Lozier Corp. v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal. ( 2013 )


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  •                       Nebraska Advance Sheets
    LOZIER CORP. v. DOUGLAS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.	705
    Cite as 
    285 Neb. 705
    raised by the facts, but not presented in the pleadings, should
    not come at the expense of due process.” 273 Neb. at 1053,
    736 N.W.2d at 373.
    In the present case, the amended complaint filed by Matt
    sought to modify custody and to award full custody to him.
    Although Brittni and Cristian expressed a preference during
    the custody hearing for a schedule in which they would stay
    with their parents by alternating 1 week at a time, no com-
    plaint to modify the parenting plan to this or other effect was
    filed. See § 42-364(6). The district court correctly observed
    that the issue of modifying the parenting plan was not properly
    before it.
    CONCLUSION
    The district court did not err when it denied Matt’s amended
    complaint to modify custody, in which he sought full custody
    of the children. Furthermore, the district court did not err when
    it observed that the issue of modifying the parenting plan was
    not properly before it. Thus, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    Miller-Lerman, J., participating on briefs.
    Lozier Corporation, appellant, v. Douglas County
    Board of Equalization, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed April 19, 2013.   Nos. S-12-322 through S-12-324.
    1.	 Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews decisions
    rendered by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission for errors appearing
    on the record.
    2.	 Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors appear-
    ing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms
    to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is not arbitrary, capricious,
    or unreasonable.
    3.	 Taxation: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews questions of law aris-
    ing during appellate review of decisions by the Tax Equalization and Review
    Commission de novo on the record.
    4.	 Taxation: Statutes. The plain language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5013(2) (Cum.
    Supp. 2012) focuses on whether a mailing is properly placed in the mail, rather
    than on whether the Tax Equalization and Review Commission receives it.
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    706	285 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    5.	 Statutes: Legislature: Intent. The intent of the Legislature may be found
    through its omission of words from a statute as well as its inclusion of words in
    a statute.
    6.	 Statutes: Notice: Intent: Words and Phrases. The intent of the “legible post-
    mark” requirement in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5013(2) (Cum. Supp. 2012) is to act as
    evidence of the date an appeal is mailed. A postage meter stamp, when viewed in
    the context of the pertinent U.S. Postal Service regulations, satisfies this purpose
    and is a “postmark” within the meaning of § 77-5013(2).
    7.	 Statutes: Jurisdiction. An appellate court strictly construes jurisdictional
    statutes.
    8.	 Statutes: Jurisdiction: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. If the meaning
    of an ambiguous jurisdictional statute is unclear, even after reviewing the legisla-
    tive history, the statute’s purpose, and other resources, only then would an appel-
    late court give it its most narrow interpretation.
    Appeals from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission.
    Reversed.
    James F. Cann, of Koley Jessen, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
    Theresia M. Urich and Malina Dobson, Deputy Douglas
    County Attorneys, for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack,
    and Cassel, JJ.
    Connolly, J.
    NATURE OF THE CASE
    Lozier Corporation (Lozier) mailed three appeals to the Tax
    Equalization and Review Commission (TERC). Though Lozier
    mailed the appeals before the filing deadline, TERC did not
    receive the appeals until after the deadline had passed. A late-
    arriving appeal may still be timely if the mailing meets certain
    requirements under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5013(2) (Cum. Supp.
    2012). TERC determined that the mailing did not meet those
    requirements and dismissed the appeals as untimely. The pri-
    mary issue is whether a postage meter stamp is a “postmark”
    under § 77-5013(2).
    BACKGROUND
    Lozier claimed that the Douglas County Board of
    Equalization (the Board) had overvalued three parcels of land.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    LOZIER CORP. v. DOUGLAS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.	707
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    285 Neb. 705
    Lozier hired an accounting firm—Marks Nelson Vohland
    Campbell Radetic LLC (Marks Nelson)—to prepare and file
    three property tax appeals. The deadline to file the appeals was
    September 12, 2011.
    The record shows that Marks Nelson prepared the appeals,
    placed them in a single envelope, marked the envelope with
    its postage meter, and then mailed the envelope by certified
    mail to TERC on September 1, 2011. But the envelope did not
    arrive at TERC. Instead, for unknown reasons, it arrived back
    at Marks Nelson on September 15. At that point, Marks Nelson
    marked its envelope with additional postage (using its post-
    age meter) to send the envelope certified mail, return receipt
    requested. Making no other changes to the envelope, Marks
    Nelson again mailed it to TERC. TERC received the envelope
    on September 20.
    TERC entered an order to show cause as to why it should
    not dismiss the appeals as untimely. A partner with Marks
    Nelson testified for Lozier to the above facts. He, along with
    a corporate officer at Lozier, argued that they had timely filed
    the appeals under § 77-5013(2). That section provides, in
    relevant part, that an appeal is timely filed “if placed in the
    United States mail, postage prepaid, with a legible postmark
    for delivery to [TERC] on or before the date specified by law
    for filing the appeal.”
    TERC first noted that the envelope did not have a U.S.
    Post Office “cancel[l]ation mark” but that it did have “two
    different Pitney Bowes postage labels” from Marks Nelson’s
    postage meter. TERC noted that while there was “credible evi-
    dence that the envelope was placed in the United States Mail
    prior to September 15, 2011, . . . that envelope was delivered
    to . . . Marks Nelson . . . rather than to [TERC].” So TERC
    concluded that the envelope was in Marks Nelson’s posses-
    sion on September 15, 2011, and “not appropriately placed
    in the United States mail for delivery to [TERC] prior to that
    date.” Finally, TERC concluded that the envelope arrived at
    TERC “without a legible postmark.” TERC therefore deter-
    mined that the appeals were untimely and dismissed them for
    lack of jurisdiction.
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    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Lozier assigns, consolidated and restated, that TERC erred
    in concluding that Lozier did not timely file its appeals under
    § 77-5013(2).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1-3] We review TERC decisions for errors appearing on the
    record.1 When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on
    the record, our inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the
    law, is supported by competent evidence, and is not arbitrary,
    capricious, or unreasonable.2 We review questions of law aris-
    ing during appellate review of TERC decisions de novo on
    the record.3
    ANALYSIS
    The issue is whether Lozier complied with the statutory
    requirements for a timely appeal under § 77-5013(2). Section
    77-5013(2) states, in relevant part, that an appeal “is timely
    filed . . . if placed in the United States mail, postage pre-
    paid, with a legible postmark for delivery to [TERC] on or
    before the date specified by law for filing the appeal.” We
    previously addressed a version of this “mailbox rule” in
    Creighton St. Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm.,4 where
    we concluded that TERC lacked the authority to adopt the
    rule because it improperly expanded its jurisdiction. But the
    Legislature obviously has the authority to adopt such a rule,
    which it did in § 77-5013(2) after our decision in Creighton
    St. Joseph Hosp.5
    At the outset, the Board argues that the September 1,
    2011, mailing was irrelevant and that TERC properly focused
    1
    See, e.g., Republic Bank v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    283 Neb. 721
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 682
     (2012).
    2
    See id.
    3
    See id.
    4
    Creighton St. Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 
    260 Neb. 905
    , 
    620 N.W.2d 90
     (2000).
    5
    See, § 77-5013(2); 2001 Neb. Laws, L.B. 170, and 2004 Neb. Laws,
    L.B. 973.
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    LOZIER CORP. v. DOUGLAS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.	709
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    on the September 15 mailing. The Board argues that this is
    so “because it is from this re-deposit into the U.S. mail on
    September 15 . . . that the envelope was eventually delivered
    to [TERC].”6 In other words, because the September 15 mail-
    ing arrived at TERC and the September 1 mailing did not, the
    Board claims that the September 15 mailing must be the focus
    of our analysis.
    We give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning,7
    and we will not read into a statute a meaning that is not there.8
    Section 77-5013(2) does not provide that the mailing which
    arrived controls over a prior mailing which did not. Instead,
    § 77-5013(2) focuses only on whether the appeal was prop-
    erly placed in the mail with sufficient postage and a legible
    postmark for delivery to TERC before the filing deadline. So
    whether the mailing actually arrived the first time has no bear-
    ing on whether TERC acquired jurisdiction. And this makes
    sense. If the Board’s position was correct, then any time a
    person’s appeal was returned after the last filing date, even
    if the person had done everything correctly and according to
    § 77-5013(2), the appeal would be untimely. This would be an
    absurd result because it would penalize taxpayers for events
    not under their control.
    The U.S. Tax Court rejected an argument similar to the
    Board’s in Estate of Marguerite M. Cranor.9 In that case,
    the petitioner mailed his petition on September 3, 1999, well
    before the September 7 deadline. The September 3 mailing
    was correct in all respects, but it was returned to the peti-
    tioner on September 16. The petitioner removed the petition
    from the returned envelope and remailed it in a new envelope
    that same day. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue con-
    tended that the second mailing was the only one that mat-
    tered, that it occurred after the September 7 deadline, and that
    6
    Brief for appellee at 10.
    7
    See, e.g., Spady v. Spady, 
    284 Neb. 885
    , 
    824 N.W.2d 366
     (2012).
    8
    See, e.g., Blakely v. Lancaster County, 
    284 Neb. 659
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 149
    (2012).
    9
    Estate of Marguerite M. Cranor, 
    81 T.C.M. 1111
     (2001).
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    therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of
    the petition.10
    The court rejected the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s
    argument:
    [S]ection 7502(a) does not require that the qualifying
    envelope (i.e., the envelope which was timely mailed,
    properly addressed, and bore the proper postage) be the
    envelope in which the petition is received; nor does section
    7502(a) bar application of the “timely mailing is timely
    filing” rule if a petition contained in a properly addressed
    envelope (that otherwise meets the above requirements) is
    returned to, and remailed by, the taxpayer.11
    [4] The same reasoning applies here. We reject the Board’s
    argument that the September 1, 2011, mailing is irrelevant to
    our inquiry. The plain language of § 77-5013(2) focuses on
    whether the mailing was properly placed in the mail, rather
    than on whether TERC received it. And because the September
    15 mailing obviously occurred after the filing deadline, only
    the September 1 mailing could have conferred jurisdiction on
    TERC. It must be the focus of our analysis.
    There is no dispute that Lozier placed the envelope “in
    the United States mail” on September 1, 2011, or that the
    September 1 mailing was before the September 12 filing
    deadline. Nor is there any dispute that the envelope had the
    proper postage. The only issues are whether Lozier placed the
    envelope in the mail “for delivery to [TERC]” and whether
    the mailing had “a legible postmark.”
    TERC seemingly concluded, and the Board now argues, that
    Lozier had not placed the envelope in the mail “for delivery to
    [TERC]” because it arrived at Marks Nelson’s offices rather
    than at TERC. But errors are known to occur in the postal sys-
    tem, and the fact that Lozier’s September 1, 2011, mailing did
    not arrive at TERC is not dispositive. And when viewed with
    the rest of the evidence, we conclude that both TERC’s conclu-
    sion and the Board’s argument are unreasonable.
    10
    See id.
    11
    Id. at 1113.
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    LOZIER CORP. v. DOUGLAS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.	711
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    There is no dispute that Lozier intended to appeal several
    tax valuations and that it could only do so by sending the
    appropriate documents to TERC. It stands to reason, then, that
    Lozier intended to mail the documents to TERC so its appeals
    could be heard. Testimony supports this conclusion. A corpo-
    rate officer at Lozier testified that Marks Nelson, on behalf
    of Lozier, mailed the appeals to TERC for review. A partner
    with Marks Nelson also testified that Marks Nelson mailed
    Lozier’s appeals to TERC for review. Additionally, the parties
    do not dispute that the envelope contained an accurate address
    for TERC. And when Marks Nelson remailed the envelope on
    September 15, 2011, with no changes from the September 1
    mailing other than adding postage for a return receipt, it did
    in fact arrive at TERC. We conclude that Lozier placed the
    envelope in the mail “for delivery to [TERC]” on September
    1 and that both TERC’s conclusion and the Board’s argument
    otherwise are unreasonable.
    Still, the Board also argues that the mailing did not com-
    ply with U.S. Postal Service (USPS) regulations and so for
    that reason, Lozier did not place the envelope in the mail
    “for delivery to [TERC].” Specifically, the Board argues that
    the return address was not located in the top left corner of
    the envelope and that the Marks Nelson logo was below the
    delivery line of the delivery address. We find these argu-
    ments unpersuasive.
    We may take judicial notice of federal agencies’ regula-
    tions.12 The USPS’ Domestic Mail Manual (DMM)13 has been
    incorporated by reference into the Code of Federal Regulations
    and has the force of law.14 It lists the types of mail which
    require a return address.15 The record shows that Marks Nelson
    mailed Lozier’s appeals on September 1, 2011, by certified
    mail, without a return receipt requested. The USPS apparently
    12
    See Gase v. Gase, 
    266 Neb. 975
    , 
    671 N.W.2d 223
     (2003).
    13
    Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail
    Manual, http://about.usps.com/manuals/welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
    2013).
    14
    See 39 C.F.R. §§ 111.1 through 111.4 (2012).
    15
    See DMM, supra note 13, § 602.1.5.3.
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    does not require a return address for such a mailing.16 And
    although the USPS apparently recommends not placing a logo
    or label below the delivery line of the delivery address,17 we
    see no requirement to that effect in the DMM. So to the extent
    that the USPS’ regulations are relevant to whether Lozier
    placed its appeals in the mail “for delivery to [TERC],” in this
    case, they do not change our conclusion.
    For an appeal to be timely filed, it must contain a legible
    “postmark” dated before the filing deadline. The record shows
    that the September 1, 2011, mailing had a Pitney Bowes post-
    age meter stamp in the top right-hand corner of the envelope
    for $4.13. TERC impliedly determined, and the Board argues,
    that such a marking does not qualify as a “postmark.” Lozier,
    on the other hand, argues that such a marking does qualify as
    a “postmark.” This is an issue of first impression in Nebraska.
    The meaning of a statute is a question of law,18 which we
    review de novo on the record.19 The Tax Equalization and
    Review Commission Act20 does not define “postmark”; in fact,
    it is not defined anywhere in the Nebraska statutes. Nor is it
    defined in our case law. TERC has, however, defined “post-
    mark” in the Nebraska Administrative Code. There, TERC has
    defined “Postmark” as “[t]he cancellation mark of the [USPS].
    The mark of any private delivery or courier service (such as
    FedEx, Airborne, UPS, etc.) is not a postmark.”21 The Board
    invites us to apply that definition here.
    But that definition explicitly applies only when “used in
    the Rules and Regulations of [TERC],” and even then it does
    not apply if “the context of a term’s use requires a differ-
    ent definition.”22 Nor does it purport to define the statutory
    16
    See id.
    17
    See United States Postal Service, Business Mail 101, http://pe.usps.com/
    businessmail101/addressing/returnAddress.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
    18
    See, e.g., In re Estate of Fries, 
    279 Neb. 887
    , 
    782 N.W.2d 596
     (2010).
    19
    See, e.g., Republic Bank, supra note 1.
    20
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5001 et seq. (Reissue 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
    21
    442 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2, § 001.41 (2011).
    22
    Id., § 001.
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    term “postmark” as used in § 77-5013(2), but only the term
    “postmark” as used in TERC’s rules and regulations. And
    although specifically defined, TERC’s rules and regulations
    never actually use the term “postmark.” We reject the Board’s
    invitation.
    Again, we give statutory language its plain and ordinary
    meaning.23 “The plain meaning of the term connotes a mark
    placed on a mailed item.”24 Definitions for the term abound.
    For example, the USPS defines a “postmark” as follows:
    A postal imprint made on letters, flats, and parcels that
    shows the name of the Post Office that accepts custody of
    the mail, along with the two-letter state abbreviation and
    ZIP Code of the Post Office, and for some types of mail
    the date of mailing, and the time abbreviation a.m. or p.m.
    The postmark is generally applied, either by machine or
    hand, with cancellation or killer bars to indicate that the
    postage cannot be reused.25
    Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “postmark” as “[a]n offi-
    cial mark put by the post office on an item of mail to cancel
    the stamp and to indicate the place and date of sending or
    receipt.”26 And Webster’s defines a “postmark” as “an offi-
    cial postal marking on a piece of mail; specif: a mark show-
    ing the name of the post office and the date and sometimes
    the hour of mailing and often serving as the actual and only
    cancellation.”27 The first two definitions indicate that only
    the USPS may make a “postmark,” while the last defini-
    tion could arguably include a postage meter stamp because
    the USPS authorizes and regulates postage meters’ use28;
    23
    See, e.g., Spady, supra note 7.
    24
    See Chevron U.S.A. v. Department of Revenue, 
    154 P.3d 331
    , 334 (Wyo.
    2007).
    25
    United States Postal Service, Glossary of Postal Terms, http://about.usps.
    com/publications/pub32 (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
    26
    Black’s Law Dictionary 1286 (9th ed. 2009).
    27
    Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,
    Unabridged 1772-73 (1993).
    28
    See DMM, supra note 13, § 604.
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    so a postage meter stamp could be considered an “official
    postal marking.”29
    A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than
    one reasonable interpretation.30 Based on the foregoing, we
    conclude that the meaning of the term “postmark” is ambigu-
    ous. It could mean only a mark made by the USPS or it could
    also mean marks made by postage meters, which the USPS
    licenses and regulates. We construe an ambiguous statute
    to give effect to its legislative purpose.31 Our review of the
    legislative history of § 77-5013 provided no guidance as to
    whether the term “postmark” was intended to include postage
    meter stamps.
    There are apparently various kinds of postmarks. For exam-
    ple, the USPS recognizes and defines “[e]lectronic,” “local,”
    and “philatelic” postmarks.32 The Internal Revenue Service,
    in interpreting its own “‘timely mailing is timely filing’”
    rule, recognizes both USPS postmarks and non-USPS post-
    marks.33 Here, the Nebraska Legislature used only the unquali-
    fied, general term “postmark.” This is noteworthy because the
    Legislature has in other sections qualified the term “postmark.”
    For example, in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,125 (Reissue 2009),
    the Legislature used the term “United States postmark.” In
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-644 (Reissue 2008), the Legislature used
    the term “electronic postmark.”
    [5] Lozier accurately notes that the intent of the Legislature
    may be found through its omission of words from a stat-
    ute as well as its inclusion of words in a statute.34 The
    Legislature knew and understood that there were various types
    29
    See Severs v. Abrahamson, 
    255 Iowa 979
    , 
    124 N.W.2d 150
     (1963).
    30
    See, e.g., In re Interest of Erick M., 
    284 Neb. 340
    , 
    820 N.W.2d 639
     (2012).
    31
    See, e.g., Blakely, supra note 8.
    32
    See Glossary of Postal Terms, supra note 25.
    33
    Estate of Marguerite M. Cranor, supra note 9, 81 T.C.M. at 1113. See 26
    C.F.R. § 301.7502-1 (2012). See, also, e.g., Kahle v. Commissioner, 
    88 T.C. 1063
     (1987).
    34
    See, e.g., In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 
    256 Neb. 596
    , 
    591 N.W.2d 557
    (1999).
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    of postmarks, but it chose to use the general, unqualified term
    “postmark.” Moreover, the Legislature was also presumably
    aware of the prevalence of postage meter use. “Federal legisla-
    tion authorizing private postage meters has been in effect since
    1920 and, as long ago as 1961, forty-five percent of all mail
    in this country and half of the business mail was processed by
    private meters.”35 If the Legislature meant the term “postmark”
    to mean only a USPS postmark, it could have said so explicitly,
    as it has elsewhere. It did not.
    [6] We construe statutes to give effect to the underlying
    purpose of the statute.36 Looking at the statute’s language,
    the intent of the “legible postmark” requirement was to act
    as evidence of the date the appeal was mailed.37 We conclude
    that a postage meter stamp, when viewed in the context of
    the pertinent USPS regulations, satisfies this purpose and is a
    “postmark” within the meaning of § 77-5013(2).
    The USPS licenses and regulates the use of postage meters,
    as outlined in the DMM. Only authorized entities, such as
    Pitney Bowes, are able to provide postage meters, and no one
    but the USPS may actually own a postage meter.38 The use of
    postage meters is heavily regulated. Mailers are required to
    place metered mail in the mail by the labeled date or correct
    the date using a date correction indicium.39 Failure to do so
    will subject the mailer to penalties, such as loss of the postage
    meter.40 Additionally, a person who misuses a postage meter
    runs the risk of being criminally prosecuted.41 We believe these
    regulations are sufficient to qualify a postage meter stamp as
    satisfactory evidence of the date of mailing.
    35
    Chevron U.S.A., supra note 24, 154 P.3d at 338. See, also, Severs, supra
    note 29; Charles Pomeroy Collins, The Validity of Postmarks, 47 A.B.A. J.
    371 (1961).
    36
    See, e.g., Blakely, supra note 8.
    37
    See § 77-5013(2).
    38
    DMM, supra note 13, §§ 604.4.1.3 and 604.4.2.
    39
    Id., §§ 604.4.5.1 and 604.4.6.2.
    40
    Id., § 604.4.2.4.
    41
    See, Severs, supra note 29; 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
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    Other courts have reached similar results, reasoning that
    a postage meter stamp is a “postmark” because heavy USPS
    regulation of postage meters safeguards its evidentiary value
    as to the date of mailing.42 We recognize that many of those
    courts operated under an older version of the DMM with dif-
    ferent regulations. Most notably, the older versions of the
    DMM apparently included regulations indicating that the post
    office would inspect metered mail to ensure the postage meter
    stamp’s date accuracy.43 We have not found an equivalent regu-
    lation in the current DMM; rather, the onus appears to be on
    the mailer to correct any mistakes in the date of the postage
    meter stamp.44
    But the absence of regulations explicitly saying that the
    USPS performs random checks of metered mail does not
    mean that a postal service worker would not correct, or
    bring to the mailer’s attention, an incorrect date. The cur-
    rent regulations clearly require mail to be dated accurately.45
    Furthermore, in the absence of a contrary indication, lawful
    conduct—that mailers comply with the regulations—is pre-
    sumed.46 Moreover, though those regulations are missing, it
    remains true that the USPS authorizes and heavily regulates
    postage meter use and that misuse of a postage meter can
    result in significant penalties. Under such circumstances, and
    in the absence of evidence showing that the mailer misused
    the meter, we conclude that a postage meter stamp satisfies
    the statute’s purpose of being evidence of the mailing date and
    that it is a “postmark.”
    42
    See, Chevron U.S.A., supra note 24; Abrams v. Ohio Pacific Exp., 
    819 S.W.2d 338
     (Mo. 1991); Haynes v. Hechler, 
    182 W. Va. 806
    , 
    392 S.E.2d 697
     (1990); Bowman v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv., 
    30 Ohio St. 3d 87
    ,
    
    507 N.E.2d 342
     (1987); Severs, supra note 29; Frandrup v. Pine Bend
    Warehouse, 
    531 N.W.2d 886
     (Minn. App. 1995); Gutierrez v. Industrial
    Claim App. Off., 
    841 P.2d 407
     (Colo. App. 1992).
    43
    See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 42.
    44
    See DMM, supra note 13, § 604.4.6.2.
    45
    See id., §§ 604.4.5.1 and 604.4.6.1.
    46
    See, Coad v. Coad, 
    87 Neb. 290
    , 
    127 N.W. 455
     (1910); Severs, supra
    note 29.
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    285 Neb. 705
    We recognize, too, that other courts have held differently.47
    And although we agree that it is impossible for the USPS to
    “closely scrutinize all of the millions of meter-marked dates on
    the mail it processes,”48 we believe the risk of an inspection to
    the mailer (and its attendant penalties) sufficiently discourages
    any mismarking.
    [7,8] Finally, it is true, as the Board notes, that we strictly
    construe jurisdictional statutes.49 But that does not mean that
    whenever there is a question about the meaning of a term, we
    automatically interpret it so as to foreclose jurisdiction. If that
    were the case, then there would be no “construction” at all.
    Instead, that principle serves to decide cases where, after fur-
    ther investigation, there is no ready answer. In other words, if
    the meaning of an ambiguous jurisdictional statute is unclear,
    even after reviewing the legislative history, the statute’s under-
    lying purpose, and other resources, only then would we give
    it its most narrow interpretation. That is not the case here. We
    conclude that a postage meter stamp is a “postmark” within the
    meaning of § 77-5013(2).
    CONCLUSION
    Lozier’s mailing met the jurisdictional requirements under
    § 77-5013(2). We reverse TERC’s dismissal of Lozier’s appeals
    as untimely.
    R eversed.
    Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.
    47
    See, Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Labor, 
    148 Idaho 72
    , 
    218 P.3d 1133
     (2009);
    Lin v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    558 Pa. 94
    , 
    735 A.2d 697
    (1999); Machado v. Florida Unemployment Appeals, 
    48 So. 3d 1004
     (Fla.
    App. 2010); Corona v. Boeing Co., 
    111 Wash. App. 1
    , 
    46 P.3d 253
     (2002).
    48
    See Smith, supra note 47, 148 Idaho at 75, 218 P.3d at 1136.
    49
    See, e.g., Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Struss, 
    261 Neb. 435
    , 
    623 N.W.2d 308
     (2001).