Commonwealth v. Alexander, K., Aplt. ( 2020 )

[J-51-2020] [MO: Donohue, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 30 EAP 2019
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Judgment of
: Superior Court entered on March 5,
: 2019 at No. 3246 EDA 2017
v. : affirming the Judgment of Sentence
: entered on September 12, 2017 in
: the Court of Common Pleas,
KEITH ALEXANDER, : Philadelphia County, Criminal
: Division at No. CP-51-CR-0005971-
Appellant : 2016.
:
: SUBMITTED: April 28, 2020
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: December 22, 2020
I join the majority opinion in full. Consistent with my dissenting posture in
Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of
the Court), I agree with the majority that this Court’s adoption of the federal automobile
exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which, under the circumstances presented, affords greater
protection to our citizens than its federal counterpart. I write separately only to reconcile
my support of the majority’s rejection of Gary with my fervent belief in the adherence to
stare decisis.
Stare decisis, along with the stability in jurisprudence that the doctrine promotes,
is the foundation of our common-law system. To ensure certainty in the law, the doctrine
of stare decisis provides that “a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
be different.” In re Roca, 173 A.3d 1176, 1187 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). This remains
true regardless of changes in the composition of the Court.
Notwithstanding, as cogently explained by the majority, stare decisis does not
compel adherence to this Court’s decision in Gary as Gary itself did not comport with
precedent. Compare Gary, 91 A.3d at 104 (holding that police officers may conduct a
warrantless search of a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania when there is probable cause to
do so, with no exigency required beyond the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle) with
Commonwealth v. Luv, 735 A.2d 87, 93 (Pa. 1999) (interpreting this Court’s jurisprudence
as establishing both probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances as the
two “determining factors” justifying a warrantless search of a vehicle); and
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted) (holding
that “[w]arrantless vehicle searches in this Commonwealth must be accompanied not only
by probable cause, but also by exigent circumstances beyond mere mobility; ‘one without
the other is insufficient’”). In my view, it would indeed be ironic to conclude that stare
decisis demands adherence to a decision that is premised upon a breach of that doctrine.
Moreover, as noted, the Gary Court’s adoption of the federal automobile exception
to the warrant requirement ignored well-settled jurisprudence acknowledging that Article
I, Section 8 affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, as the former
embodies “a strong notion of privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the
past two centuries.” Majority Opinion at 48 (quoting Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887, 897 (Pa. 1991)). Considering that “the doctrine of stare decisis was never
intended to be used as a principle to perpetuate erroneous rules of law,” In re Nomination
Petition of Paulmier, 937 A.2d 364, 371 (Pa. 2007), under these unusual circumstances,
I agree with the majority that Gary should be rejected.
[J-51-2020] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2
Additionally, I agree with the majority that there is no controlling rationale in Gary,
given that only three members of the Court aligned on the reasoning in adopting the
federal automobile exception, and, finally, the Gary decision is of recent vintage, and has
not been relied upon for an extended period of time so as to become ingrained in our
common law. These factors lead me to conclude that the majority’s treatment of the Gary
decision is correct, as it restores Pennsylvania jurisprudence that required both probable
cause and exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle in this
Commonwealth.
[J-51-2020] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3