Agency for Int'l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int'l, Inc. , 133 S. Ct. 2321 ( 2013 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2012                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U.S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
    ET AL. v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY
    INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    No. 12–10. Argued April 22, 2013—Decided June 20, 2013
    In the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
    Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 
    22 U.S. C
    . §7601 et seq., Con-
    gress has authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars to fund
    efforts by nongovernmental organizations to combat HIV/AIDS
    worldwide. The Act imposes two related conditions: (1) No funds
    “may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of
    prostitution,” §7631(e); and (2) no funds may be used by an organiza-
    tion “that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution,”
    §7631(f). To enforce the second condition, known as the Policy Re-
    quirement, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
    and the United States Agency for International Development
    (USAID) require funding recipients to agree in their award docu-
    ments that they oppose prostitution.
    Respondents, recipients of Leadership Act funds who wish to re-
    main neutral on prostitution, sought a declaratory judgment that the
    Policy Requirement violates their First Amendment rights. The Dis-
    trict Court issued a preliminary injunction, barring the Government
    from cutting off respondents’ Leadership Act funding during the liti-
    gation or from otherwise taking action based on their privately funded
    speech. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Policy Re-
    quirement, as implemented by the agencies, violated respondents’
    freedom of speech.
    Held: The Policy Requirement violates the First Amendment by com-
    pelling as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief
    that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Gov-
    2      AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    Syllabus
    ernment program. Pp. 6–15.
    (a) The Policy Requirement mandates that recipients of federal
    funds explicitly agree with the Government’s policy to oppose prosti-
    tution. The First Amendment, however, “prohibits the government
    from telling people what they must say.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Ac-
    ademic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 
    547 U.S. 47
    , 61. As a direct
    regulation, the Policy Requirement would plainly violate the First
    Amendment. The question is whether the Government may nonethe-
    less impose that requirement as a condition of federal funding.
    Pp. 6–7.
    (b) The Spending Clause grants Congress broad discretion to fund
    private programs or activities for the “general Welfare,” Art. I, §8,
    cl. 1, including authority to impose limits on the use of such funds to
    ensure they are used in the manner Congress intends. Rust v. Sulli-
    van, 
    500 U.S. 173
    , 195, n. 4. As a general matter, if a party objects
    to those limits, its recourse is to decline the funds. In some cases,
    however, a funding condition can result in an unconstitutional bur-
    den on First Amendment rights. The distinction that has emerged
    from this Court’s cases is between conditions that define the limits of
    the Government spending program—those that specify the activities
    Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to leverage
    funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the federal pro-
    gram itself.
    Rust illustrates the distinction. In that case, the Court considered
    Title X of the Public Health Service Act, which authorized grants to
    health-care organizations offering family planning services, but pro-
    hibited federal funds from being “used in programs where abortion is
    a method of family planning.” 500 U. S., at 178. To enforce the pro-
    vision, HHS regulations barred Title X projects from advocating abor-
    tion and required grantees to keep their Title X projects separate
    from their other projects. The regulations were valid, the Court ex-
    plained, because they governed only the scope of the grantee’s Title X
    projects, leaving the grantee free to engage in abortion advocacy
    through programs that were independent from its Title X projects.
    Because the regulations did not prohibit speech “outside the scope of
    the federally funded program,” they did not run afoul of the First
    Amendment. Id., at 197. Pp. 7–11.
    (c) The distinction between conditions that define a federal pro-
    gram and those that reach outside it is not always self-evident, but
    the Court is confident that the Policy Requirement falls on the un-
    constitutional side of the line. To begin, the Leadership Act’s other
    funding condition, which prohibits Leadership Act funds from being
    used “to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitu-
    tion or sex trafficking,” §7631(e), ensures that federal funds will not
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)                  3
    Syllabus
    be used for prohibited purposes. The Policy Requirement thus must
    be doing something more—and it is. By demanding that funding re-
    cipients adopt and espouse, as their own, the Government’s view on
    an issue of public concern, the Policy Requirement by its very nature
    affects “protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded
    program.” Rust, supra, at 197. A recipient cannot avow the belief
    dictated by the condition when spending Leadership Act funds, and
    assert a contrary belief when participating in activities on its own
    time and dime.
    The Government suggests that if funding recipients could promote
    or condone prostitution using private funds, “it would undermine the
    government’s program and confuse its message opposing prostitu-
    tion.” Brief for Petitioners 37. But the Policy Requirement goes be-
    yond preventing recipients from using private funds in a way that
    would undermine the federal program. It requires them to pledge al-
    legiance to the Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution. That
    condition on funding violates the First Amendment. Pp. 11–15.
    
    651 F.3d 218
    , affirmed.
    ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
    GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed
    a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. KAGAN, J., took no
    part in the consideration or decision of the case.
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)                              1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
    that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 12–10
    _________________
    AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
    ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN
    SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    [June 20, 2013]
    CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
    Court.
    The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tu-
    berculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 117
    Stat. 711, as amended, 
    22 U.S. C
    . §7601 et seq., outlined a
    comprehensive strategy to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS
    around the world. As part of that strategy, Congress
    authorized the appropriation of billions of dollars to fund
    efforts by nongovernmental organizations to assist in the
    fight. The Act imposes two related conditions on that
    funding: First, no funds made available by the Act “may be
    used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of
    prostitution or sex trafficking.” §7631(e). And second, no
    funds may be used by an organization “that does not have
    a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex traffick-
    ing.” §7631(f). This case concerns the second of these
    conditions, referred to as the Policy Requirement. The
    question is whether that funding condition violates a
    recipient’s First Amendment rights.
    2    AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    I
    Congress passed the Leadership Act in 2003 after find-
    ing that HIV/AIDS had “assumed pandemic proportions,
    spreading from the most severely affected regions, sub-
    Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, to all corners of the
    world, and leaving an unprecedented path of death and
    devastation.” 
    22 U.S. C
    . §7601(1). According to congres-
    sional findings, more than 65 million people had been
    infected by HIV and more than 25 million had lost their
    lives, making HIV/AIDS the fourth highest cause of
    death worldwide. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, AIDS had
    claimed the lives of more than 19 million individuals and
    was projected to kill a full quarter of the population of that
    area over the next decade. The disease not only directly
    endangered those infected, but also increased the potential
    for social and political instability and economic devasta-
    tion, posing a security issue for the entire international
    community. §§7601(2)–(10).
    In the Leadership Act, Congress directed the President
    to establish a “comprehensive, integrated” strategy to
    combat HIV/AIDS around the world. §7611(a). The Act
    sets out 29 different objectives the President’s strategy
    should seek to fulfill, reflecting a multitude of approaches
    to the problem. The strategy must include, among other
    things, plans to increase the availability of treatment for
    infected individuals, prevent new infections, support the
    care of those affected by the disease, promote training for
    physicians and other health care workers, and accelerate
    research on HIV/AIDS prevention methods, all while
    providing a framework for cooperation with international
    organizations and partner countries to further the goals of
    the program. §§7611(a)(1)–(29).
    The Act “make[s] the reduction of HIV/AIDS behavioral
    risks a priority of all prevention efforts.” §7611(a)(12); see
    also §7601(15) (“Successful strategies to stem the spread of
    the HIV/AIDS pandemic will require . . . measures to
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)            3
    Opinion of the Court
    address the social and behavioral causes of the problem”).
    The Act’s approach to reducing behavioral risks is multi-
    faceted. The President’s strategy for addressing such
    risks must, for example, promote abstinence, encourage
    monogamy, increase the availability of condoms, promote
    voluntary counseling and treatment for drug users, and,
    as relevant here, “educat[e] men and boys about the risks
    of procuring sex commercially” as well as “promote alter-
    native livelihoods, safety, and social reintegration strate-
    gies for commercial sex workers.” §7611(a)(12). Congress
    found that the “sex industry, the trafficking of individ-
    uals into such industry, and sexual violence” were factors
    in the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and deter-
    mined that “it should be the policy of the United States to
    eradicate” prostitution and “other sexual victimization.”
    §7601(23).
    The United States has enlisted the assistance of non-
    governmental organizations to help achieve the many
    goals of the program. Such organizations “with experience
    in health care and HIV/AIDS counseling,” Congress found,
    “have proven effective in combating the HIV/AIDS pan-
    demic and can be a resource in . . . provid[ing] treatment
    and care for individuals infected with HIV/AIDS.”
    §7601(18). Since 2003, Congress has authorized the ap-
    propriation of billions of dollars for funding these organi-
    zations’ fight against HIV/AIDS around the world.
    §2151b–2(c); §7671.
    Those funds, however, come with two conditions: First,
    no funds made available to carry out the Leadership Act
    “may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or
    practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.” §7631(e).
    Second, no funds made available may “provide assistance
    to any group or organization that does not have a policy
    explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, except
    . . . to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
    Malaria, the World Health Organization, the International
    4    AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    AIDS Vaccine Initiative or to any United Nations agency.”
    §7631(f). It is this second condition—the Policy Require-
    ment—that is at issue here.
    The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
    and the United States Agency for International Develop-
    ment (USAID) are the federal agencies primarily respon-
    sible for overseeing implementation of the Leadership Act.
    To enforce the Policy Requirement, the agencies have
    directed that the recipient of any funding under the Act
    agree in the award document that it is opposed to “prosti-
    tution and sex trafficking because of the psychological and
    physical risks they pose for women, men, and children.”
    45 CFR §89.1(b) (2012); USAID, Acquisition & Assistance
    Policy Directive 12–04, p. 6 (AAPD 12–04).
    II
    Respondents are a group of domestic organizations
    engaged in combating HIV/AIDS overseas. In addition to
    substantial private funding, they receive billions annually
    in financial assistance from the United States, including
    under the Leadership Act. Their work includes programs
    aimed at limiting injection drug use in Uzbekistan, Tajiki-
    stan, and Kyrgyzstan, preventing mother-to-child HIV
    transmission in Kenya, and promoting safer sex practices
    in India. Respondents fear that adopting a policy explicitly
    opposing prostitution may alienate certain host govern-
    ments, and may diminish the effectiveness of some of
    their programs by making it more difficult to work with
    prostitutes in the fight against HIV/AIDS. They are also
    concerned that the Policy Requirement may require them
    to censor their privately funded discussions in publica-
    tions, at conferences, and in other forums about how best
    to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS among prostitutes.
    In 2005, respondents Alliance for Open Society Interna-
    tional and Pathfinder International commenced this litiga-
    tion, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Government’s
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)            5
    Opinion of the Court
    implementation of the Policy Requirement violated their
    First Amendment rights. Respondents sought a pre-
    liminary injunction barring the Government from cut-
    ting off their funding under the Act for the duration of
    the litigation, from unilaterally terminating their coopera-
    tive agreements with the United States, or from otherwise
    taking action solely on the basis of respondents’ own pri-
    vately funded speech. The District Court granted such a
    preliminary injunction, and the Government appealed.
    While the appeal was pending, HHS and USAID issued
    guidelines on how recipients of Leadership Act funds could
    retain funding while working with affiliated organizations
    not bound by the Policy Requirement. The guidelines per-
    mit funding recipients to work with affiliated organiza-
    tions that “engage[ ] in activities inconsistent with the
    recipient’s opposition to the practices of prostitution and
    sex trafficking” as long as the recipients retain “objective
    integrity and independence from any affiliated organiza-
    tion.” 45 CFR §89.3; see also AAPD 12–04, at 6–7.
    Whether sufficient separation exists is determined by the
    totality of the circumstances, including “but not . . . lim-
    ited to” (1) whether the organizations are legally separate;
    (2) whether they have separate personnel; (3) whether
    they keep separate accounting records; (4) the degree of
    separation in the organizations’ facilities; and (5) the
    extent to which signs and other forms of identification
    distinguish the organizations. 45 CFR §§89.3(b)(1)–(5);
    see also AAPD 12–04, at 6–7.
    The Court of Appeals summarily remanded the case to
    the District Court to consider whether the preliminary
    injunction was still appropriate in light of the new guide-
    lines. On remand, the District Court issued a new prelim-
    inary injunction along the same lines as the first, and the
    Government renewed its appeal.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that respond-
    ents had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
    6    AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    merits of their First Amendment challenge under this
    Court’s “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine. 
    651 F.3d 218
     (CA2 2011). Under this doctrine, the court reasoned,
    “the government may not place a condition on the receipt
    of a benefit or subsidy that infringes upon the recipient’s
    constitutionally protected rights, even if the government
    has no obligation to offer the benefit in the first instance.”
    Id., at 231 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 
    408 U.S. 593
    ,
    597 (1972)). And a condition that compels recipients “to
    espouse the government’s position” on a subject of interna-
    tional debate could not be squared with the First Amend-
    ment. 
    651 F. 3d
    , at 234. The court concluded that “the
    Policy Requirement, as implemented by the Agencies, falls
    well beyond what the Supreme Court . . . ha[s] upheld as
    permissible funding conditions.” Ibid.
    Judge Straub dissented, expressing his view that the
    Policy Requirement was an “entirely rational exercise of
    Congress’s powers pursuant to the Spending Clause.” Id.,
    at 240.
    We granted certiorari. 568 U. S. ___ (2013).
    III
    The Policy Requirement mandates that recipients of
    Leadership Act funds explicitly agree with the Govern-
    ment’s policy to oppose prostitution and sex trafficking. It
    is, however, a basic First Amendment principle that “free-
    dom of speech prohibits the government from telling peo-
    ple what they must say.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
    and Institutional Rights, Inc., 
    547 U.S. 47
    , 61 (2006)
    (citing West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 
    319 U.S. 624
    ,
    642 (1943), and Wooley v. Maynard, 
    430 U.S. 705
    , 717
    (1977)). “At the heart of the First Amendment lies the
    principle that each person should decide for himself or
    herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
    consideration, and adherence.”       Turner Broadcasting
    System, Inc. v. FCC, 
    512 U.S. 622
    , 641 (1994); see Knox v.
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)            7
    Opinion of the Court
    Service Employees, 
    567 U.S.
    ___, ___–___ (2012) (slip op.,
    at 8–9) (“The government may not . . . compel the en-
    dorsement of ideas that it approves.”). Were it enacted as
    a direct regulation of speech, the Policy Requirement
    would plainly violate the First Amendment. The question
    is whether the Government may nonetheless impose that
    requirement as a condition on the receipt of federal funds.
    A
    The Spending Clause of the Federal Constitution grants
    Congress the power “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
    Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
    the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
    States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 1. The Clause provides Congress
    broad discretion to tax and spend for the “general Wel-
    fare,” including by funding particular state or private
    programs or activities. That power includes the authority
    to impose limits on the use of such funds to ensure they
    are used in the manner Congress intends. Rust v. Sulli-
    van, 
    500 U.S. 173
    , 195, n. 4 (1991) (“Congress’ power to
    allocate funds for public purposes includes an ancillary
    power to ensure that those funds are properly applied to
    the prescribed use.”).
    As a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on
    the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the
    funds. This remains true when the objection is that a
    condition may affect the recipient’s exercise of its First
    Amendment rights. See, e.g., United States v. American
    Library Assn., Inc., 
    539 U.S. 194
    , 212 (2003) (plurality
    opinion) (rejecting a claim by public libraries that condi-
    tioning funds for Internet access on the libraries’ in-
    stalling filtering software violated their First Amendment
    rights, explaining that “[t]o the extent that libraries wish
    to offer unfiltered access, they are free to do so without
    federal assistance”); Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
    tion of Wash., 
    461 U.S. 540
    , 546 (1983) (dismissing “the
    8    AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully
    realized unless they are subsidized by the State” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    At the same time, however, we have held that the Gov-
    ernment “ ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
    that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of
    speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.’ ”
    Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59
    (quoting American Library Assn., supra, at 210). In some
    cases, a funding condition can result in an unconstitution-
    al burden on First Amendment rights. See Forum for
    Academic and Institutional Rights, supra, at 59 (the First
    Amendment supplies “a limit on Congress’ ability to place
    conditions on the receipt of funds”).
    The dissent thinks that can only be true when the condi-
    tion is not relevant to the objectives of the program (al-
    though it has its doubts about that), or when the condition
    is actually coercive, in the sense of an offer that cannot be
    refused. See post, at 2–3 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Our
    precedents, however, are not so limited. In the present
    context, the relevant distinction that has emerged from
    our cases is between conditions that define the limits of
    the government spending program—those that specify the
    activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions
    that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside
    the contours of the program itself. The line is hardly
    clear, in part because the definition of a particular pro-
    gram can always be manipulated to subsume the chal-
    lenged condition. We have held, however, that “Congress
    cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition
    of its program in every case, lest the First Amendment be
    reduced to a simple semantic exercise.” Legal Services
    Corporation v. Velazquez, 
    531 U.S. 533
    , 547 (2001).
    A comparison of two cases helps illustrate the distinc-
    tion: In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash-
    ington, the Court upheld a requirement that nonprofit
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)            9
    Opinion of the Court
    organizations seeking tax-exempt status under 
    26 U.S. C
    .
    §501(c)(3) not engage in substantial efforts to influence
    legislation. The tax-exempt status, we explained, “ha[d]
    much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization.”
    461 U. S., at 544. And by limiting §501(c)(3) status to
    organizations that did not attempt to influence legislation,
    Congress had merely “chose[n] not to subsidize lobbying.”
    Ibid. In rejecting the nonprofit’s First Amendment claim,
    the Court highlighted—in the text of its opinion, but see
    post, at 5—the fact that the condition did not prohibit that
    organization from lobbying Congress altogether. By re-
    turning to a “dual structure” it had used in the past—
    separately incorporating as a §501(c)(3) organization and
    §501(c)(4) organization—the nonprofit could continue to
    claim §501(c)(3) status for its nonlobbying activities, while
    attempting to influence legislation in its §501(c)(4) capac-
    ity with separate funds. Ibid. Maintaining such a struc-
    ture, the Court noted, was not “unduly burdensome.” Id.,
    at 545, n. 6. The condition thus did not deny the organiza-
    tion a government benefit “on account of its intention to
    lobby.” Id., at 545.
    In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, by
    contrast, the Court struck down a condition on federal
    financial assistance to noncommercial broadcast television
    and radio stations that prohibited all editorializing, in-
    cluding with private funds. 
    468 U.S. 364
    , 399–401 (1984).
    Even a station receiving only one percent of its overall
    budget from the Federal Government, the Court ex-
    plained, was “barred absolutely from all editorializing.”
    Id., at 400. Unlike the situation in Regan, the law provid-
    ed no way for a station to limit its use of federal funds to
    noneditorializing activities, while using private funds “to
    make known its views on matters of public importance.”
    468 U. S., at 400. The prohibition thus went beyond en-
    suring that federal funds not be used to subsidize “public
    broadcasting station editorials,” and instead leveraged the
    10   AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    federal funding to regulate the stations’ speech outside the
    scope of the program. Id., at 399 (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Our decision in Rust v. Sullivan elaborated on the ap-
    proach reflected in Regan and League of Women Voters. In
    Rust, we considered Title X of the Public Health Service
    Act, a Spending Clause program that issued grants to
    nonprofit health-care organizations “to assist in the estab-
    lishment and operation of voluntary family planning
    projects [to] offer a broad range of acceptable and effective
    family planning methods and services.” 500 U. S., at 178
    (internal quotation marks omitted). The organizations
    received funds from a variety of sources other than the
    Federal Government for a variety of purposes. The Act,
    however, prohibited the Title X federal funds from being
    “used in programs where abortion is a method of family
    planning.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). To
    enforce this provision, HHS regulations barred Title X
    projects from advocating abortion as a method of family
    planning, and required grantees to ensure that their Title
    X projects were “ ‘physically and financially separate’ ”
    from their other projects that engaged in the prohibited
    activities. Id., at 180–181 (quoting 42 CFR §59.9 (1989)).
    A group of Title X funding recipients brought suit, claim-
    ing the regulations imposed an unconstitutional condition
    on their First Amendment rights. We rejected their claim.
    We explained that Congress can, without offending the
    Constitution, selectively fund certain programs to address
    an issue of public concern, without funding alterna-
    tive ways of addressing the same problem. In Title X,
    Congress had defined the federal program to encourage
    only particular family planning methods. The challenged
    regulations were simply “designed to ensure that the
    limits of the federal program are observed,” and “that
    public funds [are] spent for the purposes for which they
    were authorized.” Rust, 500 U. S., at 193, 196.
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)           11
    Opinion of the Court
    In making this determination, the Court stressed that
    “Title X expressly distinguishes between a Title X grantee
    and a Title X project.” Id., at 196. The regulations gov-
    erned only the scope of the grantee’s Title X projects,
    leaving it “unfettered in its other activities.” Ibid. “The
    Title X grantee can continue to . . . engage in abortion
    advocacy; it simply is required to conduct those activities
    through programs that are separate and independent from
    the project that receives Title X funds.” Ibid. Because the
    regulations did not “prohibit[ ] the recipient from engaging
    in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
    funded program,” they did not run afoul of the First
    Amendment. Id., at 197.
    B
    As noted, the distinction drawn in these cases—between
    conditions that define the federal program and those that
    reach outside it—is not always self-evident. As Justice
    Cardozo put it in a related context, “Definition more
    precise must abide the wisdom of the future.” Steward
    Machine Co. v. Davis, 
    301 U.S. 548
    , 591 (1937). Here,
    however, we are confident that the Policy Requirement
    falls on the unconstitutional side of the line.
    To begin, it is important to recall that the Leader-
    ship Act has two conditions relevant here. The first—
    unchallenged in this litigation—prohibits Leadership Act
    funds from being used “to promote or advocate the legali-
    zation or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.” 
    22 U.S. C
    . §7631(e). The Government concedes that §7631(e)
    by itself ensures that federal funds will not be used for the
    prohibited purposes. Brief for Petitioners 26–27.
    The Policy Requirement therefore must be doing some-
    thing more—and it is. The dissent views the Requirement
    as simply a selection criterion by which the Government
    identifies organizations “who believe in its ideas to carry
    them to fruition.” Post, at 1. As an initial matter, what-
    12   AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    ever purpose the Policy Requirement serves in selecting
    funding recipients, its effects go beyond selection. The
    Policy Requirement is an ongoing condition on recipients’
    speech and activities, a ground for terminating a grant
    after selection is complete. See AAPD 12–04, at 12. In
    any event, as the Government acknowledges, it is not
    simply seeking organizations that oppose prostitution.
    Reply Brief 5. Rather, it explains, “Congress has ex-
    pressed its purpose ‘to eradicate’ prostitution and sex
    trafficking, 
    22 U.S. C
    . §7601(23), and it wants recipients
    to adopt a similar stance.” Brief for Petitioners 32 (em-
    phasis added). This case is not about the Government’s
    ability to enlist the assistance of those with whom it al-
    ready agrees. It is about compelling a grant recipient to
    adopt a particular belief as a condition of funding.
    By demanding that funding recipients adopt—as their
    own—the Government’s view on an issue of public con-
    cern, the condition by its very nature affects “protected
    conduct outside the scope of the federally funded pro-
    gram.” Rust, 500 U. S., at 197. A recipient cannot avow
    the belief dictated by the Policy Requirement when spend-
    ing Leadership Act funds, and then turn around and
    assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality, when partici-
    pating in activities on its own time and dime. By requir-
    ing recipients to profess a specific belief, the Policy
    Requirement goes beyond defining the limits of the federally
    funded program to defining the recipient. See ibid. (“our
    ‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve situations in
    which the Government has placed a condition on the
    recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular pro-
    gram or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient
    from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope
    of the federally funded program”).
    The Government contends that the affiliate guidelines,
    established while this litigation was pending, save the
    program. Under those guidelines, funding recipients are
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)           13
    Opinion of the Court
    permitted to work with affiliated organizations that do not
    abide by the condition, as long as the recipients retain
    “objective integrity and independence” from the unfettered
    affiliates. 45 CFR §89.3. The Government suggests the
    guidelines alleviate any unconstitutional burden on the
    respondents’ First Amendment rights by allowing them to
    either: (1) accept Leadership Act funding and comply with
    Policy Requirement, but establish affiliates to communi-
    cate contrary views on prostitution; or (2) decline funding
    themselves (thus remaining free to express their own
    views or remain neutral), while creating affiliates whose
    sole purpose is to receive and administer Leadership Act
    funds, thereby “cabin[ing] the effects” of the Policy Re-
    quirement within the scope of the federal program. Brief
    for Petitioners 38–39, 44–49.
    Neither approach is sufficient. When we have noted the
    importance of affiliates in this context, it has been because
    they allow an organization bound by a funding condition to
    exercise its First Amendment rights outside the scope of
    the federal program. See Rust, supra, at 197–198. Affili-
    ates cannot serve that purpose when the condition is that
    a funding recipient espouse a specific belief as its own. If
    the affiliate is distinct from the recipient, the arrangement
    does not afford a means for the recipient to express its
    beliefs. If the affiliate is more clearly identified with the
    recipient, the recipient can express those beliefs only at
    the price of evident hypocrisy. The guidelines themselves
    make that clear. See 45 CFR §89.3 (allowing funding
    recipients to work with affiliates whose conduct is “incon-
    sistent with the recipient’s opposition to the practices of
    prostitution and sex trafficking” (emphasis added)).
    The Government suggests that the Policy Requirement
    is necessary because, without it, the grant of federal funds
    could free a recipient’s private funds “to be used to pro-
    mote prostitution or sex trafficking.” Brief for Petitioners
    27 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
    561 U.S. 14
       AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    1, ___–___ (2010) (slip op., at 25–26)). That argument
    assumes that federal funding will simply supplant private
    funding, rather than pay for new programs or expand
    existing ones. The Government offers no support for that
    assumption as a general matter, or any reason to believe it
    is true here. And if the Government’s argument were
    correct, League of Women Voters would have come out
    differently, and much of the reasoning of Regan and Rust
    would have been beside the point.
    The Government cites but one case to support that
    argument, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. That
    case concerned the quite different context of a ban on
    providing material support to terrorist organizations,
    where the record indicated that support for those organi-
    zations’ nonviolent operations was funneled to support
    their violent activities. 561 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26).
    Pressing its argument further, the Government con-
    tends that “if organizations awarded federal funds to
    implement Leadership Act programs could at the same
    time promote or affirmatively condone prostitution or sex
    trafficking, whether using public or private funds, it would
    undermine the government’s program and confuse its
    message opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” Brief
    for Petitioners 37 (emphasis added). But the Policy Re-
    quirement goes beyond preventing recipients from using
    private funds in a way that would undermine the federal
    program. It requires them to pledge allegiance to the
    Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution. As to
    that, we cannot improve upon what Justice Jackson wrote
    for the Court 70 years ago: “If there is any fixed star in our
    constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
    petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
    nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
    citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”
    Barnette, 319 U. S., at 642.
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)           15
    Opinion of the Court
    *    *     *
    The Policy Requirement compels as a condition of fed-
    eral funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature
    cannot be confined within the scope of the Government
    program. In so doing, it violates the First Amendment
    and cannot be sustained. The judgment of the Court of
    Appeals is affirmed.
    It is so ordered.
    KAGAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision
    of this case.
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)           1
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 12–10
    _________________
    AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
    ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN
    SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    [June 20, 2013]
    JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,
    dissenting.
    The Leadership Act provides that “any group or organi-
    zation that does not have a policy explicitly opposing
    prostitution and sex trafficking” may not receive funds
    appropriated under the Act. 
    22 U.S. C
    . §7631(f). This
    Policy Requirement is nothing more than a means of
    selecting suitable agents to implement the Government’s
    chosen strategy to eradicate HIV/AIDS. That is perfectly
    permissible under the Constitution.
    The First Amendment does not mandate a viewpoint-
    neutral government. Government must choose between
    rival ideas and adopt some as its own: competition over
    cartels, solar energy over coal, weapon development over
    disarmament, and so forth. Moreover, the government
    may enlist the assistance of those who believe in its ideas
    to carry them to fruition; and it need not enlist for that
    purpose those who oppose or do not support the ideas.
    That seems to me a matter of the most common common
    sense. For example: One of the purposes of America’s
    foreign-aid programs is the fostering of good will towards
    this country. If the organization Hamas—reputed to have
    an efficient system for delivering welfare—were excluded
    from a program for the distribution of U. S. food assis-
    2    AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    tance, no one could reasonably object. And that would
    remain true if Hamas were an organization of United
    States citizens entitled to the protection of the Constitu-
    tion. So long as the unfunded organization remains free to
    engage in its activities (including anti-American propa-
    ganda) “without federal assistance,” United States v.
    American Library Assn., Inc., 
    539 U.S. 194
    , 212 (2003)
    (plurality), refusing to make use of its assistance for an
    enterprise to which it is opposed does not abridge its
    speech. And the same is true when the rejected organiza-
    tion is not affirmatively opposed to, but merely unsupport-
    ive of, the object of the federal program, which appears to
    be the case here. (Respondents do not promote prostitu-
    tion, but neither do they wish to oppose it.) A federal
    program to encourage healthy eating habits need not
    be administered by the American Gourmet Society,
    which has nothing against healthy food but does not insist
    upon it.
    The argument is that this commonsense principle will
    enable the government to discriminate against, and injure,
    points of view to which it is opposed. Of course the Consti-
    tution does not prohibit government spending that dis-
    criminates against, and injures, points of view to which
    the government is opposed; every government program
    which takes a position on a controversial issue does that.
    Anti-smoking programs injure cigar aficionados, programs
    encouraging sexual abstinence injure free-love advocates,
    etc. The constitutional prohibition at issue here is not a
    prohibition against discriminating against or injuring
    opposing points of view, but the First Amendment’s prohi-
    bition against the coercing of speech. I am frankly dubi-
    ous that a condition for eligibility to participate in a minor
    federal program such as this one runs afoul of that prohi-
    bition even when the condition is irrelevant to the goals of
    the program. Not every disadvantage is a coercion.
    But that is not the issue before us here. Here the views
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)            3
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    that the Government demands an applicant forswear—or
    that the Government insists an applicant favor—are
    relevant to the program in question. The program is valid
    only if the Government is entitled to disfavor the opposing
    view (here, advocacy of or toleration of prostitution). And
    if the program can disfavor it, so can the selection of those
    who are to administer the program. There is no risk that
    this principle will enable the Government to discriminate
    arbitrarily against positions it disfavors. It would not, for
    example, permit the Government to exclude from bidding
    on defense contracts anyone who refuses to abjure pros-
    titution. But here a central part of the Government’s
    HIV/AIDS strategy is the suppression of prostitution, by
    which HIV is transmitted. It is entirely reasonable to
    admit to participation in the program only those who
    believe in that goal.
    According to the Court, however, this transgresses a
    constitutional line between conditions that operate inside
    a spending program and those that control speech outside
    of it. I am at a loss to explain what this central pillar of
    the Court’s opinion—this distinction that the Court itself
    admits is “hardly clear” and “not always self-evident,”
    ante, at 8, 11—has to do with the First Amendment. The
    distinction was alluded to, to be sure, in Rust v. Sullivan,
    
    500 U.S. 173
     (1991), but not as (what the Court now
    makes it) an invariable requirement for First Amendment
    validity. That the pro-abortion speech prohibition was
    limited to “inside the program” speech was relevant in
    Rust because the program itself was not an anti-abortion
    program. The Government remained neutral on that
    controversial issue, but did not wish abortion to be pro-
    moted within its family-planning-services program. The
    statutory objective could not be impaired, in other words,
    by “outside the program” pro-abortion speech. The purpose
    of the limitation was to prevent Government funding from
    providing the means of pro-abortion propaganda, which
    4    AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    the Government did not wish (and had no constitutional
    obligation) to provide. The situation here is vastly differ-
    ent. Elimination of prostitution is an objective of the
    HIV/AIDS program, and any promotion of prostitution—
    whether made inside or outside the program—does harm
    the program.
    Of course the most obvious manner in which the admis-
    sion to a program of an ideological opponent can frustrate
    the purpose of the program is by freeing up the opponent’s
    funds for use in its ideological opposition. To use the
    Hamas example again: Subsidizing that organization’s
    provision of social services enables the money that it
    would otherwise use for that purpose to be used, instead,
    for anti-American propaganda. Perhaps that problem
    does not exist in this case since the respondents do not
    affirmatively promote prostitution. But the Court’s analy-
    sis categorically rejects that justification for ideological
    requirements in all cases, demanding “record indica[tion]”
    that “federal funding will simply supplant private funding,
    rather than pay for new programs.” Ante, at 14. This
    seems to me quite naive. Money is fungible. The economic
    reality is that when NGOs can conduct their AIDS work
    on the Government’s dime, they can expend greater re-
    sources on policies that undercut the Leadership Act. The
    Government need not establish by record evidence that
    this will happen. To make it a valid consideration in
    determining participation in federal programs, it suffices
    that this is a real and obvious risk.
    None of the cases the Court cites for its holding provide
    support. I have already discussed Rust. As for Regan v.
    Taxation With Representation of Wash., 
    461 U.S. 540
    (1983), that case upheld rather than invalidated a prohibi-
    tion against lobbying as a condition of receiving 
    26 U.S. C
    .
    §501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. The Court’s holding rested
    on the conclusion that “a legislature’s decision not to
    subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)                     5
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    infringe the right.” 461 U. S., at 549. Today’s opinion,
    ante, at 9, stresses the fact that these nonprofits were
    permitted to use a separate §501(c)(4) affiliate for their
    lobbying—but that fact, alluded to in a footnote, Regan,
    461 U. S., at 545, n. 6, was entirely nonessential to the
    Court’s holding. Indeed, that rationale prompted a sepa-
    rate concurrence precisely because the majority of the
    Court did not rely upon it. See id., at 551–554 (Blackmun,
    J., concurring). As for FCC v. League of Women Voters of
    Cal., 
    468 U.S. 364
     (1984), the ban on editorializing at
    issue there was disallowed precisely because it did not
    further a relevant, permissible policy of the Federal Com-
    munications Act—and indeed was simply incompatible
    with the Act’s “affirmativ[e] encourage[ment]” of the “vig-
    orous expression of controversial opinions” by licensed
    broadcasters. Id., at 397.
    The Court makes a head-fake at the unconstitutional
    conditions doctrine, ante, at 12, but that doctrine is of no
    help. There is no case of ours in which a condition that is
    relevant to a statute’s valid purpose and that is not in
    itself unconstitutional (e.g., a religious-affiliation condition
    that violates the Establishment Clause) has been held to
    violate the doctrine.* Moreover, as I suggested earlier, the
    contention that the condition here “coerces” respondents’
    speech is on its face implausible. Those organizations that
    wish to take a different tack with respect to prostitution
    “are as unconstrained now as they were before the enact-
    ment of [the Leadership Act].” National Endowment for
    Arts v. Finley, 
    524 U.S. 569
    , 595 (1998) (SCALIA, J., con-
    curring in judgment). As the Court acknowledges, “[a]s a
    general matter, if a party objects to a condition on the
    ——————
    * In Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 
    531 U.S. 533
     (2001),
    upon which the Court relies, the opinion specified that “in the context of
    this statute there is no programmatic message of the kind recognized in
    Rust and which sufficed there to allow the Government to specify the
    advice deemed necessary for its legitimate objectives,” id., at 548.
    6    AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR
    OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the
    funds,” ante, at 7, and to draw on its own coffers.
    The majority cannot credibly say that this speech condi-
    tion is coercive, so it does not. It pussyfoots around the
    lack of coercion by invalidating the Leadership Act for
    “requiring recipients to profess a specific belief ” and “de-
    manding that funding recipients adopt—as their own—the
    Government’s view on an issue of public concern.” Ante, at
    12 (emphasis mine). But like King Cnut’s commanding of
    the tides, here the Government’s “requiring” and “demand-
    ing” have no coercive effect. In the end, and in the circum-
    stances of this case, “compell[ing] as a condition of federal
    funding the affirmation of a belief,” ante, at 15 (emphasis
    mine), is no compulsion at all. It is the reasonable price of
    admission to a limited government-spending program that
    each organization remains free to accept or reject. Section
    7631(f) “defin[es] the recipient” only to the extent he de-
    cides that it is in his interest to be so defined. Ante, at 12.
    *    *    *
    Ideological-commitment requirements such as the one
    here are quite rare; but making the choice between com-
    peting applicants on relevant ideological grounds is un-
    doubtedly quite common. See, e.g., Finley, supra. As far
    as the Constitution is concerned, it is quite impossible to
    distinguish between the two. If the government cannot
    demand a relevant ideological commitment as a condition
    of application, neither can it distinguish between appli-
    cants on a relevant ideological ground. And that is the
    real evil of today’s opinion. One can expect, in the future,
    frequent challenges to the denial of government funding
    for relevant ideological reasons.
    The Court’s opinion contains stirring quotations from
    cases like West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 
    319 U.S. 624
     (1943), and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
    
    512 U.S. 622
     (1994). They serve only to distract attention
    Cite as: 570 U. S. ____ (2013)           7
    SCALIA, J., dissenting
    from the elephant in the room: that the Government is not
    forcing anyone to say anything. What Congress has done
    here—requiring an ideological commitment relevant to the
    Government task at hand—is approved by the Constitu-
    tion itself. Americans need not support the Constitution;
    they may be Communists or anarchists. But “[t]he Sena-
    tors and Representatives . . . , and the Members of the
    several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
    Officers, both of the United States and of the several
    States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
    [the] Constitution.” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. The Fram-
    ers saw the wisdom of imposing affirmative ideological
    commitments prerequisite to assisting in the government’s
    work. And so should we.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12–10.

Citation Numbers: 186 L. Ed. 2d 398, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4699, 570 U.S. 205, 81 U.S.L.W. 4476, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 331, 2013 WL 3064411

Judges: Roberts

Filed Date: 6/20/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

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