.3d 907 ( 1995 )

United States v. Skipper , 74 F.3d 608 ( 1996 )

United States v. Mateen Yusuf Shabazz, A/K/A Edward L. ... , 993 F.2d 431 ( 1993 )

United States v. Gonzalez , 190 F.3d 668 ( 1999 )

united-states-of-america-plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant-v-walter , 172 F.3d 357 ( 1999 )

United States v. Ceccolini , 98 S. Ct. 1054 ( 1978 )

United States v. Leon , 104 S. Ct. 3405 ( 1984 )

United States v. Larry Darnell Westbrook, Wayne Allen ... , 119 F.3d 1176 ( 1997 )

United States v. Ricou Deshaw , 974 F.2d 667 ( 1992 )

United States v. Miguel Enrique Reyna , 130 F.3d 104 ( 1997 )

United States v. Mendoza , 522 F.3d 482 ( 2008 )

United States v. Scroggins , 599 F.3d 433 ( 2010 )

United States v. Esparza , 678 F.3d 389 ( 2012 )

View All Authorities »