In re Children of Quincy A. , 2023 ME 49 ( 2023 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2023 ME 49Docket: Ken-23-42
Argued: July 6, 2023
Decided: August 15, 2023
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.
IN RE CHILDREN OF QUINCY A.
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Quincy A. and Sharon C. appeal from a judgment of the District Court
(Augusta, Nale, J.) terminating their parental rights to their children. See
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2) (2023). On appeal, the father contends
(1) that the court erred when it found by clear and convincing evidence that the
father was unfit as a parent and (2) that the Department failed to meet its
statutory obligations pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A)(A) (2023), and both
parents contend that the court erred and abused its discretion when it found
that terminating the parents’ parental rights, rather than establishing a
permanency guardianship, was in the best interests of the children.1 For the
reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
1 The mother does not contest the trial court’s unfitness findings, and competent evidence in the
record supports the court’s findings of the mother’s unfitness. See In re Child of Louise G., 2020 ME
87, ¶ 8, 236 A.3d 445.
2
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On July 27, 2021, the Department sought, and the District Court
(Augusta, Davis, J.) signed, an order of preliminary protection as to the children
at issue here. The court (Churchill, J.) scheduled a summary preliminary
hearing for August 6, 2021, at which both parents appeared and waived their
right to a hearing.
[¶3] By agreement of the mother and the Department, the court
(Montgomery, J.) issued a jeopardy order that was entered as to the mother on
March 14, 2022. Jeopardy was based on the mother’s misuse of substances
while caring for the children, her continued relationship with the father despite
the father’s history of domestic violence against her, and her lack of recognition
of the serious emotional and physical risk that the father posed to her and the
children. On March 14 and March 15, 2022, the court held a jeopardy hearing
as to the father. After the hearing, the court found jeopardy as to the father due
to his history of domestic violence against the mother. Specifically, the court
noted its concern about the father’s continued denial of his domestic violence
against the mother. The court called the denials “remarkable and
unbelievable,” and further noted that the oldest child had witnessed some of
3
these episodes of domestic violence. Thereafter, on August 25, 2022, the court
held a judicial review and permanency planning hearing.
[¶4] On August 29, 2022, the Department petitioned to terminate the
parents’ parental rights as to the children. On October 5, 2022, the Department
filed its first reunification plan as to each parent. Neither plan had been signed
by the parent to whom the plan applied. The court (Nale, J.) held a two-day
hearing on the termination petitions on December 16, 2022, and January 12,
2023. On February 6, 2023, the court issued its judgment terminating the
parental rights of both parents as to both children.
[¶5] The court found the following facts, which are fully supported by
competent evidence in the record, by clear and convincing evidence. See In re
Child of Amber D., 2020 ME 30, ¶ 6, 226 A.3d 1157. The parents are the
biological parents of both children at issue in this case. This case is the most
recent in a series of child protection cases involving the parents within the past
seven years. The oldest child has been in the care and custody of the
Department three separate times in his life.
[¶6] The parents have a history of domestic violence in their relationship
that they have consistently denied. There have been numerous reports of
domestic violence between the parents, including by the oldest child. Although
4
the parents ultimately acknowledged during the termination of parental rights
hearing that there was domestic violence in their relationship, the court found
the previous denials “absolutely stunning” considering the extent of the history
of domestic violence between the parents. The parents minimize the domestic
violence and refuse to acknowledge the impact that the domestic violence has
had on their children, with the father outright denying that the children had
ever witnessed domestic violence and saying the domestic violence made no
impact on them. The mother also refuses to acknowledge the impact that the
domestic violence has had on the children, and she has not put the children’s
needs over her own. Similarly, the mother has a limited understanding of the
impact that her substance use disorder has had on her children. For example,
the mother tested positive for illicit substances at least once, but she continued
to deny using any illicit substances when asked about the positive tests.
[¶7] Although the parents have engaged in services, they would require
a long period of time to complete those services and be able to take
responsibility for the children and protect them from jeopardy. The mother
would require at least three to six months to complete her services, if not
longer. It is unclear how long reunification would take for the father because
the Department knows little about whether the father has made any progress.
5
The father failed to provide the Department with updated contact information
and releases for his services in a timely manner, and family team meetings had
to be rescheduled multiple times to ensure the father’s participation. The
Department offered to make referrals to service providers for the father, but he
said that he would self-refer. The trial court found that reunification for both
parents could take substantial amounts of time given both parents’ lack of
progress at the time of the termination hearing and their failure to recognize
the impact of their lack of progress in these services on their ability to take
responsibility for the children and protect them from jeopardy.
[¶8] The children struggled early in this case but ultimately have found
stability in a resource placement with their half-sister. The older child has
spent one-third of his life in foster care and the younger child has spent one-half
of her life in foster care, and they require permanency. In less than a year, the
Department had to move the children multiple times due to the oldest child’s
behavioral problems stemming from the domestic violence that the child
witnessed between the parents. In January 2022, the Department placed the
children with their maternal half-sister. Their needs are being addressed in this
placement, and their maternal half-sister has been a strong advocate for the
children. However, the trial court found that the children require permanency
6
immediately. The oldest child has reported a fear of being “swept away” to yet
another placement at some point in time, and both children have been affected
by the domestic violence between their parents.
[¶9] The court found that both parents were unfit because they (1) were
unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and these
circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to
meet the children’s needs, (2) were unwilling or unable to take responsibility
for the children within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the
children’s needs, and (3) failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and
reunify with the children; and that terminating both parents’ parental rights
was in the best interests of the children. The court further found that the
Department’s proposed permanency plan of adoption was in the best interests
of the children. Both parents timely appealed. See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2023);
M.R. App. P. 2B(c).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
[¶10] “We review the court’s findings of fact for clear error and the
court’s ultimate determination that termination of the parental rights is in the
7
child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” In re Children of Jason C., 2020
ME 86, ¶ 7, 236 A.3d 438 (quotation marks omitted).
B. Parental Unfitness
[¶11] On appeal, the father contends that the court erred when it found
by clear and convincing evidence that the father was unfit as a parent and that
the Department failed to meet its statutory obligations pursuant to 22 M.R.S.
§ 4041(1-A)(A).
[¶12] We will set aside a finding of parental unfitness “only if there is no
competent evidence in the record to support it, if the fact-finder clearly
misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the finding is so contrary to
the credible evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case.”
In re Child of Katherine C., 2019 ME 146, ¶ 2, 217 A.3d 68 (quotation marks
omitted).
[¶13] To find parental unfitness, a court must find by clear and
convincing evidence one of four statutory grounds. In re Child of Olivia F., 2019
ME 149, ¶ 6, 217 A.3d 1106; see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(iv). “Where
the court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the
alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re K.M.,
2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (quotation marks omitted). In evaluating
8
parental unfitness, “the court must examine from the child’s perspective—not
the parent’s—the time within which the parent can take responsibility for a
child and protect that child from jeopardy.” In re Child of Walter C., 2019 ME
121, ¶ 7, 213 A.3d 113 (quotations marks omitted).
[¶14] Pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041, “the Department is obligated, with
the participation of the parent, to develop a rehabilitation and reunification
plan that sets out, inter alia, the reasons the child was removed from the home,
the changes the parent must implement to eliminate jeopardy to the child, and
the services the Department will provide that must be completed before the
child may be returned to the parent’s custody.” In re Child of Rebecca J., 2019
ME 119, ¶ 6, 213 A.3d 108. “The rehabilitation and reunification plan is the
roadmap by which the Department and a parent are expected to cooperatively
seek to rehabilitate the conditions that resulted in jeopardy to the child.” Id.(quotation marks omitted).
[¶15] Looking first to the Department’s efforts, although the Department
did file a rehabilitation and reunification plan as to the father, we note that this
plan was unsigned by the father and was filed after the Department had filed its
petition to terminate the father’s parental rights.2 We are concerned with the
2Additionally, in its judicial review order, dated August 25, 2022, the court (Montgomery, J.)
ordered the Department to file a reunification plan as to the father, with a copy provided to the
9
Department’s filing a petition to terminate a parent’s parental rights prior to
filing the plan that is intended to help the parent understand what that parent
must do to alleviate jeopardy and maintain parental rights. See In re Thomas D.,
2004 ME 104, ¶ 26, 854 A.2d 195 (“If the Department files a petition for
termination of parental rights, the plan establishes benchmarks by which to
assess whether a parent has successfully ameliorated the problems that led to
the initial finding of jeopardy.”). The reunification plan also protects the rights
of parents by providing notice of how the parent can achieve reunification
within a timeframe that will reasonably meet the child’s needs. Id. Absent
those circumstances where the Department does not have the obligation to
reunify, the Department and the parent share the obligation to pursue
reunification, and the reunification and rehabilitation plan is the centerpiece of
the Department’s obligation. See id. ¶¶ 23, 26 (“Unless the Department has
been excused from reunification efforts, the rehabilitation and reunification
parties, no less than fourteen days after the entry of the jeopardy order. Although the record contains
evidence that the Department did go through the plan with the father, we note that the docket reflects
that the plan was not filed until October 5, much later than fourteen days after the judicial review
hearing. We also note that the trial court did not have the benefit of the reunification plan at the
judicial review and permanency planning hearing, which would, of course, have aided the trial court
in reviewing the Department’s efforts and the parents’ efforts in reunification. See In re Thomas D.,
2004 ME 104, ¶ 26, 854 A.2d 195.
10
plan is the centerpiece of child protective proceedings following a jeopardy
determination.”).
[¶16] However, as we have previously articulated, if a parent has notice
of the issues that must be addressed to alleviate jeopardy, and the trial court’s
finding of unfitness is not solely supported by the parent’s failure to engage in
good faith in rehabilitation and reunification efforts, then we will not vacate a
trial court’s unfitness finding. In re Child of Rebecca J., 2019 ME 119, ¶¶ 7-11,
213 A.3d 108. In In re Child of Rebecca J., the Department failed to file a
reunification and rehabilitation plan, but we affirmed the termination of
parental rights by the trial court because the mother was aware of what the
Department required, and her unfitness was based on her inability to protect
the child from jeopardy and take responsibility for the child. Id.[¶17] Here, the trial court found that the father was unfit on grounds
besides his failure to engage in good faith reunification with his children, and
competent evidence in the record reflects that the father had notice of the
issues that he needed to address to alleviate jeopardy. The trial court found
that the father was unfit because the father (1) was unwilling or unable to
protect the children from jeopardy and these circumstances were unlikely to
change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs,
11
(2) was unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time
which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, and (3) failed to
make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children, meaning
that the unfitness finding was based on more than only the father’s failure to
make good faith efforts to comply with a reunification plan that he did not sign
and that the Department filed after it filed its petition to terminate the father’s
parental rights. Competent evidence in the record reflects that the father knew
what the Department expected of him, and during oral argument, the father’s
counsel confirmed multiple times that the father knew what the Department
expected of him. The Department caseworkers testified that they told the
father that he needed to engage in mental health treatment, and the father
himself testified that he tried to seek mental health treatment and complete
parenting classes and a certified batterer’s intervention program to comply
with the Department’s expectations. Although the trial court did not make an
explicit finding that the father knew what the Department expected of him, the
father’s counsel did not move for further findings of fact pursuant to Maine Rule
of Civil Procedure 52, and therefore “we assume that the court implicitly made
all findings consistent with the evidence that are necessary to support the
judgment.” Francoeur v. Berube, 2023 ME 27, ¶ 11, 293 A.3d 418. Therefore,
12
competent evidence in the record reflects that the father knew what the
Department expected of him to alleviate jeopardy as to his children.
[¶18] Further, there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to
support the trial court’s findings of unfitness. The court found that the father
failed to recognize the impact that domestic violence had on the children and
that he had been unable to make sufficient progress towards alleviating
jeopardy and taking responsibility for the children in a timeframe reasonably
calculated to meet the children’s needs. See In re Children of Corey W., 2019 ME
4, ¶¶ 7, 20, 199 A.3d 683 (affirming termination of the mother’s parental rights
when she made no progress toward understanding her children’s needs, she
showed no insights into how her parenting deficiencies impacted her children,
and the children needed certainty immediately); In re Hope H., 2017 ME 198,
¶ 10, 170 A.3d 813 (“Marginal progress toward reunification and a simple
desire to remain parents is not enough to ameliorate jeopardy and meet the
children’s needs.”).
[¶19] Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it
found that both parents were unfit.
13
C. Best Interests of the Children
[¶20] Both parents contend that the court abused its discretion when it
found that terminating the parents’ parental rights, rather than establishing a
permanency guardianship, was in the best interests of the children.
[¶21] “[A] court must consider many factors” in making its best interest
determination, and that decision “is not limited to whether or not there is
affirmative evidence that contact with an absent parent will be harmful to the
child;” rather, “[t]he constellation of relevant circumstances will be different in
each case.” Adoption by Jessica M., 2020 ME 118, ¶¶ 21, 23, 239 A.3d 633(alteration and quotation marks omitted). “Permanency in a particular case
must be fashioned from the actual circumstances and needs of the children
before the court.” Id. ¶ 21 (quotation marks omitted). After each permanency
hearing, the trial court must adopt a permanency plan for a child that contains
determinations on permanency options for the child. 22 M.R.S. § 4038-B(3),
(4)(A) (2023).3
[¶22] The Legislature has provided five different permanency options,
including adoption and permanency guardianship. Id. § 4038-B(4)(A)(1)-(5).
3 Title 22 M.R.S. § 4038-B(4)(A) (2023) provides the following permanency options: (1) returning
the child to the parent; (2) adoption; (3) a permanency guardianship; (4) placing the child with a fit
and willing relative; and (5) placing the child in another planned permanent living arrangement.
14
“[A] permanency guardianship may be ordered to establish safe, long-term care
for a child, but it is not appropriate when the child needs the certainty and
stability of adoption and the parties otherwise need clarity in their respective
roles.” In re Child of Dawn B., 2019 ME 93, ¶ 11, 210 A.3d 169 (alteration and
quotation marks omitted). Unlike adoption, a permanency guardianship allows
for a court to order that a parent have reasonable contact with the child where
it is in the best interests of the child. 22 M.R.S § 4038-C(3) (2023). If a trial
court finds that a child needs permanency, then the trial court should not
automatically conclude that terminating the parents’ parental rights and
adoption is the best way to effectuate permanency. The Legislature has
determined that both adoption and permanency guardianships are equally
available to further the goal of permanency for children, see 22 M.R.S
§ 4038-B(4)(A)(2), (3), and courts should consider the particularities of what
kind of permanency and stability a child needs before determining whether
adoption, rather than one of the other equally available options, is the best
course. A finding that a child needs permanency cannot, without more, be
enough to conclude that termination is in the best interest of the child because
this would never allow a court to conclude that any other permanency option,
including a permanency guardianship, would be in the best interest of the child.
15
[¶23] In In re Emma C., 2018 ME 7, ¶ 4, 177 A.3d 628, we discussed the
option of a permanency guardianship instead of a termination and adoption.
We affirmed the trial court’s decision to terminate a parent’s parental rights,
concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding that
adoption, rather than permanency guardianship, was in the best interest of the
child “because, as the GAL testified, the child is at an age where stability and
permanency within a family unit that has demonstrated its commitment to her
is of the utmost importance.” Id. Although the child’s need for permanency
factored into the trial court’s determination that terminating the father’s
parental rights was in the best interest of the child, the court also considered
the particularities of that child, such the child’s age and her circumstances. Id.Given the child’s need for permanency, we discussed two of the Legislature’s
permanency options and affirmed the trial court’s determination that adoption,
rather than a permanency guardianship, would be in the best interest of that
particular child. Id.[¶24] In sum, to ensure that terminating a parent’s parental rights is in
the best interest of the child, there must be some reason besides a general need
for permanency that adoption is the best permanency option for that child. The
risk of a generalized finding that permanency always requires adoption, and
16
therefore termination of a parent’s parental rights, is that a court might
terminate a parent’s parental rights when it is not in the best interest of a child
and another, better permanency option exists. See Adoption by Jessica M., 2020
ME 118, ¶ 21, 239 A.3d 633 (“Permanency in a particular case must be
fashioned from the actual circumstances and needs of the children before the
court.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).
[¶25] This case presents such a risk. Here, the trial court concluded that
the children needed permanency and that adoption would provide the children
with that permanency without discussing why adoption, rather than a
permanency guardianship, was in the best interests of these children. The trial
court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in
the best interests of the children contradicted some of the trial court’s findings,
such as that the court hoped that the mother would not be shut out of the
children’s lives, that the children love their parents, and that “[o]ne thing the
court cannot do is say [the mother] is not the mother. She will always be the
mother, whatever the adoptive parent does now . . . .” The trial court’s findings
seem to suggest that a permanency guardianship, rather than adoption, could
have been in the children’s best interests because it could allow the mother to
stay involved with the children. See 22 M.R.S § 4038-C(3).
17
[¶26] However, in the absence of a Rule 52 motion for further findings,
wherein the court could have been asked to discuss the reason for determining
that adoption, rather than a permanency guardianship, was in the children’s
best interests, “we assume that the court implicitly made all findings consistent
with the evidence that are necessary to support the judgment,” Francoeur, 2023
ME 27, ¶ 11, 293 A.3d 418, and we assume that the trial court considered both
options and determined that terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the
best interests of the children. See In re Child of Danielle F., 2019 ME 65, ¶ 7, 207
A.3d 1193 (rejecting the mother’s argument that the trial court should have
ordered a permanency guardianship because “the court found that the child
needs permanency now, not years down the road”); In re Child of Nicole M.,
2018 ME 75, ¶ 26 & n.9, 187 A.3d 1 (“In cases where the evidence raised the
prospect of disruptive disputes between a parent and a guardian, we affirmed
decisions of the trial court that a permanency plan of adoption—and not a
permanency guardianship—is in the child’s best interest.”). We conclude that
the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it determined that
terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
18
III. CONCLUSION
[¶27] In conclusion, the trial court did not err in its findings of unfitness
regarding the mother and father and did not err or abuse its discretion in
determining that terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the best
interests of the children.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Henry W. Griffin, Esq. (orally), Auburn, for appellant Qunicy A.
Allison Muir Kuhns, Esq. (orally), Law Office of Allison Muir Kuhns, Portland,
for appellant Sharon C.
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Bangor, for appellee Department of
Health and Human Services
Augusta District Court docket number PC-2021-38
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY