State v. Crawl ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Crawl, 2024-Ohio-752.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 29859
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. CRB2200844
:
DORIAN L. CRAWL : (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)
:
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on March 1, 2024
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ARVIN S. MILLER, Attorney for Appellant
MARIA L. RABOLD, Attorney for Appellee
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WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, Dorian L. Crawl, appeals from a judgment finding him
guilty of menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). According to Crawl,
his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest
weight of the evidence because the State failed to prove the following matters: that Crawl
acted knowingly; that the alleged victim, A.P., suffered mental distress; and that Crawl
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engaged in a pattern of conduct as required by the statute. Having reviewed the record,
we find the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Crawl’s assignments of error will be
overruled, and the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On August 11, 2022, the State filed a criminal complaint against Crawl
charging him with menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), a first-degree
misdemeanor. The alleged victim, A.P., was Crawl’s former classmate.
{¶ 3} After Crawl pled not guilty, the court held a bench trial on June 13, 2023. At
that time, the State presented testimony from A.P. and from Sergeant Selmon, who was
employed by the West Carrollton Police Department. A.P. testified that she knew Crawl
but did not recall having seen him since she was around 12 or 13 years old, when they
had attended the same elementary school. Trial Transcript (“Tr.”), 11. A.P. had not
talked to Crawl since that time. Id. at 11-12. They were not friends during school, and
A.P. was not sure she had ever even talked to Crawl. Id. at 25. At the time of trial, A.P.
was 30 years old and had a nine-year old child. Id. at 6.
{¶ 4} In 2020, Crawl sent a message to A.P. through her social media account on
Instagram. A.P. did not respond and did not approve a friend request. Id. at 12-13.
A.P. had had the Instagram account since around high school, but she had not used it as
frequently in the past as she did in 2022. As a result, A.P. did not see Crawl’s 2020
message until May 24, 2022, when she posted again on Instagram and became aware of
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the prior message. Id. at 14 and 20.
{¶ 5} On that day, A.P. posted a picture for her birthday, which said, “29, be great
to me.” Id. A.P.’s Instagram account was not private, so anyone could see her posts.
Id. at 18. In response, Crawl sent another message, with a “sad emoji.” Underneath,
Crawl stated: “Happy Birthday, baby girl. I love you. Hope we can see each other
sometime soon.” Id. at 16. A.P. did not respond to these messages. They made her
feel very uncomfortable. Id.
{¶ 6} On May 30, 2022, A.P. posted what is called a “Boomerang” video, in which
someone throws a boomerang and it comes back to them. Tr. at 17-18 and 20. In
response to the video, Crawl sent a message stating, “Where is this, [A.P.]? Is this your
house, boo?” A.P. did not respond to that message, either. Id. at 18. Subsequently,
on June 27, 2022, Crawl showed up at A.P.’s front door, and A.P. looked through the
peephole and saw him. When she asked who was there, Crawl said, “It’s Dorian. I’m
[A.P.’s] friend. I’m here to see her.” At that point, Crawl turned the doorknob. Id. at 9-
10.
{¶ 7} A.P. “freaked out” because Crawl had been sending messages asking where
she lived and a lot of weird things. Her child was also in the house, and she did not know
if Crawl was going to try to continue to force his way through the door. Id. at 19, 21, and
26. The door was unlocked, and A.P. turned the deadbolt. She then ran back to where
her daughter was, placed her in a closet, and told her not to move until she (A.P.) came
back. A.P. then called the police. Id. at 10.
{¶ 8} After the incident, A.P. installed cameras around her apartment, made sure
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that she was on her phone with someone when she came home late at night with her
daughter, and had her boyfriend stay over a lot more often because she was
uncomfortable staying alone. Id. at 19. A.P. was also looking for another place to live
and intended to move immediately. Id. at 19-20. She said she continued to have a
great deal of anxiety in general and upon seeing Crawl in court. Id. at 28.
{¶ 9} On June 27, 2022, Officer Selmon was dispatched to the area regarding
“suspicious circumstances where a male had tried to enter a residence.” Tr. at 32.
When Selmon first made contact with A.P., she “was visibly upset, shaken, crying.” Id.
Selmon stated, “You could tell she was nervous, as if something significant happened to
her.” Id. at 32-33. Selmon then investigated, including speaking with Crawl over the
telephone. Id. at 33.
{¶ 10} Crawl told Officer Selmon that “he had known [A.P.] since their teenage
years, that they were never friends, never talked in school, but that he felt there was more
and he was looking into that, more of a relationship that they could have had. So he was
attempting to make contact with A.P. to follow up on that.” Id. at 34. Crawl also said
that “he was trying to figure out what was going on with them and elaborated, stating that
basically that meant that – why she had never asked him to prom in their younger years
and then why there wasn’t a relationship.” Id. at 34-35.
{¶ 11} Concerning A.P.’s lack of response, Crawl told Selmon that A.P. had never
provided him with her address and that he had located it by Googling her name. Crawl
stated that was how he came across A.P.’s address and showed up at her house on June
27, 2022. Id. at 35. In addition, Crawl told Selmon that he “was trying to remain calm
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and collected” and that he had not liked the way [A.P.] had reacted to him. Id. at 36-37.
Even after the criminal action was filed, Crawl sent messages to A.P. through her
Facebook account in March 2023. Id. at 26-27.
{¶ 12} At the end of the State’s case, Crawl moved for a judgment of acquittal,
which was denied. Tr. at 41-44. The defense then elected not to present any evidence.
After taking the matter under advisement, the court found Crawl guilty on June 22, 2023.
The court sentenced Crawl to 180 days in jail, suspended 178 days with two days jail time
credit, placed him on probation for two years, and issued a protection order prohibiting
him from having contact with A.P. for a period of two years. Crawl filed a motion to stay
execution of his sentence during the pendency of the appeal, and the trial court granted
a stay on July 12, 2023. Previously, Crawl had filed a timely notice of appeal from his
conviction.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Manifest Weight Challenge
{¶ 13} In support of his appeal, Crawl has raised two assignments of error.
Because they are interrelated, we will consider them together. Crawl’s first assignment
of error states that:
The Trial Court Erred by Not Granting the Defendant’s Rule 29
Motion for Acquittal When the State Failed to Provide Sufficient Evidence
on All Elements of the Charge, Thus Violating the Defendant’s Due Process
Rights.
{¶ 14} Crawl’s second assignment of error states that:
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The Trial Court Committed Error by Not Granting the Defendant’s
Motion for Acquittal at the Close of the State’s Case.
{¶ 15} Concerning sufficiency, Crawl contends the State failed to provide evidence
about several elements of stalking. Specifically, Crawl asserts: (1) a lack of evidence
that he knowingly caused A.P. to believe he would harm her or that he knowingly caused
A.P. emotional distress; and (2) a lack of evidence of a pattern of conduct that would
support a stalking conviction. The manifest weight challenge is based on the same
points.
A. Applicable Standards
{¶ 16} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has
presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to
the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678
N.E.2d 541 (1997). In such situations, we apply the test from State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), which states that:
An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial
to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the
average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
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essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 17} In contrast, “[a] weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability
of the evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence
is more believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson at ¶ 12. In this instance,
a court reviews “ ‘the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power
to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Accord State v. Drummond, 111
Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 193.
{¶ 18} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts,
manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that
a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a
finding of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11. Accord State v. Pulley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
29501, 2023-Ohio-3277, ¶ 140. Consequently, “a determination that a conviction is
supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.”
(Citations omitted.) State v. Braxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198,
¶ 15.
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{¶ 19} As an additional matter, “[b]ecause the factfinder * * * has the opportunity
to see and hear the witnesses, the cautious exercise of the discretionary power of a court
of appeals to find that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires
that substantial deference be extended to the factfinder's determinations of credibility.
The decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses
is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.”
State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997).
Accord State v. Brock, 2019-Ohio-3116, 140 N.E.3d 1239, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.).
B. Discussion
{¶ 20} Crawl was charged with menacing by stalking in violation of R.C.
2903.211(A)(1). This statute provides that: “No person by engaging in a pattern of
conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause
physical harm to the other person or a family or household member of the other person
or cause mental distress to the other person or a family or household member of the other
person.”
{¶ 21} In challenging his conviction, Crawl first argues that his actions did not
threaten A.P. and did not cause her mental distress. He notes that his remarks on A.P.’s
social media account constituted nothing more than uncomfortable comments, and that
A.P. never blocked him from viewing her public posts or told him to stop responding to
her posts.
{¶ 22} “ ‘'Mental distress’ means any of the following: (a) Any mental illness or
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condition that involves some temporary substantial incapacity; (b) Any mental illness or
condition that would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or
other mental health services, whether or not any person requested or received psychiatric
treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services.” R.C.
2903.211(D)(2)(a) and (b). “ ‘Mental distress need not be incapacitating or debilitating
* * * [and] expert testimony is not required to find mental distress.’ ” State v. Szloh, 189
Ohio App.3d 13, 2010-Ohio-3777, 937 N.E.2d 168, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), quoting Perry v.
Joseph, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 07AP-359, 07AP-360, and 07AP-361, 2008-Ohio-1107,
¶ 8. “ ‘A trial court is permitted to rely on its knowledge and experience in determining
whether mental distress has been caused.’ ” Id.{¶ 23} Here, Crawl’s social media comments were unquestionably inappropriate.
The parties had not seen each other since elementary school and never had any
relationship. In that context, calling A.P. by the name of “baby girl,” professing love, and
expressing a desire to get together soon were bizarre. Even so, if Crawl’s actions had
been confined to these few strange comments on social media, a reasonable person
probably would not have suffered emotional distress as defined by the statute.
{¶ 24} However, Crawl ignores his subsequent actions after making these
comments, i.e., when he showed up uninvited and attempted to enter A.P.’s home. This
was sufficient to cause mental distress, and, in fact, did cause distress, as A.P. testified.
Compare State v. Neeley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25229, 2013-Ohio-303, ¶ 19 (finding
sufficient evidence of mental distress where victim testified that she was afraid of
defendant following his actions and had installed a security system in her home).
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{¶ 25} Crawl’s next point is that the State failed to establish that he acted
knowingly, because he was unaware that his remarks on A.P.’s social media account
would cause her mental distress. “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when
the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the
person is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶ 26} Again, had Crawl’s actions simply been confined to the social media
responses, his argument might have merit. More occurred here, however. What was
most disturbing was that Crawl attempted to enter A.P.’s home. A reasonable person
would be aware that entering or attempting to enter someone’s home under these
circumstances would cause mental distress.
{¶ 27} In this context, Crawl argues that, absent any prior relationship, he would
not have been aware that his actions were unwanted. Ironically, the lack of a prior
relationship here indicated the opposite. In essence, Crawl occupied the same position
as a stranger; having someone in that position try to break into one’s home could certainly
cause mental distress.
{¶ 28} Crawl’s final argument is that his actions in responding to social media posts
and showing up at A.P.’s home did not demonstrate the needed “pattern” of activity to
support a stalking conviction. Again, Crawl focuses on the parties’ lack of a prior
relationship as well as the fact that A.P. did not fear for her safety based on his social
media comments.
{¶ 29} A “pattern of conduct” is defined as “two or more actions or incidents closely
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related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those
actions or incidents * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). “In determining what constitutes a
pattern of conduct, courts must take every action of the respondent into consideration,
even if some of the actions in isolation do not seem particularly threatening.” Cable v.
McHenry, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28398, 2019-Ohio-4293, ¶ 12, citing Middletown v.
Jones, 167 Ohio App.3d 679, 2006-Ohio-3465, 856 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.).
“Explicit threats are not necessary; therefore, nonverbal acts directed at the victim may
be enough to cause the victim reasonably to believe that physical harm will ensue.” Id.,citing State v. Smith, 126 Ohio App.3d 193, 709 N.E.2d 1245 (7th Dist.1998).
{¶ 30} For the reasons previously discussed, there was a pattern of conduct. The
two social media posts were close in time to Crawl’s visit to A.P.’s home, and his attempt
to enter her home was a nonverbal act directed at A.P.
{¶ 31} Having reviewed the entire record and having accorded substantial
deference to the trial court’s credibility decisions, we find the conviction was supported by
the manifest weight of the evidence. In turn, that disposes of the argument as to
sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, both assignments of error are overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 32} Both of Crawl’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
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EPLEY, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.