Feasby v. Logan ( 2023 )

[Cite as Feasby v. Logan, 2023-Ohio-4478.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
PAULDING COUNTY
TIMOTHY A. FEASBY, ET AL.,
CASE NO. 11-23-05
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
JOHN LOGAN, ET AL., OPINION
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from Paulding County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CI-22-072
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: December 11, 2023
APPEARANCES:
John E. Hatcher for Appellants
Timothy Holtsberry for Appellees
Case No. 11-23-05
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Timothy A. Feasby and Rhonda D. Feasby (“the
Feasbys”), appeal the May 25, 2023 judgment entry of the Paulding County Court
of Common Pleas dismissing their complaint after granting a judgment on the
pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C) in favor of defendants-appellees, John Logan and
Jessie Logan (“the Logans”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} On May 4, 2022, the Feasbys filed a complaint in the trial court alleging
claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress against
their neighbors, the Logans. Along with their complaint, the Feasbys filed a motion
requesting a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction against the
Logans to “remove or lower their camera that is approximately fourteen (14’) feet
off of the ground and that [the] audio capability of that camera be disabled thereby
abating the ongoing invasion of [the Feasbys’] privacy.” (Doc. No. 2).
{¶3} On May 23, 2022, the Logans filed their answer. Also that day, the
Logans filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C), arguing
that “there are no allegations on the complaint’s face that would indicate a cause of
action being brought for an invasion of privacy * * * .” (Doc. No. 9). Specifically,
the Logans argued that “[t]he complaint does not allege an unwarranted
appropriation or exploitation of the [Feasbys’] personalities, nor a publication of the
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[Feasbys’] private affairs nor an allegation of outrage or mental suffering, shame or
humiliation.” (Id.).
{¶4} In response to the Logans’ motion seeking a judgment on the pleadings,
the Feasbys filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint on July 18, 2022. On
August 11, 2022, the Logans filed a memorandum in opposition to the Feasbys
motion for leave to amend their complaint.
{¶5} That same day, the Feasbys filed a memorandum in opposition to the
Logans’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings. In their memorandum, the Feasbys
contend that the Logans misconstrued the elements of an invasion-of-privacy claim
by asserting that a party must “prove all different types of invasion of the privacy
[sic] in every invasion of privacy case when in reality they are three distinct causes
of action.” (Doc. No. 14).
{¶6} Before addressing the Logans’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings,
the trial court granted the Feasbys’ motion for leave to amend their complaint on
January 10, 2023. Consequently, the Feasbys filed an amended complaint on
January 11, 2023. The Logans filed their answer to the Feasbys’ amended complaint
on January 25, 2023.
{¶7} On March 16, 2023, the trial court (without providing any analysis)
granted the Logans’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C).
(Doc. No. 18).
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{¶8} The Feasbys filed a notice of appeal on April 14, 2023. However,
because the trial court’s March 16, 2023 entry granting a judgment on the pleadings
in favor of the Logans was not a final, appealable order, this court dismissed the
Feasbys’ appeal. Following the dismissal of the Feasbys’ appeal, the trial court
dismissed the Feasbys’ complaint on May 25, 2023. (Doc. No. 22). The Feasbys
filed their notice of appeal on June 15, 2023. They raise one assignment of error
for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings.
{¶9} In their sole assignment of error, the Feasbys argue that the trial court
erred by granting the Logans’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R.
12(C). Specifically, the Feasbys argue that the trial court erred by granting a
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Logans because the trial court “was [led]
to believe that a party needed to prove all three enumerated elements * * * when
those enumerated elements are actually three different causes of action for invasion
of privacy * * * .”1 (Appellant’s Brief at 7).
Standard of Review
{¶10} “Under Civ.R. 12(C), ‘[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such
time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.’”
1
Because the Feasbys do not raise any argument relative to their intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress
claim, we will not address it.
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Jones v. Gilbert, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-22-19, 2023-Ohio-754, ¶ 10, quoting
Civ.R. 12(C). When “considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the court is limited to the statements contained in the parties’ pleadings
and any ‘written instruments’ attached as exhibits to those pleadings.” Id., citing
Socha v. Weiss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga, 2017-Ohio-7610, ¶ 9 and Civ.R. 10(C) (stating
that a “copy of any written instrument attached to a pleading is a part of the pleading
for all purposes”).
{¶11} “‘A trial court reviews a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the
pleadings using the same standard of review as a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Oliver v. Marysville, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-18-01, 2018-Ohio-1986, ¶ 18, quoting Walker v. Toledo, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-15-1240, 2017-Ohio-416, ¶ 18. Consequently, “‘Civ.R. 12(C) requires
a determination that no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.’” Jones at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Midwest Pride
IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570 (1996).
{¶12} “‘An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on a Civ.R. 12(C)
motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo and considers all legal issues without
deference to the trial court’s decision.’” Id., quoting Wentworth v. Coldwater, 3d
Dist. Mercer No. 10-14-18, 2015-Ohio-1424, ¶ 15.
Under Civ.R. 12(C), dismissal is appropriate where a court (1)
construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as
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true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set
of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.
(Emphasis sic.) Wentworth at ¶ 15. “Thus, the granting of a judgment on the
pleadings is only appropriate where the plaintiff has failed to allege a set of facts
which, if true, would establish the defendant’s liability.” Id.Analysis
{¶13} In Ohio,
[t]o be actionable, the invasion of privacy must involve “the
unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one’s personality, the
publicizing of one’s private affairs with which the public has no
legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”
(Emphasis added.) Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 162 Ohio St.3d 231, 2020-
Ohio-4193, ¶ 32, quoting Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35 (1956), paragraph two of
the syllabus. See also Hamrick v. Wellman Prods. Group, 9th Dist. Medina No.
03CA0146-M, 2004-Ohio-5170, ¶ 35 (noting that “[t]he tort of invasion of privacy
includes * * * separate torts”). Generally, “a defendant may be liable for intrusion
upon another’s seclusion if the defendant intentionally intrudes upon the ‘solitude
or seclusion’ or the private affairs or concerns of another, and if such an intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Moran v. Lewis, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 106634, 2018-Ohio-4423, ¶ 4.
{¶14} “Under Ohio law, in order to properly plead an invasion of privacy
claim premised on the invasion into another’s seclusion, at a minimum, there must
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be allegations demonstrating an intrusion, physical or otherwise, into another’s
solitude or private affairs.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing Housh at paragraph two of the syllabus.
See also Sullinger v. Sullinger, 849 Fed.Appx. 513, 522 (6th Cir.2021) (“A plaintiff
must raise facts showing that a defendant ‘wrongful[ly] intru[ded] into’ the
plaintiff’s ‘private activities.’”), quoting Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464,
2007-Ohio-2451, ¶ 15. A “‘“defendant is subject to liability under [this] rule * * *
only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.”’” Moran at ¶ 10,
quoting Salupo v. Fox, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82761, 2004-Ohio-149, ¶ 23,
quoting Haynik v. Zimlich, 30 Ohio Misc.2d 16, 22 (C.P.1986).
{¶15} “‘Intrusion upon seclusion’ is based on the ‘right to be left alone.’”
Lunsford at ¶ 33, quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby
Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 615, 630, 895 P.2d 1269 (1995). “It is ‘akin to trespass in
that it involves intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s private affairs.’” Id., quoting
Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 27 Ohio App.3d 163, 166 (10th Dist.1985).
Importantly, “[w]hether a plaintiff’s activities were ‘private’ depends on whether he
has a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the totality of circumstances.”
Sullinger at 522-523. See also Lunsford at ¶ 33 (noting that, “[w]hether an invasion
of privacy has occurred turns on the particular facts of the case”).
{¶16} On appeal, the Feasbys contend that the trial court erred by granting
the Logan’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings because when “[c]onstruing all
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allegations and any inference therefrom to the benefit of the non-moving party (the
[Feasbys]), it is clear that [they] have pled a cause of action for Invasion of Privacy
due to the [Logans’] wrongful intrusion into their seclusion or private activities.”
(Appellants’ Brief at 7).
{¶17} The Logans disagree and argue that, to maintain their invasion-of-
privacy claim, the Feasbys were required to plead facts demonstrating “that the
security camera * * * is somehow capable of taking pictures inside the [Feasbys’]
home to be considered an invasion of privacy.” (Emphasis sic.) (Appellees’ Brief
at 6). In other words, the Logans contend that “pictures of the yard are not an
invasion of privacy under the law” because “all of the yard space is open to the
public and therefore is not private and not an invasion of privacy.” (Id.). The
Logans’ argument is misplaced. See Mangelluzzi v. Morley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 102272, 2015-Ohio-3143, ¶ 17 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that
“photographing or videotaping individuals in their backyard cannot support an
invasion of privacy claim because a person’s backyard is not ‘private’ and that the
‘qualified privilege’ defense entitles them to judgment on the pleadings”).
{¶18} “Ohio follows the ‘no set of facts’ pleading standard, recognizing that
a complaint ‘“should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.”’” Mangelluzzi at ¶ 12, quoting O’Brien v. Univ.
Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245 (1975), quoting Conley v.
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Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957). The Supreme Court of Ohio explained
that “a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage” because
“[v]ery often, the evidence necessary for a plaintiff to prevail is not obtained until
the plaintiff is able to discover materials in the defendant’s possession.” York v.
Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1991). Importantly, the court
reasoned that, “[i]f the plaintiff were required to prove his or her case in the
complaint, many valid claims would be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s lack of
access to relevant evidence.” Id. “Consequently, as long as there is a set of facts,
consistent with the plaintiff’s complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover,
the court may not grant a defendant’s motion” for judgment on the pleadings under
Civ.R. 12(C). Id.{¶19} Because “‘Ohio is a notice-pleading state,’” “Ohio law does not
ordinarily require a plaintiff to plead operative facts with particularity.” Hall v.
Crawford Cty. Job & Family Servs., 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-21-19, 2022-Ohio-
1358, ¶ 16, quoting Pugh v. Sloan, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0031, 2019-
Ohio-3615, ¶ 26; Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-
2480, ¶ 29. Indeed, “[u]nder the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need
only contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is
entitled to relief.’” Mangelluzzi at ¶ 13, quoting Civ.R. 8(A)(1). “‘Each averment
of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading
or motions are required.’” Hall at ¶ 16, quoting Civ.R. 8(E)(1). “In sum, ‘[t]he
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statement of the claim must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim
and the grounds upon which it is based.’” Id., quoting Pugh at ¶ 27. Therefore,
when “reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complainant’s failure
to allege specific facts to disprove possible affirmative defenses of the defendant
should not be fatal to the complaint.” Mangelluzzi at ¶ 13.
{¶20} Construing the material allegations alleged in the Feasbys’ amended
complaint (along with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those
allegations), we conclude that the trial court erred by granting a judgment on the
pleadings in favor of the Logans. Accord Mangelluzzi at ¶ 22. That is, our review
of the record reveals that the Feasbys alleged a set of facts that, if true, could
establish the Logan’s liability. Therefore, it is not beyond doubt that the Feasbys
cannot prove any set of facts in support of their invasion-of-privacy claim that would
entitle them to relief. See Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-
2451, ¶ 10 (noting that the lower court concluded “that an invasion-of-privacy action
could lie based upon Weinfeld’s use of the video camera and floodlights”). See also
J.P. v. T.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 19CA011469, 2020-Ohio-320, ¶ 17 (suggesting
that sufficient evidence was presented demonstrating that the defendant “engaged
in actions that would constitute an invasion of privacy, such as routinely video
recording his neighbors’ activities”).
{¶21} In this case, the Feasbys alleged that the Logans wrongfully intruded
into their private activities to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or
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humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities as provided under the third prong
of an invasion-of-privacy claim. Importantly, the Feasbys alleged in their amended
complaint that the Logans “are wrongfully intruding into the [Feasbys’] private
activities” and that they “have suffered damages” as well as “mental and emotional
harm from the actions of the [Logans] * * * .” (Doc. No. 16).
{¶22} In particular, the parties do not dispute that the Logans installed a
security camera on their property or that the Logans informed the Feasbys of the
camera along with its voice- and audio-recording capabilities. Rather, the parties
dispute whether the Logans’ conduct intruded into the Feasbys’ private activities.
Contrary to the Logans’ suggestion that the Feasbys are precluded (as a matter of
law) from alleging an invasion-of-privacy claim when the viewing occurs outside
of the home, such a claim can stand if the circumstances support the claim. See
Mangelluzzi at ¶ 16 (agreeing that there is “no blanket rule of law that precludes an
invasion of privacy claim when the viewing occurs outside of the home”).
{¶23} Based on our review of the record in this case, we conclude that the
Feasbys alleged sufficient facts to suggest that they had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their yard and that the Logans invaded their privacy by installing a
security camera “so that they could see over the embankment being built by the
[Feasbys].” (Doc. No. 16). Compare Mangelluzzi at ¶ 16 (concluding that the
Mangelluzzis pleaded sufficient facts to suggest “that the Morleys have invaded
their privacy by videotaping and photographing them on numerous occasions while
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they ‘are in their own backyard’” and that, “despite the Mangelluzzis installing ‘an
additional $10,000 worth of fencing to stop defendants from videotaping’ the
Mangelluzzis’ children, ‘[d]efendants have responded by climbing to the top of their
children’s swing sets in order to continue to videotape them’”) with Salupo, 2004-
Ohio-149, ¶ 24-25 (concluding that the plaintiff did “not allege defendants intruded
into a private place, or that they invaded his private seclusion”).
{¶24} Importantly, the Feasbys alleged in their amended complaint that,
because the Logans “have said cameras on their property[, the Feasbys] decided to
extend their tree rows and [they built] a twelve (12) foot embankment to ensure that
they had privacy from the [Logans’] surveillance cameras while outside in their
yard.” (Doc. No. 16). Yet, according to the Feasbys, the Logans “installed a large
camera approximately fourteen (14) feet above their garage door on the front of their
residence” following the construction of their privacy embankment. (Id.).
Critically, the Feasbys alleged “that this large camera was purchased by the
[Logans] and placed so that they could see over the embankment being built by the
[Feasbys].” (Id.). Compare Mangelluzzi at ¶ 19 (asserting that “the complaint
alleges that the Mangelluzzis erected a fence to stop the Morleys from interfering
and invading their privacy, yet the Morleys continued to do so and took such
measures as climbing on their children’s swing set to videotape the Mangelluzzis’
children”).
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{¶25} Moreover, the Logans’ contention that their conduct was justified
since the Feasbys’ “yard space is open to the public and therefore not private, and
not an invasion of privacy,” is specious. (Appellee’s Brief at 6). Significantly, the
pleadings do not demonstrate that the Logans are unequivocally entitled to any type
of privilege defense to defeat the Feasbys’ claim. See Mangelluzzi at ¶ 20. Indeed,
the Feasbys’ amended complaint belies any such inference that the Feasbys’ front
yard is viewable to the public. Furthermore, based on the reasonable inference
established by the Feasbys’ amended complaint that they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their front yard, evaluating any evidentiary materials
suggesting that the Logans are entitled to such defense is inappropriate at this stage
of the proceedings. See id. at ¶ 9 (“‘Unlike a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary
judgment, which authorizes the court to evaluate evidentiary materials, Civ.R. 12(C)
imposes a structural test: whether on their face the pleadings foreclose the relief
requested.’”), quoting Steinbrink v. Greenon Local School Dist., 2d Dist. Clark No.
11CA0050, 2012-Ohio-1438, ¶ 15.
{¶26} Thus, when construing the allegations in the Feasbys’ favor (as we are
required to do), we conclude that the Feasbys alleged a set of facts which would
allow them to recover. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting
a judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C) in favor of the Logans.
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{¶27} Having found error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed
and Cause Remanded
MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/hls
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