Duda v. Carothers , 379 Pa. 248 ( 1954 )

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Arnold,

Plaintiff appeals, from the order of the court below refusing to take off a compulsory nonsuit entered in an action of trespass. The case arises out of the death of plaintiffs decedent after being struck by defendant’s automobile.

The accident occurred on a twenty foot public highway at 10:30 A.M. on a clear, dry day. Decedent had been walking in a northerly direction on the berm and on his left side of the road. One Eckman, driving in the same direction, stopped his car on his side and “hollered back” to offer decedent a ride. As he did so, he saw defendant’s automobile about a “car length” from decedent, proceeding southerly on the paved portion of the highway at a speed of 30 miles per hour. Eckman’s warning to decedent of the car’s approach was not heeded, and decedent “went to take a step . . . lost his balance . . . went forward and the car struck him.” Defendant’s ear was brought to a stop on the pavement within a “car length and a half” from the point of collision, and the only skid marks were approximately one foot in length on the paved portion of the highway. The damage to defendant’s car was on the side of the right headlight, the windshield, and the right door.

Plaintiff contends that defendant was negligent because deceased was struck when “standing on the berm.” The difficulty with this contention is that it is not supported by the evidence. Eckman testified: “Q. Now, do.you know of your own knowledge as to whether Duda, the decedent, was on the paved portion or on the berm portion when he was struck? A. I couldn’t say that. Q. What did he do if you know? A. It looked like he just took a step forward toward the pavement of the road. It looked like he lost his balance and kind of went forward and the car struck him. Q. And for that reason you weren’t able to state whether or not Mr. Duda was on the pavement proper or alongside of the pavement; is that right? A. That is right.”¹

Although the plaintiff starts with the presumption that the deceased used due care, the presumption does not establish the negligence of the defendant. In Moore Exrx. v. Esso Standard Oil Company of Pennsylvania, 364 Pa. 343, 344, 345, 72 A. 2d 117, this Court affirmed on the opinion of Judge Sweney of the court below, in which that judge stated: “Two questions are here presented: (1) what effect, if any, does the presumption that decedent exercised due care have upon the question as to whether he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law; and (2) did plaintiff prove any negligence on the part of the defendants? The burden was upon the plaintiff to prove the defendants negligent by a preponderance of the evidence ... It is our opinion that the presumption of due care is a presumption of fact. As such, the presumption is not evidence and should not be substituted for evidence; it has no probative quality. [Citing Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315 Pa. 479] . . . One thing is clear and that is that the presumption of due care does not prove the defendant negligent; nor does the presumption take the case to the jury, without real proof of the defendant’s negligence. The presumption has no significance, until plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of defendant’s negligence.” See also Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12, 17, 82 A. 2d 11. The mere collision between the automobile and decedent-pedestrian does not prove negligence: Thompson v. Gorman, 366 Pa. 242, 246, 77 A. 2d 413.

In this case there is nothing which the jury could reasonably use as a basis for a finding of negligence in the defendant, and it is not permitted to speculate or guess: Lanni v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 371 Pa. 106, 110, 88 A. 2d 887.

Judgment affirmed.

1 Eckman also testified that just before and immediately after the collision all four wheels of the defendant’s car were on the pavement.