Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, S., Aplt. ( 2017 )

[J-101-2016] [MO: Saylor, C.J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 16 WAP 2016
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the Superior
: Court entered January 21, 2016 at No.
: 1711 WDA 2014, affirming the Order of
v. : the Court of Common Pleas of
: Allegheny County entered October 7,
: 2014 at Nos. CP-02-CR-0000261-2014,
SEAN CULLEN-DOYLE, : CP-02-CR-0001018-2014, CP-02-CR-
: 0002489-2014, CP-02-CR-0002529-
Appellant : 2014, CP-02-CR-0003271-2014 and
: CP-02-CR-0004050-2014
:
: ARGUED: November 2, 2016
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: July 20, 2017
The majority holds that a single first-degree burglary conviction does not
constitute a “history of present or past violent behavior” which would disqualify an
offender from eligibility for a reduced sentence under the Recidivism Risk Reduction
Incentive Act (“RRRI Act”). 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503. It bases this holding on its conclusion
that the phrase “history of present or past violent behavior” is ambiguous, and,
consequently, on, inter alia, the policy underlying the RRRI Act, which it characterizes
as reducing recidivism by “offer[ing] greater reform opportunities for first-time offenders
than for repeat offenders.” Majority Opinion at 6. Because I view the phrase “history of
present or past violent behavior” as unambiguously encompassing all instances of
violent behavior — both past crimes and those “present” crimes for which a defendant is
being sentenced — I would find that Appellant’s single first-degree burglary conviction,
which involves violent behavior per se, disqualifies him from eligibility for the RRRI
program. Accordingly, I must dissent.
As the majority notes, “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1921(a). If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we may not look
beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language “under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit,” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), as the statutory language is “presumed to be the best
indication of legislative intent.” Commonwealth v. Corban Corp., 957 A.2d 274, 276
(Pa. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). If, however, an ambiguity exists with
respect to the language of a statute, we may determine the General Assembly’s intent
by considering the factors listed in Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act. 1
Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). Critically, for present purposes, a word or phrase is ambiguous
when it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. A.S. v. Pa. State Police,
143 A.3d 896, 905-06 (Pa. 2016).
Here, the majority, without identifying any reasonable interpretation of the phrase
“history of present or past violent behavior,” much less any alternative interpretation
which would render the phrase ambiguous, opines that the phrase is materially
ambiguous because “‘history’ ordinarily concerns past events.” Majority Opinion at 4. I
do not disagree with the majority’s straightforward assessment that “history” must
concern events which occurred in the past. I disagree, however, that, as a result,
Section 4503 is ambiguous because it is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations.
In concluding that “history of present or past violent behavior” is ambiguous, the
majority focuses solely on the meaning of “history” without considering the term in the
context of the rest of the phrase. Yet, it is well settled that “we cannot arrive at the
meaning of a word, even the ‘ordinary’ meaning, without considering the surrounding
[J-101-2016] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 2
words and provisions,” Commonwealth v. Fant, 146 A.3d 1254, 1260 (Pa. 2016), and it
is precisely the application of the word “history” in the context of the “present or past
violent behavior” language in Section 4503, rather than the definition of “history” itself,
which forms the basis of the parties’ dispute regarding the proper interpretation of this
statutory language.
When considered in its proper context with the entire phrase, I do not view the
obvious association of “history” with past events as creating an ambiguity in the statute.
Although “history of present or past violent behavior,” and, more specifically, the notion
of a “present history,” is certainly awkward verbiage, I nevertheless find this wording
capable of an interpretation which gives effect to the whole phrase, consistent with the
aforementioned principles of statutory construction. In my view, “history” for purposes
of Section 4503 refers to an “established record” of violent behavior, and “present” or
“past” signifies that any violent conviction will suffice for ineligibility. Webster’s New
College Dictionary 537 (3d ed. 2008) (defining “history” as an “established record or
pattern”). Thus, this “established record” may have been created either by virtue of a
past conviction of a violent act for which the defendant was already sentenced — i.e, a
“history of past violent behavior” — or by a violent act for which the defendant was
convicted and is presently being sentenced — i.e., a “history of present violent
behavior.” In short, and as the Superior Court observed below, the phrase excludes
from RRRI eligibility “all violent behavior.” Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, 133 A.3d
14, 21 (Pa. Super. 2016) (emphasis original).
Construing “history of present or past violent behavior” in this fashion not only
gives effect to each of the words contained in the phrase, but is consistent with the
other eligibility requirements found in Section 4503. See Fant, 146 A.3d at 1260 (“We
must read a section of a statute in conjunction with other sections, construing them
[J-101-2016] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 3
always with reference to the entire statute.”). Indeed, in addition to requiring that an
offender “not demonstrate a history of present or past violent behavior” as a prerequisite
for RRRI eligibility, Section 4503 requires, inter alia, that the offender “[h]as not been
found guilty of or previously convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for” any of the
enumerated offenses in that section, including certain personal injury crimes, certain
sexual offenses, and certain drug offenses. 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503. These eligibility
provisions clearly encompass both past and present convictions, and contemplate
disqualification from the RRRI program based upon a single conviction, undermining the
majority’s conclusion that the Act broadly contemplates eligibility for first-time offenders.
Moreover, the majority’s interpretation requires us to reach the strained conclusion that
the General Assembly intended that a defendant, such as Appellant, who has been
convicted of a single violent offense, would be RRRI eligible when it has excluded
defendants who have been convicted of a single enumerated crime — including some
crimes which are non-violent — from doing so. See, e.g., id. § 4503(4) (rendering, inter
alia, a defendant who was convicted of open lewdness ineligible for the RRRI program);
§ 4503(6) (rendering, inter alia, a defendant who was convicted of certain enumerated
drug offenses ineligible for the RRRI program).
In light of the foregoing, I find that the phrase “history of present or past violent
behavior” unambiguously excludes from RRRI eligibility all violent offenders — both
first-time offenders and those who have previously been convicted of a violent crime.
Because I view this language as unambiguous, the inquiry must end there, and, thus, I
do not find it necessary or appropriate to rely on the factors listed in Section 1921(c) of
the Statutory Construction Act in interpreting Section 4503, regardless of how
compelling some of those factors may be in support of Appellant’s preferred
construction.
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Justices Dougherty and Wecht join this dissenting opinion.
[J-101-2016] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 5