People v. Grandberry , 2024 IL App (3d) 230546 ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (3d) 230546Opinion filed January 10, 2024
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IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
) Du Page County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) Circuit No. 23-CF-694
)
RAVEN CHANEL GRANDBERRY, ) Honorable
) Margaret M. O’Connell
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Holdridge and Peterson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Raven Chanel Grandberry, appeals from the Du Page County circuit court’s
order granting the State’s motion for pretrial detention, arguing that the court abused its discretion
in finding that she was charged with a detainable offense. We reverse and remand.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant was indicted with two counts of aggravated battery of a peace officer (Class 2)
(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West 2022)) and six counts of aggravated battery of a nurse (Class 3)
(id. § 12-3.05(d)(11)) based on an April 2, 2023, incident. The indictments stated that defendant
spit on officers and nurses and bit the finger of a nurse, causing bruising. Defendant’s bond was
set at $100,000, and as conditions of bond, defendant was required to abstain from alcohol, wear
a SCRAM device, and have no contact with the alleged victims. Defendant remained in custody
due to her inability to pay.
¶4 On September 21, 2023, defendant filed a motion to reopen conditions of pretrial release.
In response, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was
charged with a forcible felony, or any other felony which involved the threat of or infliction of
great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement, and her release posed a real and present
threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)).
¶5 The factual basis provided in pertinent part, on April 2, 2023, officers responded to multiple
calls of a vehicle driving recklessly on the roadway. Officers conducted a traffic stop of
defendant’s vehicle and detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. Defendant’s speech was
slurred, and she had bloodshot, watery, glossy eyes. There was an open bottle of wine within
defendant’s reach. Defendant became hostile towards paramedics. She went limp and refused to
walk as she was being escorted to the ambulance. “Upon arrival at the hospital, the defendant
began to spit on the floor. While being transferred to a hospital bed, the defendant struggled with
the nurses and security and spit at them. The defendant also bit the finger of a nurse causing
bruising.” Defendant’s known criminal history included a child restraint violation and a pending
battery against a public safety official in Indiana.
¶6 A hearing was held on the petition on October 11, 2023. The State said, “When we say it
is a forcible felony, it technically isn’t because there was no great bodily harm.” However, the
State went on to argue, “we’re following under a felony which involves the threat of an infliction
of great bodily harm, so based on the defendant’s conduct, we’re saying there was a threat of great
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bodily harm and she poses a risk to the safety of the public.” Defense counsel disagreed that it was
a forcible felony stating that, under the statute, an aggravated battery is only a forcible felony when
it causes great bodily harm, not when the aggravating factor is a special victim. Defense counsel
argued that the “any other felony” portion of the statute only included any offenses not listed,
which would not encompass aggravated battery as charged. The court found that defendant was
charged with a detainable offense. At the close of the hearing, the court found that the State had
met its burden and granted the petition.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in granting the State’s
petition to detain as she was not charged with a detainable offense. We consider factual findings
for the manifest weight of the evidence, but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s
petition to detain is considered for an abuse of discretion. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d)
230317, ¶ 13. Under either standard, we consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Id.; see also People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 19. We consider issues
of statutory construction de novo. People v. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45.
¶9 Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied
in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified
petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that
defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any
person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this
threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and the
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conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider. Id.
§§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.
¶ 10 Defendant argues that she was not charged with a detainable offense. Section 110-6.1(a)
of the Code sets forth the various offenses eligible for pretrial detention. Id. § 110-6.1(a). The State
specifically proceeded under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5), which states:
“[T]he defendant's pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of
any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of
the case, and the defendant is charged with a forcible felony, which as used in this
Section, means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal
sexual assault, armed robbery, aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary where there
is use of force against another person, residential burglary, home invasion,
vehicular invasion, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping,
aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement or any other felony which involves the threat of or infliction of great
bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5).
As the provision specifically defines what a forcible felony is for purposes of that section, we need
not look elsewhere to define it.
¶ 11 Here, defendant was charged with aggravated battery of a peace officer and aggravated
battery of a nurse. As stated above section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) provides that aggravated battery is a
forcible felony when it results in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. The
State did not allege, and specifically conceded, that the victims did not suffer such injury. The facts
that rendered the charges “aggravated” was solely the status of the victims as peace officers and
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nurses. Aggravated battery of a peace officer or a nurse is not listed as a forcible felony in that
section.
¶ 12 Instead, the State argued, and the court agreed, that defendant’s charges fell under the “any
other felony” portion of the statute. We disagree. The statute specifically lists 18 felonies that are
considered forcible felonies and then states, “or any other felony which involves the threat of or
infliction of great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” Id. This language means
any felonies other than those listed. As the statute specifically enumerated a subset of aggravated
battery as a forcible felony (aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent
disability or disfigurement), “other felony” must refer to felonies other than aggravated battery,
not different subsets of aggravated battery like we have here. Moreover, we note that the list of
forcible felonies includes some felonies without qualification, like robbery and aggravated
robbery, and others with qualification, like aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or
permanent disability or disfigurement and burglary where there is use of force against another
person. Had the legislature intended to include all aggravated batteries, it would have done so. We
find support for our position in the Fourth District’s decision in People v. Brookshaw, 2023 IL
App (4th) 230854-U, ¶ 13.
¶ 13 Therefore, we find that the court abused its discretion in granting the State’s petition as
defendant was not charged with a detainable offense, and we remand for the court to determine the
appropriate conditions for defendant’s pretrial release.
¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 15 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed and remanded.
¶ 16 Reversed and remanded.
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