In Re: Angeles Roca, Judge ( 2017 )

[J-49A-2017] [MO: Saylor, C.J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
IN RE: ANGELES ROCA FIRST : No. 42 EAP 2016
JUDICIAL DISTRICT PHILADELPHIA :
COUNTY : Appeal from the Order dated December
: 16, 2016 of the Court of Judicial
: Discipline at No. 14 JD 2015.
APPEAL OF: ANGELES ROCA :
: ARGUED: May 9, 2017
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: November 22, 2017
I join the majority opinion in full. I agree with the majority that Article V, Section
18(c)(2) of the Pennsylvania Constitution directs this Court to review a judicial sanction
imposed by the Court of Judicial Discipline (“CJD”) to determine whether the sanction is
“lawful.” PA. CONST. art. V., § 18(c)(2).1 I further agree that our lawfulness inquiry is
guided by Article V, Section 18(b)(5), which provides that the CJD “may order removal
from office, suspension, censure or other discipline as authorized by this section and as
warranted by the record.” PA. CONST. art. V., § 18(b)(5). Accordingly, as the majority
holds, this Court’s lawfulness review encompasses an examination of whether the
sanction is authorized by Section 18 and warranted by the record, i.e., the sanction is
not “an unreasonably harsh penalty completely out of proportion to the misconduct
involved.” Slip Op. at 21. For the reasons set forth by the majority, I agree that the
CJD’s sanction of removing Appellant Angeles Roca from office is, indeed, lawful.
1
Article V, Section 18(c)(2) provides that, on the law, this Court’s review is plenary; on
the facts, our review is clearly erroneous; and as to sanctions, our review is whether the
sanction imposed was lawful. PA. CONST. art. V, §18(c)(2).
I write separately to comment upon the majority’s observation that the imposition
of discipline “not only punishes the wrongdoer, but also repairs the damaged public trust
and provides guidance to other members of the judiciary regarding their conduct.” Slip
Op. at 19 (quoting In re Berkheimer, 930 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). I agree that the imposition of judicial discipline, by
collateral consequence, acts to restore the public trust in the judiciary. The CJD may
not, however, under the guise of restoring the public trust, exercise its discretion in a
manner untethered to the misconduct of the accused jurist. It is not the role of the CJD
to impose a more severe penalty upon a judicial officer in order to “make an example”
out of the jurist or to allay the public’s alleged fears of judicial dysfunction as portrayed
by the media. The CJD’s focus should always be on the individual judicial misconduct
committed.2 While the CJD is indisputably an independent court established by this
Commonwealth’s Constitution, PA. CONST. art. V. § 18(b)(1), it does not possess
unbridled discretion to sanction a judicial officer in accordance with the purported whims
of the CJD, the peculiar judge or judicial panel hearing the matter, or the “court of public
opinion.”
2
This is evident in the CJD’s consideration of the following nonexclusive factors the
CJD adopted in In re Toczydlowski, 853 A.2d 24 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2004), and applied
in this case: (1) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern
of conduct; (2) the nature, extent and frequency of the acts of misconduct; (3) whether
the conduct occurred in or out of the courtroom; (4) whether the misconduct occurred in
the judge’s official capacity or in his or her private life; (5) whether the judge has
acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (6) whether the judge has
evidenced an effort to change or modify his or her conduct; (7) the judge’s length of
service on the bench; (8) whether there have been prior complaints about the judge; (9)
the effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (10)
the extent to which the judge exploited his position to satisfy his personal desires.
[J-49A-2017] [MO: Saylor, C.J.] - 2