People v. Dawson ( 2020 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2021.08.02
11:00:57 -05'00'
People v. Dawson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170872Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption CALEHA M. DAWSON, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
No. 4-17-0872
Filed April 23, 2020
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County, No. 17-CF-617;
Review the Hon. Thomas J. Difanis, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appeal dismissed.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, John M. McCarthy, and Martin J. Ryan, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.
Julia Rietz, State’s Attorney, of Urbana (Patrick Delfino and David J.
Robinson, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of
counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices DeArmond and Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The circuit court of Champaign County revoked the probation of defendant, Caleha M.
Dawson, and resentenced her to two years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery (720 ILCS
5/12-3.05(d)(3) (West 2016)). Defendant appeals. The Office of the State Appellate Defender
(appellate counsel) has moved to withdraw from representing defendant because it can think
of no reasonable argument to make in support of her appeal. See Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967); People v. Jones, 38 Ill. 2d 384 (1967). We notified defendant of her right to
file a response to appellate counsel’s motion. She has not done so. It is no wonder because,
having fully served her sentence, she now lacks a personal stake in the probation revocation.
Therefore, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we dismiss this appeal as
moot.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On June 27, 2017, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to aggravated battery (720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(3) (West 2016)). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the circuit court sentenced
her to probation for 30 months.
¶4 On July 31, 2017, the State petitioned to revoke defendant’s probation. The petition alleged
that one of the conditions of defendant’s probation had been that she commit no further crimes
and that she had violated that condition by committing the Class A misdemeanor of battery (id.
§ 12-3).
¶5 On August 11, 2017, defendant appeared with her appointed defense counsel and admitted
the petition to revoke her probation.
¶6 On November 20, 2017, the circuit court resentenced defendant to two years’
imprisonment, with credit for 85 days in presentence custody, and one year of mandatory
supervised release. Defendant’s name is not in the inmate database of the Illinois Department
of Corrections (Department). See Illinois Department of Corrections-Inmate Search, Ill. Dep’t
of Corrs., http://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/search/isdefault2.asp (last visited Apr. 21,
2020).
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 Appellate counsel recognizes that, since defendant has served her sentence, a challenge to
the severity of the sentence would be moot. See People v. Murrell, 60 Ill. 2d 287, 294 (1975).
An issue in an appeal is moot if “the occurrence of events since filing of the appeal makes it
impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief.” People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d
286, 294 (2002). It would be impossible to grant effectual relief from a sentence that the
defendant already has served. It appears from the Department’s official website that defendant
is no longer in the Department’s custody. See People v. Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308,
¶ 4 n.1 (holding that the appellate court “may take judicial notice of information appearing on
the [Department’s] website”). Her sentence is completely discharged. Her reincarceration is
over and done with and cannot be undone. Thus, there would be no practical use in arguing
that the two-year prison term she received in the resentencing was too harsh. Such an argument
would be moot (see In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 15), and we should, even on our own
initiative, dismiss moot appeals (see Hernandez v. Morris, 39 Ill. App. 3d 783, 784 (1976)).
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¶9 Rather, dismissal is the general rule. There are exceptions to the mootness doctrine,
including the collateral consequences exception. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 361 (2009).
This exception “allows for appellate review, even though a court order or incarceration has
ceased, because a plaintiff has suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to
the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. “[S]ubsistence of the suit requires *** that continuing collateral
consequences *** be either proved or presumed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.¶ 10 It would be easy to prove or presume collateral consequences from a felony conviction.
Felons lose the right to possess firearms (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)), for example, and
to take the oath of office for a municipal position (65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West 2018)). A
felony conviction probably will continue to inflict actual harm upon a defendant after the
defendant has fully served the sentence. See People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 267 (2005). For
that reason, the collateral consequences exception to mootness allows the defendant, as an
appellant, to continue challenging the judgment in the felony case even though effectual relief
from the fully served sentence would be impossible. See id.¶ 11 Does the same logic apply to a revocation of probation if the defendant has fully served the
new or revised sentence? According to the Fourth District in People v. Halterman, 45 Ill. App.
3d 605, 608 (1977), the answer is yes. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to deceptive
practices, and the circuit court sentenced him to two years of probation. Id. at 606. Afterward,
the court revoked the probation on the ground that the defendant had committed a new offense
of theft, and the court resentenced him to imprisonment for 364 days. Id. The defendant
appealed the revocation order and the new sentence. Id. During the pendency of the appeal,
“the defendant *** served his entire sentence.” Id. at 608. The State argued that, consequently,
the appeal was now moot. Id. The Fourth District—which found the theft to be unproven—
disagreed. The Fourth District reasoned as follows:
“The State’s contention [of mootness] *** is clearly erroneous because disabilities and
adverse collateral consequences automatically flow from entry of the court’s judgment
which foreclose an allegation of mootness even though the defendant has served his
sentence. [Citations.] Here, the fact that the defendant has had his probation revoked
might be submitted to another judge for his consideration in sentencing the defendant
if he has the misfortune of again being convicted of some crime. Accordingly, we hold
that the instant case is not moot.” Id.¶ 12 The Second District has followed Halterman and its precursor, a case from the First
District, In re Sturdivant, 44 Ill. App. 3d 410, 412 (1976) (disagreeing that the appeal was
moot, for even though the respondent had completed his sentence, “the instant improper
probation revocation” could have an adverse effect on the respondent “at any future sentencing
hearing in a case involving this [respondent] should this appeal be dismissed”). People v.
Monick, 51 Ill. App. 3d 783, 785 (1977).
¶ 13 The Fifth District, on the other hand, has held that the release of the defendant from prison
renders moot any controversy over the revocation of probation. People v. Yackle, 42 Ill. App.
3d 695, 696 (1976). Once a defendant “has been released on parole from the sentence imposed
on the revocation [of probation],” the defendant can “obtain no effective relief” from the
revocation ruling. Id. “[T]he maximum relief here would [have] be[en] the vacation of the
order of revocation and sentence and the consequent return of defendant to probationary
status.” Id. Such relief was meaningless after the defendant’s release on parole. Thus, in
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reliance on a pre-Monick case from the Second District, People v. North, 3 Ill. App. 3d 428(1972), the Fifth District was “inclined to deem the question moot.” Yackle, 42 Ill. App. 3d at
696.
¶ 14 So, on the one hand we have Halterman, Sturdivant, and Monick, and on the other hand we
have Yackle and North. Which set of cases is correct? A decision by the United States Supreme
Court, Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), on which our supreme court relied in Alfred H.H.,
233 Ill. 2d at 361, tends to vindicate Yackle and North.
¶ 15 Spencer was a habeas corpus action in which Randy G. Spencer sought to invalidate an
order revoking his parole. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 3. He sought this relief even though he had
completed the entire term of imprisonment underlying the parole revocation. Id. The question
for the Supreme Court was whether Spencer’s completion of his prison sentence had made his
case moot. Id.¶ 16 Spencer disputed that his case was moot. Id. at 14. Even though he had fully served his
prison sentence, the parole revocation, he argued, continued to inflict harm upon him: the
parole revocation was a demerit that later might be used against him. See id. at 15. If he ever
were convicted of another crime, the sentencing judge could take the parole revocation as
evidence of his lack of rehabilitative potential and, accordingly, give him a more severe
sentence than he otherwise might have received. See id. at 15-16.
¶ 17 That hypothetical possibility, the Supreme Court held, was not a concrete injury-in-fact,
for such an adverse use of the parole revocation depended on Spencer’s breaking the law again,
getting caught, and being convicted. Id. Spencer was able—and was legally obligated—to
prevent that hypothetical possibility from coming to pass. See id. Indeed, the assumption and
expectation were that, from now on, Spencer would respect the law and thereby avoid further
prosecution and conviction. See id.¶ 18 Likewise, it should have been taken for granted in Halterman that there would be no future
occasion for a judge to frown on the defendant’s parole revocation. It was untrue that
“disabilities and adverse collateral consequences” would “automatically flow from” the
revocation of his parole. (Emphasis added.) Halterman, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 608. Instead, as the
appellate court more accurately stated in the next sentence of Halterman, “the fact that the
defendant has had his probation revoked might be submitted to another judge for his
consideration in sentencing the defendant if he has the misfortune of again being convicted of
some crime.” (Emphases added.) Id. Avoiding that misfortune was within the defendant’s
power, and instead of entertaining the possibility that he would reoffend, the appellate court
should have assumed and expected that he would not reoffend. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15.
¶ 19 We assume and expect the same of defendant in the present case. We take it as a given that
she will never again find herself in a sentencing hearing. Thus, she lacks a personal stake in
the question of the probation revocation, and this appeal is moot. See People v. Roberson, 212
Ill. 2d 430, 435 (2004).
¶ 20 “[The supreme] court has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine when the
question involved is of a public nature, the circumstances are likely to recur, and an
authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers is desirable.” In re
Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999). This appeal presents no question of a public
nature. Absent a clearly applicable exception to the doctrine of mootness, a moot appeal must
be dismissed. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129,
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¶ 21.
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 Because this appeal is moot, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we
dismiss this appeal.
¶ 23 Appeal dismissed.
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