People v. Walton ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (4th) 240541FILED
June 26, 2024
NO. 4-24-0541 Carla Bender
4 th District Appellate
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macoupin County
LEE C. WALTON, ) No. 23CF275
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Joshua A. Meyer,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Zenoff and Lannerd concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 After his initial pretrial release on conditions was revoked, defendant Lee C.
Walton was detained prior to trial pursuant to section 110-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1,
2023), commonly referred to as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). Subsequently, the circuit court
found that defendant’s continued detention was reasonably necessary to ensure his appearance at
court hearings and to prevent the commission of a future felony or Class A misdemeanor. 725
ILCS 5/110-6(j) (West 2022). Defendant now appeals, arguing that his continued detention is no
longer necessary.
¶2 For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged by information in Macoupin County case No. 23-CF-275
with two counts of aggravated battery of a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West 2022))
(Class 2 felony); criminal trespass to a residence (id. § 19-4(a)(2)) (Class 4 felony); and aggravated
assault involving the use of a deadly weapon (id. § 12-2(c)(1)) (Class A misdemeanor). The
incident occurred on the 900 block of Johnson Street in Carlinville, Illinois. The State initially did
not petition the court to detain defendant pending trial pursuant to the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a) (West 2022). On December 17, 2023, defendant was granted pretrial release on the
following conditions relevant here: (1) the mandatory condition that he not violate any criminal
statute of any jurisdiction (id. § 110-10(a)(4)) and (2) the additional condition that he not enter the
900 block of Johnson Street in Carlinville, Illinois (see id. § 110-10(b)(4)).
¶5 About two weeks after being granted pretrial release, defendant was charged with
six new offenses in Macoupin County case No. 24-CF-2: aggravated battery of a peace officer
(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4) (West 2022)) (Class 2 felony); criminal trespass to a residence
(id. § 19-4(a)(2)) (Class 4 felony); two counts of resisting arrest (id. § 31-1(a)) (Class A
misdemeanor); battery (id. § 12-3(a)(2)) (Class A misdemeanor); and criminal trespass to land
(id. § 21-3(a)(2)) (Class B misdemeanor). The charged events are alleged to have occurred on
January 3, 2024, on the 900 block of Johnson Street in Carlinville.
¶6 On January 4, the State filed a verified petition to revoke defendant’s pretrial
release in case No. 23-CF-275 pursuant to section 110-6(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6(a)
(West 2022)), contending that defendant’s conduct on January 3 demonstrated that he had violated
the conditions of his release and that detention was necessary to prevent him from being charged
with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. The State also filed a petition for sanctions
based on the same conduct. See id. § 110-6(e)(1).
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¶7 The State’s petitions were filed on January 4, 2024. According to the State’s
proffer, on the evening of January 3, 2024, Carlinville Police Department officer Hunter Sutton
was dispatched to 911 Johnson Street, Carlinville, for a reported argument. Upon his arrival, Sutton
found an “ongoing argument.” He attempted to speak with defendant, who ultimately ended up
going upstairs, out a window, and onto the roof. Holding a cord, defendant stated that he was going
to hang himself. The cord snapped, and defendant fell from the roof.
¶8 Defendant then fled the scene and attempted to gain entry to a nearby residence on
Johnson Street, a location at which he had previously trespassed. The owner, however, had locked
the doors. Defendant then went to the back door of the residence and tried to push his way inside,
but he was unsuccessful because the property owner had barred the door. Defendant then fled and
gained entry to the residence of James Morgan, also on Johnson Street. Upon arrival, Sutton
observed defendant inside Morgan’s residence arguing with Morgan. Defendant wrestled with
Morgan before he was ultimately placed under arrest by Sutton and another officer. While
defendant was in the custody of the Macoupin County Sheriff’s Department, he resisted being
placed into his cell and spit on a police officer.
¶9 In response to the State’s petitions, defense counsel argued:
“Your Honor, [defendant] lives in [L]uka, Illinois. He works constructions [sic].
He suffers from sleep apnea and high blood pressure. He has two minor children
that he helps care for. He also is trying to get into school at Kaskaskia. He is willing
to do any pretrial condition in order to be released. He is asking for his release.”
¶ 10 Following arguments, the circuit court granted the State’s petition to revoke pretrial
release, finding “by clear and convincing evidence for the reasons stated on the record that no
condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably” prevent defendant from being
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charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. In further elaboration of its ruling, the
court stated in its written order that “defendant has multiple felony charges and has not followed
his PreTrial Release conditions. He has a significant criminal history and is suffering from mental
health issues.” The written order also stated the court’s conclusion that the conditions specified in
paragraphs 2 and 12 of its December 17, 2023, order for pretrial release had been violated.
Defendant did not appeal from any of the rulings made on January 4, 2024.
¶ 11 A pretrial status hearing was held on March 18, 2024; pursuant to section 110-6(j)
of the Code, the circuit court was obligated at that hearing to determine whether defendant’s
continued pretrial detention was necessary. Id. § 110-6(j). No transcript of that hearing is available,
but the parties have filed a stipulation with this court, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Defense counsel *** proffered that the Defendant was not a danger to any person
or the community, as [he] was having mental health issues during the time of the
incidents in question, which have stabilized since that time. Mental health services
are not available to the Defendant in the Macoupin County jail. Further, that the
Defendant lives in [L]uka, [I]llinois, in Marion County, several counties away. He
also suffers from sleep apnea and uses a CPAP machine, which is not currently
functioning; he cannot remedy that issue in jail. Counsel further argued that
reasonable conditions exist to mitigate any perceived danger the Defendant poses,
including but not limited to being required to live at the [L]uka, [I]llinois residence,
court-ordered mental health treatment, and being ordered not to have contact with
specified persons and/or locations.”
The State argued,
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“[T]he defendant poses a danger to the community because of his significant
criminal history, and the fact that he was previously released on pre-trial release
with conditions, and committed another offense while on release. Further, the State
argued that no reasonable conditions existed to mitigate the danger, because the
Defendant had been released on pre-trial conditions previously, and committed
another offense while on pre-trial release. In rebuttal, defense counsel argued that
the Defendant had not previously been released on the condition that the defense
was proposing at this time, and therefore, he did not have a history of
noncompliance with those conditions.”
¶ 12 At the conclusion of the March 18 hearing, the court found that continued detention
was necessary to reasonably assure defendant’s appearance for later hearings and to prevent him
from being charged with a subsequent felony or a Class A misdemeanor.
¶ 13 This appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 As explained earlier, no appeal was taken from the January 4, 2024, order revoking
defendant’s pretrial release. Instead, defendant appeals from the circuit court’s order of March 18,
which found that continued detention was necessary to reasonably ensure defendant’s appearance
at subsequent hearings or to prevent him from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A
misdemeanor. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(j) (West 2022). On appeal, defendant argues his continued
detention was not necessary when the main issue surrounding his dangerousness—his mental
health crisis—had passed and the only way he could obtain necessary services was to be released
from jail. Before addressing the particulars of this case, it is useful to understand the nature of the
Act’s provisions for changes in, or subsequent circuit court review of, orders relating to detention.
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¶ 16 A. Alteration of an Order Regarding Detention or Release
¶ 17 We believe our understanding of the applicable statutory provision may be aided
by reviewing the circuit court’s inherent authority to amend its orders, as well as the additional
provisions for changes in status added by the Act. In particular, we feel it is useful to compare the
provision at issue here to similar provisions also contained in the Code concerning the circuit
court’s obligation to review its prior detention-related decisions on an ongoing basis.
¶ 18 1. Circuit Court’s Inherent Authority to Alter an Interlocutory Order
¶ 19 An order calling for a party to be detained prior to trial, or released but subject to
conditions, is not stand-alone legal determination, nor is it of lasting duration. Its existence is
entirely subservient to the litigation of the criminal charges that initiated the case. The detention
order seeks to govern the defendant’s status only through the ultimate disposition of the case; after
a defendant is sentenced, the detention order terminates. See People v. Maxey, 2015 IL App (1st)
140036, ¶ 38 (noting that a bail issue was mooted by the defendant’s final judgment of conviction).
Such nonfinal orders have been expressly referred to as “interlocutory.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)
(eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
¶ 20 “A court in a criminal case has inherent power to reconsider and correct its own
rulings, even in the absence of a statute or rule granting it such authority,” and the “court’s power
to reconsider and correct its decisions extends to interlocutory *** judgments.” People v. Mink,
141 Ill. 2d 163, 171 (1990); see People v. Harris, 2024 IL App (2d) 240070, ¶ 27 (stating the same
proposition with respect to the Code, as amended by the Act). Consequently, the circuit court here
had the authority to revisit and alter its prior detention ruling. The Act, however, has added specific
provisions relating to changes to interlocutory orders for detention and release that supplement the
court’s inherent authority.
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¶ 21 2. Party’s Authority to Request a Change in Detention or Conditions
¶ 22 Not surprisingly, the Code allows the parties in a criminal case to argue, by way of
motion, for changes to certain orders pertaining to detention or release. For example, either party
may move to change the conditions of pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-6(g) (West 2022) (noting
that conditions may not be increased absent a hearing). Where a defendant has been granted pretrial
release for a felony or Class A misdemeanor, the State may petition for revocation of release on
the basis that a new offense of the same statute has been committed. Id. § 110-6(a). Conspicuous
by its absence, however, is any provision for a defendant to seek release after being detained. This
may be explained by the fact that the Code provides that, even without a motion by the defendant
seeking release, it is always the circuit court’s obligation to continue to review the necessity of
continued detention. There are, in fact, three such provisions concerning review of detention or
conditions at every subsequent court appearance. We now examine each of them to aid in our
understanding of the provision applicable to this case.
¶ 23 3. The Code’s Requirements for Ongoing Review of Detention Status
¶ 24 There are three similar provisions in the Code with respect to the circuit court’s
obligation to review detention or release status. For all three, the obligation to revisit the
defendant’s status arises at every subsequent court appearance.
¶ 25 The first provision requires that, when the circuit court releases a defendant on
conditions, it is required to review the continued necessity of those conditions:
“At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must
find that the current conditions imposed are necessary to reasonably ensure the
appearance of the defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the
compliance of the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release. The court is
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not required to be presented with new information or a change in circumstance to
remove pretrial conditions.” Id. § 110-5(f-5).
Of note is the last sentence concerning changes in circumstance. See People v. Watkins-Romaine,
2024 IL App (1st) 232479, ¶ 44 (noting that no change in circumstances need be shown under
section 110-5(f-5)). As we will see, this express statement—that no “new information or a change
in circumstance” must be shown to seek the removal of conditions—is not mirrored in the other
two statutory sections concerning ongoing review of detention.
¶ 26 The second provision relates to review of detention status when a defendant is
initially released but later detained after that release has been revoked:
“At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must
find that continued detention under this Section is necessary to reasonably ensure
the appearance of the defendant for later hearings or to prevent the defendant from
being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.” 725 ILCS 5/110-
6(j) (West 2022).
Here, defendant was initially released on conditions and then detained following revocation of his
release. Consequently, the circuit court’s subsequent review responsibilities in this case are
dictated by section 110-6(j).
¶ 27 Finally, the third provision requires a similar review of the continued necessity of
detention of defendants who were detained at the initial detention hearing:
“At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must
find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the
safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable
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facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.”
Id. § 110-6.1(i-5).
In other words, where a defendant is initially detained, the circuit court’s obligation to review the
necessity of detention at future court dates is dictated by section 110-6.1(i-5). See id.; People v.
Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶ 27. Here, defendant was not initially detained; he was
released with conditions and later detained following revocation of his release. Consequently,
section 110-6.1(i-5) does not apply to him.
¶ 28 A statute should be evaluated as a whole, and each provision must be construed in
connection with every other relevant section. Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings
Co., 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 50. Comparing and contrasting these three similar provisions gives some
insight into the meaning of each. Pertinent here is the fact that, as previously noted, only section
110-5(f-5) provides that the “court is not required to be presented with new information or a change
in circumstance to remove pretrial conditions.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(f-5) (West 2022). “ ‘When the
legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same statute, courts presume that the legislature acted intentionally and purposely in the
inclusion or exclusion [citations], and that the legislature intended different meanings and
results.’ ” People v. Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 23 (quoting Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1
v. Board of Education of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 24). Because only section 110-5(f-5)
specifically excludes the requirement to show “new information or a change in circumstance” (725
ILCS 5/110-5(f-5) (West 2022)), we conclude that such a showing is required for relief under
section 110-6(j) or section 110-6.1(i-5).
¶ 29 This is not a surprising conclusion. If a court has found that a defendant qualifies
for detention and no new information or change in circumstances is presented, it makes little sense
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to think that court would reverse its prior ruling for no particular reason. The situation is different
when dealing with the conditions imposed on a released defendant, as conditions may be shown
to be lacking in one respect or another; they may be too stringent, too loose, or perhaps
unnecessary. The Code, as amended by the Act, simply recognizes that a court must continue to
manage conditions of pretrial release in the pretrial period regardless of any change in
circumstances. A decision to detain, however, requires no ongoing management by the court, and
there will likely be no reason to revisit it unless circumstances have changed or new information
has come to light.
¶ 30 B. Analysis of This Case
¶ 31 As noted above, a circuit court always possesses the inherent authority to change
its interlocutory rulings. However, we proceed with the understanding that a circuit court’s review
of the need for a defendant’s continued detention under section 110-6(j) would require the
defendant to demonstrate some “new information or a change in circumstance” in order to
demonstrate a right to a change in detention status. See id. § 110-6(j).
¶ 32 1. Standard of Review
¶ 33 We review a circuit court’s detention order under an abuse of discretion standard.
People v. Morgan, 2024 IL App (4th) 240103, ¶ 35. “ ‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the
circuit court’s decision is “arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable,” or where “no reasonable person
would agree with the position adopted by the [trial] court.” ’ ” People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th)
230864, ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9, quoting People v.
Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010)). This discretionary standard applies to all aspects of detention,
whether resulting from an initial petition to deny pretrial release or a petition to revoke pretrial
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release. See People v. McCaleb, 2024 IL App (1st) 240514-U, ¶ 20; People v. Thomas, 2024 IL
App (1st) 240479, ¶ 16; People v. Long, 2023 IL App (5th) 230881, ¶ 16.
¶ 34 2. Circuit Court’s Continued Detention Order
¶ 35 The appeal in this case is not from the circuit court’s January 4, 2024, revocation
order but from its March 18 order finding the necessity for continued detention under section
110-6(j). As explained above, the Code required defendant to present new information or a change
in circumstances to demonstrate a right to a change in his detention status. Here, defendant argued
some of the same reasons for release offered at the original detention hearing: that he lived well
outside Macoupin County in Luka, Illinois; that he suffered from sleep apnea; and that he would
comply with conditions if were to be given his pretrial release. However, he also offered up some
new information: that the mental health crisis that led to his detention had stabilized, that mental
health services for his continued recovery were not available in the jail, and that the CPAP machine
used to address his sleep apnea was not functioning and could not be fixed while he was in jail.
¶ 36 Because defendant presented the court with new information and/or a change in
circumstances, we must review for an abuse of discretion the circuit court’s decision that
defendant’s continued detention was necessary to reasonably ensure his appearance at later
hearings or to prevent him from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.
See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(j) (West 2022). It has been held that section 110-6.1(i-5)’s parallel
provision for review does not require a new evidentiary hearing, nor does it “prescribe a standard
of proof or place a burden of proof on any party.” Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶¶ 14-15.
Section 110-6.1(i-5) has also been interpreted to mean that the “continued detention” decision is
the same as the initial detention decision but under a “less demanding standard.” 725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). We believe that the same observations are true with respect to section
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110-6(j), the provision at issue here. The only difference between the two provisions is the type of
misconduct to be guarded against by the imposition of conditions (i.e., a threat to safety under
section 110-6.1(i-5), versus commission of a felony or Class A misdemeanor under section 110-
6(j)).
¶ 37 We note, however, that review of the necessity for continued detention under
section 110-6(j) cannot, as a practical matter, be undertaken without reference to the reasons for
the original detention decision. Consequently, while section 110-6(j) does not provide for the
circuit court to simply scrutinize the merits of the earlier detention, it does permit the court to
determine whether that decision, viewed against a change in circumstances or new information,
remains appropriate in the particular case in question. It has been suggested that, on appeal from
an order finding a need for continued detention, the reviewing court lacks jurisdiction to review
the original detention decision. Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶¶ 29-30. However, the original
detention order is always the context against which a subsequent review must be measured. It is
the baseline from which to assess the significance of any alleged change in circumstances or new
information.
¶ 38 In this case, defendant was granted pretrial release on December 17, 2023, subject
to the following conditions relevant here: (1) that he not enter the 900 block of Johnson Street in
Carlinville, Illinois, and (2) that he not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction. The record
is clear that defendant conspicuously violated two core conditions of his earlier release. This
episode was more than a minor misstep, and it looms large in determining whether releasing
defendant on conditions again would adequately prevent him from reoffending. Defendant’s
extensive criminal history also remains a factor that the circuit court rightly considered and
accounted for.
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¶ 39 As for defendant’s argument that his mental health crisis has “stabilized” since the
time of the January 3 incident, the record gives little detail in support of this contention.
Furthermore, while it is undoubtedly true that defendant’s mental health needs could be better
addressed were he out of custody, that fact does not obviate the concern that his release on
conditions has once proven to be ineffective in guarding against reoffending. It is also unclear
why, if defendant was permitted to bring a CPAP machine into the jail, it was necessary that he
(rather than a friend or family member) must personally attend to its repair or replacement. The
“new information” or changes in circumstance argued by defendant provide a weak basis to depart
from the original detention decision.
¶ 40 Consequently, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that defendant’s continued detention was necessary.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 43 Affirmed.
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People v. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macoupin County, No. 23-CF-
275; the Hon. Joshua A. Meyer, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Manuela Hernandez,
for of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys
for Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, for the People.
Appellee:
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