Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr ( 1877 )

Chief Justice Agnew

delivered the opinion of the court, February 5th 1877.

It is true that where no duty is owed no liability arises. If therefore one leaves a stick of timber standing upright against his wall, or an open pit in his private yard to which others have not access, and a person strays in without invitation, or comes in without right, and pulls down the timber upon himself, or falls into the pit, he can have no action against the owner of the yard for the alleged negligence. He had no business there and the owner owed him no duty. But it has been often said, duties arise out of circumstances. Hence, where the owner has reason to apprehend danger, owing to the peculiar situation of his property and its openness to accident, the rule will vary. The question then becomes one for a jury, to be determined upon all its facts of the probability of danger and the grossness of the act of imputed negligence. Such was the nature of this case. This building was a factory in which several kinds of business were carried on in different stories, requiring the use of a hoisting apparatus above and an inclined plane below for the easy carriage of heavy articles, machinery, &c., into and out of the factory. These appliances were approached by means of a private opening or cartway shut in by a gate, which their use required to be often opened for the ingress of wagons and hands engaged in the business. The gate and passage-Avay opened out upon a public and much frequented street, Avhere persons Avere passing and children playing. Unlike an ordinary private alley, this passage was often open, and therefore liable to the incursions of children, and even grown persons, from thoughtlessness, accident or curiosity. Now, the inclined way, which did the injury, was a dangerous trap. It was a heavy platform weighing eight or nine hundred pounds, attached by hinges within eighteen or twenty inches of the wall, and when lowered it fell across the cartway. When not lowered it stood upright against the wall, leaning so little beyond the centre of gravity that a jar or a slight pull would cause it to fall forward. Its fall in this instance caught four children beneath it, one had his back broken, another his hands mashed and two escaped under the cavity. It was held up by no hook or other fastening, but merely rested by its own slight weight beyond the equipoise, ready, therefore, to catch children, like mice beneath a dead-fall. When wagons passed it was often held up by hand, and a witness saw it fall against the wheels. Now, can it be righteously said that the owner of such a dangerous trap, held by no fastening, so liable to drop, so near a public thoroughfare, so often open and exposed to the entries of persons on business, by accident, or from curiosity, owes no duty to those who will be probably there ? The common feeling of mankind, as well as the maxim sic utere tuo, ut alienum non Icedas, must say this cannot bo true — that this spot is not so private and secluded as that a man may keep dangerous pits or deadfalls there without a breach of duty to society. On the contrary, the mind, impelled by the instincts of the heart, sees at once that in such a place, and under these circumstances, he had good reason to expect that one day or other some one, probably a thoughtless boy in the buoyancy of play, would be led there, and injury would follow — especially, too, when prompted by knowledge that a fastening was needed. Perhaps the best monitor in such a case is the conscience of one who feels, in his dreadful recollection, the crushing sense that he had left such an engine of ill to take the life of an innocent child. Such, too, is the humanity of the law, that one may not justifiably, or even excusably, place a dangerous pitfall, a wolf-trap, or a spring-gun, purposely to catch and injure even wilful trespassers poaching upon his grounds. The common feeling of mankind, guided by the second branch of the great law of love, and the common sense of jurors, must be left, in such a case, to pronounce upon the facts. We see no error, therefore, in submitting this case, on its facts, to the verdict of a jury. The verdict, when approved by the court, must be permitted to stand; for we take it no judge who sees manifest injustice done by the verdict will permit it to stand. An upright judge does his duty quite as well when he strikes down a false and unjust verdict, as when he approves of that which he cannot condemn.

Judgment affirmed.

Paxson, J-, dissents.