Trunk v. Coleman , 2024 Ohio 244 ( 2024 )

[Cite as Trunk v. Coleman, 2024-Ohio-244.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CHRISTINA ANN TRUNK, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 112392
v. :
ROBERT M. COLEMAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 25, 2024
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations
Case No. DR-22-388561
Appearances:
Alexander R. Folk, for appellee.
Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A.
Cruz, and Kelley R. Tauring, for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
Defendant-appellant Robert Coleman (“Appellant”) appeals the
judgment entry of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
Relations Division, which granted appellee, Christina Trunk’s (“Appellee”),
complaint for annulment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant filed an ex parte petition to establish the fact of marriage to
Appellee in the Superior Court of California, Humboldt County, on September 23,
2021. The petition alleged that he and Appellee were married in two self-
solemnizing wedding ceremonies on October 19, 2016. Appellant did not direct the
Humboldt County Clerk of Court to serve Appellee with the petition. The court held
a hearing on the petition on September 30, 2021. Appellee did not appear at the
hearing. (Tr. 154.) The petition was granted ex parte, and Appellant submitted the
judgment entry to the California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”). CDPH
registered the court-ordered delayed marriage certificate on February 17, 2022.
Appellee filed a complaint for annulment in Cuyahoga County
Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, on February 1, 2022. Appellee
alleged that she never consented to marry Appellant, never obtained a marriage
license, nor participated in a ceremony. Appellant responded with a motion to
dismiss, which the trial court denied. The matter proceeded to trial on December
13, 2022.
Appellant testified that he initially did not know what date he and
Appellee were married, but later recalled they were married on October 19, 2016,
the day before his twin sister was murdered at exactly 9:47 p.m. Appellant proffered
several exhibits, including text messages and photographs. However, none of the
exhibits depicted a wedding ceremony nor referenced an actual wedding. (Tr. 158.)
Appellee acknowledged that she was Appellant’s on-and-off girlfriend
between August 2016 and July 2021. It is undisputed that Appellee lived with
Appellant in California from August 12, 2016, through October 19, 2016.
Appellant’s twin sister was attacked on October 20, 2016, and later died. Appellee
traveled with Appellant to Tennessee, where his sister lived, for Appellant to obtain
custody of his deceased sister’s children. Appellee alleged that she volunteered on a
farm in California between October and December 2016 before returning
permanently to Ohio.
In January 2017, Appellee moved in with her mother. She secured
student loans and enrolled in massage therapy school. Appellee documented her
marital status as “single” on her loan application. Appellant and Appellee both
testified they filed their income taxes as unmarried individuals between 2016 and
2021.
Appellant moved to Ohio in May 2017. He lived in a hotel for one
week, then with Appellee and her mother for approximately one week, before
purchasing a home in Columbia Station, Ohio. Appellant secured a mortgage loan
and recorded the mortgage deed as an “unmarried individual” in June 2017.
Appellee testified that she lived with Appellant from January 2018 until she ended
the relationship and obtained an individual lease for an apartment in Middleburg
Heights on July 4, 2021.
Appellant elicited the following testimony from Appellee regarding
her consent to marry him and knowledge of Appellant’s filing of the petition for a
delayed marriage certificate:
Q. So, to clarify, you didn’t have any knowledge, I never requested you
to sign a marriage certificate?
APPELLEE. I never signed a marriage certificate.
Q. Prior to November 22, ‘21?
APPELLEE. I never signed wrote my signature on anything. I never
wrote m[y] signature on —
***
I never wrote my name on any petition, any document. I never agreed
to this marriage, never.
***
Q. When did you first find out about the petition to establish the fact,
date, and time of marriage?
APPELLEE: November 22, 2021.
Q. Did you receive notice of hearing before that?
APPELLEE: No.
Q. Did you have any knowledge of the hearing in September?
APPELLEE: No.
(Tr. 59.)
Appellee had the following exchange with the court, as it relates to her
consent to marry Appellant:
THE COURT: Did you consent to a marriage?
APPELLEE: I did not consent to a marriage.
(Tr. 68, 69.)
The trial court issued a judgment entry on January 10, 2023, granting
Appellee’s complaint for annulment. A nunc pro tunc judgment entry of annulment
with findings of fact and conclusions of law was issued on January 11, 2023.
During the pendency of the case, Appellant filed numerous motions
for delay and harassment. Accordingly, the court deemed Appellant a vexatious
litigator. The court ordered Appellant to seek leave of court before instituting legal
proceedings in the court of claims, any court of common pleas, municipal court, or
county court. Furthermore, the January 11, 2023 order required Appellant to obtain
leave of court before instituting proceedings in the court of appeals under Ohio law.
Appellant’s initial appeal was dismissed when he failed to seek leave to appeal the
trial court’s order. Upon reconsideration, we granted Appellant leave to proceed.
Appellant now appeals, assigning three assignments of error for review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by
denying the Appellant’s motion for continuance to obtain substitute
counsel.
Assignment of Error No. 2
As a matter of law, the trial court erred, abusing its discretion by
prohibiting the Appellant from introducing any evidence or witnesses
at trial, violating his due process rights.
Assignment of Error No. 3
The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by
finding that no marriage occurred and that the order delayed certificate
of marriage issued by the Superior Court of California was a nullity.
Law and Analysis
Motion to Continue Trial
Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court
erred when it denied his motion for continuance. We find Appellant’s assignment
of error disregards his purposeful conduct and other relevant factors the trial court
considered when it denied his request for continuance. Consequently, Appellant’s
contention is without merit.
The decision to grant a motion for an extension of time lies within the
trial court’s sound discretion and will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion. Johnson v. Univ. Hosp. Case Med. Ctr., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90960,
2009-Ohio-2119, ¶ 5. See also Kinas v. Kinas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98965, 2013-
Ohio-3237, ¶ 28. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or
judgment; it implies the court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Stratton v. Stratton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107798, 2019-Ohio-
3279, ¶6, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140(1983).
A reviewing court should consider the length of the delay requested,
whether prior continuances have been granted; inconvenience to the litigants, the
court, and witnesses; whether the requested delay is legitimate rather than dilatory,
purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances
underlying the request; and any other relevant factors. Depompei v. Santabarbara,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101163, 2015-Ohio-18, ¶ 41, Rawlin Gravens Co., L.P.A., v.
Jatsek Constr. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100587, 2014-Ohio-1952, ¶ 22, citing
State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67-68, 616 N.E.2d 186 (1981).
Appellant argues that he attempted to obtain substitute counsel, but
he could not find an attorney due to the issues involved in the case and the
prohibition on continuances. However, the following highlights of the record reveal
Appellant’s actions contributed to the underlying circumstances that necessitated
his request for a continuance.
Appellant first filed a motion for an extension of time to answer the
complaint on March 10, 2022, which was granted until April 11, 2022. On April 11,
2022, an attorney entered a notice of appearance, but instead of filing an answer, he
filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied, on May 9, 2022. Appellant was ordered
to answer the complaint within fourteen days. On May 20, 2022, Appellant’s
attorney filed a motion to withdraw and motion for an extension of time to answer.
Counsel’s request was due, in part, to Appellant discharging him. (App. Brief May
20, 2022). Both motions were granted, and the pretrial was continued until June
6, 2022.
Appellant filed an answer, pro se, on May 24, 2022, and a second
motion to dismiss on July 11, 2022. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to
dismiss and stated that no further continuances would be granted due to
substitution of counsel. On September 23, 2022, a second attorney filed a notice of
appearance for Appellant, and the court continued the trial date of November 16,
2022, to give Appellant’s new counsel time to prepare for trial.
The new trial date was December 13, 2022. Appellant’s second
attorney filed a motion to withdraw on October 7, 2022, and a motion for
continuance. On October 12, 2022, the trial court granted the motion to withdraw.
The journal entry reflects that the trial court weighed the harm a continuance would
cause Appellee, the age of the case, and Appellant’s right to counsel when
considering Appellant’s request for a continuance. The trial court ultimately denied
the motion for continuance, and the final pretrial remained set for October 26, 2022.
Also, the December 13, 2022 trial date remained.
Appellant filed several pro se motions throughout the pendency of the
case, including a motion for conciliation1 on November 27, 2022, which the court
denied. He also filed an answer and the following motions: temporary support;
subpoenas; sanctions (two hundred fourteen pages); dismissal; continuance;
reconsideration of temporary support; and mutual access to the marital residence.
The record reflects that many of these motions were frivolous.
Appellant’s third attorney filed a limited notice of appearance on
November 30, 2022, followed shortly by a motion to withdraw on December
6, 2022. Counsel cited the Rules of Professional Conduct, which require an attorney
1 The Ohio legislature has not codified conciliation within the Revised Code.
Appellant obtained the motion template from an Arizona court’s website.
to withdraw representation when there is a fundamental disagreement with the
actions a client wants the attorney to take. Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(B)(4). The trial court
granted the motion to withdraw.
Moreover, the court noted in its findings of fact and conclusions of
law that Appellant took actions throughout the proceedings that appeared to be for
delay. Furthermore, the trial court found Appellant to be a vexatious litigator due
to the number of voluminous, frivolous motions he filed. One such example was a
motion for access to the “marital home” that Appellant filed to obtain court-ordered
access to Appellee’s apartment, though he had never lived there. The appellant’s
conduct throughout these proceedings may have made it difficult for the Appellant
to find an attorney willing to engage in frivolous motion practice on his behalf.
Doing so would violate the Professional Rules of Conduct and subject a licensed
attorney to sanctions.
Given the court’s initial responsiveness to Appellant’s requests for
extensions of time and continuances and Appellant’s senseless pro se motions, we
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s final
motion to continue. Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Exclusion of Evidence
Appellant argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court
erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it prohibited him from
introducing any evidence or witnesses at trial. We find Appellant’s argument is
without merit.
Decisions involving the granting or denying a motion in limine are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc., 135
Ohio St.3d 440, 2013-Ohio-1507, 989 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 22. Generally, a trial court has
broad discretion concerning decisions on the admission and exclusion of evidence.
Barton v. Cty. of Cuyahoga, 2020-Ohio-6994, 166 N.E.3d 129, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.),
citing Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, 834
N.E.2d 323, ¶ 20. We will not reverse a court’s order concerning the conduct of
discovery absent an abuse of discretion. See Arnold v. Am. Natl. Red Cross, 93 Ohio
App.3d 564, 639 N.E.2d 484 (8th Dist.1994).
In the instant case, Appellee filed a motion in limine on December 7,
2022, to exclude evidence and witnesses that Appellant failed to disclose he
intended to introduce at trial. “One of the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure
is to eliminate surprise.” Djukic v. Turner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88849, 2007-
Ohio-4433, ¶ 13.
The trial court ordered the parties to begin discovery by journal entry
on May 19, 2022. The parties were ordered to exchange exhibits no later than seven
days before trial in the court’s July 11, 2022 case management order. Additionally,
the parties were required to file trial briefs before the December 13, 2022 trial.
Appellant failed to comply with the trial court’s discovery orders.
We have previously held that pro se litigants are presumed to have
knowledge of the law and correct legal procedure and are held to
the same standards as all other litigants. Hudson & Keyse LLC v. Sherrills, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110366, 2022-Ohio-126, ¶ 20, citing Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore
Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 363, 676 N.E.2d 171 (8th Dist.1996). Both parties filed
briefs, but appellant failed to disclose witness names or an exhibit list in his brief. A
trial court does not abuse discretion by excluding undisclosed evidence that gives
rise to unfair surprise. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 85, 482
N.E.2d 1248 (1985). The trial court permitted Appellant to proffer the excluded
exhibits for appellate review. This court has thoroughly reviewed the entire record
and finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Appellee’s
motion in limine. Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
California Marriage Laws
In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court
committed an error of law and abused its discretion by finding that no marriage took
place and declaring the delayed certificate of marriage issued in California invalid
and the alleged marriage null and void ab initio. This assignment of error is without
merit.
As a preliminary matter, it is worthy to note that the underlying facts
of this case are particularly bizarre primarily due to Appellant’s actions. The
Appellant secured a judgment entry establishing the facts of an alleged marriage
after an ex parte hearing in California. He subsequently obtained a delayed marriage
certificate that he now claims is conclusive proof of his alleged marriage to Appellee.
Notably, Appellee had no knowledge of his actions, did not consent, nor participate
in the California court proceedings.
Before reviewing the ultimate issue of the trial court’s granting
Appellee’s complaint for annulment, this court must determine if there is a valid
California marriage. In doing so, we must 1) determine the effect of the Appellant’s
delayed marriage certificate; 2) examine Appellee’s collateral attack on Appellant’s
claim of a valid marriage; 3) consider the application of the Full Faith and Credit
doctrine under Ohio law as it pertains to the alleged marriage; and 4) determine the
trial court’s inherent power to: employ its equitable authority to declare the
marriage certificate invalid and the alleged marriage null and void; and grant
Appellee’s complaint for annulment.
“Generally, the validity of a marriage is determined by the lex loci
contractus; if the marriage is valid where solemnized, it is valid elsewhere; if it is
invalid there, it is invalid everywhere.” Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 168 Ohio St. 357,
358, 155 N.E.2d 206 (1958), McDowell v. Sapp, 39 Ohio St. 558, 560 (1883). “Ohio
recognizes all other out-of-state marriages, if valid in the state performed, and even
if not authorized nor validly performed under Ohio law, such as marriages between
first cousins, marriages of certain minors, and common law marriages.” Obergefell
v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp.2d 968, 973 (S.D.Ohio 2013). Therefore, as an initial
matter, we must examine California law to determine if the parties have a valid
California marriage.
Certificate of Marriage is Not Conclusive
Appellant claims the certificate of delayed marriage is conclusive
proof that he and Appellee were married in 2016. We are confronted with whether
the trial court is required to accept this delayed marriage certificate as conclusive
evidence of the validity of a California marriage when it was obtained through an ex
parte proceeding. The standard of review applicable to this issue is an abuse of
discretion. Bevan v. Bevan, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-018, 2006-Ohio-2775, ¶ 22.
{¶ 33} The California Legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme
regulating marriage in California, “setting forth in detail the procedures to be
followed.” Chaney v. Netterstrom, 21 Cal.App.5th 61, 65, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 860(2018), citing Lockyer v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1079, 17
Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 95 P.3d 459 (2004). The marriage statutes provide procedures for
validating and recording contested and uncontested marriages.2 An uncontested
judgment, declaring a marriage, entered by consent or stipulation, has a
conclusive effect on a judgment rendered after trial. Needelman v. DeWolf Realty
Co., Inc., 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 759, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 673 (2015). However, absent
conclusive proof, a California judgment establishing the fact of marriage is open to
collateral attack. In re Marriage of Seaton, 200 Cal.App.4th 800, 808, 133
Cal.Rptr.3d 50 (2011).
2 Cal.Fam. Code 425 provides the procedure for validating an uncontested
marriage by stipulation or agreement of the parties.
Cal.Fam.Code 309 provides procedures for validating contested marriages and
marriages when a party is unavailable.
Cal.Fam.Code 309 also provides procedures for establishing the fact of marriage
through an ex parte proceeding under Health and Safety Code Section 103450.
California’s Civil Rules establish the procedure for a party or nonparty
to attack the collateral effect of a judgment. California Code of Civil Procedure
(“CCP”) 1908 states in relevant part:
At any time before a final judgment, as defined in Section 577, a
determination of whether the judgment, verdict upon which it was
entered, or a finding upon which it was entered is to be binding upon a
nonparty under this subdivision or whether such nonparty is entitled
to the benefit of this subdivision may, on the noticed motion of any
party or any nonparty that may be affected by this subdivision, be made
in the court in which the action was tried or in which the action is
pending on appeal. If no such motion is made before the judgment
becomes final, the determination may be made in a separate action. If
appropriate, a judgment may be entered or ordered to be entered
pursuant to such determination.
Cal.Civ.Proc.Code 1908.
Generally, CCP 1908 applies to marriage record judgments.
However, California law has established that ex parte “marriage record” orders
under the Health and Safety Code are viewed as administrative functions or acts of
recordation that the legislature has authorized the courts to perform. Schmidt v.
Retirement Bd., 37 Cal.App.4th 1204, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 (1995). These records are
not orders or judgments to which effect must be given under the Code of Civil
Procedure. Id. Thus, CCP 1908 does not apply to orders purporting to establish the
facts of a marriage that were obtained ex parte. Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796,
803, 221 P.2d 1 (1950), citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 70 S.Ct.652, 94 L.Ed.865 (1950).
A judgment of a court purporting to bind a person by the findings of
fact of an earlier action, when the person was not afforded proper notice of the
earlier pending action, deprives that person of property without due process of law
and is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. The statutory scheme under the California Health and Safety Code does not
accord to ex parte “marriage record” orders conclusive or even prima facie effect,
and to give these orders such evidentiary weight in an action involving a non-
consenting party infringes on that party’s due process rights. See Schmidt at 1207.
Appellant’s argument that the record of marriage he obtained ex parte validated the
parties’ marriage, under California law, because it is a judgment of the court given
effect by CCP 1908, is contrary to California’s marriage laws and Appellee’s right of
due process.
Importantly, Appellant failed to demonstrate that Appellee had
notice of Appellant’s filing a petition for an order to establish the fact of marriage.
Given the clear and substantial evidence that Appellee had not been served, the trial
court determined that Appellee was not notified of the California proceedings.
When asked if the Appellant directed the court clerk in Humboldt, California, to
serve Appellee with the petition, he responded, “No. They said I was the only person
they were serving. They said no one else needed to be served.” The record reveals
that Appellant’s efforts to notify Appellee of the pending proceedings in California
legitimately came after he obtained a judgment establishing the fact of marriage.
Appellant testified extensively about his measures to inform Appellee
that he had initiated proceedings in California to “validate” the alleged marriage. He
texted Appellee from numerous unknown numbers, had a friend attempt to give the
documents to Appellee, and caused a packet containing the petition to be left on the
outside of Appellee’s car on November 22, 2021. Consequently, the trial court found
that Appellee was not notified of the California proceedings and that the judgment
was obtained ex parte.
The trial court correctly determined that the delayed certificate of
marriage Appellant obtained through an ex parte proceeding is merely a statistical
record acknowledging the late registration of an alleged marriage, not conclusive
proof of marriage. See id. Consequently, the certificate is subject to collateral attack
and invalidation by Appellee.
Marriage Without Consent is Invalid
Appellee claims the alleged marriage is invalid because she never
consented to marry Appellant and had no notice of the California proceedings. The
“invalidity of a void marriage may be shown collaterally in any proceeding in which
the fact of marriage may be material.” In re Marriage of Seaton, 200 Cal.App.4th
800 at 808, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 50. Appellee’s argument in support of annulment is
lack of consent and notice.
It is well settled that a valid marriage requires the parties’ consent,
capacity to consent, solemnization, and mutual assumption of marital rights, duties,
or obligations under California law. Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1, 8, 16 P. 345 (1888).
Clear and convincing proof that a party did not consent to marry invalidates a
judgment establishing the fact of marriage, and the injured party is entitled to a
declaration of nullity. In re Marriage of Cantarella, 191 Cal.App.4th 916, 923, 119
Cal.Rptr.3d 829 (2011).
California and Ohio both recognize that a void marriage is invalid for
all purposes from the moment of its inception, whether or not it has been so declared
in a court of law. Lockyer, 33 Cal.4th 1055, at 1114, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 95 P.3d 459(2004); see Darling v. Darling, 44 Ohio App.2d 5, 7, 335 N.E.2d 708 (8th
Dist.1975). In the instant case, the trial court found that the judgment of the fact of
marriage was void ab initio because Appellee demonstrated by clear and convincing
proof that she never consented to marry Appellant and never solemnized a marriage.
The fundamental requirement to establish the existence of a common law marriage
is consent between the parties. See In re Estate of Shepherd, 97 Ohio App.3d 280,
283, 646 N.E.2d 561 (3d Dist.1994). Clear and convincing evidence establishes a
high probability of the existence of the disputed fact, more significant than proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. Nevarrez v. San Marino Skilled Nursing &
Wellness Centre, LLC, 221 Cal.App.4th 102, 113, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 874 (2013).
Appellee claims she did not consent to marry Appellant, sign a marriage license, or
solemnize the marriage. The test for determining the existence of a valid marriage is
fact-specific. Bevan, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-018, 2006-Ohio-2775, at ¶ 25.
When there is a dispute about the validity of a marriage, the trier of fact is charged
with determining the weight and credibility of witnesses and “is free to believe all,
part, or none of the testimony presented to it.” Sulfridge v. Kindle, 4th Dist. Adams
No. 04CA795, 2005-Ohio-3929 ¶20. A trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. Id.Both parties testified during the trial. Appellee testified that she had
never consented to marry Appellant. There was no marriage license nor pictures of
the wedding ceremony. There were text messages that reflected the parties were
“boyfriend” and “girlfriend” long after the date of the alleged marriage.
In regard to finances, both Appellant and Appellee filed taxes
individually. Appellant claims that he only filed his taxes individually so that
Appellee would not get in trouble. Additionally, Appellee applied for her student
loans as an unmarried individual, and Appellant purchased a home as an unmarried
individual. The loan, mortgage deed, and tax filings demonstrated their single
status.
For the alleged marriage, Appellant claims he did not initially
remember the marriage date but later recalled two ceremonies on the same day, one
at 10:00 a.m., and the second at exactly 9:47 p.m., on October 19, 2016. He testified
that the officiant who married them died, and the marriage license they obtained
before the ceremony was lost or destroyed.
Importantly, the trial court found Appellant’s testimony
contradictory and delusional. Appellant relied on several self-serving affidavits to
obtain the ex parte judgment in California. Appellant executed several affidavits in
support of his claim that the parties were married. The trial court noted that
Appellant’s claim arose after Appellee ended the relationship. Moreover, the court
found that Appellant’s affidavits in the instant case were not credible.
Furthermore, the record supports by clear and convincing evidence
the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law because it contains no
credible evidence supporting the elements of marriage between Appellant and
Appellee. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that
the judgment recording the facts of the parties’ alleged marriage is invalid and the
alleged marriage is null and void under California law.
Void Judgments are Not Entitled to Full Faith and Credit
Now, Appellant argues that his out-of-state judgment is accorded the
Full Faith and Credit of an Ohio judgment. The decision to give Full Faith and Credit
to another state’s court decisions is a question of law. We review legal questions
under a de novo standard of review. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros.
Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 N.E.2d 684 (1995). A de novo review requires an
independent review of the lower court’s decision without deference to that court’s
decision. Brown v. Cty. Commr., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th
Dist.1993). Rice v. Flynn, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22416, 2005-Ohio-4667, ¶ 28.
A valid judgment of another state is entitled to Full Faith and Credit
under the federal Constitution and Ohio statutes. Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio
108, 109 (1837). However, a void judgment is not entitled to the Full Faith and
Credit of another state. Id. When a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
respondent to a petition, resides in another state, has no notice of the proceedings,
and false and fraudulent representations obtained the decree, the judgment is void.
Id. Having previously determined the certificate of delayed marriage void, we find
the California judgment is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit under Ohio law.
Annulment of Invalid Marriage
Appellee has collaterally attacked the validity of the alleged marriage
by filing an annulment action in Ohio. However, Appellant argues that Ohio’s
statutory scheme does not permit the trial court to grant an annulment when
determining a marriage is void. We disagree.
It is well-settled law that an Ohio domestic relations court is a court
of equity that may exercise its ordinary powers to declare a marriage a nullity, void
ab initio, upon a determination that the alleged marriage is invalid. Waymire v.
Jetmore, 22 Ohio St. 271, 274 (1872). See Newell v. Newell, 23 Ohio App.2d 149,
150, 261 N.E.2d 278 (5th Dist.1970). The court’s equitable powers are also
statutorily memorialized in R.C. 3105.011, which states in relevant part:
(A) The court of common pleas, including divisions of domestic
relations courts, has full equitable powers and jurisdiction
appropriate to determining all domestic relations matters. This
section is not a determination by the general assembly that such
equitable powers and jurisdiction do not exist concerning any such
matter.
***
(B) (2) Actions and proceedings under Chapters 3104. * * *.
Appellee argues that the order of declaration of marriage was
procured fraudulently using false affidavits in the California Superior Court.3 The
California court subsequently relied on these false affidavits and granted Appellant’s
request for an order injuring Appellee. The trial court accepted Appellee’s collateral
attack on the marriage.
The record reflects that Appellant manipulated California’s
complicated marriage laws. These laws permit an individual, including one not a
party to the marriage, to obtain a judgment order of the facts of a marriage. Clearly,
Appellant used the California judgment in Ohio in an attempt to validate this
fictitious marriage, all without Appellee’s consent. Furthermore, it is worth noting
that Appellant included case law from several states that permit common law
marriage and informed Appellee that he intended to establish a marriage in other
states.
Ohio’s annulment statute under R.C. 3105 does not address these
unusual facts. However, R.C. 3103.011 grants the domestic relations court full
equity powers and jurisdiction in domestic relations matters. Miller v. Miller, 92
Ohio App.3d 340, 347, 635 N.E.2d 384 (6th Dist.1993). Therefore, Ohio domestic
relations courts may exercise their equitable authority by statute and common law
when the facts and circumstances demand it.
3 Count 8 of Appellee’s complaint for annulment states: 8. Plaintiff states that she
desires an annulment from the defendant on the grounds that the marriage
acknowledgement was obtained through deception and fraud.
Appellee has proven by clear and convincing evidence she never
consented to marriage with Appellant. Therefore, Appellee is entitled to a
declaration of nullity. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it exercised
its equitable authority by issuing a judgment of nullity to bar Appellant from further
perpetuating an alleged marriage to Appellee. Accordingly, the trial court properly
granted Appellee’s petition for annulment.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR