People v. Underwood ( 2019 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2020.05.11
20:16:53 -05'00'
People v. Underwood, 2019 IL App (3d) 170623Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption SONJA L. UNDERWOOD, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Third District
No. 3-17-0623
Rule 23 order filed December 11, 2019
Motion to
publish allowed December 18, 2019
Opinion filed December 18, 2019
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 16-TR-57041; the
Review Hon. Chrystel L. Galvin, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and Dimitri Golfis, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino,
Thomas D. Arado, and Mark A. Austill, of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices McDade and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Sonja L. Underwood, was convicted following a bench trial of driving while
license suspended. On appeal, she argues the State failed to introduce independent evidence
corroborative of her admission and thus failed to establish the corpus delicti. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The State charged defendant by citation with driving while license suspended (625 ILCS
5/6-303(a) (West 2016)). Defendant subsequently waived her right to a jury trial, and a bench
trial commenced on May 19, 2017.
¶4 Officer William Otis of the Joliet Police Department testified that he responded to the scene
of an accident on August 14, 2016. Otis testified that upon his arrival at the scene, he observed
that “[t]here were two vehicles already pulled into the BP gas station at 6 McDonough.” The
two vehicles were a Ford Explorer and an Acura. Otis testified that he spoke with “both drivers
of the vehicles,” though he could not recall whether the drivers were inside or outside of their
respective vehicles when he arrived.
¶5 Otis testified that he spoke with the driver of the Ford Explorer, who he identified as
defendant. According to Otis, defendant told him that she was attempting to turn at the
intersection of McDonough Street and Chicago Street when the other driver struck her vehicle.
Otis observed damage to both vehicles that corresponded to the version of events provided by
defendant. Otis testified that part of his training to become a police officer included training in
the reconstruction of traffic accidents. He had undertaken additional accident reconstruction
courses since that original training.
¶6 On cross-examination, Otis agreed that he did not know the amount of time the two vehicles
had been parked at the gas station prior to his arrival. He also agreed that the registered owner
of the Ford Explorer was Richard Williamson. On redirect, Otis testified that defendant
admitted to driving the Ford Explorer when it was involved in the accident. The State submitted
into evidence a driving abstract, which established that a suspension of defendant’s driver’s
license was in effect on the day of the accident.
¶7 The court found defendant guilty of driving while license suspended. Defendant was
sentenced to a term of 24 months’ conditional discharge and 300 hours of community service.
Defendant appeals.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. More specifically, she argues that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti by
providing sufficient independent evidence corroborative of her extrajudicial admission.
¶ 10 In Illinois, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt two basic propositions
at trial: “(1) that a crime occurred, i.e., the corpus delicti; and (2) that the crime was committed
by the person charged.” People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 183 (2010). As a matter of law, the
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State’s proof of the corpus delicti may not consist exclusively of the defendant’s extrajudicial
admission. Id. “Where a defendant’s confession is part of the proof of the corpus delicti, the
prosecution must also adduce corroborating evidence independent of the defendant’s own
statement. [Citation.] If a confession is not corroborated in this way, a conviction based on the
confession cannot be sustained.” Id.¶ 11 The amount or nature of independent corroborative evidence required by the corpus delicti
rule is “far less” than that needed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Lara,
2012 IL 112370, ¶ 45. That same evidence need not be corroborative of every element of the
charged offense. Id. ¶ 50. “[T]he independent evidence need only tend to show the commission
of a crime.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 18.
¶ 12 In Lara, our supreme court made clear that “direct corroborating evidence” is not
mandatory under the corpus delicti rule. (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 31. In reaching that
conclusion, the court discussed its prior decision in People v. Perfecto, 26 Ill. 2d 228 (1962).
Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶¶ 31-32. In Perfecto, the court cited numerous pieces of circumstantial
evidence in finding that the defendant’s confession was properly corroborated. Perfecto, 26 Ill.
2d at 229-30. The Lara court approved of that analysis, as well as the prior court’s statement
of the applicable law: “The true rule is that if there is evidence of corroborating circumstances
which tend to prove the corpus delicti and correspond with the circumstances related in the
confession, both *** may be considered in determining whether the corpus delicti is
sufficiently proved in a given case.” (Emphases in original and internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 32 (quoting Perfecto, 26 Ill. 2d at 229, quoting People v.
Gavurnik, 2 Ill. 2d 190, 194 (1954)).
¶ 13 In the present case, defendant was charged with driving while license suspended. That
offense requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant was driving a
motor vehicle on a highway of this state while (2) her driver’s license was suspended. 625
ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2016). The State proved the second of these propositions through direct
evidence. The primary evidence of the first element—that defendant was driving a motor
vehicle—was established through defendant’s confession to that fact. Thus, we must consider
what evidence corroborates that account.
¶ 14 According to Otis’s testimony, defendant told him that the accident had occurred when she
attempted to turn at an intersection and had been struck by the other vehicle. Further, Otis
testified that when he arrived at the scene of the accident, there were only two people in the
vicinity of the two vehicles.
¶ 15 To be sure, that corroborative evidence cannot be characterized as strong or especially
compelling. Nevertheless, Lara does not require corroborative evidence to meet a particularly
high evidentiary threshold, one “far less” than that required to prove a defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 45. Here, defendant’s accurate knowledge of the
traffic accident and her being the only person in the vicinity of the Ford Explorer correspond
with her admission that she was driving the vehicle. Id. ¶ 32.
¶ 16 Defendant correctly points out that the State’s corroborative evidence demonstrates, at
most, “that [defendant] saw the accident happen” and does not eliminate other possible
scenarios. For example, the corroborative evidence presented by the State here does not
eliminate the possibility that defendant was a passenger in the Ford Explorer during the
accident and that the actual driver fled on foot after pulling into the gas station. Nor does it
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eliminate a scenario in which defendant witnessed the accident as a pedestrian and then stood
in the vicinity of the vehicle after the driver had fled.
¶ 17 The requirement that corroborative evidence tend to show the commission of a crime
cannot be construed to require that the same corroborative evidence foreclose every other
possible explanation of that evidence. Indeed, we are aware of no case that would indicate the
corroborative evidence necessary for satisfaction of the corpus delicti rule must be so strong
as to eliminate all other possibilities. Defendant was the only person in the vicinity of the Ford
Explorer in the aftermath of the accident and was able to accurately detail the accident for Otis.
While other possible explanations for that evidence are apparent, that defendant was the driver
of the vehicle is the simplest explanation. That evidence corresponds with defendant’s
admission and tends to show that she was driving the Ford Explorer. Under the low threshold
described in Lara, the corroborative evidence was sufficient for the court to consider
defendant’s admission to driving the vehicle as evidence.
¶ 18 Finally, defendant discusses a number of cases applying the corpus delicti rule in the
context of traffic accidents. See People v. Foster, 138 Ill. App. 3d 44 (1985); People v. Lurz,
379 Ill. App. 3d 958 (2008); People v. Call, 176 Ill. App. 3d 571 (1988); People v. Rhoden,
253 Ill. App. 3d 805 (1993). Of those cases, however, only in Foster did the court find the
State had failed to provide sufficient corroborative evidence. Foster, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 47. In
that case, two people were found, asleep, in the passenger cabin of a vehicle, a fact that
significantly distinguishes that case from the one in question. Id. at 45.
¶ 19 Regarding the remaining cases, in which the court found the corroborative evidence to be
sufficient, defendant emphasizes facts present in those cases but not present here. For example,
in Lurz, the defendant was the owner of the vehicle and had in his possession the keys to the
vehicle. Lurz, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 972. Defendant argues that the absence of such facts is thus
indicative that the corroborating evidence is insufficient in the present case.
¶ 20 That certain evidence is sufficiently corroborative in one fact-specific case, however, does
not mean that the absence of such evidence in another case is fatal. There was no evidence here
that defendant had the keys to the Ford Explorer, but she was able to give accurate details
regarding the accident the vehicle had just sustained. Defendant was not the registered owner
of the vehicle, but she was the only person in the vicinity of the vehicle after the accident. The
facts of each case will inevitably be different. In this case, we find that the State’s evidence
was sufficiently corroborative of defendant’s admission to satisfy the corpus delicti rule.
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 23 Affirmed.
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