Virginia v. West Virginia , 27 S. Ct. 732 ( 1907 )

206 U.S. 290 (1907)

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
v.
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA.

No. 7, Original.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued March 11, 12, 1907. Decided May 27, 1907. IN EQUITY.

Mr. William A. Anderson, Attorney General of the State of Virginia, and Mr. Holmes Conrad, for complainant.

Mr. John G. Carlisle and Mr. Charles E. Hogg, with whom Mr. C.W. May, Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, Mr. W. Mollohan, Mr. George W. McClintic and Mr. W.G. Mathews were on the brief, for defendant.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The State of West Virginia was admitted into the Union June 20, 1863, under the proclamation of the President of the United States of April 20, 1863, in pursuance of the act of Congress approved December 31, 1862, upon the terms and conditions prescribed by the Commonwealth of Virginia in ordinances adopted in convention and in acts passed by the General Assembly of the "Restored Government of the Commonwealth," giving her consent to the formation of a new State out of her territory, with a constitution adopted for the new State by the people thereof. The ninth section of the ordinance adopted by the people of the "Restored State of Virginia" in convention assembled in the city of Wheeling, Virginia, on August 20, 1861, entitled "An ordinance to provide for the formation of a new State out of a portion of the territory of this State," provided as follows:

"9. The new State shall take upon itself a just proportion of the public debt of the Commonwealth of Virginia, prior to the first day of January, 1861, to be ascertained by charging to it all state expenditures within the limits thereof, and a just proportion of the ordinary expenses of the state government, since any part of said debt was contracted; and deducting therefrom the monies paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth from the counties included within the said new State during the same period. All private rights and interests in lands within the proposed State, derived from the laws of Virginia prior to such separation, shall remain valid and secure under the laws of the proposed State, and shall be determined by the laws now existing in the State of Virginia. . . ."

The consent of the Commonwealth of Virginia was given to the formation of a new State on this condition. February 3 and 4, 1863, the General Assembly of the "Restored State of Virginia" enacted two statutes in pursuance of the provisions of which money and property amounting to and of the value of several millions of dollars were, after the admission of the new State, paid over and transferred to West Virginia. The constitution of the State of West Virginia when admitted contained these provisions, being sections 5, 7 and 8 of Article VIII thereof, as follows:

"5. No debt shall be contracted by this State, except to meet casual deficits in the revenue, to redeem a previous liability of the State, to suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or defend the State in time of war."

"7. The legislature may at any time direct a sale of the stocks owned by the State in banks and other corporations, but the proceeds of such sale shall be applied to the liquidation of the public debt; and hereafter the State shall not become a stockholder in any bank. . . ."

"8. An equitable proportion of the public debt of the Commonwealth of Virginia, prior to the first day of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, shall be assumed by this State; and the legislature shall ascertain the same as soon as may be practicable, and provide for the liquidation thereof, by a sinking fund sufficient to pay the accruing interest, and redeem the principal within thirty-four years."

The "public debt" and the "previous liability" manifestly referred to a portion of the public debt of the original State of Virginia and liability for the money and property of the original State, which had been received by West Virginia under the acts of the General Assembly above cited, enacted while the territory and people afterwards forming the State of West Virginia constituted a part of the Commonwealth of Virginia, though one may be involved in the other; while the provisions of sections 7 and 8 were obviously framed in compliance with the conditions on which the consent of Virginia was given to the creation of the State of West Virginia, and the money and property were transferred. From 1865 to 1905 various efforts were made by Virginia through its constituted authorities to effect an adjustment and settlement with West Virginia for an equitable proportion of the public debt of the undivided State, proper to be borne and paid by West Virginia, but all these efforts proved unavailing, and it is charged that West Virginia refused or failed to take any action or do anything for the purpose of bringing about a settlement or adjustment with Virginia.

The original jurisdiction of this court was, therefore, invoked by Virginia to procure a decree for an accounting as between the two States, and, in order to a full and correct adjustment of the accounts, the adjudication and determination of the amount due Virginia by West Virginia in the premises.

But it is objected that this court has no jurisdiction because the matters set forth in the bill do not constitute such a controversy or such controversies as can be heard and determined in this court, and because the court has no power to enforce and therefore none to render any final judgment or decree herein. We think these objections are disposed of by many decisions of this court. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 378, 406; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125; Kansas v. Colorado, May 13, 1907, ante, p. 46; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208; S.C., 200 U.S. 496; Georgia v. Copper Company, May 13, 1907, ante, p. 230; United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621; United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211; United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379.

In Cohens v. Virginia, the Chief Justice said: "In the second class, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties. In this are comprehended ``controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State,' ``and between a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects.' If these be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy. Be it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the courts of the Union."

And, referring to the Eleventh Amendment, it was further said:

"It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the Constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the Federal courts formed a very serious objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and the court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so extensively entertained, this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted by the state legislatures. That its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the Nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the court still extends to these cases; and in these a State may still be sued. We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State. There is no difficulty in finding this cause. Those who were inhibited from commencing a suit against a State, or from prosecuting one which might be commenced before the adoption of the amendment, were persons who might probably be its creditors. There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister States would be creditors to any considerable amount, and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace. The amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced or prosecuted by individuals, but not to those brought by States."

By the cases cited, and there are many more, it is established that, in the exercise of original jurisdiction as between States, this court necessarily in such a case as this has jurisdiction.

United States v. North Carolina and United States v. Michigan, supra, were controversies arising upon pecuniary demands, and jurisdiction was exercised in those cases just as in those for the prevention of the flow of polluted water from one State along the borders of another State, or of the diminution in the natural flow of rivers by the State in which they have their sources through and across another State or States, or of the discharge of noxious gases from works in one State over the territory of another.

The object of the suit is a settlement with West Virginia, and to that end a determination and adjudication of the amount due by that State to Virginia, and when this court has ascertained and adjudged the proportion of the debt of the original State which it would be equitable for West Virginia to pay, it is not to be presumed on demurrer that West Virginia would refuse to carry out the decree of this court. If such repudiation should be absolutely asserted we can then consider by what means the decree may be enforced. Consent to be sued was given when West Virginia was admitted into the Union, and it must be assumed that the legislature of West Virginia would in the natural course make provision for the satisfaction of any decree that may be rendered.

It is, however, further insisted that this court cannot proceed to judgment because of an alleged compact entered into between Virginia and West Virginia, with the consent of Congress, by which the question of the liability of West Virginia to Virginia was submitted to the arbitrament and award of the legislature of West Virginia as the sole tribunal which could pass upon it. As we have seen, the constitution of West Virginia when admitted into the Union contained the provision: "An equitable proportion of the public debt of the Commonwealth of Virginia prior to the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, shall be assumed by this State, and the legislature shall ascertain the same as soon as may be practicable and provide for the liquidation of the same by a sinking fund and redeem the principal within thirty-four years." And it is said that, on May 13, 1862, the legislature of Virginia passed an act entitled "An act giving the consent of the Legislature of Virginia to the formation and erection of a new State within the jurisdiction of this State," by which consent was given to the creation of the proposed new State, "according to the boundaries and under the provisions set forth in the Constitution for the said State of West Virginia, and the schedule thereto annexed, proposed by the convention which assembled at Wheeling on the twenty-sixth day of November, 1861;" and that by the act of Congress the consent of that body was given to all those provisions which thus became a constitutional and legal compact between the two States. The act of May 13, 1862, was not made a part of the case stated in the bill, and its validity is denied by counsel for Virginia, but it is unnecessary to go into that, for when Virginia, on August 20, 1861, by ordinance provided "for the formation of a new State out of the territory of this State," and declared therein that "the new State shall take upon itself a just proportion of the public debt of the Commonwealth of Virginia prior to the first day of January, 1861," to be ascertained as provided, it is to be supposed that the new State had this in mind when it framed its own constitution, and that when that instrument provided that its legislature should "ascertain the same as soon as practicable," it referred to the method of ascertainment prescribed by the Virginia convention. Reading the Virginia ordinance and the West Virginia constitutional provision in pari materia, it follows that what was meant by the expression that the "legislature shall ascertain" was that the legislature should ascertain as soon as practicable the result of the pursuit of the method prescribed, and provide for the liquidation of the amount so ascertained. And it may well be inquired why, in the forty-three years that have elapsed since the alleged compact was entered into, West Virginia has never indicated that she stood upon such a compact, and, if so, why no step has ever been taken by West Virginia to enter upon the performance of the duty which such "compact" imposed, and to notify Virginia that she was ready and willing to discharge such duty.

It is also urged that Virginia had no interest in the subject matter of the controversy because she had been released from all liability on account of the public debt of the old Commonwealth, evidenced by her bonds outstanding on the first day of January, 1861. This relates to the acts of the General Assembly of Virginia of March 30, 1871, March 28, 1879, February 14, 1882, February 20, 1892, March 6, 1894, and March 6, 1900. According to the bill, Virginia by the act of March 30, 1871, and subsequent acts, in an attempt to provide for the funding and payment of the public debt, having estimated that the liability of West Virginia was for one-third of the amount of the old bonds, provided for the issue of new bonds to the amount of two-thirds of the total, and for the issue of certificates for the other third, which showed that Virginia held the old bonds so far as unfunded in trust for the holders or their assignees to be paid by the funds expected to be obtained from West Virginia as her "just and equitable proportion of the public debt."The legislation resulted in the surrender of most of the old bonds to Virginia, satisfied as to two-thirds, and held as security for the creditors as to one-third. We do not care to take up and discuss this legislation. We are satisfied that as we have jurisdiction, these questions ought not to be passed upon on demurrer. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 144, 145. And this also furnishes sufficient ground for not considering at length the objection of multifariousness. The observations of Lord Cottenham, in Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Mylne & Craig, 603, that it is impracticable to lay down any rule as to what constitutes multifariousness, as an abstract proposition; that each case must depend upon its own circumstances; and much must be left where the authorities leave it, to the sound discretion of the court, have been often affirmed in this court. Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333, 411; Gaines v. Relf, 2 How. 619, 642. But we do not mean to rule that the bill is multifarious. It is true that the prayer contains, among other things, the request, "that all proper accounts may be taken to determine and ascertain the balance due from the State of West Virginia to your oratrix in her own right and as trustee aforesaid," but it also prays that the court "will adjudicate and determine the amount due to your oratrix by the State of West Virginia in the premises." And we understand the reference to holding in trust to be in the interest of mere convenience, and that the bill cannot properly be regarded as seeking in chief anything more than a decree for "an equitable proportion of the public debt of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the first day of January, 1861." The objections of misjoinder of parties and misjoinder of causes of action may be treated as resting on matter of surplusage merely, and at all events further consideration thereof may wisely be postponed to final hearing. Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 491, 492; California v. Southern Pacific Company, 157 U.S. 249.

The order will be —

Demurrer overruled without prejudice to any question, and leave to answer by the first Monday of next term.