Berry v. COM., UNEMP. COMP. BD. OF REV. ( 1980 )

OPINION OF THE COURT

EAGEN, Chief Justice.

Appellants, Billy Berry, Edison Eby and sixteen others, are among ninety-seven former maintenance and production workers of the George Sail Metal Company and members of Teamster’s Local 115, who began a work stoppage on May 18, 1973, and subsequently filed claims for unemployment compensation benefits with the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation (Bureau). The Bureau initially denied the claims of all those involved in the work stoppage after determining they were disqualified from receiving benefits because their unemployment was a result of a labor dispute within the terms of Section 402(d) of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Act of 1937.¹ Among the instant appellants, only Edison Eby formally appealed the determination of the Bureau denying benefits within the ten days mandated by Section 501 of the Act.² Appellant Eby requested a hearing before a referee which took place on September 26, 1973. The referee held the work stoppage was the result of a labor dispute and affirmed the determination of the Bureau denying benefits. After review, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirmed the decision of the referee on March 6, 1974. No further appeal ensued.

The case of a co-worker, Charlie Davis, moved more slowly through the administrative process. Following the initial denial of benefits, Davis appealed and requested a hearing before a referee. Davis was represented by counsel at the hearings which took place on April 3, 1974 and September 3, 1974. The referee affirmed the Bureau determination denying benefits. Davis then appealed to the Board which, on April 30,1975, reversed the decision of the referee after oral argument and awarded Davis benefits on the ground the work stoppage at George Sail Metal Company was the result of a lockout by the employer.³

Upon learning of the decision in the Davis case, appellants retained counsel. Appellant Eby requested reconsideration of his case by the Board, and the remaining appellants requested permission to make nunc pro tunc appeals. The Board refused to grant relief on the basis that the absence of timely appeals rendered the decisions final and the mandatory language of the Act prohibits the Board from reconsideration of final decisions.⁴ The Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding that the appeal provisions of the Act are mandatory and admit of only one exception: proof that fraud or its equivalent by the administrative authorities prevented filing of timely appeals. Berry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 33 Pa.Cmwlth. 565, 382 A.2d 487 (1978). We granted appellants’ petition for allowance of appeal.

Appellants would have us carve out an exception to the mandatory appeal requirements of the Act to provide for reconsideration of Bureau determinations and Board decisions upon proof of fraud by a party opponent to the proceedings or a showing of newly discovered, previously unavailable evidence. Both the Commonwealth Court and the Superior Court⁵ have decided numerous cases on the principle that neither courts nor the compensation authorities have jurisdiction to extend the time for an appeal from denial of benefits, absent a showing of fraud or its equivalent on the part of the administrative authorities. See, e. g., Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. DeVictoria, 24 Pa.Cmwlth. 143, 353 A.2d 920 (1976); Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ferraro, 22 Pa.Cmwlth. 304, 348 A.2d 753 (1975); Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Buongiovanni, 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 338, 345 A.2d 783 (1975); Ferretti Unemployment Compensation Case, 195 Pa.Super. 234, 171 A.2d 594 (1961); Flynn Unemployment Compensation Case, 192 Pa.Super. 251, 159 A.2d 579 (1960); Bee Unemployment Compensation Case, 180 Pa.Super. 231, 119 A.2d 558 (1956).

A comparison of the transcripts of the hearing in appellant Eby’s case with the transcript of the hearings in the Davis case reveals that many of the same facts were elicited in both proceedings. However, they were presented more effectively at the Davis hearings. Many of the facts testified to by witnesses at the Davis hearings could have been presented by appellant Eby at his hearing, but were not. Moreover, seventeen of the eighteen instant appellants did not seek a hearing before a referee, but rather accepted the Bureau’s determination denying benefits without seriously pursuing their rights to administrative review in a timely fashion. Appellants have presented no compelling reasons to interfere with the legislatively mandated scheme for distribution of unemployment compensation benefits.

Orders affirmed.

MANDERINO, J., did not participate in the decision of this case. LARSEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which FLAH-ERTY, J., joined.

1 . Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Session, P.L. (1937) 2897, §§ 2 et seq., as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 751 et seq. [hereinafter cited as the Act].

2 . A 1976 amendment extended the time for appeal to fifteen days, Act of April 14, 1976, P.L. 113, No. 50, § 1, 43 P.S. § 821(c) (Supp. 1979-80).

3 . Section 402(d) of the Act, which excludes payment of compensation in cases of work stoppage resulting from labor disputes, specifically excepts lockouts.

4 . Section 509 of the Act, 43 P.S. § 829, provides in pertinent part:

“Any decision made by the department or any referee or the board shall become final ten days after the date thereof, and shall not be subject to collateral attack as to any application claim or claims covered thereby or otherwise be disturbed, unless appealed from, as hereinbefore provided . . .”

5 . Jurisdiction of appeals from decisions of the Board resided in the Superior Court before foundation of the Commonwealth Court. Section 509 of the Act, 43 P.S. § 829.