People v. Robinson , 2021 IL App (1st) 181653 ( 2021 )

Digitally signed
by Reporter of
Decisions
Reason: I attest
Illinois Official Reports to the accuracy
and integrity of
this document
Appellate Court Date: 2023.03.28
16:07:55 -05'00'
People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 181653Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-
Caption Appellee, v. LAURENCE M. ROBINSON, Petitioner-Appellant.
District & No. First District, First Division
No. 1-18-1653
Filed June 1, 2021
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 08-CR-02542-01;
Review the Hon. Ramon Ocasio III, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Joseph Michael Benak, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Annette Collins, and Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Pierce and Coghlan concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Petitioner-appellant Laurence Robinson pleaded guilty to three counts of first degree
murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. Robinson later filed a pro se
postconviction petition, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel was arguably ineffective and
his guilty plea was involuntary because the circuit court misapprehended the correct sentencing
range. At the first-stage hearing, the circuit court found that the petition did not present a “just
constitutional claim.” Robinson now appeals, arguing that his petition states the gist of a
constitutional claim and that this court should remand the petition for second-stage
proceedings. For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s ruling and remand for
second-stage proceedings.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On the evening of February 12, 2007, 17-year-old Laurence Robinson entered the
Bachhall’s Hardware Store in Maywood, Illinois. Upon his entrance, the cashier, June
Lowenthal, told Robinson that the store was closed. Robinson then removed a revolver from
the pocket of his hoodie and demanded that June give him all the money. June responded that
she did not have any money. Her son, Jeff Lowenthal, who managed the family store, hurried
to the front of the store. As Robinson saw Jeff approaching, Robinson then shot Jeff in the left
chest area and twice more in the back. Robinson then noticed another employee, Jay Weber,
fired a shot at him, and fled the store. Jeff later died from his gunshot wounds.
¶4 On January 8, 2008, Robinson was arrested. Weber and a customer present at the time of
the shooting later identified Robinson in photo arrays and in-person lineups. Expert testing of
two fired bullets recovered from Jeff’s body revealed that they were fired from a handgun later
recovered from Robinson’s grandfather’s home, where Robinson lived.
¶5 On May 12, 2008, Robinson’s appointed counsel was replaced by a private attorney. At
the pretrial status hearing, on August 10, 2011, private counsel informed the circuit court that
he “had a conversation with [Robinson] and I’ve shown him the recent Supreme Court case
that came down. He indicated that there is going to be a change of plea in this case.” The
assistant state’s attorney (ASA) stated that it would be “an agreed situation.”
¶6 On September 1, 2011, the circuit court accepted Robinson’s negotiated guilty plea to three
counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder, whereby Robinson would
receive a 35-year sentence for the murder counts, to be served at 100% and to run concurrently
with a 30-year sentence for attempted murder.
¶7 The circuit court then advised Robinson that he was pleading guilty to three counts of first
degree murder in that he (1) without lawful justification shot and killed Jeff Lowenthal with a
firearm, (2) without legal justification shot and killed Jeff Lowenthal while armed with a
firearm knowing that such act created a strong possibility of death or great bodily harm to Jeff
Lowenthal, and (3) without legal justification shot and killed Jeff Lowenthal with a “firearm
during the commission of a forcible felony, to wit armed robbery.”
¶8 The circuit court also advised Robinson that he was pleading guilty to one count of
attempted first degree murder in that, he without lawful justification and with intent to kill Jay
Weber, shot at him, which “constituted a substantial step” toward the commission of first
degree murder. Robinson was informed the sentencing range for the murder counts was 20 to
-2-
60 years, the range for attempted murder was 6 to 30 years, and the sentence will be followed
by 3 years of mandatory supervised release. Robinson stated that he understood.
¶9 At no time did Robinson file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but on January 9, 2018,
Robinson filed a pro se postconviction petition. The petition alleged that Robinson’s trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the conviction and sentence of three separate
35-year terms of imprisonment for first degree murder for one offense and for failing to request
a fitness hearing and subpoena medical records to corroborate Robinson’s defense. Robinson
contends that he did not receive a fair sentencing hearing because the circuit court did not
consider his youth as required pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), when it
accepted his guilty plea and because he “did not fully understand the nature of the charges”
against him, “was unable to fully aid in his defense,” and “was not in his right state of mind
when he pled guilty.”
¶ 10 Additionally, Robinson’s petition alleged that he was denied due process, equal protection,
and fair sentencing and was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because the circuit
court did not consider the factors in Miller before a “de facto life sentence.” He alleged that
because he pleaded guilty to “a de facto life sentence,” he would “not have a meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate maturity or rehabilitation as required to obtain release and reenter
society.” Robinson further alleged that the circuit court was unable to receive evidence in
mitigation “to indicate if it would concur with the proposed disposition where the new
constitutional Rule of Law was unavailable at the time that [Robinson] was being sentenced.”
Robinson requested that his “plea be withdrawn, and his conviction and sentence vacated” and
that Miller’s requirements be taken into consideration upon resentencing.
¶ 11 Robinson also attached his own affidavit in which he averred that he was sent to a mental
hospital and diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2005 when he was 15 years old. He also attested
that he took psychotropic medication on and off from 2005-2006 for his bipolar disorder but
that he informed trial counsel that he was not on medication from 2007-2011.
¶ 12 On February 2, 2018, the circuit court dismissed the petition without a written order but
stated that the petition did not present a “just constitutional claim.” Robinson now appeals.
¶ 13 ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Robinson initially argued on appeal that his pro se postconviction petition stated the gist
of a constitutional violation, his trial counsel was arguably ineffective, his guilty plea should
be vacated because the circuit court misapprehended the correct sentencing range, and the
circuit court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. Furthermore, Robinson argues that
this court should remand his petition for second-stage proceedings because the circuit court
applied the incorrect legal standard for summary dismissal, did not make any findings of fact,
and did not issue a written order.
¶ 15 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) sets out a
three-stage proceeding in which a criminal defendant may assert that his conviction resulted
from a substantial denial of his rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois
Constitution, or both. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). A circuit court may summarily
dismiss a postconviction petition if it determines that the petition is “frivolous or is patently
without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). A petition is frivolous or patently
without merit only if it has “no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at
16.
-3-
¶ 16 At the first stage, the court must liberally construe and accept as true all the allegations in
the petition unless contradicted by the record. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001).
A defendant need only allege sufficient facts to state the “gist” of a constitutional claim for his
petition to be forwarded to the second stage. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9. A petition lacks an
arguable basis in fact if it is based upon fanciful factual allegations, such as one that is clearly
baseless, fantastic, or delusional. Id. at 16-17. A petitioner needs to present only a limited
amount of detail and is not required to include legal argument or citation to legal authority.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244-45. However, a pro se petitioner is not excused from providing
factual detail on the alleged constitutional deprivation. People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 254
(2008). The summary dismissal of a postconviction petition is reviewed de novo. People v.
Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496 (2010).
¶ 17 Robinson’s petition alleges that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the circuit
court did not consider his youth when it accepted his guilty plea. In his supplemental briefing,
Robinson further alleges that he has stated the gist of a constitutional violation that, per Miller
and People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea
because it was secured by the threat of a now unconstitutional de facto life sentence.
¶ 18 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory sentences of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole violate the eighth amendment of the United
States Constitution when imposed upon a juvenile offender. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. The Court
noted that its holding “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering
an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” Id.
at 483. Among those attendant circumstances were diminished culpability, greater prospects
for reform, lack of maturity, an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, limited control over
their environment, and an inability to extricate themselves from crime-producing settings. Id.
at 471. The Supreme Court later held that Miller applies retroactively. See Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016).
¶ 19 In People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9, the Illinois Supreme Court expanded the reasoning
of Miller to include mandatory de facto life sentences, stating:
“A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the
same practical effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory
sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison.
Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable
prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and potential
for rehabilitation.”
¶ 20 Shortly after Reyes, the Illinois Supreme Court further expanded Miller’s reasoning to
apply to discretionary life sentences. See People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40.
¶ 21 In Buffer, our supreme court found that, to prevail on a claim that a juvenile’s life sentence
violated the eighth amendment, a defendant must show both that (1) he was “subject to a life
sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto,” and (2) “the sentencing court failed
to consider youth and its attendant characteristics.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27. The Buffer
court defined a de facto life sentence as being greater than 40 years. Id. ¶ 42.
¶ 22 In admonishing Robinson on his guilty plea, the court stated that, should he elect to go to
trial, Robinson could face a maximum of 60 years in prison if found guilty of first degree
murder and 30 years in prison if found guilty of attempted first degree murder. On appeal,
Robinson argues that the circuit court’s judgment summarily dismissing his postconviction
-4-
should be reversed and the cause remanded for second-stage postconviction proceedings
because he states the gist of a constitutional claim that he was subjected to an unfair plea
proceeding under Miller. In supplemental briefing, he further argues that his postconviction
petition states the gist of a constitutional claim that his plea was secured by the threat of a
de facto life sentence.
¶ 23 In support of his argument, Robinson relies upon the Appellate Court, Fifth District,
decision in People v. Parker, 2019 IL App (5th) 150192. In Parker, the State charged a 16-
year-old defendant with first degree murder. Id. ¶ 2. The defendant entered a negotiated plea.
Id. ¶ 3. The State agreed to ask for a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed 50 years. Id. At
the plea hearing, the circuit court admonished the defendant that “the possible sentencing range
was 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment or, under certain circumstances, life imprisonment.” Id.
During the sentencing hearing, the circuit court again advised the defendant that “he could
have been sentenced to life imprisonment or 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment.” Id. ¶ 4. The circuit
court sentenced the defendant to 35 years in prison. Id. Subsequently, the defendant filed a
motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he “entered his guilty plea without
sufficient understanding and contemplation of the serious nature of the consequences of
entering a plea, that he felt pressured to enter his guilty plea by the advice that he received
from his parents, and that his counsel briefly discussed the plea offer with him in the hallway
of the courthouse while he was shackled and under guard, thus allowing him no privacy or
sufficient time to discuss the offer.” Id. ¶ 5.
¶ 24 During the hearing on the motion, the defendant withdrew the motion after being advised
by the circuit court that withdrawing his guilty plea could result in a sentence of 20 to 80 years’
or life imprisonment. Id. Almost nine years later, the defendant filed a pro se petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that he was coerced into entering a guilty plea by his counsel
and parents where his plea was based on a misrepresentation of the possible sentencing range.
Id. ¶ 7. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the defendant’s initial postconviction
petition at the second stage of postconviction proceedings on the grounds the initial petition
was not timely filed. Id. ¶ 8.
¶ 25 Fourteen years after the circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider the
sentence, the defendant in Parker filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition arguing in part that his sentence, “without consideration of his youth and its attendant
characteristics, amounted to a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment ***
as set forth in *** Miller.” Id. ¶ 9. The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion for leave to
file a successive conviction, arguing that Miller was inapplicable because the defendant did
not receive a mandatory life sentence. Id. The defendant appealed the denial of his motion for
leave to file a successive postconviction petition and cited Buffer as additional authority, as
Robinson does in his supplemental brief. In Parker, the appellate court stated:
“[T]he defendant concede[d] that Buffer is adverse authority for his argument that his
35-year prison sentence constituted a de facto life sentence. However, he contends that
Buffer supports his related argument that he should be allowed to challenge his guilty
plea through a successive postconviction petition because he would not have pled guilty
if he had understood the implications of the eighth amendment, [and] that he should be
entitled to a new sentencing hearing where the trial court failed to consider his youth
and its attendant characteristics when imposing the sentence ***.” Id. ¶ 16.
-5-
The defendant argued:
“[H]e met the cause and prejudice test to file a successive postconviction petition
because Reyes and Buffer had not been decided when he filed his initial postconviction
petition and the application of Buffer changed the applicable sentencing range and
eliminated his justifications for entering a guilty plea—i.e., to avoid a natural-life
sentence and for the State’s recommendation to cap the sentence at 50 years—as neither
sentence was constitutionally available absent evidence of incorrigibility.” Id.
¶ 26 The Parker court agreed with the defendant, finding that he demonstrated cause because
Reyes and Buffer had not yet been decided when he filed his initial postconviction petition. Id.
¶ 18. The court also found that the defendant had demonstrated prejudice because his guilty
plea was influenced by the State’s sentencing recommendation and repeated admonishments
that he could receive a life sentence. Id. The defendant in Parker argued that he would not have
pleaded guilty in exchange for a sentencing cap of 50 years had the guidelines in Buffer been
established when he entered his guilty plea. Id. The appellate court reversed and remanded the
circuit court’s judgment denying the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 20.
¶ 27 Here, in his supplemental brief, Robinson argues that, based on Parker’s factual similarities
with this case, the same result reached in Parker should be mandated in this case. Robinson
further argues that the same threat of a sentence in excess of 40 years, as in Parker, was present
in this case and that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of the youth-related factors
set forth in Miller.
¶ 28 The State urges this court to reject this claim because Robinson’s fully negotiated plea bars
his claim, Robinson’s “Parker claim” was not included in his pro se postconviction petition,
and Parker is distinguishable from this case. We disagree.
¶ 29 Robinson’s fully negotiated plea does not bar his claim in this case.
“Generally, due process requires that for a defendant to knowingly and voluntarily
plead guilty, a defendant must be advised of the direct consequences of a guilty plea.
[Citation.] As we have previously explained, a direct consequence of a guilty plea is
one which has a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of a
defendant’s sentence. [Citation.] A trial court’s obligation to ensure that a defendant
understands the direct consequences of his plea traditionally encompasses those
consequences that affect the defendant’s sentence and other punishment that the circuit
court may impose.” People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 35.
¶ 30 The State argues that Robinson entered a fully negotiated plea deal, “which forecloses his
claim of error” per People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33. However, our supreme court
has explained that “[i]n relation to a guilty plea *** ‘waiver’ refers to the ‘ “voluntary
relinquishment of a known right.” ’ ” People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 547 (2004) (quoting
Hill v. Cowan, 202 Ill. 2d 151, 158-59 (2002)). Robinson’s rights under the eighth amendment
in this context were not known at the time he pleaded guilty; therefore, he could not have
voluntarily relinquished them.
¶ 31 In response to the State’s argument that Robinson failed to raise his “Parker claim” at the
proper time, Robinson asserts that this court must give his petition liberal construction,
resulting in finding that the claim is contained within his argument in the postconviction
petition. Our supreme court has stated a “requirement that a pro se petition be given a liberal
-6-
construction. Where defendants are acting pro se, courts should review their petitions ‘with a
lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to proceed.’ [Citation.]” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 21.
¶ 32 Under the “liberal construction” standard, we find that Robinson’s initial claim that “the
17-year-old juvenile petitioner at the time of the offense was substantially denied due process
and equal protection of the law, a fair sentencing and subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment where Miller’s requirements were not taken into consideration before accepting
his plea” was sufficient to allow consideration of the argument that his plea was secured under
the threat that, if he proceeded to trial, he would be subject to an unconstitutional de facto life
sentence per Miller and Buffer.
¶ 33 We find Parker persuasive and hold Robinson has stated the gist of a constitutional claim.
Robinson’s plea was influenced by the circuit court’s admonishment of a de facto life sentence
per Buffer, without first complying with the requirements stated in Miller. See Parker, 2019
IL App (5th) 150192, ¶ 18. The State argues that, unlike the defendant in Parker, “[Robinson]
has never alleged that his fully negotiated plea was the result of any threats.” However,
Robinson does allege in his pro se petition that “the 17-year-old juvenile petitioner at the time
of the offense was substantially denied due process and equal protection of the law, a fair
sentencing and subjected to cruel and unusual punishment where Miller’s requirements were
not taken into consideration before accepting his plea.”
¶ 34 As stated by our supreme court in Hodges, “we have required only that a pro se defendant
allege enough facts to make out a claim that is arguably constitutional for purposes of invoking
the Act.” (Emphasis added.) Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9. In this case, Robinson has stated an
arguable claim that his plea was secured by the threat of a de facto life sentence and that the
court failed to consider the youth-related factors set forth in Miller.
¶ 35 We note that another division of the Appellate Court, First District, recently followed
Parker under similar circumstances. See People v. Brown, 2021 IL App (1st) 160060-U, ¶ 35.
¶ 36 Having determined that Robinson’s postconviction states the gist of a constitutional claim
that his plea was secured by the threat of a de facto life sentence, we need not address the other
issues raised in the petition. Under the plain language of the Act, the circuit court “must docket
the entire petition, appoint counsel, if the petitioner is so entitled, and continue the matter for
further proceedings in accordance with sections 122-4 through 122-6.” (Emphasis omitted.)
People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 371 (2001).
¶ 37 Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s summary dismissal of Robinson’s
first-stage postconviction petition and remand for second-stage postconviction proceedings.
¶ 40 Reversed and remanded.
-7-