Harmon, D., Aplt. v. UCBR ( 2019 )

[J-62-2018][M.O. - Dougherty, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
DANIEL HARMON, : No. 37 EAP 2017
:
Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the
: Commonwealth Court entered on 6/7/17
: at No 787 CD 2015 affirming the
: decision entered on 4/15/15 by the
v. : Unemployment Compensation Board of
: Review at No. B-577458
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION :
BOARD OF REVIEW, :
:
Appellee : ARGUED: September 25, 2018
CONCURRING OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: April 26, 2019
I join the majority opinion, except for the treatment of deference due to the
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 12-
13. In this regard, I believe that some consideration should be given to the Board’s
adjudicative role at the time it proffered its interpretation of the governing statute. See,
e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 292, 126 S. Ct.
1752, 1767 (2006) (explaining that “agency adjudications typically warrant deference”);
accord ARIPPA v. PUC, 792 A.2d 636, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (noting that deference is
due to an agency’s interpretation of a statute rendered while acting in an expert capacity
during the course of an adjudication). Such a role seems less likely than that of an
adversarial litigant to incentivize administrative agencies to “adopt positions arbitrarily
and/or based on interests unrelated to . . . legislative intent[.]” Huntley & Huntley v.
Borough of Oakmont, 600 Pa. 207, 229, 964 A.2d 855, 868 (2009).
A pervading question in this field, of course, is how much deference is due in any
given context. For present purposes, I find that the majority’s able analysis of the
relevant statute is substantially more persuasive than the reasoning supplied by the
Board and surpasses the weight of the deference that I would accord. Further, and
relatedly, the particular statutory-interpretation issue raised in the present matter only
modestly implicates agency expertise.
[J-62-2018][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] - 2