Missouri Ex Rel. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy , 18 S. Ct. 505 ( 1898 )

170 U.S. 78 (1898)

MISSOURI, ex rel. LACLEDE GAS LIGHT COMPANY
v.
MURPHY.

No. 47.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued March 1, 2, 1898. Decided April 11, 1898. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

Mr. Henry Hitchcock for plaintiff in error.

Mr. W.C. Marshall for defendants in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

Mandamus lies to compel a party to do that which it is his duty to do, but can confer no new authority, and the party to be coerced must have the power to perform the act. Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U.S. 493, 501.

On the facts disclosed by the record, was it the duty of the street commissioner to issue a permit to the company to make excavations on Broadway so that it might place electric wires under the surface of the street?

The Supreme Court of the State held that it was not the duty of the street commissioner to do so. Did that court in so holding give effect to ordinances impairing the obligations of the contract created by the company's charter?

Assuming the charter to be in force, as contended, the company was authorized to light the city, and to lay down pipes for that purpose, "with as much dispatch and as little inconvenience to the public as possible." It originally furnished light by means of gas through underground pipes, and when electricity came into use it furnished electric light through overhead wires. It now sought to put these electric wires under the surface; and it insisted that it had a vested right to do this without being controlled by the municipal authorities.

Subsequently to the passage of the acts of 1857 and 1868, a city charter had been adopted, whereby the State vested the city with the power to regulate the use of the streets, and pass ordinances deemed expedient "in maintaining the peace, good government, health and welfare of the city, its trade, commerce and manufactures."

The board of public improvements of the city of St. Louis, consisting of a president, the street commissioner, the sewer commissioner, the water commissioner, the harbor and wharf commissioner and the park commissioner, has existed for many years under the charter and ordinances of that city. Each of these commissioners is the head of the department indicated by the title of the office, and has special charge thereof, but subject to the general control of the board, and the board is charged with the duty, among other things, of furnishing data and information to the municipal assembly of the city in respect of matters with which it is called upon to deal; preparing and recommending ordinances for the improvement and lighting of the streets; and establishing regulations for excavations and the laying of gas pipes in the streets, etc., etc., chap. 33, Rev. Ord. 1892, p. 976; chap. 32, Rev. Ord. 1887, p. 893; chap. 32, Rev. Ord. 1881, p. 716.

The street commissioner had primary jurisdiction over streets and highways, and § 568, Article I of chap. 15 of the Revised Ordinance of 1887, which article treated of excavations in streets and public places, for various purposes, provided that "No person shall make or cause to be made any excavation on any public street, highway or alley, without written permission of the street commissioner so to do, except public work done under the authority of the water or sewer commissioner, who at the time of ordering any such excavating shall notify the street commissioner of the same."

By §§ 581, 582, 583, et seq., Article II of the same chapter, wires, tubes or cables carrying electricity for the production of light or power were to be placed above or below the surface of the ground of streets, alleys or public places, and secured in such manner as prescribed by the board of public improvements, and that board, on the filing of an application stating the streets, alleys and public places desired to be occupied and the manner in which the wires, tubes or cables were to be secured, were authorized to grant a permit for such occupancy, with such restrictions, regulations and qualifications as the board might designate, etc., etc. These were sections of Ordinance No. 12,723. (See Revised Ordinance 1887, p. 652.)

Section 590, Article I, chap. 15 of the Revised. Ordinance of 1892, was the same as § 568 of Revised Ordinance of 1887, and §§ 603, 604, et seq., of Art. II of that chapter, quoted ante, corresponded substantially with sections 581, etc., of the Ordinance of 1887. (Revised Ordinance 1892, p. 660.)

Section 2721, chap. 42 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, (vol. 1, p. 693,) provided: "Companies organized under the provisions of this article, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining telephone or magnetic telegraph lines, are authorized to set their poles, piers, abutments, wires and other fixtures along, across or under any of the public roads, streets and waters of this State, in such manner as not to incommode the public in the use of such roads, streets and waters; Provided, Any telegraph or telephone company desiring to place their wires and other fixtures under ground, in any city, shall first obtain consent from said city through the municipal authorities thereof."

The company asserted by its pleadings that it had never accepted the provisions of Ordinance 12,723, and the subsequent ordinances, and had never obtained the consent of the municipal assembly to occupy the streets with electric wires laid under their surface.

Nor had the company ever applied to the board of public improvements for a permit to occupy Broadway with electric wires laid under the surface of that street.

But the company asserted that the only limitation on its power to so occupy the streets was that the work should be done "with as much dispatch and as little inconvenience to the public as possible."

And, admitting that it sought to excavate with the view to occupy the street with electric wires laid under the surface, the company demanded the writ of mandamus to compel the street commissioner to issue a permit allowing it to excavate for that purpose.

The Supreme Court held that the grant of the State to the company, "though construed to include the right to use electricity for illuminating purposes in respect to such right was taken subject to reasonable regulations as to its use, and the power to regulate has been delegated to the city of St. Louis. Under its general public power the city has the right to require compliance with reasonable regulations as a condition to using its streets by electric wires."

In view of the want of knowledge of the art of producing light by electricity when the franchise was granted, the court thought that "it would be most unwarrantable to imply, not only that relator had the right under the general words used in the act of incorporation to use electricity for lighting purposes, but that it also had the right to adopt its own methods for exercising that power, regardless of the paramount rights of the public to the use of the streets. The power delegated to the city to regulate the use of its streets existed before the art of lighting by electricity was known, or at least before relator adopted it, and the art should be exercised, if at all, under the powers thus in force when it was brought into use."

Considering the danger to life and property from electric wires when charged, it seemed to the court too plain for argument that the city should have the right to direct the manner in which their use should be exercised, and especially when more than one method was open, and the rights and safety of the public were more or less affected by either.

Again, many companies used electric wires for various purposes, and to accommodate them all and prevent monopolies in the use of the streets it appeared absolutely necessary that the municipal authorities should have the right to direct the manner in which wires should be placed under ground.

The court was of opinion that it would be time enough for the company to complain when its rights were distinctly infringed, and held that the street commissioner "properly refused to grant the permit demanded unless relator first complied with the requirements of the valid ordinances then in force."

Obviously the Supreme Court declined to enter on a discussion as to what were and what were not valid ordinances, as respected the company, because the record showed that the company denied that it was subject to any control by the municipal authorities, and claimed that all that was required of it by its charter was to do the work with as much dispatch and as little inconvenience as possible.

It had made no application to the municipal assembly, directly or through the board of public improvements, for authority to proceed.

It had not filed any application with the board of public improvements giving details of the streets it wished to occupy, and the manner in which the wires, etc., were to be secured, supported and insulated, and a plat of the route; nor asked that board for a permit for the occupancy it desired.

Whatever objections the company may have been entitled to raise to particular provisions of the ordinances, in denial of their applicability or validity, it took no action whatever, so far as this record shows, calculated to bring such matters to a distinct issue.

The street commissioner had no power under the charter and ordinances to issue the permit requested in the absence of the assent of the board of public improvements, which had general control; and the court could not command him to do that which it was not his official duty to perform.

Judgment to that effect in itself involved no Federal question, for confessedly there was no contract right that leave to excavate should be given by a particular officer; but we concur with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the company was subject to reasonable regulations in the exercise of the police powers of the city, and so far as that involved any Federal question, such question was correctly decided. New York v. Squire, 145 U.S. 175; St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 148 U.S. 92; 149 U.S. 465.

We are unable to accede to the contention that the company was entitled by contract with the State to lay electric wires under ground without reference to the directions or regulations of the city on that subject; or that the street commissioner was obliged to permit it to excavate the streets for that purpose without the assent of the board of public improvements or of the municipal assembly, or effort to obtain either, on the mere averment of the company that it fears it might thereby subject itself to requirements from which it insists it was exempted by the terms of its charter.

If the company, as it asserted, possessed the right to place electric wires beneath the surface of the streets, that right was subject to such reasonable regulations as the city deemed best to make for the public safety and convenience, and the duty rested on the company to comply with them.

If requirements were exacted or duties imposed by the ordinances, which, if enforced, would have impaired the obligations of the company's contract, this did not relieve the company from offering to do those things which it was lawfully bound to do.

The exemption of the company from requirements inconsistent with its charter could not operate to relieve it from submitting itself to such police regulations as the city might lawfully impose. And until it had complied, or offered to comply, with regulations to which it was bound to conform, it was not in a position to assert that its charter rights were invaded because of other regulations, which, though applicable to other companies, it contended would be invalid if applied to it.

The Supreme Court of Missouri did not feel called on to define in advance what might, or might not, be lawful requirements; and there is certainly nothing in this record compelling us to do so.

It must be remembered that the case does not come before us from the Circuit Court. This is a writ of error to revise the judgment of the highest tribunal of a State, and this we cannot do unless Federal questions have been erroneously disposed of.

Judgment affirmed.