Bailey v. Ohio Dept. of Dev. Disabilities , 2024 Ohio 1696 ( 2024 )

[Cite as Bailey v. Ohio Dept. of Dev. Disabilities, 2024-Ohio-1696.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Linda Bailey, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 23AP-542
v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2022-00463JD)
Ohio Department of : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Developmental Disabilities,
:
Defendant-Appellee.
:
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on May 2, 2024
On brief: Hurley Law LLC, and Rosel C. Hurley, III, for
appellant.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Amy S. Brown,
for appellee.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Linda Bailey, appeals from the judgment of the Court of
Claims of Ohio granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by defendant-
appellee, Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities (“ODDD”). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On June 9, 2022, Bailey filed her form complaint in the Court of Claims of
Ohio, alleging claims premised on allegations of negligence and seeking to recover
monetary damages against ODDD. Specifically, Bailey has alleged, in pertinent part as
follows:
Claimant’s ward, Joshua Akins, has been physically abused by
Ohio Depart[ment] of Developmental Disabilities via the
No. 23AP-542 2
Cuyahoga County Board of Developmental Disabilities. State
agency has admitted allegations, claimant has pictures of abuse
(physical).
Claimant states that her ward has tested positive multiple times
for fentanyl. Ward does not have a prescription for that drug.
Claimant has medical records stating the positive results and
police reports for corrupting another with drugs.
Claimant states that Ward is severely autistic and is non-verbal.
(Compl. at ¶ 12.)
{¶ 3} On June 21, 2023 ODDD filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). In its motion, ODDD argued it is not the proper defendant and
the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety because the court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the merits of Bailey’s claims. More specifically, ODDD asserted the alleged abuse
of Bailey’s ward occurred, if at all, through acts or omissions of the Cuyahoga County Board
of Developmental Disabilities, which is not an agent of the state but is instead a political
subdivision over which the Court of Claims lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶ 4} On July 5, 2023, Bailey filed her response to the motion. Subsequently, on
August 4, 2023, the Court of Claims issued its order granting the motion and dismissing
Bailey’s complaint, without prejudice. (Aug. 4, 2023 Entry at 4.)
{¶ 5} On September 1, 2023, Bailey filed a notice of appeal, which is now before the
court.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 6} Bailey asserts the following as her sole assignment of error for our review1:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMING THAT THE
OHIO COURT OF CLAIMS DID NOT HAVE
JURISDICTION IN REGARDS TO THE INJURIES AND
MALTREATMENT COMMITED AGAINST THE WARD
OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT BY DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE.
1 Bailey also restates her assignment of error as “[t]he dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant’s claims by the Court of
Claims was not proper and the case should be returned to the Ohio Court of Claims for adjudication” later in
her brief. (Brief of Appellant at 7.) We find the two statements interchangeable.
No. 23AP-542 3
III. Discussion
{¶ 7} A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by Civ.R. 12(C), which
states: “[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such times as not to delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A motion for judgment on the pleadings,
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C), “has been characterized as a belated Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Tran v. State, 10th Dist. No.
09AP-587, 2009-Ohio-6784, ¶ 10. In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a
trial court is permitted to “consider both the complaint and answer.” Zhelezny v. Olesh,
10th Dist. No. 12AP-681, 2013-Ohio-4337, ¶ 8. The trial court “must construe all the
material allegations of the complaint as true, and must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. The court may grant the motion “if it finds, beyond
doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim(s) that would entitle
him or her to relief.” Id. Because an appeal of a decision granting a motion for judgment
on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C) raises only questions of law, the standard for appellate
review is de novo. Rayess v. Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134 Ohio
St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-5676, ¶ 18, citing Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79,
2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5.
{¶ 8} Bailey asserts in her sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in
finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Bailey’s claims and in dismissing
her complaint for that reason. We disagree.
{¶ 9} Subject-matter jurisdiction is “a condition precedent to the court’s ability to
hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is
void.” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11; State ex rel. Ohio
Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 246, 2006-Ohio-5202, ¶ 8.
{¶ 10} “[T]he jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited by statute and specifically
confined to the powers conferred by the legislature.” State ex rel. DeWine v. Court of
Claims, 130 Ohio St.3d 244, 2011-Ohio-5283, ¶ 21. The Court of Claims is a court of limited
jurisdiction and has exclusive, original jurisdiction over only civil actions against the state
specifically permitted by the waiver of immunity set forth in R.C. 2743.02. Troutman v.
Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1240, 2005-Ohio-334, ¶ 10. Further,
No. 23AP-542 4
R.C. 2743.02(E) provides that “[t]he only defendant in original actions in the court of
claims is the state.”
{¶ 11} For purposes of R.C. Chapter 2743, “state” is defined as “the state of Ohio,
including, but not limited to, the general assembly, the supreme court, the offices of all
elected officers, and all departments, boards, offices, commissions, agencies, institutions,
and other instrumentalities of the state.” R.C. 2743.01(A). The definition of “state”
expressly excludes “political subdivisions,” which are defined as “municipal corporations,
townships, counties, school districts, and all other bodies corporate and politic responsible
for governmental activities only in geographic areas smaller than that of the state to which
the sovereign immunity of the state attaches.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2743.01(B). Thus,
counties are political subdivisions which are specifically excluded from the definition of
“state” pursuant to R.C. 2743.01(B). See also, Estate of Fleenor v. Ottawa Cty., 170 Ohio
St.3d 38, 2022-Ohio-3581, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Alexander v. Summit Cty., 17 Ohio Dec.
451, 1906 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 145 (Sept. 17, 1906) (“Ohio counties are political subdivisions
of the state that facilitate the state’s operations.”).
{¶ 12} In this case, while Bailey has named the ODDD as the defendant, as set forth
above, her claim is specifically premised on allegations of physical abuse of her ward on
the part of the Cuyahoga County Board of Developmental Disabilities, including
allegations that her ward has tested positive on multiple occasions for the drug fentanyl
despite not having been prescribed that drug. (Compl. at ¶ 12.) Thus, the question before
this court is whether a county board of developmental disabilities such as the Cuyahoga
County Board of Developmental Disabilities is an instrumentality of the state for purposes
of R.C. Chapter 2743 so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. As
explained below, we agree with the Court of Claims that it is not such an instrumentality
of the state and is instead a political subdivision explicitly excluded from the definition of
state by R.C. 2743.01(A).
{¶ 13} “ ‘Generally, Ohio’s courts of common pleas have original jurisdiction over
civil actions commenced against counties and their agencies.’ ” Williams v. Ohio Dept. of
Human Servs., 10th Dist. No 95API06-778, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5470, *6 (Dec. 12, 1995),
quoting Burr v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 23 Ohio St.3d 69 (1986), paragraph one of the
syllabus. “Counties are not the state but, rather, are political subdivisions and fall outside
No. 23AP-542 5
the legislature’s statutory waiver of “state” immunity and the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction.”
Id., citing Burr at 72. In Burr, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
Although many social programs operate under state or federal
oversight and financing, they still remain local governmental
operations of the political subdivision. The local agencies and
county commissioners are not agents of the state absent
statutory language to that effect.
(Emphasis added.) Burr at 72.
{¶ 14} Although we have not yet had cause to determine whether a county board of
developmental disabilities is an instrumentality of the state for purposes of R.C. Chapter
2743, we have considered the status of numerous other county agencies in this context and
have consistently determined such agencies are not instrumentalities of the state so as to
subject them to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. See, e.g., Cotton v. FCPC, 10th Dist.
No. 18AP-292, 2018-Ohio-3948 (courts of common pleas are not agencies of the state and
thus not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims); Daugherty v. Ohio Dept. of
Human Servs., 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1093, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 708 (Feb. 27, 2001)
(county department of human services is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims); Williams, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5470 (county child support enforcement agency
is not an agency of the state for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2743); Donaldson v. Court of
Claims, 10th Dist. No. 91AP-1218, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2584 (May 19, 1992) (county
elected officials are officers of a political subdivision, rather than officers of the state);
Walden v. State, 10th Dist. No. 87AP-1060, 1988 Ohio App LEXIS 1753 (May 5, 1988) (for
purposes of R.C. 2743.01(A), a county prosecutor is not an instrumentality of the state of
Ohio and, therefore, is an improper party defendant in the Court of Claims).
{¶ 15} Moreover, in this case, Bailey has not identified any statutory language
which demonstrates that county boards of developmental disabilities are
instrumentalities of the state for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2743 so as to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims as required by Burr. Neither do we find any such
statutory language demonstrating same. Therefore, we find that a county board of
developmental disabilities is not an instrumentality of the state for purposes of R.C.
Chapter 2743 so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.
No. 23AP-542 6
{¶ 16} Thus, the Court of Claims did not err in finding that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over Bailey’s claims, and therefore did not err in dismissing her complaint on
that basis. Accordingly, Bailey’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 17} Having overruled Bailey’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment
of the Court of Claims of Ohio.
Judgment affirmed.
LUPER SCHUSTER and LELAND, JJ. concur.