Easton Area SD, Aplt. v. Miller, R. ( 2020 )


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  •                              [J-75-2019][M.O. - Dougherty, J.]
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    MIDDLE DISTRICT
    EASTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT,                     :   No. 13 MAP 2019
    :
    Appellant                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
    :   Commonwealth Court at No. 1897 CD
    :   2017 dated 7/20/18 affirming the order
    v.                             :   of the Northampton County Court of
    :   Common Pleas, Civil Division, at No. C-
    :   0048-CV-2017-5558 dated 12/1/17,
    RUDY MILLER AND THE EXPRESS                      :   exited 12/5/17
    TIMES,                                           :
    :
    Appellees                 :   ARGUED: September 12, 2019
    CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
    CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR                                              DECIDED: June 18, 2020
    As the majority observes, the District has maintained from the outset that, if it
    were to release the requested video, it would risk the loss of funding under the federal
    Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”). See Majority Opinion, slip op. at
    12. In particular, and as the majority develops, under Section 67.708(b)(1)(i) of the
    Right to Know Law (the “RTKL”), see 65 P.S. §67.708(b)(1)(i), to show such a loss
    could occur the District would have to demonstrate that releasing the video would
    implicate certain aspects of FERPA relating to educational agencies which have a
    “policy or practice” of releasing education records without the consent of the student’s
    parents. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 15 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §1232g(b)(1), (b)(2)(A)-
    (B)). Although the majority ultimately determines that the video is, in fact, an education
    record, see id. at 22, it finds that the District has failed to establish the policy-or-practice
    prerequisite.   In this respect, the majority notes that such phraseology “denotes
    repeated or systematic violations of student privacy, as opposed to singular or
    exceptional instances.” Id. at 17.
    I have misgivings about this reasoning.      It is true that courts have found an
    absence of a policy or practice based on an isolated incident. See, e.g., Daniel S. v.
    Bd. of Educ. of York Cmty. High Sch., 
    152 F. Supp. 2d 949
    , 954 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (finding
    that a physical education teacher’s disclosure to his cross-country team that he had
    dismissed two students from his gym class was an isolated incident “involving one
    teacher,” rather than a systematic practice); Jensen v. Reeves, 
    45 F. Supp. 2d 1265
    ,
    1276 (D. Utah 1999) (same with regard to a principal’s one-time disclosure to several
    parents of information regarding a student who had been accused of harassing their
    children), aff’d, 3 Fed. Appx 905, 910 (10th Cir. 2001); cf. Weixel v. N.Y. City Bd. of
    Educ., 
    287 F.3d 138
    , 151 (2d Cir. 2002) (same, where a school employee contacted a
    student’s doctor, home instructor, and lawyer to provide inaccurate and defamatory
    information about the student). In my view, however, this type of analysis should not be
    applied to an assessment of how a school district responds to an RTKL request for
    records, particularly where there is no indication the response is atypical.
    As illustrated by the present matter, third parties sometimes request education
    records without first obtaining the consent of the student’s parents. It seems, under the
    majority’s reasoning, that an agency handling such records can never refuse a single
    request along these lines on the basis that disclosure would place it at risk of losing
    funds on account of a policy or practice – precisely because it was only a single
    request. Put differently, the requester can always claim that it is only forwarding a
    single records request, and hence, the District cannot show that any refusal is based on
    a legitimate concern for being found to have a policy of practice of unconsented-to
    [J-75-2019][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] - 2
    disclosures. On the other hand, even one instance in which the agency accedes to a
    records request without parental consent (and without a court directive) would comprise
    evidence of a policy or practice along those lines, as no other basis for the release
    would be apparent. Accordingly, I would find that, in order to give meaning to the
    exemption appearing at Section 67.708(b)(1)(i) of the RTKL, see generally 1 Pa.C.S.
    §1922(2) (reflecting a presumption that the General Assembly intends for every aspect
    of a statute to have some effect), a school district can validly claim – as the District here
    has done – that the record is exempt under that provision.
    Finally, although redactions along the lines of those required by the majority may
    be salutary, no issue concerning these types of changes is presently before this Court.
    The only issue accepted for review is whether the unredacted video is exempt from
    disclosure pursuant to FERPA. See Easton Area Sch. Dist. v. Miller, ___ Pa. ___, ___,
    
    201 A.3d 721
    , 721-22 (Pa. 2019) (per curiam) (granting limited review). As I would find
    that it is, I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.
    In sum, then, I agree with the majority’s determination that the video is an
    education record, but I respectfully dissent from its decision to affirm the intermediate
    court’s order with instructions.
    Justice Mundy joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.
    [J-75-2019][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] - 3