State v. Hickman ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Hickman, 2023-Ohio-1793.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2022-A-0114
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
DELMAR LEE HICKMAN,
Trial Court No. 0000 PC 10914
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: May 30, 2023
Judgment: Affirmed
Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Christopher R. Fortunato,
Assistant Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).
Margaret Brunarski, Ashtabula County Public Defender, and Michael J. Ledenko,
Assistant Public Defender, 22 East Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For
Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Delmar Lee Hickman, appeals the judgment of the Ashtabula
County Court of Common Pleas, denying the recommendation of his psychologist as well
as an independent expert that he be granted conditional release from a hospital into a
less-restricted group home. We affirm.
{¶2} On August 14, 1980, at the age of 17, appellant shot his parents multiple
times with a rifle, killing them both. Appellant was tried in 1984 on two counts of
aggravated murder and found not guilty by reason of insanity. Appellant has been
continuously incarcerated and/or hospitalized since his arrest on the date of the
homicides.
{¶3} Prior to being acquitted, in 1983, appellant’s psychiatrist, Dr. Richard
Fishell, diagnosed appellant with intermittent explosive disorder, based upon his history;
borderline intellectual functioning; schizoid personality; and seizure disorder.
{¶4} In 1985, Dr. J. William McIntosh, a psychologist with the Dayton Mental
Health Center, the facility to which appellant was transferred after the acquittal, performed
a status report on appellant. Dr. McIntosh ultimately concluded that appellant had
adjusted well to the facility and did not suffer from a mental disorder “such as those which
are usually termed psychosis.” The doctor noted that appellant’s past shows problems
with impulse control stemming from poor conscience and moral development. Still, Dr.
McIntosh recommended appellant be transferred to a less-restrictive treatment setting.
{¶5} Appellant was so transferred and for nearly the past 37 years he has been
hospitalized at Heartland Behavioral Healthcare. According to his treating psychologist,
Dr. Zev Goldberg, appellant possesses borderline intellectual functioning (I.Q. tests range
from 73 to 76). Dr. Goldberg also diagnosed appellant with “Unspecified Trauma- and
Stressor-Related Disorder, By History.” Pursuant to his report, the doctor stated this
diagnosis is utilized when symptoms characteristic of a trauma- and stressor-related
disorder appear to have been present, but there is insufficient information to make a more
specific diagnosis. The diagnosis related back primarily to physical and verbal abuse
appellant experienced while he was growing up. And Dr. Goldberg clarified that the 1983
diagnosis of intermittent explosive disorder and any diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder has been “rejected by numerous psychiatrists who have worked with [appellant].”
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{¶6} Dr. Goldberg also emphasized appellant does not show a history of
problems with a personality disorder, let alone an antisocial personality disorder. Further,
the doctor observed that over the course of his hospitalization, appellant has rarely
demonstrated irritability and “very rarely” exhibited aggressiveness. Dr. Goldberg did
testify, however, that appellant has had problems with other peers. He asserted that the
problems were initiated by others and the last episode occurred in 2012.
{¶7} Appellant, historically, has been unmedicated. In 2017, however, he was
started on the drug Abililfy, a medicine to control impulsivity. Dr. Goldberg testified that
the medication was started as a “prophylactic treatment” as appellant is directed toward
leaving the hospital setting and moving into the general community. Although appellant
has remained on the medication, the doctor testified “there is really no clear indication
that the medication is necessary.”
{¶8} Dr. Goldberg additionally noted that appellant worked full-time at a local
Goodwill store from 1987 to 2012. The doctor testified appellant was considered a
responsible worker and got along well with co-workers. Apparently, appellant lost his job
when the Goodwill changed ownership. Dr. Goldberg stated appellant did not lose his
job because he did anything wrong. During his employment, appellant either walked to
work or took public transportation. He always returned to the hospital after work.
{¶9} Dr. Goldberg noted a minor incident which occurred during appellant’s
employment. He had a disagreement with a peer at work, but the incident did not warrant
any formal discipline. Still, appellant commenced an anger management program with
Heartland, which he completed.
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{¶10} A second expert was enlisted to examine appellant and issue a report. Dr.
Jessica Hart, a psychologist with the Forensic Psychiatric Center of Northeast Ohio, had
similar clinical impressions to Dr. Goldberg. Dr. Hart noted appellant had borderline
intellectual functioning and unspecified trauma- and stressor-related disorder, by history.
Dr. Hart noted that, during her evaluation, appellant “does not appear to have any
significant mood, anxiety, or psychotic symptoms that are affecting [appellant’s] daily life.”
Although appellant has a history of violence (based upon the underlying offenses), the
doctor observed there is no indication of any history of relationship instability, personality
disorder, violent attitudes, or noncompliance with treatment.
{¶11} After completing their evaluations, both Dr. Goldberg and Dr. Hart
recommended appellant be given conditional release into a group-home setting.
{¶12} Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court denied and disapproved the
recommendation that appellant be given conditional release to the group home. The trial
court observed:
It was determined by clear and convincing evidence
that the Acquittee, Delmar Hickman, remains a
mentally ill person subject to court order pursuant to
O.R.C. 2945.401. The Court finds that Mr. Hickman
would benefit from continued treatment in a hospital
setting to address his Borderline Intellectual
Functioning, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, and
Schizoid Personality Disorder as described in the
reports. The Court further finds that Mr. Hickman is a
potential threat to public safety and other people if he
were to be released in an uncontrolled and
unmonitored environment other than a hospital setting.
The least restrictive commitment alternative available
consistent with the welfare of the Acquittee and public
safety remains commitment to Heartland Behavioral
Healthcare at his current Level 5 movement.
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{¶13} Appellant now appeals the trial court’s judgment and assigns the following
as error:
{¶14} “The trial court erred by abusing its discretion to deny Mr. Hickman
unsecured conditional release because the State of Ohio did not support its objection to
unsecured conditional release by clear and convincing evidence.”
{¶15} The procedure at issue is governed by R.C. 2945.401. That statute sets
forth a comprehensive scheme which provides a trial court with continuing jurisdiction
over the commitment conditions of persons committed to mental-health institutions by
order of the court. State v. Stutler, 169 Ohio St.3d 639, 2022-Ohio-2792, --- N.E.3d ----,
¶ 10. R.C. 2945.401(E) sets forth various factors that a trial court must consider when
ruling on a recommendation that a committed individual be granted “nonsecured status”
or having his or her commitment terminated. R.C. 2945.401(E) states the trial court must
consider:
(1) Whether, in the trial court’s view, the defendant or
person currently represents a substantial risk of
physical harm to the defendant or person or others;
(2) Psychiatric and medical testimony as to the current
mental and physical condition of the defendant or
person;
(3) Whether the defendant or person has insight into
the defendant’s or person’s condition so that the
defendant or person will continue treatment as
prescribed or seek professional assistance as
needed;
(4) The grounds upon which the state relies for the
proposed commitment;
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(5) Any past history that is relevant to establish the
defendant’s or person’s degree of conformity to the
laws, rules, regulations, and values of society;
(6) If there is evidence that the defendant’s or person’s
mental illness is in a state of remission, the
medically suggested cause and degree of the
remission and the probability that the defendant or
person will continue treatment to maintain the
remissive state of the defendant’s or person’s
illness should the defendant’s or person’s
commitment conditions be altered.
{¶16} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.401(H), the prosecutor represents the state as well
as the public interest at the hearing on an institution’s recommendation for a change of
commitment conditions. And, under R.C. 2945.401(G)(2), the prosecutor must show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the proposed change in the condition of commitment
to a less restrictive status represents a threat to public safety or a threat to the safety of
any person. After a hearing and considering all the above points, “the trial court may
approve, disapprove, or modify the recommendation and shall enter an order
accordingly.” R.C. 2945.401(I).
{¶17} In Stutler, 2022-Ohio-2792 at ¶ 15, the Supreme Court of Ohio recently
made the following observation regarding the trial court’s discretion in a change-of-
condition-of-commitment case:
That a trial court has more discretion to disapprove or
modify an institution’s recommendation for a
committed person’s nonsecured movement or
termination of the person’s commitment explains why
the legislature chose to use the word “may” in R.C.
2945.401(I). R.C. 2945.401(I)’s statement that the trial
court “may approve, disapprove, or modify” a
recommendation made under R.C. 2945.401(D)(1)
shows that the court has more discretion to disapprove
or modify a recommendation for nonsecured status or
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termination of commitment based on its findings
under R.C. 2945.401(E) than it does for other
recommendations for changes that involve the
person’s remaining supervised. In this context, the use
of the word “may” is nothing more than a reflection of
the trial court’s options, which are based on the type of
recommended change in commitment status or
conditions before the court. See United States v.
Rogers, 461 U.S. 677, 706, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d
236 (1983) (“The word ‘may,’ when used in a statute,
usually implies some degree of discretion. This
common-sense principle of statutory construction is by
no means invariable, however, * * * and can be
defeated by indications of legislative intent to the
contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure
and purpose of the statute” [footnote omitted]). When
the recommended change in a person’s commitment
status or conditions does not include a request for
nonsecured status or termination of the person’s
commitment, however, the prosecution’s burden of
proof under R.C. 2945.401(G)(2) remains in full force
and effect.
{¶18} In Stutler, the institution recommended a change in the individual’s
commitment level to one of “off-grounds supervised movement.” Id. at ¶ 14. However,
here, it would appear, given appellant was seeking conditional-release, the institution
recommended a change of condition to one of “nonsecured status.” See R.C. 2945.401
(D)(1). “Nonsecured status” is defined, in relevant part, as “any unsupervised, off-grounds
movement * * * or any conditional release, that is granted to a person * * * who is found
not guilty by reason of insanity * * *.” R.C. 2945.37(A)(3). Hence, the trial court in this
matter, according to the Court in Stutler, enjoyed broader discretion in reaching its
conclusion than if the movant sought a change in commitment level, such as one involving
“off-grounds supervised movement.”
{¶19} With the above standard(s) in mind, the trial court stated it considered the
relevant R.C. 2945.401(E) factors. And it emphasized it possessed discretion to either
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approve, disapprove, or modify the recommendation at issue. In its judgment entry, the
court erroneously found appellant needed to continue treatment for intermittent explosive
disorder and schizoid personality disorder. At the hearing, Dr. Goldberg expressly stated
that other psychiatrists who had worked with appellant since the original 1983 diagnosis
had determined appellant did not suffer (any longer) from intermittent explosive disorder
or other antisocial personality disorders. And none of the clinical impressions or
diagnoses presented in the reports indicate appellant suffers from schizoid personality
disorder at this time.
{¶20} Still the trial court’s focus upon appellant’s borderline intellectual functioning
and the severity of his history of violence are uncontroverted. And even though there was
testimony and evidence that appellant would be, at some basic level, monitored in the
group home, that monitoring would be less rigorous than that of a hospital setting. In this
respect, and in light of appellant’s history, we cannot conclude the trial court was
unreasonable in concluding appellant “is a potential threat to public safety and other
people if he were to be released in an uncontrolled and unmonitored environment other
than a hospital setting.”
{¶21} “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ * * * is one of art, connoting judgment
exercised by a court which neither comports with reason, nor the record.” State v.
Underwood, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-113, 2009-Ohio-209, ¶ 30, citing State v.
Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678, 148 N.E. 362 (1925). Put differently, a trial court
abuses its discretion when it fails “‘to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-
making.’” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004). When a reviewing court is analyzing an
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issue of law, “the mere fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is
enough to find error[.] * * * By contrast, where the issue on review has been confined to
the discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the reviewing court would have reached
a different result is not enough, without more, to find error.” Beechler at ¶ 67.
{¶22} Here, we cannot conclude the trial court’s ultimate conclusion, in light of
appellant’s intellectual deficits and the reason for which he was initially committed, was
unsound or unreasonable.
{¶23} Appellant’s assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶24} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Ashtabula
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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