State v. Taylor , 2023 Ohio 3683 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2023-Ohio-3683.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 22CA011858
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DAVID TAYLOR COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 21CR103835
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 10, 2023
FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.
{¶1} David Taylor appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common
Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} A grand jury indicted Mr. Taylor on one count of improperly discharging a firearm
into a habitation or school safety zone with two accompanying firearm specifications, one count
of carrying a concealed weapon, one of count improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle,
and one count of obstructing official business. Mr. Taylor pleaded not guilty. The matter
proceeded to a jury trial wherein the following evidence was adduced.
{¶3} On the evening of January 16, 2021, the victim, her boyfriend, and her family,
which included children ranging in age from six-months old to sixteen-years old, were enjoying a
family night at their home. Shortly before 10:00 p.m., five gunshots came through the front of the
house. Fortunately, no one was struck.
2
{¶4} About two blocks away, two police officers who were parked in their respective
cruisers heard the gunshots. Each officer immediately drove in the direction of the gunshots,
although each officer took a different route.
{¶5} While driving in the direction of where he thought the gunshots came from, one of
the officers observed a vehicle speeding down the road. The officer attempted to stop the vehicle.
The vehicle continued speeding and ran through several stop signs and red lights–reaching speeds
of over 80 m.p.h.–before coming to a stop after it crashed into a parked vehicle. The driver, who
was a juvenile (the “juvenile”), and the passenger, later identified as Mr. Taylor, fled on foot in
different directions. The other officer had arrived at this point, so one officer pursued the juvenile
on foot, and the other officer pursued Mr. Taylor on foot. Mr. Taylor ran over train tracks and
attempted to hide in a wooded area, but the officer located and apprehended him. The other officer
apprehended the juvenile. While Mr. Taylor was seated in the back of a police cruiser, he called
his mother and told her that no one had shot at a house, and that the police chased their car for no
reason.
{¶6} The vehicle the juvenile was driving was later identified as Mr. Taylor’s mother’s
vehicle. While searching the vehicle, officers located a 9mm gun on the passenger-side floor.
Officers also located five shell casings in the road outside the victim’s house. The State presented
forensic evidence indicating that the juvenile and Mr. Taylor both tested positive for gunshot
residue, and that the shell casings located in the street were consistent with having been fired from
the gun located in Mr. Taylor’s mother’s vehicle.
{¶7} Prior to trial, the parties discussed the fact that the juvenile had entered an
admission to the charges of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, improperly
discharging a firearm into a habitation or school safety zone, and improperly handling firearms in
3
a motor vehicle in his delinquency proceeding. The juvenile court memorialized the juvenile’s
admission to the charges in a judgment entry (the “Admission”). The parties also discussed the
fact that the juvenile was awaiting his dispositional hearing.1 Defense counsel expressed that he
wanted to review the dispositional hearing transcript from the juvenile’s case to see if there was
any allocution or exculpatory evidence in favor of Mr. Taylor. The prosecutor indicated that the
juvenile’s dispositional hearing would not occur until after Mr. Taylor’s trial because the State
wanted to avoid a situation where the juvenile, facing no further penalty, would take full
responsibility for the events. Defense counsel indicated that he would prefer to proceed to trial
after the juvenile’s dispositional hearing, but stated that he understood the State’s position in that
regard.
{¶8} At trial, the State proceeded under the theory that Mr. Taylor was guilty as the
principal offender or was complicit to the acts of the juvenile as an aider and abettor. After the
State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel attempted to introduce a certified copy of the Admission “to
show the innocence of [Mr. Taylor].” After lengthy discussions on the record and briefing on the
issue, the trial court excluded the certified copy of the Admission from evidence. The trial court
reasoned, in part, that the Admission simply indicated that the juvenile admitted to the charges,
which did not necessarily exculpate Mr. Taylor since the juvenile could have admitted to the
charges for a number of reasons. The trial court also reasoned that the Admission was hearsay,
and that it did not fall within the Evid.R.804(B)(3) exception to hearsay for statements against
interest because there was no corroborating evidence to demonstrate its trustworthiness. After the
trial court’s ruling, the defense presented no evidence.
Throughout the proceedings, the parties referred to the juvenile’s admission as a guilty
1
plea, and to his dispositional hearing as a sentencing hearing.
4
{¶9} The trial court then instructed the jury, which included instructions on complicity,
aiding and abetting, and constructive possession. The jury found Mr. Taylor guilty of the charges
and accompanying specifications. The trial court sentenced Mr. Taylor accordingly. He now
appeals, raising four assignments of error for this Court’s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
DEFENDANT DAVID TAYLOR WAS DENIED A MEANINGFUL
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE, WHICH WOULD
HAVE MATERIALLY ALTERED THE OUTCOME OF THE TR[IAL] WHEN
HE WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE OF CODEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF THE CHARGES
COMMITTED.
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Taylor argues that the trial court erred by
excluding the certified copy of the Admission from evidence, which deprived him of a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees.
{¶11} “[A] trial court has broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence and
this Court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of
discretion and material prejudice to the defendant.” (Alteration sic.) State v. Mitchell, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 21CA0071-M, 2022-Ohio-3176, ¶ 30, quoting Drew v. Marino, 9th Dist. Summit No.
21458, 2004-Ohio-1071, ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s attitude was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219
(1983).
{¶12} Having reviewed the record, this Court cannot say that the trial court committed
reversible error when it excluded the Admission from evidence because Mr. Taylor cannot
establish that he suffered material prejudice. Mitchell at ¶ 30. Mr. Taylor argues that his trial
counsel intended to introduce the Admission as exculpatory evidence to show that the juvenile
5
admitted under oath that “he had handled the firearm, that he had shot into the building, and that
he had taken responsibility.” (Emphasis sic.) Mr. Taylor’s argument, however, fails to
acknowledge the State’s theory at trial that–even if Mr. Taylor was not the principal offender–the
evidence established his guilt as an aider and abettor. Under R.C. 2923.03(F), an aider and abettor
to a crime is subject to the same penalties as the principal offender. As a result, the Admission,
even if admitted into evidence, would not have exculpated Mr. Taylor because the jury could have
found him guilty under the theory of complicity as an aider and abettor.2 See State v. Hurse, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-687, 2015-Ohio-2656, ¶ 9-12 (holding that the trial court’s exclusion of
evidence of a codefendant’s conviction did not prejudice the defendant because the jury could have
found the defendant guilty of complicity); see State v. Askew, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20110,
2005-Ohio-4026, ¶ 15 (noting that a codefendant’s incriminating statements do not exculpate one
who is complicit to the crime). Thus, even assuming without deciding that the trial court erred by
excluding the Admission, Mr. Taylor cannot establish that he suffered material prejudice as a result
of the trial court’s ruling. Hurse at ¶ 12. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE STATE [O]F OHIO COMMITTED MISCONDUCT AND
PURPOSEFULLY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A MATERIAL WITNESS TO
HIS DEFENSE WHEN IT KNOWINGLY MOVED CODEFENDANT’S
SENTENCING DATE TO A DATE AFTER TAYLOR’S TRIAL DATE IN
ORDER TO DISSUADE CODEFENDANT FROM ENTERING ADMISSIONS
OF GUILT AT TAYLOR’S TRIAL.
2
This Court notes that Mr. Taylor has not challenged the sufficiency or manifest weight of
the evidence as it relates to his role as either a principal offender or as an aider and abettor.
6
{¶13} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Taylor argues that the State committed
prosecutorial misconduct when it moved the juvenile’s dispositional hearing to a date after Mr.
Taylor’s trial to dissuade the juvenile from testifying on Mr. Taylor’s behalf. Mr. Taylor argues
that this deprived him of a material witness, which deprived him of a fair trial. For the following
reasons, this Court disagrees.
{¶14} As Mr. Taylor acknowledges in his merit brief, his trial counsel did not object when
the State indicated that the juvenile’s dispositional hearing was moved to a date after Mr. Taylor’s
trial. As a result, Mr. Taylor is limited to arguing plain error on appeal. State v. Fortune, 9th Dist.
Wayne No. 19AP0024, 2020-Ohio-3606, ¶ 38 (“If a defendant fails to object to alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, he forfeits all but plain error.”). Under Crim.R. 52, “[p]lain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention
of the court.” “To establish plain error, one must show (1) an error occurred, i.e., a deviation from
a legal rule, (2) the error is plain, i.e., an obvious defect in the proceedings, and (3) the error
affected a substantial right, i.e., affected the outcome of the proceedings.” State v. Grant, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 29259, 2019-Ohio-3561, ¶ 5, citing State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-
7565, ¶ 36. Notice of plain error “is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional
circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d
91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶15} “In deciding whether a prosecutor’s conduct rises to the level of prosecutorial
misconduct, a court determines if the prosecutor’s actions were improper, and, if so, whether the
defendant’s substantial rights were actually prejudiced.” State v. Moreland, 9th Dist. Summit No.
27910, 2016-Ohio-7588, ¶ 22, citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14 (1984). To demonstrate
prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that, but for the prosecutor’s misconduct, the trier of fact
7
would not have convicted him.” Moreland at ¶ 22. “The touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness
of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’” State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-
6266, ¶ 140, quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).
{¶16} Here, the prosecutor stated during a pretrial that the delay in the juvenile’s
dispositional hearing was:
purposeful * * * to avoid the situation where the juvenile’s already sentenced, and
then we have the potential where he faces no further penalty, and potentially * * *
takes the blame for all this, so the juvenile court is continuing out his sentencing
until this case is resolved.
{¶17} During trial, outside the presence of the jury, the juvenile’s attorney informed the
trial court that the juvenile was still awaiting final disposition. The juvenile’s attorney also
informed the trial court that, if Mr. Taylor’s defense counsel called the juvenile as a witness, the
juvenile intended to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The trial court, therefore,
determined that “it would be [an] inefficient use of judicial resources” to require the juvenile to
appear at Mr. Taylor’s trial, and declared him unavailable to testify.
{¶18} On appeal, Mr. Taylor argues that the juvenile “would have likely testified that he
was the one who fired the weapon and that [Mr.] Taylor was not complicit in that regard.” As a
result, he argues, he was denied the opportunity to present a complete defense.
{¶19} As an initial matter, there is no indication that the prosecutor in Mr. Taylor’s case
was the same prosecutor in the juvenile’s case. Thus, any delay in the dispositional hearing would
have been requested by a different prosecutor and would have been granted by a different trial
judge. This Court is not aware of–nor has Mr. Taylor pointed to–any case law that indicates that
a prosecutor can engage in prosecutorial misconduct based upon the actions of a different
prosecutor, in a different case, in front of a different trial judge. See App.R. 16(A)(7) (requiring
appellants to support their arguments with citations to legal authorities).
8
{¶20} Additionally, Mr. Taylor’s argument is based upon speculation as to how the
juvenile would have testified. While defense counsel proffered the Admission for the record, the
juvenile could have admitted to the charges based upon his role as the principal offender, or as an
aider and abettor. Mr. Taylor speculates on appeal that the juvenile “would have likely testified
that he was the one who fired the weapon and that [Mr.] Taylor was not complicit in that regard.”
This Court, however, will not engage in speculation as to how the juvenile “would have likely
testified” for purposes of determining whether the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct.
See Moreland, 2016-Ohio-7588, at ¶ 29, 34 (rejecting an appellant’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct and noting that “this Court will not engage in speculation.”); State v. Chatman, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-803, 2009-Ohio-2504, ¶ 55 (noting that, without evidence as to how a
witness would have testified, “it is pure speculation to conclude there was prosecutorial
misconduct and that prejudice resulted from the same.”).
{¶21} Even assuming without deciding that the prosecutor in Mr. Taylor’s case engaged
in misconduct, this Court cannot say that, but for the prosecutor’s misconduct, the trier of fact
would not have convicted Mr. Taylor. As set forth in this Court’s recitation of the facts above, the
State presented evidence indicating that: (1) the juvenile was driving Mr. Taylor’s mother’s vehicle
and Mr. Taylor was in the front passenger’s seat; (2) after the vehicle crashed into a parked vehicle,
Mr. Taylor fled from officers on foot and attempted to hide in a wooded area before an officer
apprehended him; (3) officers located a gun on the passenger-side floor of the vehicle; (4) Mr.
Taylor testified positive for gunshot residue; and (5) the shell casings located from the street in
front of the victim’s house were consistent with having been fired from the gun located in the
vehicle. While Mr. Taylor speculates on appeal that the juvenile’s testimony would have been
exculpatory, this Court disagrees in light of this evidence.
9
{¶22} Based upon the foregoing, this Court concludes that Mr. Taylor has failed to
establish that, but for the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, the jury would not have convicted him.
See Moreland, 2016-Ohio-7588, at ¶ 22. As a result, Mr. Taylor has failed to establish
prosecutorial misconduct. See id. Mr. Taylor’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHICH MATERIALLY DEPRIVED HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL WHEN[]
COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE STATE’S MANIPULATION OF
SENTENCING SCHEDULE IN ORDER TO DEPRIVE HIM OF A MATERIAL
WITNESS AND WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL PREJUDICED THE JURY TO
TAYLOR THROUGH HIS DAMAGING CLOSING ARGUMENTS.
{¶23} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Taylor argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees.
{¶24} “[I]n Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor,
112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Mr. Taylor must establish: (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient to the extent
that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment[;]” and (2) that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one that falls below an
objective standard of reasonable representation. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989),
paragraph two of the syllabus. To establish prejudice, Mr. Taylor must show that there existed a
reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. State v. Sowell, 148 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138. As the Ohio Supreme
Court has acknowledged, “[a] defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates
a court’s need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing
Strickland at 697.
10
{¶25} Mr. Taylor argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for several
reasons, including by: (1) failing to object to the State delaying the dispositional hearing of the
juvenile, which effectively barred the juvenile from testifying on his behalf; (2) making comments
about partisanship and race relations during closing arguments instead of focusing on the
weaknesses in the State’s case; and (3) suggesting his guilt during closing arguments by stating
that the incident could have occurred by “some reckless teenager who’s got a new fancy toy, I’m
just going to ride around like a cowboy, hee-haw, shooting off into the air.” For the following
reasons, this Court concludes that Mr. Taylor’s arguments lack merit.
{¶26} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s failure to object to the State delaying the
dispositional hearing of the juvenile, this Court has already concluded that Mr. Taylor has failed
to demonstrate any resulting prejudice. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor cannot establish ineffective
assistance in that regard. See Madrigal at 389 (“A defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the
Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other.”).
{¶27} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s closing arguments, the Ohio Supreme Court
has acknowledged that “[c]ounsel for both sides are afforded wide latitude during closing
arguments.” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, ¶ 192. It has also acknowledged
that “[d]ebatable trial tactics generally do not constitute a deprivation of effective counsel.” Id.{¶28} Mr. Taylor is correct in that his trial counsel discussed race relations, partisanship,
and national instances of police misconduct that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic during
closings arguments. He did so in the context of attempting to explain to the jury why Mr. Taylor,
an African American, would have been motivated to run from a crashed vehicle and attempt to
hide from the police in a wooded area despite not committing a crime. This Court fails to see how
Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s strategy in this regard was deficient, let alone deficient to the extent
11
that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
{¶29} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s comment during closing arguments that the
incident could have occurred by “some reckless teenager who’s got a new fancy toy, I’m just going
to ride around like a cowboy, hee-haw, shooting off into the air[,]” this Court’s review of the record
indicates the Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel was not suggesting Mr. Taylor’s guilt. When read as a
whole, Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel stated: “How do we know that this just wasn’t some reckless
teenager who’s got a new fancy toy, I’m just going to ride around like a cowboy, hee-haw, shooting
off into the air.” Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel then explained that the State did not present an expert
witness as to the trajectory of the bullet and criticized the police officers’ investigation. Viewing
Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s closing argument as a whole, this Court concludes that Mr. Taylor’s
argument that his trial counsel improperly suggested his guilt lacks merit. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor
has failed to establish that his trial counsel rendered a deficient performance in this regard. Mr.
Taylor, therefore, cannot establish ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Madrigal,
87 Ohio St.3d at 389.
{¶30} In light of the foregoing, Mr. Taylor’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
COUNSEL’S MANY ERRORS, WHILE SOME MAY BE DEEMED
HARMLESS, CUMULATIVELY DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.
{¶31} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Taylor argues that cumulative error deprived
him of a fair trial. This Court disagrees.
{¶32} This Court has explained the doctrine of cumulative error as follows:
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, “a conviction will be reversed when the
cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial even though
each of the numerous instances of trial—court error does not individually constitute
12
cause for reversal.” State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 223.
To succeed on a claim of cumulative error, a defendant must establish that there
were multiple instances of trial court error, State v. Stahl-Francisco, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 19CA0093-M, 2020-Ohio-5456, ¶ 17, and that he sustained prejudice
as a result of those errors, State v. Froman, 162 Ohio St.3d 435, 2020-Ohio-4523,
¶ 156. If a defendant “‘fail[s] to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the errors
he has alleged, he cannot demonstrate cumulative error.’” State v. Straughan, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 29549, 2021-Ohio-1054, ¶ 68, quoting In re F.B., 9th Dist.
Summit Nos. 28960, 28985, 2019-Ohio-1738, ¶ 47. The Supreme Court has
recognized that “‘there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and * *
* the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.’” State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d
195, 212 (1996), quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-509 (1983).
(Alterations sic.) State v. Yatson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 20CA011658, 2022-Ohio-2621, ¶ 75.
{¶33} Mr. Taylor argues that, in addition to the errors set forth in his third assignment of
error regarding his trial counsel’s deficient performance, his trial counsel committed a series of
errors, including: (1) suggesting to the trial court that Mr. Taylor would be pleading guilty and,
therefore, suggesting his guilt and removing his ability to have a bench trial; (2) “float[ing] the
theory that [Mr.] Taylor was either the shooter or that he was complicit in the shooting[;]” and (3)
failing to present the certified copy of the Admission during the State’s case-in-chief by using it
to cross-examine the officer who arrested the juvenile. The cumulative effect of these errors, Mr.
Taylor argues, deprived him of a fair trial.
{¶34} While Mr. Taylor asserts that his trial counsel suggested his guilt to the trial court,
this Court’s review of the record reveals otherwise. During several pretrials, Mr. Taylor’s counsel
did note that he and the prosecutor were in negotiations to potentially “resolve” the case ahead of
the trial date. In discussing the underlying facts at one of the pretrials, Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel
made clear that he was not “in any way representing * * * that [his] client has represented” that
the facts as alleged by the State occurred. Despite Mr. Taylor’s argument to the contrary, the
record–when read as a whole–does not indicate that his trial counsel suggested his guilt to the trial
court.
13
{¶35} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s argument that his trial counsel “floated” the idea that he
was the shooter or was complicit to the shooting, Mr. Taylor has not pointed this Court to the
portion of the record that he relies upon to support this argument. See App.R. 16(A)(7) (requiring
an appellant’s brief to cite the “parts of the record on which appellant relies.”). Notwithstanding,
the record indicates that Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel zealously advocated for Mr. Taylor throughout
the pretrial process and trial; it does not indicate that his trial counsel simply conceded his guilt as
Mr. Taylor’s argument suggests. His argument, therefore, lacks merit.
{¶36} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s failure to introduce a certified copy of the
Admission, this Court has already determined that Mr. Taylor has failed to establish prejudice in
that regard. His argument, therefore, lacks merit. Straughan, 2021-Ohio-1054, at ¶ 68, quoting
In re F.B., 2019-Ohio-1738, at ¶ 47 (providing that if a defendant “fail[s] to demonstrate any
prejudice resulting from the errors he has alleged, he cannot demonstrate cumulative error.”).
{¶37} Lastly, to the extent that Mr. Taylor relies upon his trial counsel’s alleged errors as
set forth in his third assignment of error, “a party may not incorporate the arguments contained in
the other assignments of error to support a different assignment of error.” State ex rel. Midview
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio School Facilities Comm., 9th Dist. Lorain No.
16CA010991, 2017-Ohio-6928, ¶ 29. Even if Mr. Taylor had properly developed an argument in
this regard, this Court has already determined that Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel did not render a
deficient performance, and/or that he did not suffer any prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s
alleged deficient performance. Mr. Taylor’s argument, therefore, lacks merit. See Straughan at ¶
68.
{¶38} In light of the foregoing, Mr. Taylor’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
14
III.
{¶39} Mr. Taylor’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JILL FLAGG LANZINGER
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.
15
APPEARANCES:
JOHN KOPASAKIS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
J.D. TOMLINSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.