Weisblatt, E., and S. Sear v. Gov. Wolf - No. ( 2015 )

[J-105A-D-2014]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.
SHERYL SEARS; RONALD J. GUINEY; : No. 22 MAP 2013
FLORENCE SPANOS; BARBARA L. :
MILLER; RANDELL DEVLIN; KATHLEEN : Appeal from the Order of the
DEVLIN; SALLYE FISCUS; NICHOLAS : Commonwealth Court at No. 121 MD
BALANDIAT; LORETTA E. : 2011 (consolidated with No. 157 MD
MAIERHOFER; MARY GALLAGHER; : 2011) dated 3/4/13 exited 3/5/13
DANIEL CECCHETTI; MICHELE :
YAMSHON; VICKI L. MAZZAFERRO; :
MADELINE MARTUCCI; GARY :
CARPINELLO; KAREN CARPINELLO; :
DIANE HOLBERT; ARTHUR W. :
CUNNINGHAM, JR.; DANA :
CUNNINGHAM; DOLORES LOBIONDO; :
MICHAEL LOBIONDO; CAROL KUHNS; :
TAMMY BEVAN; ALICIA RAGER; :
TERESA LIBERATO; VALERIE BENKO; :
JOHN C. EGAN; TAMMY GROSS; :
BLANCHE HOOVER; JOSEPH D. :
STEINER; CYNTHIA BRAZEN; SUSAN :
ANTOSZEWSKI; ANGELA STETZ; :
BONNIE ZUZO; CAROL WEISS; LINDA :
SAUNDERS; LOUISE SCHNEIDER; :
LINDA GORSUCH; ALEX J. DERITIS, :
SR.; SHARON THIR; BECKY THIR; :
BARBARA SIMS; FRANK SIMS; CAROL :
L. DEVERS; DEBBIE A. KRAFT; :
DEBORAH A. MCGRADY; JEFF C. :
MILLER; DAVID LIPSTEIN; BONNIE :
LIPSTEIN; THOMAS R. HABERMAN; :
WILLIAM A. ROTH; DAVID DAWSON; :
VICTORIA D. HARTSEK; JEANINE :
RICHARDS; KELLY RICHARDS; :
WILLIAM AINSWORTH; WILLIAM :
BRIGGS; LORRAINE CAPALBO; CHRIS :
IAMS; RONALD KAPLAN; JOAN O'SHEA; :
KIMBERLY THOMAS; BIANCA WILLIS; :
SHAWN WILLIS; PAMELA R. ALWINE; :
BARBARA A. BEAM; BEVERLY A. :
CORCORAN; JAMES J. CORCORAN; :
KRISTYN L. CORCORAN; BILLYE :
GLENN; DAVID MCKEE; CHRISTINA A. :
MILLER; PARTICIA VARGULISH; DORA :
M. ALEXANDER; AND JODA L. SCHENA, :
ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL :
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED :
:
v. :
:
TOM WOLF AS GOVERNOR OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
RANDY ALBRIGHT AS SECRETARY OF :
BUDGET OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA; HOUSE OF :
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
MIKE TURZAI AS SPEAKER OF THE :
HOUSE; SENATE OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
JOSEPH B. SCARNATI, III, AS :
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE :
SENATE; AND DEPARTMENT OF :
TREASURY OF THE COMMONWEALTH :
OF PENNSYLVANIA :
:
APPEAL OF: MIKE TURZAI AS :
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE; SENATE OF :
THE COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA; JOSEPH B. :
SCARNATI, III, AS PRESIDENT PRO :
TEMPORE OF THE SENATE :
:
SHERYL SEARS; RONALD J. GUINEY; : No. 23 MAP 2013
FLORENCE SPANOS; BARBARA L. :
MILLER; RANDELL DEVLIN; KATHLEEN : Appeal from the Order of the
DEVLIN; SALLYE FISCUS; NICHOLAS : Commonwealth Court at No. 121 MD
BALANDIAT; LORETTA E. : 2011 dated 3/4/13, exited 3/5/13
MAIERHOFER; MARY GALLAGHER; :
DANIEL CECCHETTI; MICHELE :
YAMSHON; VICKI L. MAZZAFERRO; :
MADELINE MARTUCCI; GARY :
CARPINELLO; KAREN CARPINELLO; :
DIANE HOLBERT; ARTHUR W. :
CUNNINGHAM, JR.; DANA :
CUNNINGHAM; DOLORES LOBIONDO; :
MICHAEL LOBIONDO; CAROL KUHNS; :
TAMMY BEVAN; ALICIA RAGER; :
[J-105A-D-2014] - 2
TERESA LIBERATO; VALERIE BENKO; :
JOHN C. EGAN; TAMMY GROSS; :
BLANCHE HOOVER; JOSEPH D. :
STEINER; CYNTHIA BRAZEN; SUSAN :
ANTOSZEWSKI; ANGELA STETZ; :
BONNIE ZUZO; CAROL WEISS; LINDA :
SAUNDERS; LOUISE SCHNEIDER; :
LINDA GORSUCH; ALEX J. DERITIS, :
SR.; SHARON THIR; BECKY THIR; :
BARBARA SIMS; FRANK SIMS; CAROL :
L. DEVERS; DEBBIE A. KRAFT; :
DEBORAH A. MCGRADY; JEFF C. :
MILLER; DAVID LIPSTEIN; BONNIE :
LIPSTEIN; THOMAS R. HABERMAN; :
WILLIAM A. ROTH; DAVID DAWSON; :
VICTORIA D. HARTSEK; JEANINE :
RICHARDS; KELLY RICHARDS; :
WILLIAM AINSWORTH; WILLIAM :
BRIGGS; LORRAINE CAPALBO; CHRIS :
IAMS; RONALD KAPLAN; JOAN O'SHEA; :
KIMBERLY THOMAS; BIANCA WILLIS; :
SHAWN WILLIS; PAMELA R. ALWINE; :
BARBARA A. BEAM; BEVERLY A. :
CORCORAN; JAMES J. CORCORAN; :
KRISTYN L. CORCORAN; BILLYE :
GLENN; DAVID MCKEE; CHRISTINA A. :
MILLER; PARTICIA VARGULISH; DORA :
M. ALEXANDER; AND JODA L. SCHENA, :
ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL :
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED :
:
v. :
:
TOM WOLF AS GOVERNOR OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
RANDY ALBRIGHT AS SECRETARY OF :
BUDGET OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA; HOUSE OF :
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
MIKE TURZAI AS SPEAKER OF THE :
HOUSE; SENATE OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
JOSEPH B. SCARNATI, III, AS :
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE :
SENATE; AND DEPARTMENT OF :
[J-105A-D-2014] - 3
TREASURY OF THE COMMONWEALTH :
OF PENNSYLVANIA :
:
APPEAL OF: TOM WOLF AS :
GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH :
OF PENNSYLVANIA; RANDY ALBRIGHT :
AS SECRETARY OF BUDGET OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :
:
:
ERIC WEISBLATT, INDIVIDUALLY AND : No. 24 MAP 2013
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS :
SIMILARLY SITUATED : Appeal from the Order of the
: Commonwealth Court at No. 157 MD
v. : 2011 dated 3/4/13, exited 3/5/13
:
HONORABLE TOM WOLF, AS :
GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH :
OF PENNSYLVANIA; HONORABLE :
RANDY ALBRIGHT, AS SECRETARY OF :
BUDGET OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA; HONORABLE :
CHRISTOPHER CRAIG, AS ACTING :
TREASURER OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
AND DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY :
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA :
:
APPEAL OF: HONORABLE TOM WOLF, :
AS GOVERNOR OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
HONORABLE RANDY ALBRIGHT, AS :
SECRETARY OF BUDGET OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :
:
: No. 31 MAP 2013
ERIC WEISBLATT, INDIVIDUALLY AND :
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS : Appeal from the Order of the
SIMILARLY SITUATED, : Commonwealth Court at No. 157 MD
: 2011 dated 3/4/13, exited 3/5/13
Cross Appellant :
:
v. :
:
HONORABLE TOM WOLF, AS :
[J-105A-D-2014] - 4
GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH :
OF PENNSYLVANIA; HONORABLE :
RANDY ALBRIGHT, AS SECRETARY OF :
BUDGET OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA; HONORABLE :
CHRISTOPHER CRAIG, AS ACTING :
TREASURER OF THE :
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
AND DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY :
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, : ARGUED: November 19, 2014
Cross Appellees
OPINION
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: June 19, 2015
These consolidated direct appeals concern Appellees’ efforts to resurrect a
defunct state-run health insurance program.
By way of essential background, this case involves challenges to amendments to
the Fiscal Code,1 which, inter alia, defines the powers and duties of the Department of
Revenue and the Treasury Department relative to the disbursement or disposition of
Commonwealth funds. See 72 P.S. §2. In conjunction with annual appropriations
processes, the General Assembly has employed omnibus amendments to the Fiscal
Code, for many years, as the enabling mechanism for financing state government
operations and various programs. See, e.g., Act of July 6, 2010, P.L. 279, No. 46
(encaptioned “Fiscal Code - Omnibus Amendments” and providing, inter alia, for the
implementation of the operating budget of the Commonwealth for the fiscal year 2010-
2011).
1
Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 343, No. 176 (as amended 72 P.S. §§1-1804).
[J-105A-D-2014] - 5
Appellees were recipients of state-subsidized, low-cost health insurance via the
adultBasic program, which was previously administered by the Department of Insurance
and made available to certain qualifying adults in Pennsylvania. The program
historically received the bulk of its funding from the proceeds of a 1998 multi-state
master settlement agreement between forty-seven states – including the
Commonwealth – and several major tobacco product manufacturers in the United
States.2
The allocation and distribution of funds received annually by the Commonwealth
under this accord was initially administered outside of the Fiscal Code, via the Tobacco
Settlement Act.3 Per this enactment, such monies were deposited into a special fund
denominated the Tobacco Settlement Fund (the “Fund”), see 35 P.S. §5701.303(a)
(repealed). The TSA also provided for appropriations calculated annually using defined
formulas. See 35 P.S. §5701.306(b) (repealed). As relevant here, thirty percent of the
funds were allocated, collectively, to adultBasic and another health-related program
which provides medical assistance benefits for workers with disabilities, known as
“MAWD.” See 35 P.S. §5701.306(b)(1)(vi) (repealed).
Of particular significance to the present appeals, the TSA’s adultBasic provisions
also specified:
Subsidization of the benefit package [of adultBasic] is
contingent upon the amount of the appropriations to the
program and limited to eligible adults . . .. Nothing under this
section shall constitute an entitlement derived from the
2
See generally Act of June 22, 2000, P.L. 394, No. 54 (as amended 35 P.S. §§5671 –
5675) (the “Tobacco Settlement Agreement Act”).
3
Act of June 26, 2001, P.L. 755, No. 77 (as amended 35 P.S. §§5701.101 –
5701.5103) (the “TSA”).
[J-105A-D-2014] - 6
Commonwealth or a claim on any funds of the
Commonwealth.
35 P.S. §5701.1303(c) (emphasis added).4
In the years after the passage of the TSA, in conjunction with the annual budget
process and through the vehicle of the omnibus amendments to the Fiscal Code, the
Legislature directed a series of one-time transfers of tobacco settlement monies from
the Fund.5 Such redirection was initially undertaken primarily in furtherance of health-
related purposes, albeit ones outside the purview of the TSA. See supra note 5.6 As
relevant to the present litigation, for purposes of fiscal years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012,
the General Assembly again used modifications to the Fiscal Code to override the
TSA’s requirements for tobacco settlement monies. The amendments in question were
4
MAWD apparently received priority over adultBasic relative to tobacco settlement
funds, as no particular formula was provided in the TSA for division between these two
programs, but MAWD benefits are in the nature of an entitlement. See 35 P.S.
§5701.1503(c) (providing, upon the satisfaction of certain conditions specified in
MAWD, that the department or its designee “shall provide to the worker medical
assistance benefits” (emphasis added)).
5
See Act of June 29, 2002, P.L. 614, No. 91, §18 (adding Section 1721-A to the Fiscal
Code, 72 P.S. §1721-A (expired)); Act of July 7, 2005, P.L. 174, No. 41, §2 (reenacting
amended Section 1721-A, 72 P.S. §1721-A (expired)); Act of July 5, 2006, P.L. 296, No.
66, §2 (adding Section 1715-C of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §1715-C); Act of July 17,
2007, P.L. 141, No. 42, §4 (adding Section 1715-G of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §1715-
G); Act of July 4, 2008, P.L. 629, No. 53, §8 (adding Section 1715-I of the Fiscal Code,
72 P.S. §1715-I); Act of October 9, 2009, P.L. 537, No. 50, §5 (adding Section 1715-K
of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §1715-K).
6
For a period of time beginning in 2005, some of the dissipation of funding to adultBasic
was offset by subsidization from Pennsylvania’s Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans as
part of their non-profit missions pursuant to the Community Health Reinvestment
Agreement. See generally Act of July 5, 2006, P.L. 296, No. 66 (containing, inter alia, a
superseded version of Section 1715-C(b) of the Fiscal Code); accord H.R. 500, 195th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011). Such agreement, however, expired in 2010.
See id.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 7
contained in the Act of July 6, 2010, P.L. 279, No. 46 (“Act 46”) (adding Sections 1715-
M of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §1715-M), and the Act of June 30, 2011, P.L. 159, No. 26
(“Act 26”) (adding Section 1715-C of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §1715-C). One effect of
the amendments was to divert tobacco settlement funds more generally to other fiscal
priorities of the Commonwealth. For example, Act 46 required a transfer of
$250,000,000 to the Commonwealth’s General Fund. See 72 P.S. §1715-M(b)(5).7 At
least partially on account of the loss of essential funding, adultBasic ceased operations
in February 2011. See N.T., Apr. 12, 2011, at Exh. P-5 (reflecting a termination notice
provided to a previous adultBasic subscriber).8
In March 2011, Appellees Cheryl Sears and seventy-four other former recipients
of adultBasic (the “Sears Appellees”) filed an original-jurisdiction petition for review in
the Commonwealth Court, styled as a class action. The petition and amendments
designated as respondents: the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Secretary of Budget
(collectively, the “Executive Appellants”); the Senate, the House of Representatives,
7
See generally 72 P.S. §302 (defining the “General Fund” as “[a]ll monies received by
the Treasury Department from the Department of Revenue, or from any other source,
which are not by this act required to be credited to any other fund”).
Notably, the Legislature has continued, in subsequent years, to apply similar practices
of redirecting tobacco settlement monies away from the Tobacco Settlement Fund
through the vehicle of omnibus amendments to the Fiscal Code. See Act of July 2,
2012, P.L. 823, No. 87, §14 (adding Section 1715-G of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §1715-
G), Act of July 18, 2013, P.L. 574, No. 71, §§14-15 (adding Sections 1711-A.1 through
1713-A.1 of the Fiscal Code and repealing Sections 303, 306, and 307 of the TSA, 35
P.S. §§5701.303, 5701.306 – 5701.307).
8
The Commonwealth Court has found that the adultBasic program also terminated
because MAWD had been consuming an increasing portion of the tobacco settlement
funds dedicated to it and adultBasic collectively, and on account of the expiration of the
subsidization stream under the Community Health Reinvestment Agreement. See
Sears v. Corbett, 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 13-14 (Pa. Cmwlth. Apr. 20, 2011)
(single judge memorandum).
[J-105A-D-2014] - 8
and various legislative leaders (the “Legislative Appellants”), and the Department of
Treasury. As amended, the petition contended, inter alia, that the redirection of tobacco
settlement monies under Acts 46 and 26 violated the TSA’s requirements for
appropriation and allocation of tobacco settlement funds. See 35 P.S. §5701.306. The
petition also asserted that these enactments offended various provisions of the
Pennsylvania Constitution governing legislative processes, including the general
requirement that no bill shall be passed containing more than a single subject. See PA.
CONST. art. III, §3. Appellees sought declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief
retroactively reestablishing the adultBasic program and reimbursing the program over
two hundred million dollars.
In April 2011, Appellee Eric Weisblatt commenced a separate original-jurisdiction
proceeding in the Commonwealth Court, also styled as a class action, proffering
materially similar allegations and claims for relief, in the relevant respects. Appellee
Weisblatt, however, named only executive-branch officials and agencies as defendants.
Appellees in both proceedings moved for a preliminary injunction to preclude the
Treasury from disbursing the tobacco settlement monies which were due to be received
that month as appropriated per Act 46. Relief was denied by the court, however, upon
its finding that the harm asserted by Appellees was neither immediate nor irreparable.9
See Sears v. Corbett, Nos. 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 11 (Pa. Cmwlth. Apr. 20,
2011) (single-judge memorandum). The court reasoned that the harm had already
occurred, given the termination of the adultBasic program several months earlier, and
9
See generally Warehime v. Warehime, 580 Pa. 201, 209-10, 860 A.2d 41, 46-47
(2004) (discussing the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, including the
requirements that relief is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that
cannot be compensated by damages).
[J-105A-D-2014] - 9
moreover, the requested relief would not restore Appellees’ insurance or resurrect
adultBasic. See Sears, Nos. 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 11-12.10 Finally, the
court determined that greater harm would inure to the Commonwealth were relief to be
afforded, since the General Assembly had redirected monies, per Act 46, in order to
balance the budget as required by the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at 12 & n.12
(citing PA. CONST. art. VIII, §12). According to the court, judicial interference with this
regime would adversely affect the operation of government, services, and programs.
See id. at 13.
Subsequently, Appellants filed preliminary objections. In particular, they relied on
the TSA’s prescription that “[n]othing under this section [pertaining to adultBasic
benefits] shall constitute an entitlement derived from the Commonwealth or a claim on
any funds of the Commonwealth.” 35 P.S. §5701.1303(c). Furthermore, several of the
appellants invoked sovereign immunity to the extent that Appellees sought to compel
the restoration of adultBasic in the absence of legislative appropriations or to hold them
responsible for any effects of its termination.
On June 27, 2012, the Commonwealth Court issued a divided, en banc opinion in
the Sears case, which sustained the preliminary objections pertaining to several of the
Sears Appellees’ claims, while deeming others meritorious and/or subject to further
consideration. See Sears v. Corbett, 49 A.3d 463 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). In terms of
sovereign immunity, the majority distinguished between those suits seeking to compel
affirmative action on the part of state officials or to recover money or property, and
those asking to restrain state officials from performing affirmative acts. See id. at 471
(citing Phila. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571, 576, 190 A.2d 111, 114
10
The court also observed that the executive branch had advised subscribers of other
available healthcare insurance alternatives. See id. at 10.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 10
(1963)). Only the latter, the majority explained, was excepted from the application of
sovereign immunity. See id.
The Commonwealth Court majority next applied this distinction to the Sears
Appellees’ request for an order mandating that all future tobacco settlement monies be
deposited in accordance with the TSA, the Fund be reimbursed these monies, and the
adultBasic program be reinstated retroactively. Given that the Legislature already had
provided for redirection of the relevant funds, the majority reasoned, the Legislative
Appellants would be required to take affirmative action to effectuate a remedy. See id.
at 472-73. Accordingly, the majority concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
barred relief as against the legislative respondents and sustained the preliminary
objections in this regard. See id. at 473.11
The majority, however, regarded the relief requested relative to the Executive
Appellants as in the nature of a restraint from carrying out the dictates of the Acts 46
and 26 amendments. See id. (“Should this Court ultimately conclude that the
aforementioned Acts were unconstitutional, we could certainly direct Respondents
Corbett and Zogby to refrain from enforcing this legislation.”). Given the permissibility of
a prohibitory injunction impacting the sovereign, the majority overruled the Executive
Appellants’ preliminary objections in such regards.
In response to the argument that the Sears Appellees lacked any entitlement to
adultBasic benefits, the majority credited their position that the non-entitlement
language in Section 1303 of the TSA had a limited and directed purpose, in that it “was
meant [only] to address the expiration of the annual [tobacco settlement fund] payments
11
The Commonwealth Court majority also found that the Speech and Debate Clause
found in Article II, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution foreclosed any type of
judicial order directing the General Assembly to enact new legislation. See Sears, 49
A.3d at 481-82.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 11
in 2025 or a substantial decrease in [such payments].” Id. at 474. Viewed as such, the
majority reasoned, the TSA did not preclude the Sears Appellees from challenging the
diversion of tobacco settlement monies from adultBasic. See id. Conceptually, the
majority also perceived a material difference between claiming entitlement to monies
and challenging redirection of such funds away from a particular program. See id.
(“[The Sears Appelllees] are not alleging an entitlement, nor are they asserting a claim
to Commonwealth Funds. Rather, [they] are challenging the redirection of [tobacco
settlement] monies away from the Fund.”).
The majority proceeded to determine that Acts 46 and 26 were inconsistent with
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s single-subject provision. See PA. CONST. art. III, §3.
Initially, the majority mentioned the salient purpose of Article III, Section 3 -- which is to
prevent what were considered by early framers to be pernicious practices of the past --
as encapsulated within the following passage from this Court’s decision in City of
Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 542, 838 A.2d 566 (2003):
[O]mnibus bills . . . permitted the passage of hidden
legislation and allowed “logrolling” -- that is, “embracing in
one bill several distinct matters, none of which could singly
obtain the assent of the legislature, and procuring its
passage by combining the minorities who favored the
individual matters to form a majority that would adopt them
all.” As a corollary, the single-subject requirement prevents
the attachment of riders which could not become law on their
own to popular bills that are certain to pass. Also, a bill
addressing a single topic is more likely to obtain a
considered review than one addressing many subjects.
Id. at 574-75, 838 A.2d at 586 (citations omitted). See generally id. at 573, 838 A.2d at
585 (“Article III’s general purpose is ‘to place restraints on the legislative process and
encourage an open, deliberative and accountable government.’” (quoting Pa. AFL-CIO
ex rel. George v. Commonwealth, 563 Pa. 108, 119, 757 A.2d 917, 923 (2000))).
[J-105A-D-2014] - 12
Further, the majority recognized that, in giving effect to the above aims while also
extending appropriate deference to the legislative branch, this Court had devised a
“practical germaneness test” as the litmus for constitutional compliance with the single-
subject requirement. Sears, 49 A.3d at 475 (citing City of Phila., 575 Pa. at 579, 838
A.2d at 589 (reflecting that Article III, Section 3 requires that legislation possess some
“single unifying subject to which all of the provisions of the act are germane”)).
Applying this test, the Commonwealth Court majority found that both Acts 46 and
26 encompassed multiple diverse subjects, including ones unrelated to the
Commonwealth’s operating budget. For example, the majority explained that Act 46
contains various sections pertaining to “building/construction permits, heritage areas
and the establishment of a heritage area program within the Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources, victims of crime and the establishment of a
Special Juvenile Compensation Fund, and semi-annual reports of the Pennsylvania
Emergency Management Agency.” Sears, 49 A.3d at 478.12
Judge Simpson authored the dissent, which Judge McGinley joined. Relying on
Section 1303(c) of the TSA, the dissent found that “the TSA established the adultBasic
program, but it placed express limits on privileges of eligible adults.” Sears, 49 A.3d at
487 (Simpson, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent stressed the statutory non-
entitlement language. See id. (quoting 35 P.S. §5701.1303(c)).
Judge Simpson acknowledged the Sears Appellees’ suggestion that they were
not alleging an entitlement or making a claim to Commonwealth funds, as well as their
argument that the non-entitlement language was merely intended to address a financial
12
The majority opinion also disposed of various other claims advanced by Appellants.
We have chosen to focus on the single-subject aspect to streamline the discussion,
particularly since our disposition, below, centers on the threshold question of the impact
of the TSA’s prescription that the statute simply does not form the basis for a claim.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 13
shortfall expected around 2025, when the tobacco settlement payments were expected
to subside. The dissent replied, however:
By whatever name, [the Sears Appellees] seek return of
funds from the Commonwealth’s General Fund back to an
account where it will be available for the adultBasic program.
The plain language of Section 1303 does not enable them to
do so. Nor does the plain language even hint that non-
entitlement begins in 2025. To the extent that the majority
reaches a different conclusion, I respectfully part company.
Id. at 488.
Several weeks after the Commonwealth Court’s issuance of its opinion in Sears,
the court issued a divided decision in the companion case of Weisblatt. See Weisblatt
v. Corbett, 53 A.3d 91 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (en banc). Countervailing expressions were
presented incorporating the reasoning and conclusions set forth in the Sears majority
and dissenting opinions. See id. at 92-93.
Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary relief, and the Sears
and Weisblatt cases were consolidated. In March 2013, the Commonwealth Court, by
way of an unpublished single-judge opinion, denied class certification but awarded
partial summary relief in Appellees’ favor. See Sears v. Corbett, 121 & 157 M.D. 2011,
slip op. (Pa. Cmwlth. Mar. 4, 2013).13 As to Appellees’ requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief, the court considered itself bound by the previous decision on
preliminary objections discerning violations of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and other prescriptions of such charter. In this regard, the court referenced
the “law of the case” doctrine. See Sears, 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at 23 (“Law of
the case means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
13
The class certification aspect is not directly relevant to the present appeals and will
not be discussed further.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 14
rule of the decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case.” (quoting In re Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 715 A.2d 1219, 1223 n.10 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1998))). Based upon this principle as applied to the previous decision on
preliminary objections, the court declared Acts 46 and 26 to be unconstitutional and
permanently enjoined the Executive Appellants and the Treasury from enforcing the
provisions of these enactments on a prospective basis. See id.The Commonwealth Court also found the prior decision controlling relative to
Appellees’ request for mandamus relief to compensate for the lapse of funding in
previous years. In this regard, the court highlighted that such relief would require
legislative action, which, by virtue of sovereign immunity, was beyond the court’s
authority to direct. See id. at 28. Thus, the court denied the salient requests for
mandamus relief.
The Commonwealth Court further directed that the Executive Appellants and
Treasury were to appropriate “30% of the Fund to ‘health investment insurance
pursuant to Chapter 13 and for the purchase of Medicaid benefits for workers with
disabilities pursuant to Chapter 15,’ i.e., the MAWD and adultBasic Program, as
required by Section 306(b)(1)(vi) of the TSA.” Sears, 121 & 157 M.D. 2011, slip op. at
28. The court issued this directive because the Executive Appellants had submitted an
uncontradicted affidavit indicating that the entire thirty percent of the TSA funds were to
be allocated to MAWD for the 2013-2014 fiscal year. The court ruled that such
allocation was impermissible, however, given that the TSA required a division of funds
between the two programs. See id. at 28-29.
The Legislative and Executive Appellants lodged appeals, and Appellee
Weisblatt filed a cross-appeal to challenge the denial of retrospective relief. Per Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1736(b), an automatic supersedeas prevented immediate
[J-105A-D-2014] - 15
operation of the Commonwealth Court’s order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1736(b). Appellees
asked this Court to vacate the supersedeas, but their request was denied.
During the pendency of the appeals, additional omnibus amendments to the
Fiscal Code were enacted into law, which, inter alia, effectuated a repeal of the
allocation formula provided in the TSA, replacing it with a funding stream dedicated
solely to MAWD. See Act of July 18, 2013, P.L. 574, No. 71, §§14, 20(5) (“Act 71”)
(adding Sections 1711-A.1 through 1713-A.1 of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. §§1711-A.1 -
1713-A.1, and repealing Sections 303, 306, and 307 of the TSA, 35 P.S. §§5701.303,
5701.306 – 5701.307). The result is to formally displace adultBasic funding within the
terms of the TSA itself. See id. In light of these amendments, Appellees renewed their
request for relief from the supersedeas, which was again denied.
Presently, Appellants’ lead argument remains that specific admonitions by the
Legislature within the terms of the TSA itself -- namely, that funding to adultBasic was
conditional and nothing in the TSA provisions establishing the program was intended to
establish an entitlement or support a claim against the Commonwealth -- foreclose
Appellees’ challenges in their entirety.14 Appellants dismiss the Commonwealth Court
majority’s explanation for the non-entitlement language, in which the majority posited
that the provision was intended to address the program’s sunset upon the full
14
See, e.g., Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 28 (“The Tobacco Settlement Act is
crystal clear: the continuation of benefits under the adultBasic program is statutorily
conditioned upon subsequent decisions to be made by the General Assembly and the
Governor as to whether and how much to appropriate to that program.”); id. at 34 (“The
only interpretation that gives full meaning to this statutory non-entitlement language is
one that construes the language just as it reads: the General Assembly did not, by
establishing adultBasic to provide a non-mandated and gratuitous benefit to eligible
adults, create in [Appellees] any claim to adultBasic benefits or any claim to
Commonwealth funds.”); Brief for the Executive Appellants at 55 (“Section 1303(c)
specifically provides that no individual in the adultBasic program has an entitlement to
benefits or permits any claim to a fund of the Commonwealth.”).
[J-105A-D-2014] - 16
consummation of the tobacco settlement arrangement, as being entirely extra-statutory.
See Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 33 (“As Judge Simpson correctly observed,
the statutory text does not even ‘hint that non-entitlement begins in 2025.’” (quoting
Sears, 49 A.3d at 488 (Simpson, J., dissenting))). Rather, it is Appellants’ position that
the plain language of the TSA conveys the General Assembly’s anticipation of, and
accounting for, the possibility for future shifts among fiscal priorities. Furthermore, like
Judge Simpson, Appellants regard the majority’s distinction between challenging a
redirection of funds and laying a claim to the same funds as illusory.
Even if this were not the case, Appellants observe, Appellees’ action cannot
possibly result either in the reestablishment of the adultBasic program or the
reinstatement of the funding stream for the program contained in the original 2001
enactment, since adultBasic ceased operations four years ago. Moreover, they stress,
the TSA’s original funding formula has since been repealed by the General Assembly,
and any sought-after relief in the form of reimbursement is barred by the doctrines of
Sovereign Immunity and Speech or Debate Immunity. Accord Brief for the Legislative
Appellants at 14 (referencing the passage of Act 71 in 2013, after which “there is no
longer any statutory mechanism for funding of adultBasic”); Brief for the Executive
Appellants at 47 (“Enjoining the enforcement of the adultBasic provisions today has no
practical meaning or effect, as there is nothing left to enforce.”). For the above reasons,
the Legislative Appellants couch Appellees’ action as both “meritless and pointless.”
Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 8.
The Legislative Appellants also urge this Court to resolve the case on such basis
as to avoid “plung[ing] into the thorny bramble of constitutional procedure otherwise
presented here.” Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 25; accord id. at 35 (“Because
[Appellees] have no entitlement to adultBasic benefits or Commonwealth funds, the
[J-105A-D-2014] - 17
Court should exercise judicial restraint and decline to opine on the academic
constitutional questions regarding Acts 46 and 26.”). In this regard, the Legislative
Appellants invoke the maxim that difficult constitutional questions should be avoided if
another avenue for disposition is present. See, e.g., MCI WorldCom, Inc v. PUC, 577
Pa. 294, 311, 844 A.2d 1239, 1249 (2004) (“The ‘canon of constitutional avoidance’
provides that when a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” (citations omitted)). Additionally, they highlight
the Commonwealth Court’s determinations applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity
and the Speech and Debate Clause. According to the Legislative Appellants, havoc
would result were this Court to disturb the practice of employing omnibus-style
amendments to the Fiscal Code to implement the Commonwealth’s budget. They relate
that “[t]his is a matter of deep concern not only to the General Assembly, but also to the
People of the Commonwealth, who rely on a government funded by these laws
amending the Fiscal Code each and every day.” Brief for the Legislative Appellants at
27.
Along these lines, the Legislative Appellants explain that Acts 46 and 26 did
much more than simply allocate tobacco settlement monies, in that such enactments
implemented the Commonwealth budgets for the applicable fiscal years and provided
for a host of other fiscal matters.15 Given such breadth of applicability, the Legislative
15
As examples, the Legislative Appellants reference: funding for public health and
welfare, including autism services, lupus programs, breast cancer screening, arthritis
outreach, children and youth programs, and county human services, see 72 P.S.
§§1725-L, 1729-B, 1729-L; funding for volunteer fire companies and ambulance
services, and for the Pennsylvania State Police, see 72 P.S. §§1733-B, 1733-L, 1799-E;
requisitions for funding of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, 72 P.S.
§1501; grants provided by the Juvenile Court Judges Commission, see 72 P.S. §1712-
E; funding for public school education, higher education, and education for blind and
(continuedS)
[J-105A-D-2014] - 18
Appellants reiterate that “budgetary chaos could erupt throughout the Commonwealth,”
should Appellees’ position be sustained. See id. at 39. According to the Legislative
Appellants:
Such potential unintended consequences only reinforce the
public policies that underlie the Legislative Immunity and
Sovereign Immunity doctrines, all of which require that the
Court exercise restraint from interfering with the legislative,
budgetary, and policy decisions and activities of the
coordinate Branches of government.
The overwhelming gravity of these weighty constitutional
issues, along with the potential for disastrous, unintended
consequences, should give this Court great pause before
delving into the domains of the Legislative and Executive
branches that have been entrusted to them by the People,
through the Constitution.
Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 39; cf. Brief for the Executive Appellants at 31
(“Taking the omnibus bill and dividing it into a vast sea of smaller bills, all of which
would need to be passed at the same time, would likely increase the chance of
(Scontinued)
deaf students, see 72 P.S. §1722-B, 1722-L, 1738-L, 1738-E; funding for services for
the blind to be administered by the Department of Labor and Industry, see 72 P.S.
§1727-L; educational tax credits for small businesses, see 72 P.S. §§1601-H, 1602-H
(repealed); economic development, including the Neighborhood Improvement Zone
Fund, Keystone Opportunity Zone, Keystone Special Development Zone, and Gaming
Economic Development and Tourism Fund, see 72 P.S. §§1604-B (repealed), 1601-F
(repealed), 1604-F (repealed), 1605-B (repealed), 1719.1-E; audits of disbursed
funding, see 72 P.S. §§1502, 1701-O; the investment of Commonwealth monies, see 72
P.S. §§301.1, 505; issuance of bonds to refinance debt, see 72 P.S. §1601-G; and
creation of restricted receipt accounts for the purpose of administering federal grants,
impacting justice assistance, aid to volunteer fire companies, land and water
conservation, education of the disabled, library grants, homeless adult assistance,
assistance to severely disabled persons, transportation for the elderly and disabled,
disaster relief, and historic preservation, see 72 P.S. §§1716-C, 1719-M. See Brief for
the Legislative Appellants at 37-38 & n.23.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 19
confusion and obfuscation by scattering the amendments across multiple pieces of
legislation.”). In a similar vein, the Executive Appellants also raise justiciability concerns
under the political-question doctrine. See Brief for the Executive Appellants at 54
(“[T]he appropriation of Commonwealth funds is vested in the legislature and any
challenges to its decisions in that regard are non-justiciable political questions based on
the separation of powers.” (footnote and citations omitted)).16
Should this Court reach the merits, it is Appellants’ position that Acts 46 and 26
each had a unifying subject, namely, implementation of the Commonwealth’s operating
budget. According to the Legislative Appellants, “[b]ecause the Commonwealth’s
budget touches all corners of the Commonwealth, impacting virtually every aspect of
governmental, commercial, and day-to-day life in Pennsylvania, it is of course
necessary for the Fiscal Code enactments to address a multitude of different programs,
initiatives, objectives, special funds, agencies, and other matters.” Brief for the
Legislative Appellants at 45.
Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the “entitlement” language of Section
1303(a) has no bearing on their standing to pursue judicial redress. In this respect,
Appellees emphasize that the primary source of funds for adultBasic was tobacco
settlement monies, which Appellees appear to distinguish from “funds of the
Commonwealth,” as to which the TSA indicated they have no claim. See Brief for
16
The Legislative Appellants also take issue with Judge Pellegrini’s application of the
law-of-the-case doctrine, noting, inter alia, that the principle does not operate as an
inflexible command relative to decisions made at different stages of a proceeding. See
Brief for the Legislative Appellants at 30 (citing Riccio v. Am. Rep. Ins. Co., 550 Pa.
254, 261, 705 A.2d 422, 425 (1997)). In any event, presumably Judge Pellegrini
continued to support the substantive merits of the decision on preliminary objections,
since he was a member of the en banc panel and joined the majority decision. See
Sears, 49 A.3d at 468.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 20
Appellees at 35 (“[T]he subsidy is to be obtained from Tobacco Settlement proceeds,
not ‘from the Commonwealth.’”).
Appellees also maintain the distinction, adopted by the Commonwealth Court
majority, between challenging a redirection of monies and laying a claim to the same
funds. See, e.g., id. at 37-38 (“[A]ppellees are not claiming that the benefits provided by
the adultBasic program were an unconditional entitlement from the Commonwealth.
Rather, they are challenging how the General Assembly took away funding for a
program that the Tobacco Act mandated was to be funded by Tobacco Settlement
money.”). On this subject, Appellees also fault Appellants for “conflat[ing] specific laws
relating to entitlement programs with the more fundamental question of legal standing.”
Brief for Appellees at 36-37; see also id. at 37 (“For the [Appellants], the words of
Section 5701.1303(c), to the effect that adultBasic is not an entitlement program, have a
talismanic power that immunizes the General Assembly’s actions relating to the
administration of the Tobacco Settlement Fund from judicial oversight.”).
In terms of standing, Appellees observe that, in William Penn Parking Garage,
Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975), the Court explained that,
while there have been iterations of the litmus suggesting the requirement of a legal
right, “this test proved unsatisfactory, and has now been generally discarded.” See id.
at 200, 346 A.2d at 285 (footnotes and citations omitted). Under the prevailing
standard, Appellees explain, a party is aggrieved when his interest is direct, substantial
and immediate, with the Court defining these terms as follows:
A party has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation
if his interest exceeds that of all citizens in procuring
obedience to the law. The interest is direct if there is a
causal connection between the asserted violation and the
harm complained of; it is immediate if that causal connection
is not remote or speculative.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 21
City of Phila., 575 Pa. at 560, 838 A.2d at 577 (footnotes and citations omitted). Here,
Appellees contend that their interest is substantial because their health insurance was
lost; the interest is direct since, in absence of the challenged Fiscal Code amendments,
they believe the adultBasic program would have retained funding; and it is immediate in
light of the direct pecuniary harm they suffered.
Appellees’ central position is that Acts 46 and 26 reflect “the precise type of
legislation that Article III, §3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was intended to prevent --
omnibus bills containing a mixture of distinct and independent subjects which will not be
subject to the enhanced scrutiny a single-topic bill would undergo.” Brief for Appellees
at 20. Appellees’ contention, on this point, is that Acts 46 and 26 “deal with virtually
every aspect of life in Pennsylvania, certainly encompassing all levels of state and local
government and all who interact with or are governed by them.” Id. at 24; cf. supra note
15. Furthermore, Appellees highlight the understanding, on the part of this Court, that
“it would be a serious dereliction on our part to deliberately ignore a clear constitutional
violation.” Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 178, 507 A.2d 323,
333 (1986).
Appellee Weisblatt, in his capacity as the cross-appellant, has filed a separate
set of briefs arguing in favor of retrospective monetary relief.17
17
Appellees also challenge the Legislative Appellants’ standing to appeal, since the
Commonwealth Court held that no relief could be awarded against them. We decline,
however, to credit this position. The Sears Appellees named the houses of the General
Assembly and legislative leaders as respondents in their lawsuit, and Appellees secured
a judicial determination that several of the Assembly’s enactments were
unconstitutional. Thus, the Legislature is a party litigant with a manifest interest in the
outcome of the appeals, and we will entertain its arguments which, in any event, overlap
substantially with those advanced by the Executive Appellants. As to the Executive
Appellants, whose standing is challenged by the Appellee Weisblatt, they are subject to
an explicit order of the Commonwealth Court requiring them to refrain from enforcing
the provisions of Acts 46 and 26 and, thus, plainly are aggrieved.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 22
At the outset, we observe that these appeals raise substantial justiciability
concerns. Under Article VIII, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the General
Assembly is charged with the obligation to adopt a capital budget for each fiscal year.
See PA. CONST. art. VIII, §13. The process obviously entails a myriad of difficult policy
decisions, among competing interests, in determining fiscal priorities and attendant
allocations. Adoption of a budget, of course, would be a hollow act in the absence of an
implementing mechanism, here, the Fiscal Code. Accordingly, the Legislature urges
that it is a matter of necessity that it proceed via omnibus-style amendments to amend
the Fiscal Code, as part of the annual budget process.
Given the impact on many and varied interests, see, e.g., supra note 15, the
omnibus approach facially appears to test the limits of the practical germaneness litmus
which this Court conventionally applies to assess single-subject challenges. Moreover,
without any limitations whatsoever, the practice would seem to be susceptible to the
“logrolling” concern underlying Article III, Section 3’s single-subject requirement.
Accordingly, in an appropriate case, we may be required to determine whether judicial
intervention is possible and/or appropriate and, if so, what may be the appropriate
standards.
Nevertheless, we agree with Appellants and Judge Simpson that the appeals
presently before us are not such cases. In the absence of a constitutionally-recognized,
individual interest, the Legislature may sanction judicial redress or foreclose it. Cf.
Weaver v. Harpster, 601 Pa. 488, 517, 975 A.2d 555, 572 (2009) (“[I]t is not the role of
this Court to create a private cause of action where the General Assembly has decided
not to create a right or a remedy[.]”); Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 557 Pa. 340, 348,
733 A.2d 623, 627 (1999) (“This court will not engraft a private cause of action onto the
statute without further guidance from the General Assembly.”). In terms of adultBasic,
[J-105A-D-2014] - 23
from the outset, the Legislature expressed the manifest intention that subscribers
should have no claim against Commonwealth funds. See 35 P.S. §5701.1303(c). The
Commonwealth Court, then, should not have permitted the legislative and executive
branches to be haled into court based upon such prohibited claims. Cf. Jerry L.
Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual
Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 297, 303 (1996) (“[E]ntitlements versus
non-entitlements programs are distinguished in terms of beneficiaries’ capacity to
enforce their interest in the states’ fulfillment of programmatic promises.”).
The Commonwealth Court majority’s dilutions of the operative non-entitlement
language -- e.g., “[n]othing under this section shall constitute an entitlement derived
from the Commonwealth or a claim on any funds of the Commonwealth,” 35 P.S.
§5701.1303(c) -- are unpersuasive. As Judge Simpson explained, there simply is no
sunset-based qualification upon these proscriptions, and it exceeds the judicial role to
inject such a limitation. See, e.g., Frazier v. WCAB (Bayada Nurses, Inc.), 616 Pa. 592,
599, 52 A.3d 241, 245 (2012) (“When examining a statute, we are bound by its plain
language; accordingly, we should not insert words into the [a]ct that are plainly not
there.”). Moreover, funds “of the Commonwealth” plainly are at the forefront of
Appellees’ claims, since the monies in issue derived from the master settlement
agreement with tobacco product manufacturers, and the Commonwealth is the party-in-
interest to such accord. See 35 P.S. §5673 (defining the “Master Settlement
Agreement” as an agreement between “the Commonwealth” and leading tobacco
product manufacturers). Furthermore, it is the Commonwealth which received the
funds, as recognized in the TSA itself. See id. §5701.303(a) (repealed) (providing for
the depositing in the Tobacco Settlement Fund of “all payments received by the
Commonwealth pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement”). Finally, like Judge
[J-105A-D-2014] - 24
Simpson, we see no material difference between making a claim on funds of the
Commonwealth and challenging the redirection of such monies to other fiscal priorities.
See Sears, 49 A.3d at 488 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (“By whatever name, [Appellees]
seek return of funds from the Commonwealth’s General Fund back to an account where
it will be available for the adultBasic program.”).
As to the underlying legislative intent, when the General Assembly pronounced
that the TSA’s adultBasic provisions did not furnish a basis for a claim against
Commonwealth funds, we believe that it expected that the Commonwealth should not
be sued by subscribers relative to the program’s receipt of such funds. In our view, the
Legislature particularly would not have thought that persons with no entitlement to make
a claim on Commonwealth funds could pursue an action in a court of law bringing the
entire scheme for implementing the Commonwealth budget into question. Moreover,
were we to ignore the statute’s plain direction in this regard, the specter of litigation
would serve as a substantial deterrent to the allocation of funding to non-entitlement
programs.
Finally, we recognize that Appellees might qualify to seek judicial redress under
the general principles of standing reflected in the William Penn Parking Garage
decision, which recognizes as sufficient interests short of the possession of a legal
claim. See William Penn Parking Garage, 464 Pa. at 202, 346 A.2d at 286. That
decision, however, did not involve a scenario in which claims were explicitly prohibited
by the Legislature.18
18
In this regard, our present opinion is consistent with the decision in Commonwealth v.
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 607 Pa. 406, 8 A.3d 267 (2010). In that case, this Court
recognized that the general standing principles fashioned by the judiciary may yield to
the will of the General Assembly when the question is one of standing under a specific
statutory regime. See Janssen, 607 Pa. at 420, 8 A.3d at 275.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 25
In light of the absence, on Appellees part, of any entitlement to adultBasic
benefits and the related statutory prohibition against the assertions of claims on funds of
the Commonwealth, we hold that Appellees lacked standing to pursue the relief
requested in their petitions for review.
The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and its opinions on
preliminary objections and summary relief are vacated.
Former Chief Justice Castille did not participate in the decision of this case.
Messrs. Justice Eakin and Baer, Madame Justice Todd and Mr. Justice Stevens
join the opinion.
[J-105A-D-2014] - 26