State v. Sullivan ( 2023 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    01/20/2023 09:04 AM CST
    - 293 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Ty W. Sullivan, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed January 20, 2023.   No. S-22-266.
    1. Administrative Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. The meaning and
    interpretation of statutes and regulations are questions of law for which
    an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion
    irrespective of the decision made by the court below.
    2. Sentences: Probation and Parole. It is important to raise any objec-
    tions to the conditions of post-release supervision when they are first
    announced, and any alleged deficiency should be brought to the sentenc-
    ing court’s attention at the outset.
    3. Sentences. A sentence validly imposed takes effect from the time it is
    pronounced, and any subsequent sentence fixing a different term is a
    nullity.
    4. Sentences: Probation and Parole. The State cannot seek changes
    to the conditions of post-release supervision in the absence of new
    circumstances.
    5. Sentences: Probation and Parole: Collateral Attack: Appeal and
    Error. Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1904 (rev. 2016) cannot be used to collaterally
    attack a sentence and effectively eliminate the deadline to appeal.
    Appeal from the District Court for Seward County: James C.
    Stecker, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
    Korey L. Reiman, Seward County Public Defender, for
    appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Kimberly A.
    Klein for appellee.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Heavican, C.J.
    INTRODUCTION
    Ty W. Sullivan appeals from the district court’s order add-
    ing to the conditions of his post-release supervision before
    his anticipated release from the Department of Correctional
    Services. Sullivan argues that the State needed to prove new
    circumstances to warrant modification of the terms of the post-
    release supervision order under Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1904(B) (rev.
    2016). Because this appeal presents a question of first impres-
    sion as to the interpretation of § 6-1904 governing pre-release
    modification of post-release supervision orders, we granted
    the State’s petition to bypass the Nebraska Court of Appeals
    pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-102(B) (rev. 2022). 1 For
    the reasons set forth below, we affirm, as modified, the district
    court’s post-release supervision order.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    The State filed an initial information against Sullivan con-
    taining two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child, two
    counts of third degree sexual assault of a child, and two counts
    of felony child abuse, all enhanced with habitual criminal alle-
    gations. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sullivan pleaded no con-
    test to one count of felony child abuse, and the State dismissed
    the other five counts. The plea agreement included conditions
    that the State would not allege Sullivan was a habitual criminal
    and that Sullivan did not have to register as a sex offender.
    At the plea hearing, the State presented its factual basis for
    the count of felony child abuse, which included allegations that
    Sullivan would walk into the bathroom while his stepdaughters
    were showering, that he engaged in sexual contact by touch-
    ing their breasts, and that he performed digital penetration.
    1
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
    (2) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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    313 Nebraska Reports
    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    Sullivan maintained that the sexual assault charges were false.
    The court accepted Sullivan’s plea to one count of felony child
    abuse and ordered a presentence investigation report to be
    completed by the Office of Probation Administration. 2
    At sentencing, Sullivan again maintained that the initial
    allegations were false and that he did not commit the sex-
    ual assault offenses as the State originally charged. Sullivan
    pointed to a letter written by a friend of his now ex-wife.
    Sullivan’s ex-wife and his stepdaughters moved into this
    friend’s house after they made their initial allegations of
    Sullivan’s conduct. In her letter, the friend disclosed that
    Sullivan’s ex-wife admitted to making up the sexual abuse
    allegations and convincing the stepdaughters to lie because his
    ex-wife wanted to get back at Sullivan after she discovered
    that Sullivan had committed adultery. Sullivan also pointed to
    a deposition transcript of his ex-wife, in which she invoked
    her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and
    refused to answer questions, as well as to multiple requests for
    protection orders that contained conflicting allegations.
    The district court, after considering that Sullivan received the
    benefit of a favorable plea agreement, noting that Sullivan was
    “habitual [offender] eligible,” and previously noting that his
    probation had been revoked in an unrelated matter, sentenced
    Sullivan to a term of 3 years’ imprisonment in the Department
    of Correctional Services, followed by a term of 18 months’
    post-release supervision. The court’s order for post-release
    supervision adopted the Office of Probation Administration’s
    recommendation contained in the presentence investigation
    report. Neither party objected to the sentence, and no appeals
    were filed.
    As the anticipated date of Sullivan’s release from the
    Department of Correctional Services neared, a post-release
    supervision plan was prepared. The Office of Probation
    Administration reviewed Sullivan’s original post-release
    2
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2261
     (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    supervision order and filed an application to change the order
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2263
    (3) (Reissue 2016). Relevant to
    this appeal, the application sought to add the following condi-
    tions to the order: (1) follow 12 standard conditions specific
    for sex offenders, (2) obtain an “Adult[s] Who Sexually Harm
    evaluation” and follow all resulting recommendations, and (3)
    comply with real-time “GPS monitoring.”
    At the hearing on the application, Sullivan objected whole-
    sale to the addition of the conditions of his post-release
    supervision. Sullivan specifically objected to all of the sex
    offender specific conditions, except the condition that he have
    no contact with the victims. The State called a specialized
    probation officer to testify that probationers are supervised
    according to what they have done, and not by what they have
    been convicted of. From the viewpoint of this officer, the con-
    ditions specific to sex offenders were appropriate to add to the
    court’s order because the police reports related to Sullivan’s
    initial charges stated facts that were sexual in nature. Neither
    the probation investigation officer who prepared Sullivan’s
    presentence investigation report, nor the probation navigator
    who prepared Sullivan’s post-release supervision plan, testi-
    fied. Over Sullivan’s objections, the court added the conditions
    included in the Office of Probation Administration’s applica-
    tion to its order of post-release supervision under § 6-1904(B),
    rather than under § 29-2263(3). Sullivan appeals.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Sullivan assigns that the district court erred by adding to the
    conditions of his post-release supervision as a matter of law
    and that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of new
    circumstances to support the additions.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] The meaning and interpretation of statutes and regula-
    tions are questions of law for which an appellate court has an
    obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of
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    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    the decision made by the court below. 3 Claim-specific stan-
    dards of review apply to an appeal of an order that modifies or
    eliminates, or adds to conditions of probation. 4
    ANALYSIS
    As an initial matter, we note that the district court was correct
    that § 6-1904, and not § 29-2263(3), controlled the proceeding
    below. Because 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246
    (4) (Cum. Supp.
    2022) provides that the definition of “probation” includes post-
    release supervision for the purposes of the Nebraska Probation
    Administration Act, the procedure set forth in § 29-2263(3) is
    applicable to post-release supervision. However, § 29-2263(3)
    only applies during the term of probation and does not provide
    authority for the modification or elimination of any of the
    conditions imposed on the probation or the addition of further
    conditions authorized by 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2262
     (Cum.
    Supp. 2022) when an offender is still incarcerated and not yet
    a probationer.
    Chapter 6, article 19, of the Nebraska Supreme Court
    Rules, promulgated under Neb. Const. art. 5, § 1, and 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2249
     (Reissue 2016), provides rules for proba-
    tion practices governing the trial courts of this State. Section
    6-1904(B) provides a procedure for the district court to con-
    sider modification to its post-release supervision order based
    upon information regarding an offender’s performance and
    programming while incarcerated and the risks and needs
    related to the offender complying with the conditions of his
    or her post-release supervision as sentenced, along with the
    needs and services of the community. It is this rule that was
    applicable to the proceeding below and governs our review of
    Sullivan’s appeal.
    3
    In re App. No. P-12.32 of Black Hills Neb. Gas, 
    311 Neb. 813
    , 
    976 N.W.2d 152
     (2022).
    4
    See State v. Paulsen, 
    304 Neb. 21
    , 
    932 N.W.2d 849
     (2019).
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    On appeal, Sullivan argues that the State needed to prove
    new circumstances by clear and convincing evidence to war-
    rant adding to the terms of the post-release supervision order.
    Sullivan cites to opinions of this court, 5 contending that under
    § 6-1904, like § 29-2263, 6 any objections by the State to the
    post-release supervision order based on information avail-
    able at the time of sentencing needed to have been brought
    to the court’s attention when they were first announced at
    sentencing. Sullivan contends that the State is under the same
    obligations that we have found applicable to defendants and
    probationers. We agree.
    [2] We found in State v. Phillips 7 that the defendant’s
    objections on direct appeal to the conditions of post-release
    supervision imposed at sentencing were waived because the
    defendant did not sufficiently preserve them. Then in State v.
    Paulsen, 8 we affirmed the district court’s denial of a proba-
    tioner’s motion to modify the terms of his probation because
    all of the probationer’s allegations in support of modifica-
    tion were known at the time of sentencing. We noted that all
    of the probationer’s arguments challenging the terms could
    have been made on direct appeal, and we restated that it is
    important to raise any objections to the conditions of post-
    release supervision when they are first announced. We also
    noted that any alleged deficiency should be brought to the
    sentencing court’s attention at the outset. Ultimately, we held
    in Paulsen that modification of probation conditions under
    § 29-2263(3) is not an opportunity to collaterally attack the
    sentencing judgment or to reassess whether initial conditions
    were erroneous.
    5
    State v. Reames, 
    308 Neb. 361
    , 
    953 N.W.2d 807
     (2021); State v. Paulsen,
    supra note 4; State v. Dill, 
    300 Neb. 344
    , 
    913 N.W.2d 470
     (2018); State v.
    Phillips, 
    297 Neb. 469
    , 
    900 N.W.2d 522
     (2017).
    6
    See, also, State v. Kennedy, 
    299 Neb. 362
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 69
     (2018).
    7
    State v. Phillips, 
    supra note 5
    .
    8
    State v. Paulsen, supra note 4.
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    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    [3] A sentence validly imposed takes effect from the time
    it is pronounced, and any subsequent sentence fixing a dif-
    ferent term is a nullity. 9 There is no challenge that Sullivan’s
    sentence, including the initial conditions of his post-release
    supervision, was validly imposed. 10 Sullivan’s sentence, which
    included the conditions of his post-release supervision, was
    pronounced at his sentencing hearing. Those initial conditions
    reflect the sentencing court’s determination of what the State’s
    penological interests required. 11
    While aspects of a criminal sentence are quite static, similar
    to § 29-2263(3), § 6-1904 creates an exception to the general
    rule and allows a court to make adjustments to the conditions
    of post-release supervision as changing circumstances warrant
    before an offender’s release from the custody of the State. 12
    Section 6-1904 provides the sentencing court with an oppor-
    tunity to consider modification to its post-release supervision
    order based upon the individualized post-release supervision
    plan from the Office of Probation Administration for the pur-
    pose of transitioning individuals across levels of supervision
    to, ultimately, discharge them. 13 Under § 6-1904(B) and (C),
    these individualized plans are to include information regard-
    ing any programming the offender may have completed while
    incarcerated and an updated assessment of the offender’s needs
    and risks as the offender’s post-release supervision begins “to
    better accomplish the primary goal of probation—‘to insure
    that the offender will lead a law-abiding life.’” 14 To the
    9
    State v. Kidder, 
    299 Neb. 232
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 1
     (2018). See, also, State v.
    Thomas, 
    229 Neb. 635
    , 
    428 N.W.2d 221
     (1988); State v.
    Holmes, 221
     Neb.
    629, 
    379 N.W.2d 765
     (1986); State v. Vernon, 
    218 Neb. 539
    , 
    356 N.W.2d 887
     (1984).
    10
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105
     (Cum. Supp. 2022).
    11
    See State v. Heaton, 
    225 Neb. 702
    , 
    407 N.W.2d 780
     (1987).
    12
    See State v. Paulsen, supra note 4.
    13
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2252
    (11) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
    14
    State v. Paulsen, supra note 4, 304 Neb. at 27, 
    932 N.W.2d at 854
     (quoting
    § 29-2262(1)).
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    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    extent the State argues that modification is mandatory upon
    an application and recommendation of the Office of Probation
    Administration, we reject that argument. Whether modification
    is warranted is determined by the sentencing court. 15
    [4,5] Analogous to our prior decisions, 16 we now hold that
    the State cannot seek changes to the conditions of post-release
    supervision in the absence of new circumstances. The State did
    not object to the conditions of Sullivan’s post-release supervi-
    sion at the time of sentencing, nor did the State file an appeal
    as to Sullivan’s sentenced conditions of post-release supervi-
    sion. We recognize that the State’s options to appeal from a
    sentencing condition are not the same as those available to a
    criminal defendant, but the State’s authority must be exercised
    in accordance with those options and in the time and manner as
    required by law. The State cannot collaterally attack Sullivan’s
    sentence under the guise of a pre-release modification of
    his post-release supervision conditions, and to hold otherwise
    would allow § 6-1904 to “effectively eliminate the deadline to
    appeal a criminal sentence.” 17 Thus, § 6-1904 cannot be used
    to collaterally attack a sentence and effectively eliminate the
    deadline to appeal.
    At the hearing below, the only new circumstance contained
    in Sullivan’s post-release supervision plan and testified to by
    the specialized probation officer was an interview with the
    victims’ mother that she was concerned Sullivan would con-
    tact the victims in this case. Sullivan did not object to the sex
    offender specific condition that he have no contact with the vic-
    tims. Therefore, the change to the district court’s post-release
    15
    See § 6-1904(D). See, also, State v. Lee, 
    237 Neb. 724
    , 
    467 N.W.2d 661
    (1991); State v. Heaton, 
    supra note 11
    .
    16
    See, State v. Paulsen, supra note 4 (holding motion to modify conditions
    of probation cannot be used to collaterally attack sentence); State v.
    Phillips, 
    supra note 5
     (holding defendant must specifically object to
    conditions of post-release supervision at sentencing in order to sufficiently
    preserve them for direct appeal).
    17
    State v. Paulsen, supra note 4, 304 Neb. at 32, 
    932 N.W.2d at 856
    .
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    STATE V. SULLIVAN
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 293
    supervision order adding this condition is affirmed. All other
    conditions added to the post-release supervision order are a
    nullity and are of no effect. We modify the post-release super-
    vision order to delete those other conditions.
    CONCLUSION
    Sullivan’s sentence was validly imposed when it was pro-
    nounced; hence, the pronounced conditions of Sullivan’s post-
    release supervision are still in effect. Because the State is under
    the same obligations that we have previously held applicable
    to defendants and probationers, the district court’s order is
    affirmed only to the extent that Sullivan have no contact with
    the victims in this case during the term of his post-release
    supervision.
    Affirmed as modified.