Harten v. Löffler , 29 S. Ct. 351 ( 1909 )

212 U.S. 397 (1909)

HARTEN
v.
LOFFLER.

No. 91.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued January 26, 1909. Decided February 23, 1909. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

Mr. Lorenzo A. Bailey for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Leon Tobriner, for defendant in error, submitted.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant in error objects that this court is without jurisdiction on the ground of the amount in controversy not being sufficient. Taking the pleadings, the evidence given, and the verdict of the jury, it would seem that the amount in dispute is sufficient to give this court jurisdiction. In his setoff the defendant claims the unpaid balance of the purchase price for the property agreed upon, which unpaid balance amounted to $11,750, and he claims that sum now, and he also claims that the amount of the judgment against him of $1,250 is erroneous, and that a reversal of this judgment will permit him to claim before a jury on another trial the full amount of his set-off, or at least the balance due for the purchase price. We think the court has jurisdiction. Block v. Darling, 140 U.S. 234; Buckstaff v. Russell & Co., 151 U.S. 626.

The objection made by the defendant to the oral evidence goes to its being contradictory to or inconsistent with the written agreement. The defendant maintains that the admission of such evidence was contrary to the rule on that subject. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the evidence was properly admitted. The tendency and purpose of the whole evidence were simply to show the circumstances existing at the time when the contract in question was executed, and to identify the premises, and to give point and meaning to the word "about" as contained in the contract. "About" is a relative and frequently ambiguous term, and its precise meaning is affected by circumstances existing when the word is used in a contract, and known to and recognized by the parties. The evidence was not inconsistent with, nor did it contradict, the written contract, but when a diagram of the premises is shown it plainly appears that the word "about," with reference to the width of the premises on Brightwood avenue, left an ambiguity in the contract which it was perfectly proper to explain by oral evidence. The oral evidence identified the premises and gave point and certainty to the meaning of the word. In Lowber v. Bangs, 2 Wall. 728, 737, it was said that contracts where their meaning is not clear are to be construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties when they were made, and the practical interpretation which they by their conduct have given to the provisions in controversy. Taking these existing circumstances and that interpretation into consideration, it is seen that the identification of the premises is made clear by the oral evidence, and it is also plain that the word "about" must extend the sixty-feet limit to the north end of the premises. It never could have been the idea of either party that the building should be cut in two, and certainly no language was used which set forth such unusual meaning. Cases are almost innumerable upon the subject of oral evidence in connection with written instruments, but we are satisfied the rule was not infringed by the introduction of such evidence in this case. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is satisfactory and nothing more need be added upon the subject.

Fault is found with the admission of evidence in regard to the measure of damages. The rule was correctly stated by the trial court to be the difference between the purchase price and the market value at the time of the contract of sale. In the opinion of the Court of Appeals it was stated that as the contract of purchase intended not only the real estate, but also the benefit of the license, the business and the good will, it was proper to give evidence of the value of each of them, and this was the purpose of certain evidence, which was properly admitted.

The exclusion of the evidence of the witness Montague when called by the defendant with reference to the value of the property was not error, because there was absolutely no evidence whatever to support the hypothesis stated in the question. The question assumed as a fact that the business amounted to $150 or $200 a week, and that the realty was worth only $4,000 with the improvements, the land and buildings on it, and then the question was put, "What would be a fair price to pay for that land with the improvements and fixtures, and the liquor license and good will of the business, but not including any of the stock in trade?" The question assumed the value of the greater portion of the property sold.

We have carefully looked through the record and find that the other exceptions taken by the plaintiff in error upon the trial are plainly unimportant and immaterial.

The judgment must be

Affirmed.