Commonwealth v. Perfetto, M., Aplt. ( 2019 )

[J-105-2018]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 7 EAP 2018
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the Superior
: Court entered on August 30, 2017 at
: No. 2479 EDA 2015 reversing the
v. : Order entered on July 13, 2015 in the
: Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
: County, Criminal Division at No. CP-
MARC PERFETTO, : 51-CR-0013338-2014.
:
Appellant : ARGUED: December 6, 2018
OPINION
JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: April 26, 2019
In a published opinion, a splintered, en banc panel of the Superior Court concluded
that Subsection 110(1)(ii) of Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 110(1)(ii), does not preclude the Philadelphia District Attorney (the “Commonwealth”)
from prosecuting Marc Perfetto (“Appellant”) on pending misdemeanor criminal charges
that arose from the same criminal episode that resulted in Appellant also being charged
with a summary traffic offense, despite the fact that the Commonwealth already had
prosecuted Appellant for that summary traffic offense. Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 169
A.3d 1114 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). We granted allowance of appeal to assess the
propriety of this conclusion. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that Subsection
110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute bars the Commonwealth from further
prosecuting Appellant on his pending charges. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse the
Superior Court’s judgment and reinstate the trial court’s order, which granted Appellant’s
motion to dismiss his pending charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii).
I. Background
A. History of 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii)
Before examining the facts of this case, recounting a brief history of Subsection
110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute will be helpful in understanding the issues
presently before the Court. This Court first announced the compulsory joinder rule in
Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973), vacated, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), on
remand, 314 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1974). In short, the Campana Court held that “the Double
Jeopardy Clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges
against a defendant arising from a ‘single criminal episode.’” Campana, 304 A.2d at 441
(footnote omitted).
The Legislature subsequently codified this rule in the Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 110. Prior to 2002, Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute barred the
Commonwealth from prosecuting a defendant when: (1) a former prosecution resulted in
an acquittal or conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based on the same criminal
conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution; (3) the
prosecutor was aware of all of the charges when the former prosecution commenced;
and (4) all of the charges were within the jurisdiction of a single court. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1995) (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 110).
Regarding the fourth prong of this standard, this Court interpreted the phrase “within the
jurisdiction of a single court” to mean that all of the charges relevant to the compulsory
joinder analysis must have been capable of adjudication in one court. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Geyer, 687 A.2d 815, 817 (Pa. 1996) (explaining that the pre-2002
[J-105-2018] - 2
version of Subsection 110(1)(ii) did not bar a subsequent prosecution when a single court
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate all of the offenses at issue).
In 2002, the Legislature amended Subsection 110(1)(ii) by changing the fourth
prong of the statute. Specifically, the Legislature removed the phrase “was within the
jurisdiction of a single court” and replaced it with the phrase “occurred within the same
judicial district as the former prosecution.” Thus, the current version of Subsection
110(1)(ii) provides as follows:
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the
statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred
by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction
as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution
barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the
subsequent prosecution is for:
***
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the
same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the
appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement
of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district
as the former prosecution unless the court ordered a separate
trial of the charge of such offense[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66 (Pa. 2008), this Court interpreted the
phrase “occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution.” In so doing,
the Court first concluded that the Legislature intended “judicial district” to mean “the
geographical area established by the General Assembly in which a court of common
pleas is located.” Fithian, 961 A.2d at 75 (footnote omitted). As to the entirety of this
phrase, we ultimately held that, in amending Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory
joinder statute, the Legislature “intended to preclude from the reach of the compulsory
[J-105-2018] - 3
joinder statute those current offenses that occurred wholly outside of the geographic
boundaries of the judicial district in which the former prosecution was brought, even
though part of a single criminal episode.” Id. at 77. Consequently, under the present
version of Subsection 110(1)(ii), a current prosecution is prohibited if: (1) the former
prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based
on the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former
prosecution; (3) the prosecutor was aware of all of the charges when the former
prosecution commenced; and (4) all of the charges occurred within the same judicial
district. Thus, Subsection 110(1)(ii) no longer speaks to whether all of the charges are
“within the jurisdiction of a single court.”
B. Facts and Trial Court Proceedings
The factual background underlying this appeal is undisputed. On July 3, 2014,
Appellant was operating a motor vehicle in the City and County of Philadelphia when a
Philadelphia Police Officer stopped him. The officer issued Appellant a citation for the
summary offense of driving without lights when required, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4302(a)(1). The
officer also charged Appellant with three counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”), 75
Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (d)(1), and (d)(2).
On September 4, 2014, a hearing officer in the Philadelphia Municipal Court -
Traffic Division (“Traffic Division”) tried Appellant in absentia solely on the summary traffic
offense, finding him guilty. As to Appellant’s pending DUI charges, after a preliminary
hearing that resulted in the charges being held over for trial, Appellant filed in the trial
court a motion to dismiss and a supporting memorandum, invoking Subsection 110(1)(ii)
of the compulsory joinder statute. Specifically, Appellant argued that, because he already
had been convicted of the summary traffic offense, the compulsory joinder statute
prohibited the Commonwealth from subsequently prosecuting him for the DUI charges,
[J-105-2018] - 4
as all four prongs of the current version of Subsection 110(1)(ii) were met: (1) Appellant’s
former prosecution on his summary offense resulted in a conviction; (2) the DUI
prosecution arose from the same criminal episode as the summary offense prosecution -
a single traffic stop; (3) the prosecutor was aware of all of the charges when the summary
offense prosecution commenced; and (4) all of Appellant’s charges occurred within the
same judicial district - the First Judicial District, i.e., Philadelphia.
On July 13, 2015, the trial court entertained oral argument on Appellant’s motion
to dismiss. Appellant’s argument largely tracked the contentions that he presented in his
memorandum supporting his motion to dismiss, as discussed above. The theme of the
Commonwealth’s argument was that the compulsory joinder statute was inapplicable in
this case because the Commonwealth allegedly was required to try Appellant for his
summary offense in the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, which lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant’s DUI charges. The trial court ultimately agreed with
Appellant, granting his motion and dismissing the DUI charges.
The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court subsequently
authored an opinion in support of its decision. The court concluded that all of the elements
of Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute were met with respect to
Appellant’s DUI charges, requiring the court to dismiss Appellant’s DUI charges.
Regarding the Commonwealth’s jurisdictional argument, the court explained that, prior to
2013, Philadelphia had a specially designated Traffic Court that “had no authority to hear
misdemeanor cases, and bifurcation of summary and misdemeanor offenses was
permissible.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/6/2015, at 3-4 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v.
Masterson, 418 A.2d 664, 666 (Pa. Super. 1980)). The court noted that, in 2013, the
Legislature amended 42 Pa.C.S. § 1121, which resulted in the Philadelphia Traffic Court
[J-105-2018] - 5
merging into and becoming a division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court.1 According to
the trial court, following this merger, conduct resulting in charges under both the Crimes
Code and the Motor Vehicle Code are within the jurisdiction of the same court, i.e., the
Philadelphia Municipal Court. Id. at 4.
II. Appeal to the Superior Court
A fractured, en banc panel of the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s order in
a published opinion. Perfetto, supra. The court’s decision consisted of a five-judge
majority, a two-judge concurrence, and a three-judge dissent.2 The issue before the
Superior Court was “whether the trial court erred when it dismissed DUI charges pursuant
to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 based on the prior adjudication of [Appellant’s] summary traffic
offense.” Perfetto, 169 A.3d at 1117. While the trial court resolved this issue with a
relatively straightforward application of Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder
statute, the various opinions of the Superior Court, particularly the majority opinion, relied
upon sections from the Judicial and Crimes Codes, as well as comments to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which ultimately led the Superior Court to reverse the trial court’s
order.
Important to the issues presently before this Court, the majority initially recognized
that the current version of Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute does
not require a court to consider whether all of the charges were within the jurisdiction of a
single court; rather, courts now should determine whether the multiple offenses at issue
1 The amendments to Section 1121 of the Judicial Code, which is entitled “Philadelphia
Municipal Court,” became effective on June 19, 2013. The amended statute merged the
Philadelphia Traffic Court into the Philadelphia Municipal Court by reorganizing the
Municipal Court into two divisions: General Division and Traffic Division. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 1121(a). Of further note, the Philadelphia Traffic Court was a constitutionally
designated court; however, on April 26, 2016, the Pennsylvania Constitution was
amended to eliminate finally the Philadelphia Traffic Court.
2 One judge joined both the majority and concurring opinions.
[J-105-2018] - 6
occurred within the same judicial district. Id. at 1119-20. This observation
notwithstanding, the majority subsequently asserted that “the jurisdiction of a court
remains a consideration implicit to any compulsory joinder analysis, and it is particularly
important in those judicial districts that, for various reasons, have distinct minor courts or
magisterial district judges vested with exclusive jurisdiction over specific matters.” Id. at
1121 (footnote omitted).
Having concluded that compulsory joinder analysis still requires jurisdictional
considerations, the majority then engaged in a complex jurisdictional analysis of the
Philadelphia Municipal Court, which, as noted supra at p.6 n.1, now consists of the
General and Traffic Divisions. Id. at 1121-25. The majority reasoned that, when a
Philadelphia defendant engages in conduct that results in a summary traffic charge and
a misdemeanor or felony charge, the summary traffic offense must be prosecuted in the
Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court because, according to the majority,
the Traffic Division has exclusive jurisdiction over summary traffic offenses. Thus, in the
majority’s view, the defendant’s pending misdemeanor or felony charge can be
prosecuted in a subsequent proceeding without running afoul of the compulsory joinder
statute. Based upon this reasoning, the majority concluded that Appellant’s summary
traffic offense could be tried only in the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court,
and therefore, Appellant’s subsequent prosecution for his DUI charges is not subject to
dismissal under 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii).3 Accordingly, the majority reversed the trial
court’s order granting Appellant’s motion to dismiss.
3 Regarding the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, Sections 1121 and 1123
of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 1121 & 1123, speak directly to that court’s jurisdiction.
Yet, the lynchpin of the Superior Court’s jurisdictional analysis of the Municipal Court was
Subsection 1302(a.1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(a.1), which is entitled
“Traffic Court of Philadelphia.” See Perfetto, 169 A.3d at 1125 (holding that, under the
circumstances presented in this case, “Section 1302 carves out an exception to
[J-105-2018] - 7
Although the above-stated rationale adequately summarizes why the Superior
Court majority granted the Commonwealth appellate relief, we highlight that the majority,
in the course of its ruling, rejected the Commonwealth’s argument regarding Subsection
112(1) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1).
Subsection 112(1) provides as follows:
A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of section 109 of this title
(relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for same the
offense) through section 111 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred
by former prosecution in another jurisdiction) under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked
jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.
18 Pa.C.S. § 112.
The Commonwealth argued to the Superior Court that, pursuant to Subsection
112(1), compulsory joinder of criminal charges is not required where an initial prosecution
proceeded before a court that lacked jurisdiction over offenses to be tried in a subsequent
prosecution, even if all of the charges stemmed from the same criminal episode. Perfetto,
169 A.3d at 1120. In other words, the Commonwealth took the position that, because the
hearing officer in the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court who convicted
Appellant of his summary traffic offense lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant’s DUI
charges, Subsection 112(1) permits the Commonwealth subsequently to prosecute
Appellant’s DUI charges.
compulsory joinder and directs that the summary traffic offense is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the traffic court”).
Respectfully, to the extent that Subsection 1302(a.1) was at all relevant to this
matter, we observe that this subsection has expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(a.1)(2)
(stating that Subsection 1302(a.1) shall expire at the later of “(i) the date of the ratification
by the electorate of an amendment to the Constitution of Pennsylvania abolishing the
Philadelphia Traffic Court; or (ii) January 1, 2018”).
[J-105-2018] - 8
Without directly addressing the Commonwealth’s argument, the Superior Court
majority summarily set forth its extremely narrow view of Subsection 112(1), suggesting
that the subsection applies only when a single offense is at issue. More specifically,
relying on the Superior Court’s previous decision in Commonwealth v. Schmotzer, 831
A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. 2003), the majority opined that Subsection 112(1) permits a
subsequent prosecution of an offense in a court with jurisdiction over that offense if an
initial prosecution of the same offense was dismissed because the first court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate it. Perfetto, 169 A.3d at 1121. Here, in attempting to move
forward with the prosecution of Appellant’s DUI charges, the Commonwealth was not
endeavoring to resurrect an offense that previously had been dismissed by a court for
lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the majority concluded that Subsection 112(1) was
inapplicable to this case.
The two-judge Superior Court concurrence also would have reversed the trial
court’s order; however, it would have done so by adopting the Commonwealth’s argument
regarding Subsection 112(1). Specifically, the concurrence would have held that,
pursuant to the plain language of Subsection 112(1), the Commonwealth should be free
to try Appellant’s DUI charges in the General Division of the Municipal Court because the
Traffic Division lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the DUI offenses. See Perfetto, 169 A.3d
at 1126 (Moulton, J., concurring) (holding that, “under the plain language of section
112(1), a subsequent prosecution is not barred where the court presiding over the ‘former
prosecution,’ while it had jurisdiction over that matter, lacked jurisdiction over the ‘offense’
to be prosecuted in the subsequent prosecution”). Stated differently, because the hearing
officer in the Traffic Division had jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant’s summary traffic
offense but lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s DUI offenses, the concurrence would have
concluded that, pursuant to Subsection 112(a), the prosecution of the summary traffic
[J-105-2018] - 9
offense in the Traffic Division did not bar the Commonwealth from subsequently
prosecuting Appellant for the DUI offenses in the General Division of the Municipal Court.
Lastly, like the majority, the three-judge Superior Court dissent employed a
jurisdictional analysis to determine whether Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory
joinder statute bars the Commonwealth from prosecuting Appellant’s DUI charges. Id. at
1127-31 (Dubow, J, dissenting). The dissent ultimately concluded that no jurisdictional
bar precluded the Commonwealth from prosecuting all of Appellant’s charges in one
proceeding. In support of this position, the dissent relied upon Subsection 1121(b)(3) of
the Judicial Code, which provides that the General Division of the Philadelphia Municipal
Court “shall exercise full jurisdiction of the municipal court under section 1123(a)(relating
to jurisdiction and venue).” Id. at 1129 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 1121(b)(3)). In other words,
in the dissent’s view, the General Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate any charge that is properly before that court, including summary
and misdemeanor offenses.
Thus, the dissent took the position that the Legislature “created a statutory scheme
in which the General Division would hear those cases in which the Commonwealth
charged a defendant with both summary and misdemeanor traffic offenses and the Traffic
Division would hear those cases in which the Commonwealth only charged a defendant
with a summary offense.” Id. at 1129-30. Consequently, the dissent reasoned, because
no jurisdictional issues prevented the Commonwealth from prosecuting all of Appellant’s
charges in one court and because all of the prongs of Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the
compulsory joinder statute were met, the Commonwealth should be barred from further
prosecuting Appellant for his DUI charges.
It is noteworthy that the dissent also concluded that Subsection 112(1) is
inapplicable to this case. The dissent observed that Subsection 112(1) applies when the
[J-105-2018] - 10
former prosecution was before a “court” that lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the
offense. Id. at 1131. The dissent pointed out that the Traffic Division, which adjudicated
Appellant’s summary offense, is a division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. The
dissent concluded that the Philadelphia Municipal Court had jurisdiction to dispose of all
of Appellant’s charges, including the DUI offenses, as the Legislature granted that court
jurisdiction over such matters, albeit in its General Division. Id.; see 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 1121(b)(3) (granting the General Division of the Municipal Court with jurisdiction over
all matters properly before that court). For all of these reasons, the dissent would have
affirmed the trial court’s order.
III. Appeal to this Court
A. Petition for Allowance of Appeal
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which we granted to consider the
following questions, as phrased by Appellant:
(1) Whether [the] Superior Court erred in determining that [the] Philadelphia
Municipal Court - Traffic Division has sole jurisdiction over summary traffic
offenses even when those charges are part of a single incident which also
includes a misdemeanor and/or felony charges? Is this decision in conflict
with 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, the 2002 amendment thereto removing jurisdiction
as an element of the offense, its constitutional underpinnings, and decisions
of this Court?
(2) Where the lower [c]ourt dismissed the prosecution under 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 110 because all the prongs of the test for dismissal under that statute were
met, did the trial [c]ourt properly dismiss the charges?
Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 182 A.3d 435 (Pa. 2018).
B. Parties’ Arguments
i. Appellant’s Principal Brief
Appellant’s principal brief to this Court is primarily aimed at deconstructing and
discrediting the Superior Court’s majority opinion. Pertinently, Appellant takes the
position that the Superior Court majority ignored this Court’s decision in Fithian, supra,
[J-105-2018] - 11
and the plain language of the Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute by
erroneously inserting a jurisdictional element into the compulsory joinder analysis. In fact,
Appellant argues, despite acknowledging that Subsection 110(1)(ii) clearly does not
require a court to consider jurisdiction for purposes of a compulsory joinder analysis, the
majority nonetheless concluded without explanation or support that “jurisdiction of a court
remains a consideration implicit to any compulsory joinder analysis.” Appellant’s Brief at
12 (quoting Perfetto, 169 A.3d at 1121).
Appellant further asserts that, contrary to the Superior Court majority’s conclusion,
no statute confers exclusive jurisdiction over summary traffic offenses to the Traffic
Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. In support of this position, Appellant relies
upon 42 Pa.C.S. § 1121 (i.e., the provision of the Judicial Code that expressly addresses
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court), which provides that the General Division of the
Philadelphia Municipal Court has full jurisdiction of the municipal court, which would
necessarily include summary traffic offenses. Appellant’s Brief at 16 (quoting Perfetto,
169 A.2d at 1130 (Dubow, J., dissenting)).
Finally, Appellant argues that, contrary to the Superior Court’s flawed analysis, the
trial court employed the proper compulsory joinder test and correctly concluded that
Appellant’s DUI charges should be dismissed as violating the dictates of Subsection
110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute because all of the prongs of that statutory
subsection were met. For all of these reasons, Appellant contends that this Court should
reverse the Superior Court’s judgment, which reversed the trial court’s order granting
Appellant’s motion to dismiss his DUI charges on compulsory joinder grounds.4
ii. Commonwealth’s Brief
4In support of Appellant, the Defender Association of Philadelphia filed an amicus curiae
brief, which reflects the same concerns that Appellant outlines in his briefs to this Court.
[J-105-2018] - 12
The Commonwealth’s argument to this Court is two-fold. In its primary argument,
the Commonwealth advocates that we should adopt the approach to this issue advanced
by the Superior Court’s concurring opinion. According to the Commonwealth, 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 112(1) limits the reach of the compulsory joinder statute by permitting a second
prosecution - though the offense is based on the same conduct or arose from the same
criminal episode and occurred in the same judicial district as an offense previously
prosecuted - if the “former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over
the defendant or the offense[.]” Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1)).
The Commonwealth suggests that the presiding “court” in Appellant’s first
prosecution was not the Municipal Court as a whole but, rather, the hearing officer of the
Traffic Division who adjudicated the summary traffic offense, the only offense over which
he had jurisdiction.5 Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. According to the Commonwealth,
because the Traffic Division hearing officer did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
Appellant’s DUI charges, the Commonwealth was permitted to prosecute Appellant’s DUI
charges in a subsequent proceeding pursuant to Subsection 112(1).6
In the alternative, the Commonwealth argues that, even if this Court disagrees with
its interpretation of Subsection 112(1), the compulsory joinder statute nonetheless does
not preclude the Commonwealth from prosecuting Appellant for DUI. In this regard, the
5 In support of this proposition, the Commonwealth cites to and quotes the definitional
provision, not of the Crimes Code, but of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 102.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. This reliance is misplaced as Subsection 112(1) is part of
the Crimes Code, which contains a wholly distinct definition of “Court.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 103.
Given the Commonwealth’s inappropriate citation, we reject this argument.
6 The Commonwealth asserts that Appellant’s DUI charges will be tried by a jury. The
Commonwealth further asserts, “Thus, even the judges of the General Division of the
Municipal Court will not have jurisdiction to preside at the trial on those charges, and the
case will have to be tried in the Court of Common Pleas.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-9.
The Commonwealth offers no meaningful discussion as to how these assertions impact
the resolution of the issues presently before the Court.
[J-105-2018] - 13
Commonwealth posits that this Court has repeatedly held that Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the
compulsory joinder statute does not prohibit successive prosecutions if the first
prosecution was for a summary offense and the later prosecution is for a more serious
crime, despite the fact that both of the offenses stemmed from the same criminal episode.
See Commonwealth’s Brief at 12-18 (relying on Commonwealth v. Beatty, 455 A.2d 1194(Pa. 1983), and its progeny, discussed in detail infra).
iii. Appellant’s Reply Brief
In reply to the Commonwealth, Appellant contends that Subsection 112(1) is
inapplicable to this case. In this regard, Appellant highlights, inter alia, that Subsection
112(1) permits successive prosecutions when the first prosecution was before a “court”
that lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense. Here, Appellant observes, his
initial prosecution was in the Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court.
Appellant argues that, while the Traffic Division may not have had jurisdiction to decide
his DUI charges, the Municipal Court did have jurisdiction to adjudicate all of his charges
in a single proceeding, albeit in the General Division of the same court.
Appellant also asserts that the Commonwealth is well aware that it has tried (and
continues to try) many cases in one proceeding in the Philadelphia Municipal Court that
included summary traffic offenses and higher graded offenses, even when the
Commonwealth was required to prosecute summary traffic offenses in the abolished
Philadelphia Traffic Court. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4-5. Lastly, regarding the
Commonwealth’s alternative argument that Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory
joinder statute does not prohibit successive prosecutions if the first prosecution was for a
summary offense and the later prosecution is for a more serious crime, Appellant
suggests that this argument is meritless because the case law that established this
[J-105-2018] - 14
proposition has no applicability to the current, amended version of Subsection 110(1)(ii)
of the compulsory joinder statute.
C. Discussion
Given the complexities of the various opinions of the Superior Court coupled with
the divergent arguments of the parties, we find it helpful to begin our analysis by
examining the issue that the Commonwealth presented to the Superior Court. As that
court stated, “The issue presented is whether the trial court erred when it dismissed DUI
charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 based on the prior adjudication of [Appellant’s]
summary traffic offense.” Perfetto, 169 A.3d at 1117. Because the relevant facts of this
case are undisputed, this issue presents a question of law. Consequently, our scope of
review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Martinez,
147 A.3d 517, 529 (Pa. 2016).
We further observe that, to the extent that the resolution of this appeal requires us
to interpret Subsection 110(i)(ii) or any other statute, such a task is guided by the Statutory
Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. Pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act,
the object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the General
Assembly’s intention. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). When the words of a statute are clear and
free from ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
As this Court has previously concluded, Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory
joinder statute clearly and unambiguously contains four primary elements, which, if met,
preclude a prosecution due to a former prosecution for a different offense:
(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an acquittal or conviction;
(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal conduct or
arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution;
[J-105-2018] - 15
(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before the
commencement of the trial on the former charges; and
(4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial district as the
former prosecution.
Fithian, 961 A.2d at 72.
Turning to the facts of this case, at this point in the proceedings it is undisputed
that: (1) Appellant’s former prosecution for the summary offense of “driving without lights
when required” resulted in a conviction; (2) Appellant’s current prosecution for DUI “arose
during the same criminal episode, namely one traffic stop[,]” Commonwealth v. Failor,
770 A.2d 310, 313 (Pa. 2001); (3) the prosecutor was aware of Appellant’s DUI charges
before the commencement of Appellant’s trial on his summary offense of “driving without
lights when required;” and (4) Appellant’s DUI offenses occurred within the same judicial
district as the former prosecution, namely the First Judicial District, i.e., Philadelphia.
Thus, as the trial court held, a straightforward application of the plain language of
Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute to the circumstances presented in
this appeal makes clear that the Commonwealth is precluded from prosecuting Appellant
for his DUI charges. Moreover, the Commonwealth’s current arguments do not warrant
a contrary conclusion.
First, we are unpersuaded that Subsection 112(1) of the Crimes Code applies to
the circumstances presented in this case. Pursuant to Subsection 112(1), a prosecution
is not barred within the meaning of the compulsory joinder statute when the “former
prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the
offense.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1). The former prosecution in this case occurred in the Traffic
Division. As Appellant and the Superior Court dissent point out, the Traffic Division is not
a “court” unto itself; rather, it is a division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. Therefore,
[J-105-2018] - 16
for purposes of this appeal, the question under Subsection 112(1) is whether the
Philadelphia Municipal Court lacked jurisdiction over Appellant or the offense.7
As noted supra, Section 1121 of the Judicial Code speaks directly to the
organization and jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal Court; indeed, it is entitled
“Philadelphia Municipal Court.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 1121. Subsection 1121(b)(3) clearly and
unambiguously states that the General Division shall exercise full jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court under 42 Pa.C.S. § 1123(a) (relating to jurisdiction and venue). 42
7 As noted supra, the Crimes Code defines “Court.” Specifically, Section 103 of the
Crimes Code defines “Court” as follows: “Includes (when exercising criminal or quasi-
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 1515 (relating to jurisdiction and venue)) a
magisterial district judge.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 103. The dissent utilizes this definition to
conclude that, for the purpose of Subsection 112(1) of the Crimes Code, the Legislature
intended a jurisdictional analysis to focus on the jurist rather than the tribunal, though the
dissent seems to suggest that this interpretation will lead to “inconsistent usage of the
term ‘court’ throughout the Crimes Code[.]” Dissenting Opinion at 2 n.2. In light of this
reality, the dissent expresses its personal view that “relative to Section 110’s protections,
it is most sensible to focus on the jurisdiction of the particular jurist (or judge and jury)
presiding over the adjudication of the offenses involved.” Id.
Unlike the dissent, we discern no guidance from the Crimes Code’s definition of
“Court” for purposes of applying Subsection 112(1)’s exception to compulsory joinder
when the “former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the
defendant or the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1). The Crimes Code’s definition of “Court”
seems geared solely at ensuring that the term includes “magisterial district judges,” which
is particularly unhelpful to any jurisdictional analysis of the Philadelphia court system
given that it does not include magisterial district judges. Instead, we take the phrase
“before a court which lacked jurisdiction” to mean precisely what it says, in conformity
with the best known rule of statutory construction: “When the words of a statute are clear
and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
We further observe that the position put forward by the Superior Court concurrence
and adopted by the dissent would permit the Commonwealth to engage in a type of forum
shopping by allowing the Commonwealth to pick and choose whether it wants to
adjudicate all of a Philadelphia defendant’s charges in one forum with jurisdiction over all
of the defendant’s charges, such as the General Division of the Municipal Court, or split
the charges and adjudicate a summary offense first in the Traffic Division and the
remainder of the charges later in another forum. We find this result to be untenable.
[J-105-2018] - 17
Pa.C.S. § 1121(b)(3). In other words, unlike the limited jurisdiction of the Traffic Division
of the Philadelphia Municipal Court to consider only summary traffic offenses, id.
§ 1121(c)(3), the General Division has jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter that is properly
before the Municipal Court. Thus, even if we were to credit the remainder of the
Commonwealth’s argument regarding Subsection 112(1), the reality is that Appellant’s
former prosecution for his summary offense was before a court (namely, the Philadelphia
Municipal Court) that had jurisdiction to adjudicate all of Appellant’s charges, albeit in the
court’s General Division.
We also find unpersuasive the Commonwealth’s alternative argument regarding
Beatty, supra, and its progeny. By way of background, Beatty was involved in an incident
that led the Commonwealth to charge him with aggravated assault and a summary traffic
offense. Beatty, 455 A.2d at 1196. While his aggravated assault charge was pending,
Beatty pleaded guilty to the summary offense. He then filed in the trial court a motion to
dismiss his aggravated assault charge based upon the pre-2002 compulsory joinder
statute. Id. The trial court granted Beatty’s motion. However, the Superior Court
reversed the trial court’s order, and this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.
Relevant to the instant matter, this Court specifically invoked the now-defunct
fourth prong of the compulsory joinder statute that utilized the phrase “was in the
jurisdiction of a single court.” See id. at 1198 (“We may not ignore the clause of that
subsection which provides ‘and was in the jurisdiction of a single court . . ..’”). We then
observed that Beatty’s summary traffic offense was a matter within the original jurisdiction
of the district justice, id.; while the district justice lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
aggravated assault charge. In other words, this Court concluded that Beatty’s compulsory
joinder claim failed on the currently obsolete fourth prong of the compulsory joinder test
[J-105-2018] - 18
because the aggravated assault charge and the summary offense were not within the
jurisdiction of a single court.8
Although this conclusion was sufficient to dispose of Beatty’s appeal, the Court
nonetheless invoked policy considerations and opined, “Our interpretation of Section
110(1)(ii) as excluding traffic violations under the Motor Vehicle Code is further bolstered
by a consideration of the purposes sought to be achieved by the legislative enactment as
well as our promulgation of the compulsory joinder rule.” Id. at 1198. In this regard, we
stated that the disposition of summary traffic offenses prior to a trial for misdemeanor or
felony charges does not present the type of governmental harassment of a defendant that
would offend the double jeopardy concerns encapsulated in the compulsory joinder
statute. We further stated that judicial economy is not served by requiring the Courts of
Common Pleas to dispose of summary traffic offenses, which are regularly entrusted to
the district justices for disposition. Id.
In 1996, however, this Court explained the rational employed in Beatty, placing it
in proper context. Specifically, in Geyer, supra, this Court granted allowance of appeal
to examine whether, pursuant to the compulsory joinder statute, a conviction for a
summary offense bars a subsequent prosecution for a different summary offense arising
from the same criminal episode. Geyer, 687 A.2d at 815. In answering this question in
the affirmative, we observed that the Superior Court had misapplied Beatty and its
progeny by concluding that Section 110, as a rule, does not apply to summary offenses.
Id. at 817.
8 In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the relevant jurisdictional statute seemed to
grant concurrent jurisdiction “in such cases of the Court of Common Pleas.” Id. at 1198
n.3. The Court, however, was unwilling to “construe the phrase ‘and was in the jurisdiction
of a single court’ in such a manner as to ignore the traditional division of labor in our court
system.” Id. We further stated, “The traditional role of the Court of Common Pleas in the
disposition of summary motor vehicle offenses is the role of the reviewing tribunal as
opposed to the court of original jurisdiction.” Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 932).
[J-105-2018] - 19
Our discussion of that conclusion began with a lengthy quote from Beatty, where
this Court utilized the above-stated policy considerations to bolster its determination that
Beatty’s compulsory joinder claim failed on the now-defunct fourth prong of the
compulsory joinder test because Beatty’s initial prosecution “only” involved a summary
offense. Immediately thereafter, the Geyer Court explained, “Although a cursory reading
of Beatty may appear categorically to exclude traffic violations from Section 110 and the
compulsory joinder rule, the premise underlying our analysis in Beatty was that the two
offenses were not within the jurisdiction of a single court.” Id.
Thus, this Court’s decision in Geyer clearly cabined Beatty and its progeny by
dispelling the notion that summary traffic offenses are not, as a rule, subject to the
compulsory joinder statute and by tethering the Beatty Court’s policy considerations to
the then-applicable but now-obsolete fourth prong of the compulsory joinder test, which
required a jurisdictional analysis. As discussed in detail supra, in 2002, the Legislature
amended Subsection 110(1)(ii) of the compulsory joinder statute, eliminating the
jurisdictional analysis from the statute and, thus, from contemporary compulsory joinder
analysis. Fithian, supra. Accordingly, the policy considerations discussed in Beatty and
invoked by the Commonwealth and the dissent in the matter sub judice simply do not
apply to the current version of the compulsory joinder statute. For all of these reasons,
we hold that 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii) bars the Commonwealth from further prosecuting
Appellant for DUI.
IV. Conclusion
We certainly recognize that our holding today may present the Philadelphia District
Attorney’s Office with an administrative challenge; however, this Court’s decision, as
always, is guided by the law. Further, while it is tempting to resolve this matter by
considering myriad of tangential statutes, rules, and policies, we conclude that a
[J-105-2018] - 20
straightforward application of the statutes that directly apply to this case, particularly 18
Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii), preclude the Commonwealth from prosecuting Appellant for his
pending DUI charges. Indeed, such an approach embraces the proper exercise of judicial
restraint and the separation of powers, allowing the Legislature to amend, in simple
fashion, the relevant statutes to allow for the result sought by the Commonwealth, if the
Legislature sees fit to codify the policy considerations forwarded by the Commonwealth
and the dissent in this matter.
For all of these reasons, we respectfully reverse the Superior Court’s judgment
and reinstate the trial court’s order.
Justices Todd, Donohue, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.
Chief Justice Saylor files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Dougherty joins.
[J-105-2018] - 21