In re I.J.H. , 2023 Ohio 941 ( 2023 )

[Cite as In re I.J.H., 2023-Ohio-941.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In the Matter of: :
No. 22AP-332
[I.J.H.] et al., : (C.P.C. No. 18JU-9119)
(N.W., Mother, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Appellant). :
In the Matter of: :
No. 22AP-333
[I.A.H-W.], : (C.P.C. No. 18JU-9117)
(N.W., Mother, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Appellant). :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on March 23, 2023
On brief: William T. Cramer for appellant.
On brief: Sharon K. Carney for Franklin County Children
Services.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
JAMISON, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, N.W., appeals from two separate judgments of the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, granting
permanent custody of her three minor children, I.J.H., I.M.H., and I.A.H-W. to appellee,
Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 2
{¶ 2} These cases involve separate appeals from two juvenile court judgments
granting Permanent Court Commitment (“PCC”), to FCCS of appellant’s three minor
children, I.J.H., born December 5, 2013, I.A.H-W., born October 1, 2015, and I.M.H., born
December 12, 2016.
{¶ 3} On August 6, 2018, FCCS filed a complaint in case No. 18JU-9117 alleging
that I.A.H-W. was an abused child as defined in R.C. 2151.031(C), a neglected child as
defined in R.C. 2151.03(A)(2), and a dependent child as defined in R.C. 2151.04(C). The
material facts alleged in the complaint are as follows:
On or about, July 29, 2018, [FCCS] received a referral in
regards to the well-being of [I.A.H-W.] and his siblings,
[I.J.H.] and [I.M.H.]. [I.A.H-W.] was observed with huge sores
down his back, the back of his scrotum, and buttocks crack. His
ankles and feet were blistered and oozing puss and as a result,
he could barely walk and his injuries smelled like there was an
infection. The burns were originally reported to be an allergic
reaction but Mother later admitted that her boyfriend, [C.H.],
put [I.A.H-W.] in scalding hot water. There are also reports
that [C.H.] has tried to light [I.A.H-W.] on fire in the past, has
rolled [I.A.H-W.] up in a rug, has taken a baseball bat and hit
[I.A.H-W.] in the ribs and on his fingers, and on more than one
occasion has picked [I.A.H-W.] up by the arm and dropped him
on his head onto the floor.
***
At Nationwide Children’s Hospital, [I.A.H-W.] was found to
have burns on both feet, scrotum, butt crease and buttocks. He
also has a linear bruise on his left forearm, a burn under his
right eye, bruising on his left cheek, right shin, and right ear.
The burns are partial and fully burned through all the layers of
the skin. They are infected and he will most likely require skin
grafts. [I.A.H-W.] also has T3 and T5 vertebrae compression
fractures on his spine from some kind of slamming force.
***
Both [C.H.] and Mother repeatedly said they did not know what
caused the burns. Mother reported that the water in the shower
was not hot enough to cause the burns.
***
As of August 2, 2018, caseworker spoke to the detective
regarding results of Mother’s polygraph test. As they were
beginning to ask Mother the same questions a second time
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 3
around, she stated she would like to write a statement. Mother
reports that she turned on the shower, felt the water, and
[I.A.H-W.] got in to wash the feces off of him. [C.H.] then
turned the cold water off and only had the hot water on. Mother
stated the water was scolding and she saw steam coming from
the water. [C.H.] plugged the bathtub to create standing water.
Mother reported [I.A.H-W.] was sitting in the bathtub and he
was screaming. Mother stated she was “scared to death” and
that is why she did not seek help or try to stop [C.H.].
(Aug. 6, 2018 Compl. at 1-2.)
{¶ 4} On August 6, 2018, FCCS filed a complaint in case No. 18JU-9119, alleging
that I.J.H. and I.M.H. were neglected and dependent children. In addition to the horrific
allegations concerning I.A.H-W., the complaint also alleges that “[m]other was asked to
bring [I.J.H.] and [I.M.H.] into the hospital as the girls were filthy and [I.J.H.] had bed bug
bites on the left side of her upper back.” (Compl. at 1.)
{¶ 5} On December 3, 2018, I.A.H-W. was adjudicated an abused minor in case No.
18JU-9117, and his sisters were adjudicated neglected minors in case No. 18JU-9119. All
three minor children were placed in the temporary custody of FCCS. They have been in the
continuous custody of FCCS since that time. On August 7, 2018, the juvenile court
appointed attorney Suzanne Barker as Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”), for appellant’s three
minor children. Case plans were subsequently approved and adopted by the juvenile court
and the temporary custody orders were extended on July 30, 2019 and December 17, 2019.
Carol Jacobson was appointed lay GAL on February 28, 2020. On April 23, 2020, FCCS
filed a motion for PCC in each case.
{¶ 6} On April 12, 2022, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on the PCC
motions. At the permanent custody hearing, the court heard the testimony of appellant,
FCCS caseworker Cassandra McKay, lay GAL Carol Jacobson, and foster parent C.D. On
May 12, 2022, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry in case No. 18JU-9119, granting
permanent custody of I.J.H. and I.M.H. to FCCS, and a judgment entry in case No. 18JU-
9117, granting permanent custody of I.A.H-W. to FCCS.
{¶ 7} Appellant timely appealed to this court from the May 12, 2022 judgments.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} Appellant assigns the following error for our review:
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 4
The judgment granting the agency permanent custody and
terminating appellant’s parental rights was not supported by
the weight of the evidence.
III. Standard of Review
{¶ 9} This court reviews a manifest weight challenge to a juvenile court’s judgment
granting PCC under the following standard:
In reviewing a judgment granting permanent custody to FCCS
under the manifest weight standard, an appellate court must
make every reasonable presumption in favor of the judgment
and the trial court’s findings of facts. If the evidence is
susceptible of more than one construction, we must give it
that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and
judgment, most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s
verdict and judgment. An appellate court will not overturn a
permanent custody order when it is supported by competent,
credible evidence. (Internal citations and quotations
omitted.)
In re J.R., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-228, 2020-Ohio-1347, ¶ 27, quoting In re E.B., 10th Dist.
No. 16AP-352, 2017-Ohio-2672, ¶ 19. See also In re T.L., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-591, 2021-
Ohio-3221.
IV. Legal Analysis
A. Assignment of Error
{¶ 10} In appellant’s assignment of error, appellant argues that the award of
permanent custody to FCCS is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶ 11} “Parents have a basic and fundamental interest of the care, custody, and
management of their children.” E.B. at ¶ 19, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000). “The Supreme Court of Ohio recognizes that it is the constitutionally protected right
of a parent to raise his or her child.” E.B. at ¶ 19, citing In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157
(1990). See also In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28. Parental rights are not
absolute, however, as they are secondary to the ultimate welfare of the child. E.B. at ¶ 19,
citing In re K.M., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-64, 2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 15, citing In re Cunningham,
59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979).
{¶ 12} Under R.C. 2151.413(D)(1), “if a child has been in the temporary custody of
one or more public children services agencies * * * [for] twelve or more months of a
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 5
consecutive twenty-two month period, the agency with custody shall file a motion
requesting permanent custody of the child.” Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(A)(1), “[t]he court
shall conduct a hearing in accordance with section 2151.35 of the Revised Code to determine
if it is in the best interest of the child to permanently terminate parental rights and grant
permanent custody to the agency that filed the motion.”
{¶ 13} R.C. 2151.414(B) sets forth the circumstances under which a court may grant
permanent custody of a child to a children services agency such as FCCS. R.C. 2151.414
provides in relevant part as follows:
(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the
court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the
court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A)
of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the
best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the
child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody
and that any of the following apply:
***
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more
public children services agencies or private child placing
agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-
two-month period * * * from home.
{¶ 14} Appellant does not dispute that FCCS has satisfied R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), as
all three children have been in the temporary custody of FCCS for 12 or more months of a
consecutive 22-month period. Thus, the dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the
weight of the evidence supports a finding that PCC is in the best interest of appellant’s three
children.
{¶ 15} R.C. 2151.414(D) provides that in determining what is in the best interest of
the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to, those set
forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e):
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the
child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-
of-home providers, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child
or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for
the maturity of the child;
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 6
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the
child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of
a consecutive twenty-two month period[;] * * *
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement
and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a
grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in division (E)(7) to (11) of this
section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶ 16} FCCS caseworker, Cassandra McKay, testified that she has been on the case
since its inception, and she drafted the case plan for appellant and her three children. She
told the juvenile court that her role is to assist parents in completing the case plan with the
ultimate goal of reunification. McKay told the juvenile court that she made an effort to
engage the children’s father, M.H., in the case plan, but that he did not complete the
threshold objective of legally establishing paternity of I.J.H. and I.A.H-W. M.H. did not
participate in visitation and did not appear at the custody hearing. The juvenile court
terminated M.H.’s parental rights to the three children and he is not a party to the appeal.
{¶ 17} According to McKay, the primary objectives of the case plan for appellant
included completing a child parenting class, submitting to a domestic violence assessment
and following all recommendations, maintaining safe and stable housing, and maintain a
legal source of income. The expectations were that appellant would demonstrate she could
meet and maintain the needs of the children, ensure that the children attended all necessary
appointments and assessments, sign releases for all treatment and service providers, utilize
available medical, psychiatric, or psychological resources provided to assist her parenting,
meet with the caseworker every 30 days, and visit the children on a regular and consistent
basis.
{¶ 18} McKay told the juvenile court that appellant had completed the domestic
violence assessment and the parenting classes but that she has not completed the objectives
related to housing, maintaining employment, and parenting practices. McKay opined that
even though appellant provided a certificate evidencing completion of the parenting class,
her observation of appellant’s parenting skills during visitation left her with the impression
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 7
that appellant had not benefited from the class. McKay did not believe appellant’s parenting
was appropriate.
{¶ 19} McKay testified that she provided appellant with referrals necessary for her
to complete other portions of the case plan but that appellant has not followed through.
Appellant was evicted from housing McKay had obtained for her after five months due to
non-payment of rent, but she did not inform McKay of this fact. Appellant has yet to obtain
medical insurance for her youngest child, I.W., born March 29, 2019, even though McKay
had made the required social services referrals. McKay testified that appellant has had a
problem obtaining stable employment and that she has had four different jobs during the
pendency of this case.
{¶ 20} McKay did not consider appellant’s current housing appropriate for the
children, as she has been living with her mother at a Motel 6 since January of 2020. With
regard to the children’s medical and counseling sessions, McKay maintained that she and/or
foster parents have provided appellant with the relevant information, and McKay has
offered appellant help with transportation when requested, but that appellant has not
attended any of the children’s in-person appointments. McKay testified that appellant has
missed previously scheduled semi-annual review sessions.
{¶ 21} McKay stated that appellant has been relatively consistent with visitation but
that she has missed a number of visits citing work and transportation issues. The children
have also expressed a reluctance to participate in visitation or to engage with appellant.
McKay testified that the children have been in foster care since August of 2018, when they
were removed from appellant’s custody. According to McKay, the children were initially
placed in separate foster homes, but later placed in the same home. McKay informed the
juvenile court that the children’s current foster parents are potential adoptive parents.
{¶ 22} McKay told the juvenile court that each of the children is afflicted with a
serious physical illness or genetic disorder, ongoing psychological conditions, cognitive
deficits, and developmental delays. For example, both I.J.H. and I.A.H-W. are afflicted with
digestive disorders that prevent them from metabolizing certain foods, and all three children
suffer from anxiety arising from childhood trauma. All three children are small for their age
and otherwise developmentally delayed. According to McKay, appellant does not have a
meaningful understanding or appreciation of the nature and extent of the children’s medical
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 8
and psychological conditions and needs. For example, McKay observed that appellant
continued to bring inappropriate snack foods to visitations, even after being informed of
their dietary restrictions.
{¶ 23} McKay stated that, based on her observation of the children’s interactions
with appellant and the foster parents, the children are bonded with the foster parents and
one another, but not with appellant. McKay expressed her concern that the specialized
needs of these children would not be met if custody was restored to appellant. She opined
that PCC was in the best interest of all three children.
{¶ 24} Lay GAL Jacobson testified that she has been working on this case since
March of 2020, and she has met weekly with the children and the children’s caseworker for
the past 12 to 18 months.1 During that time, Jacobson has spoken with the children’s
teachers and she has observed the children in their interaction with appellant and with the
foster parents. Jacobson reached out to the children’s father but received no response.
{¶ 25} She described the children’s interactions with their foster parents as “very
open[,] * * * very communicative,” “[t]hey do things together as a family,” and foster mother
“is very involved in the kids artistic stuff * * * [and] she does a lot of projects with them.”
(Apr. 12, 2022 Tr. at 169.) By contrast, Jacobson testified that the children get “very
anxious” prior to visits with their mother. (Tr. at 171.) According to Jacobson, I.M.H. has
pulled her hair out prior to scheduled visits and I.J.H. has periodically refused to attend.
Jacobson opined that the children were bonded with their foster parents, the foster parents’
daughters, and with one another, but not with appellant.
{¶ 26} Jacobson testified extensively about the children’s medical condition,
emotional difficulties, and developmental delays. With regard to I.A.H-W., Jacobson told
the juvenile court about his physical limitations and the improvement she has observed in
the recent past:
[I.A.H-W.] has the congenital sucrase-isomaltase deficiency,
which is the inability of the body to absorb sugars within the
food. With that the - - when he has food that he is not allowed
to have his stomach pumps up - - pulls - - builds up explosive
and excessive diarrhea, which is why he’s still in - - was in
1 On March 31, 2022, the GAL, Suzanne Barker, submitted her report to the juvenile court. She
recommended PCC for all three children.
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 9
diapers and is - - is still in pull-ups. And for that he is on
medication. He takes eight pills. Every time he eats something
he has to take these pills. It appears to be working when we saw
him on Thursday. He was much more energetic, much more
attentive. He looks healthier. He’s gained a little bit of weight.
He just appears more healthy than he was before having had
the treatment that he has. He also has issues with his legs. He
cannot run, he cannot skip. He has a lot of muscle weakness in
his legs. They’re working with him on that. The foster parents
work with them - - with him on that, doing exercises, building
up his - - his muscle capacity. He also cannot urinate standing
up. He has to sit down to urinate. He is under the care of a
urologist to determine why that is occurring. Whether it’s
scar[r]ing from the burns or is some other type of issue. * * *
He does have PTSD - - has been diagnosed with PTSD.
(Tr. at 173-74.)
{¶ 27} Jacobson testified the medical and psychological issues facing I.M.H. are as
follows:
For [I.M.H.], she also has the a - - the congenital deficiency with
the sugar. She is very anxious. She is on medication for her
anxiety. She tends to not be as expressive as the other children.
They are - - she - - the pills that - - and the medications that
they are taking for the deficiency is not - - does not appear to
be working for [I.M.H.]. So, she is having to go back and be
rescoped and they’re going to do some biopsies to try to
determine what exactly is going on with that. As reported
before, she’s very small stature. She’s - - in some of the reports,
it talks about she is the - - the height of a two-year-old and the
weight of a two-year-old. She is failure to thrive as is [I.A.H-
W.], due to their - - that deficiency. She also has been through
- - the counseling has been counsel for her anxiety and how to
- - her cognitive issues and how to express feelings.
(Tr. at 174-75.)
{¶ 28} Jacobson summarized the emotional and educational issues facing I.J.H. as
follows:
[I.J.H.] has anxiety issues, extreme anxiety issues. She gets
very nervous. When she gets nervous or excited, she will do
some self-harm to herself and they’re working on that. She’ll
bite her lip, the inner lip so hard that it bleeds. So, they - - in
the counseling they are addressing that with her. She is on
medication. Like I say, she sleepwalks a lot. She wakes up at
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 10
four or five o’clock in the morning, does not go back to sleep.
She had some issues in school when they were doing it virtually.
They did not do an I.E.P. on her. The school did not feel that
they needed to do one. So, one was not completed. She has
repeated kindergarten, so now she’s in first grade. Doing much
better but had a rough time last year keeping up with things
virtually on the computer. So, her attention span is very short.
(Tr. at 172-73.)
{¶ 29} Jacobson testified that in her conversations with appellant, appellant did not
inquire about the children’s special needs. Jacobson also told the juvenile court that she
believed each of the children was capable of expressing their wishes for the future and that
all three children told her they wished to remain with their current foster parents. In
Jacobson’s opinion, the children had not been coached in this regard. Jacobson provided
the juvenile court with her opinion as to the children’s best interest:
Q. So, it’s your testimony that the children, un-persuaded, have
stated that they wish to live with their foster parents?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe that’s in the children’s best interest?
A. Yes.
Q. And why do you believe that’s in the children’s best interest?
A. Again, the - - the determination of the foster parents to make
sure that their medical and health care needs are taken care of,
that their mental health needs are taken care of. Just the bond
that I’ve seen grow between them. The - - the - - the family
atmosphere that is in the home that the children have just
thrived on. They consider themself family. They talk about
aunt, who is the - - the foster mother’s sister. They call her aunt.
It’s become a family unit.
(Tr. at 183-84.)
{¶ 30} One of the children’s foster parents, C.D., testified at the permanent custody
hearing. According to C.D., he and his wife have had custody of all three children for the
past three years. C.D. and his wife have four older daughters, but only two of them are still
at home. He testified that the special needs of the children include a digestive disorder
known as Congenital Sucrase-Isomaltase Deficiency, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and
anxiety disorder. As a result of their psychological conditions, all three children attend
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 11
weekly counseling sessions at Buckeye Ranch. According to C.D., appellant has been offered
the opportunity to attend in-person counseling sessions but she has not done so. C.D.
testified that the two younger children essentially need constant attention and supervision
in order to remain safe, healthy, well-nourished, and to progress in their schoolwork. C.D.
told the juvenile court that all three children see medical doctors on a regular basis for the
diagnosis and treatment of their respective genetic disorders. Both I.J.H. and I.A.H-W. take
prescribed medication as treatment for a digestive disorder. Though C.D. stated that he and
his wife initially communicated with appellant regarding scheduled appointments and that
appellant had the opportunity to attend in-person medical appointments, she has never
done so.
{¶ 31} Appellant testified that she is currently living at a Motel 6 with her mother
who works in housekeeping at a hotel. The testimony shows that appellant obtained two
hotplates for cooking and a refrigerator where she supposes that the children’s medications
could be stored. Appellant has acknowledged that the hotel room does not qualify as
adequate housing for herself, her mother, and her four children. Appellant testified that she
has been looking for a two bedroom apartment in the Mt. Vernon, Ohio area, but she has
not yet found anything suitable and affordable. She believes a two bedroom apartment
would be sufficient for herself, her mother, and her four children.
{¶ 32} Appellant testified that she currently makes $15 per hour as a housekeeper at
Nationwide Hotel, earning $2,000 per month. Appellant pays $1,200 per month for the
hotel room she occupies with her mother at the Motel 6. Appellant testified that her recent
employment history included working a seasonal position with Abercrombie Fitch and a
previous position with DoubleTree Hotel. Appellant maintains that she owns a vehicle and
has auto insurance. She acknowledges that the children have suffered psychological trauma
and she is aware they are all in counseling for depression and anxiety, but she claims not to
know why the children are seeing medical professionals. She did acknowledge that she was
told to stop bringing certain snack foods to the weekly visitation.
{¶ 33} Following the custody hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that PCC was in the best interest of I.J.H., I.M.H., and I.A.H-W. In our view, the
testimony of FCCS’ witnesses provides clear and convincing evidentiary support for the trial
court’s finding that PCC is in the best interest of all three children.
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 12
{¶ 34} Both caseworker McKay and GAL Jacobson, testified that the children’s
interaction and interrelationship with their foster parents was open and nurturing, and that
the children were bonded with their foster parents and one another. Neither McKay nor
Jacobson believed the children were bonded with appellant. C.D. testified that two of his
daughters also live in the home and that they have embraced their role as older sisters to the
three children. The testimony also shows that foster parents are working closely with the
children’s medical and psychological professionals and, as a result, the children’s medical
and psychological condition has improved in foster care.
{¶ 35} As previously noted, all three children have been in the temporary custody of
FCCS since they were removed from appellant’s home in August of 2018, and they have been
living with their current foster family for more than three years. With regard to the wishes
of the children, Jacobson testified that each of the children has expressed directly to her that
they wish to remain with their foster parents. Jacobson believed all three children were
mature enough to express their wishes to her and that their responses were not rehearsed.
{¶ 36} With regard to the children’s need for a legally secure permanent placement
and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody
to the agency, the testimony of all three of FCCS’ witnesses established that these children
desperately need a legally secure permanent placement given their special needs and their
attachment to one another. The children have resided together in the home of their foster
parents for the last three years and the evidence shows that the foster parents are willing
and able to care for the children, and have expressed a desire to explore adoption. Given the
specialized medical, psychological, developmental and educational needs of these three
children, as demonstrated in the record, legally secure permanent placement cannot be
achieved without a grant of permanent custody to FCCS.
{¶ 37} The juvenile court found that none of the factors listed R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)
through (11) applied in relation to appellant and the children.
{¶ 38} Appellant argues that PCC is not warranted in this case because C.H. no
longer has access to her children and, as a result, she has remedied the conditions that lead
to their removal. Appellant, however, was convicted of endangering a child based on her
failure to intervene for the benefit of I.A.H-W. and subsequent failure to seek medical
attention for his very serious injuries. Furthermore, her argument totally overlooks the
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 13
appalling physical condition of I.J.H. and I.M.H. that resulted in their removal from her
custody. The juvenile court determined that both I.J.H. and I.M.H. were neglected children;
a finding appellant did not contest. Removing C.H. from the children’s lives was but a first
step in regaining custody.
{¶ 39} Appellant also maintains that PCC is not warranted at this time because she
has substantially complied with the case plan objectives in that she has completed a
domestic violence assessment and parenting classes, and she has been consistent with her
visitation. However, the testimony of FCCS’ witnesses reveals that appellant has fallen short
of significant objectives in the case plan including maintaining stable employment and
obtaining suitable housing. The evidence also shows that appellant has demonstrated a lack
of involvement in the children’s medical appointments and counseling sessions, which has
manifested in a lack of understanding of the nature and extent of the children’s serious
medical and psychological conditions, and a lack of awareness of their developmental
delays. Though appellant claims that her caseworker and the foster parents have kept her
in the dark about these issues, the evidence in the record belies her claim.
{¶ 40} Moreover, the statutory standard the juvenile court is required to apply in
ruling on the motion for PCC mandates consideration of the statutory factors set out in R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). In other words, though appellant removed an obvious
impediment to reunification by disassociating herself with C.H. and she has satisfied certain
objectives of the case plan, the evidence shows that appellant failed to address serious
concerns for the health and safety of the children. Those concerns manifested upon removal
of the children and later became the focus of the case plan adopted by the juvenile court.
{¶ 41} Here, the trial court reviewed the evidence presented at the custody hearing
in light of the “best interest” analysis required by R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Based on the juvenile
court’s review of the evidence relevant to the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors, the juvenile court
made a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent custody is in the best
interest of I.J.H., I.M.H., and I.A.H-W. Based on our review of the evidence in the record,
we find that the juvenile court judgments are supported by sufficient evidence and not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 42} Appellant nevertheless contends that the trial court erred when it concluded
that R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) and 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applied to the children in this case because
Nos. 22AP-332 and 22AP-333 14
FCCS did not move for PCC pursuant to division (D)(2) of R.C. 2151.413, and because all
three children have unquestionably been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. Though
we agree that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is the relevant provision in this case, not R.C.
2151.414(B)(2) nor 2151.414(B)(1)(a), any error on the part of the juvenile court with regard
to the R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) and 2151.414(B)(1)(a) analysis is harmless error given our
conclusion that the weight of the evidence supports error the juvenile court’s best interest
determination. See In re A.E., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-782, 2021-Ohio-488, ¶ 29, fn. 1; T.L. at
¶ 15, fn. 1.
{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the judgments awarding permanent
custody of I.J.H., I.M.H., and I.A.H-W. to FCCS is supported by competent, credible
evidence, and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we overrule
appellant’s sole assignment of error.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 44} Having overruled appellant’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the
judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
Juvenile Branch.
Judgments affirmed.
BOGGS and LELAND, JJ., concur.