In Re: D.C.D. Appeal of: Commonwealth , 171 A.3d 727 ( 2017 )

[J-12-2017]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C.D., A MINOR : No. 34 MAP 2016
:
: Appeal from the Order of the Superior
APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF : Court at No. 999 MDA 2014 dated
PENNSYLVANIA : September 11, 2015 Affirming the Order
: of the York County Court of Common
: Pleas at No(s). CP-67-JV-0000720-
: 2012 and CP-67-DP-0000166-2013
: dated May 12, 2014.
:
: ARGUED: March 8, 2017
OPINION
JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: October 18, 2017
We granted review in this case to consider what constitutes a “compelling
reason” for early termination of delinquency supervision under Pennsylvania Rule of
Juvenile Court Procedure 632.1 After review, we conclude that the Superior Court
properly determined that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in granting early
termination to the juvenile in this case to allow him to obtain necessary and immediate
treatment, after properly taking into account the three aspects of balanced and
restorative justice (BARJ) embodied in the Juvenile Act and incorporated into the Rules
of Juvenile Court Procedure: “the protection of the community, the imposition of
accountability for offenses committed[,] and the development of competencies to enable
1
The text of Rule 632, entitled “Early Termination of Court Supervision by Motion,” is
set forth in full infra at 6 n.8.
children to become responsible and productive members of the community.” 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 6301(b)(2) (“Short title and purposes of chapter”), 6352(a) (“Disposition of
delinquent child”); see also Pa.R.J.C.P. 101 (C) (“These rules shall be interpreted and
construed to effectuate the purposes stated in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).”).
Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, which affirmed the grant of early
termination of delinquency.
At the time of the May 2014 delinquency termination hearing at issue herein,
D.C.D. was an intellectually low-functioning and socially immature twelve-year-old boy
who was a victim of sexual abuse. To understand the factors at play in the delinquency
termination hearing, we first consider D.C.D.’s history in the delinquency system. He
originally entered the delinquency system in the fall of 2012, at age ten, due to
allegations that he committed indecent assault2 against his five-year-old sister.3 Rather
than formally adjudicating him delinquent at that time, the juvenile court entered a
consent decree pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6340, which allows for the suspension of
delinquency proceedings prior to formal adjudication, and placed D.C.D. in a specialized
foster care program administered by Pressley Ridge.4
2
18 Pa.C.S § 3126(a)(7).
3
D.C.D. was also accused of having committed indecent assault against his three-year-
old cousin, but those charges were withdrawn by the Commonwealth in January 2014.
4
The Juvenile Act defines a delinquent child as “[a] child ten years of age or older
whom the court has found to have committed a delinquent act and is in need of
treatment, supervision or rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. As noted, D.C.D. was ten
years old at the time of the initial placement.
Prior to a formal adjudication of delinquency, the juvenile court and the parties
may consider the less formal option of a “consent decree” which the Juvenile Act
explains as follows:
(continued…)
[J-12-2017] - 2
In the spring of 2013, a few months after being placed in his first foster care
home, D.C.D. was alleged to have left notes of a sexual nature for his foster care
home’s neighbor in regard to the neighbor’s young daughter, which led to a charge of
harassment by communication, an act of delinquency which also constituted a violation
of his consent decree.5 The parties agreed to allow D.C.D. to continue on the original
consent decree but transferred him to a second foster home.
While on a home visit to his biological family in July 2013, D.C.D. allegedly
attempted to start a fire in his room, which constituted another violation of the consent
decree. Soon thereafter, in August of 2013, D.C.D. was found to be dependent due to
his parents’ inability to provide necessary care or control for reasons not directly related
to the issues before this Court. In accord with the finding of dependency, the juvenile
court transferred legal and physical custody to the York County Office of Children,
(…continued)
(a) General rule. - At any time after the filing of a petition and
before the entry of an adjudication order, the court may, on
motion of the district attorney or of counsel for the child,
suspend the proceedings, and continue the child under
supervision in his own home, under terms and conditions
negotiated with the probation services and agreed to by all
parties affected. The order of the court continuing the child
under supervision shall be known as a consent decree.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6340(a). If the child fails to satisfy the terms of the consent decree, the
original delinquency petition can be reinstated, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6340(d).
In this case, it appears that all parties agreed that the consent decree could not
allow D.C.D. to remain in his own home given that his victim, who was his sister, also
resided in that home. Accordingly, he was placed in specialized foster care through
Pressley Ridge. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 4/22/13, at 3.
5
18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4). Charges of stalking, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1, loitering and
prowling at night time, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5506, and summary harassment, 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2709(a), were initially filed but later withdrawn.
[J-12-2017] - 3
Youth, and Families (CYF), which would serve as the lead agency, while Juvenile
Probation continued to maintain concurrent supervision of D.C.D. pursuant to the
consent decree.
In September 2013, following new allegations of inappropriate behavior while
living in his second foster home, D.C.D. was removed from that home and temporarily
placed in a respite foster care home and subsequently in the shelter care unit at the
York County Youth Development Center. At the time, Pressley Ridge, D.C.D.’s foster
care provider, indicated that it was unable to provide another foster care placement for
him due to his history. Order of 9/11/13. Although the parties agreed that a residential
treatment facility (RTF) was necessary for D.C.D., CYF had difficulty finding a bed for
him in a RTF given that most of the providers offering services for juvenile sexual
offenders and fire-starters did not treat children under twelve. Notes of Testimony
(N.T.), 9/25/13, at 5. Indeed, D.C.D. remained in shelter care at the youth development
center for nearly a month before being accepted and moved into the Sarah Reed
Residential Treatment Facility. D.C.D. initially adjusted well to Sarah Reed and
observed proper behavioral boundaries, other than a few incidents of not respecting
other patients’ personal space.
Nevertheless, given that the prior incidents involving the harassment and fire-
starting constituted violations of his consent decree, CYF sought a combined placement
review and dispositional review hearing, which was held in January 2014. At the
hearing, D.C.D. was adjudicated delinquent as he admitted to the acts charged and
because the court determined that he was in need of treatment and supervision
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341. Specifically referencing the BARJ factors, the court
concluded that continued residential treatment at the Sarah Reed facility was
appropriate, as it would provide for community protection, while allowing D.C.D. to
[J-12-2017] - 4
develop competencies. Order of 1/28/14 at 4-6. The court also addressed
accountability, the third prong of BARJ, by assessing various fees on D.C.D. Id. at 5.
In March 2014, the juvenile court held a hearing to address D.C.D.’s placement
following a new allegation of a sexual incident involving a younger resident at Sarah
Reed.6 At that time, the parties recognized that more residential facilities were available
to treat D.C.D. as he had turned twelve. However, some of the facilities were unwilling
to accept children who had incidents of fire-starting, and others could not provide
services for his level of intellectual functioning. Given the available options, the parties
agreed that he should be moved to the Southwood Psychiatric Hospital - Choices
Program (Southwood), a RTF which had a bed immediately available and which
focused specifically upon his cohort: intellectually low-functioning, sexual offenders.
Despite the parties’ agreement to place D.C.D. at Southwood, Southwood
informed them that it could not accept him due to his adjudication of delinquency for a
sexual offense. According to testimony from the Southwood director, Southwood had
an agreement with the township in which it was located not to accept juveniles currently
adjudicated delinquent for a sexual offense, but the director stated that they could
accept D.C.D. if the delinquency supervision was terminated.7
6
As of a subsequent hearing in May 2014, the parties indicated to the juvenile court that
the Department of Public Welfare had investigated the incident but had not filed any
charges as of the date of that hearing. See Order of 5/12/14 at 5-6.
7
At a subsequent hearing, the parties disputed the exact nature and extent of
Southwood’s prohibition against juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for sexual
offenses. Based upon the Commonwealth’s assertions during the hearing, the
restriction at Southwood arose from an agreement between Southwood and North
Strabane Township during the permitting process. N.T., 5/12/14, at 28. It was
seemingly aimed at preventing Southwood from housing violent or drug-addicted
juveniles. Id. at 29. The details of the agreement were not the focus of the hearing in
this case; rather, the relevant uncontested fact was that Southwood agreed to take
(continued…)
[J-12-2017] - 5
As a result, D.C.D.’s counsel filed a motion for early termination of delinquency
supervision under Pa.R.J.C.P. 632,8 to which the York County District Attorney objected
(…continued)
D.C.D. only if he was not currently under delinquency supervision for a sexual offense.
Order of 5/12/14 at 7.
8
In full, Pa.R.J.C.P. 632, entitled “Early Termination of Court Supervision by Motion”
provides:
A. Motion. Any party may move for early termination of court
supervision. The motion shall state with specificity why early
termination is sought and why the requirements of Rule
631(A) [, see infra at 21 n.17 for full text,] have not been met.
B. Notice.
(1) In addition to the service requirements of Rule
345, any party moving for early termination shall
serve the motion on the juvenile probation officer.
(2) The victim shall be provided notice of the motion
for early termination of court supervision.
C. Objection.
(1) A party or the juvenile probation officer may object
to the motion under paragraph (A) and request a
hearing.
(2) Such objection shall be made within thirty days of
the date of the motion; otherwise, objections are
deemed waived.
D. Court’s determination. The court shall:
(1) rule on the motion and any objections without a
hearing; or
(2) schedule a hearing.
(continued…)
[J-12-2017] - 6
and requested a hearing. The court scheduled a two-day hearing in May 2014 to
address D.C.D.’s dependency placement as well as the motion to terminate delinquency
supervision. Prior to the hearing, the parties contacted at least nine potential facilities to
attempt to find a suitable treatment facility for D.C.D, which would accept him while he
remained “dual adjudicated”, i.e., both dependent and delinquent.
At the hearing, all participants other than the District Attorney and Juvenile
Probation officer favored termination of delinquency supervision to allow D.C.D. to be
transferred to Southwood. In support of termination, D.C.D.’s CYF case manager
detailed the various reasons why CYF had determined that Southwood was the only
appropriate facility for D.C.D. 9 N.T., 5/9/14, 46-52, 75-76. The case manager revealed
that a few of the facilities contacted refused to accept D.C.D. due to his fire-starting
incident or his low IQ level, some facilities were geared toward older adolescent
offenders who could prey upon D.C.D., and others did not have any available beds or
did not provide the necessary level of supervision. One provider, Valley Youth House,
(…continued)
E. Hearing. If objections have been made pursuant to
paragraph (C) and/or the court has determined a hearing is
necessary, the court shall hold a hearing and give each
party, the victim, and the juvenile probation officer an
opportunity to be heard before the court enters its final order.
F. Termination. When the requirements of paragraphs (A)
through (E) have been met and the court is satisfied that
there are compelling reasons to discharge the juvenile prior
to the completion of the requirements of Rule 631(A), the
court may order an early discharge of the juvenile from its
supervision.
9
Additionally, D.C.D.’s former neighbor, who received the sexual notes regarding her
daughter, testified telephonically during the hearing, indicating that she did not favor
termination of delinquency but emphasized that she wanted D.C.D. to obtain the help
that he needed. N.T., 5/12/14, at 27.
[J-12-2017] - 7
had a bed available but did not have a contract with York County. The CYF case
manager testified that placing a child at a facility that did not currently have a contract
with the county could take weeks or months because an agreement had to be
negotiated between the county and the provider before D.C.D. could be placed. N.T.,
5/9/14, at 80.
In contrast to these unacceptable facilities, the case manager explained the
benefits of Southwood. She observed that it specialized in providing treatment to low
functioning children with sexual abuse offending issues. N.T., 5/9/14, at 53.
Southwood additionally provided treatment on campus which would mitigate the
problems that arose at Sarah Reed where D.C.D. received only three sessions of sex
offender treatment during the approximately six months he was there. N.T., 5/9/14, at
53, 60. She further emphasized that not all residential treatment programs can provide
therapy to lower-functioning children, which she viewed as critical to D.C.D. who did not
“even understand what he is doing is wrong” and did not “fully understand what was
going on [with his body].” N.T., 5/9/14, at 75-76. She testified that she was not aware
of any other program that focused on low-functioning juvenile sexual offenders like
D.C.D. N.T., 5/9/14, at 78-79.
Testimony by the director of Southwood further supported D.C.D.’s placement at
Southwood:
We focus our program to deal specifically with sexually
reactive youth in the age range that [D.C.D.] is in, who have
experienced some form of trauma history, whether that be
reactive attachment or something more severe along those
lines, as far as trauma is concerned, and at the same time
target youth with an IQ between 60 and 110, so everything
I've read about [D.C.D.] qualifies him for the program.
N.T., 5/9/14, at 113.
[J-12-2017] - 8
D.C.D.’s juvenile probation officer testified in opposition to termination of
delinquency, despite acknowledging that Southwood would be an appropriate
placement. N.T., 5/12/14, at 31. As an alternative, he proposed the Abraxas Youth and
Family Services Program (also referred to as South Mountain), which had two
programs. One program was a secure residential facility for twelve to twenty-year-old
residents, while the second program was an open (non-secure) residential program for
twelve to fifteen-year-old juveniles. N.T., 5/9/14, at 90. He admitted that Abraxas only
had a bed available immediately in the secure program aimed at older juveniles, and
that the program appropriate for D.C.D. would not have a bed available for at least three
months.10 N.T., 5/9/14, at 90-91.
In closing, the Commonwealth urged the court not to terminate delinquency
supervision. It contended that D.C.D.’s behavior had not improved since his
delinquency adjudication such that termination of delinquency was unsupported.
Instead, it argued that his inappropriate behavior was increasing, observing that he was
being removed from Sarah Reed because of yet another incident. N.T., 5/12/14, at 32.
The Commonwealth argued in favor of D.C.D.’s placement at Abraxas, asserting it
could offer appropriate treatment services without requiring termination of delinquency
supervision and was in closer proximity to D.C.D.’s family than Southwood, allowing for
more family visits as well as other support services such as continued contact with his
guardian ad litem, his probation officer, and CYF caseworkers. It further contended that
Sarah Reed was an “appropriate” placement where he could remain until a bed became
10
The CYF case manager had previously testified not only to her concern due to the
lack of an immediate opening in the non-secure program at Abraxas, but also to her
reservations regarding whether Abraxas would be appropriate for D.C.D. given that he
would be a low-functioning twelve-year-old in a facility where twelve was the minimum
age. N.T., 5/12/14, at 51.
[J-12-2017] - 9
available in the non-secure Abraxas program aimed at younger juveniles.11 N.T.,
5/12/14, at 35-36. The Commonwealth also averred that Southwood was a relatively
unknown facility, with a cloud hanging over whether it would actually admit D.C.D. even
if delinquency were terminated. N.T., 5/12/14, at 34. It further emphasized that if the
court terminated delinquency supervision by Juvenile Probation, then it could not be
reinstated absent D.C.D.’s commission of another act of delinquency. N.T., 5/12/14, at
34.
Counsel for D.C.D., in contrast, emphasized that all parties had agreed that
Southwood was the best facility for D.C.D. a few weeks before the hearing. N.T.,
5/12/14, at 36. She observed that CYF, rather than Juvenile Probation had been the
lead agency in the case, meaning that termination of delinquency supervision would
have minimal effect on the supervision of D.C.D. and the services offered to him, given
that Juvenile Probation was not providing any services to him. Counsel also asserted
that she doubted Abraxas’ ability to care for a low-functioning juvenile offender at the
younger end of the facility’s age range. Additionally, counsel for D.C.D.’s mother, his
guardian ad litem, and counsel for Children, Youth, and Families all argued in support of
terminating delinquency supervision to allow D.C.D. to be placed at Southwood.
The juvenile court provided its decision at the close of the second day of
hearings. The court recognized that the critical inquiry in the case was whether
“compelling reasons” existed for early termination of delinquency for purposes of
Pa.R.J.C.P. 632. The court observed that the term is not defined in Juvenile Court
Rules or the Juvenile Act. Nevertheless, it reasoned that “[a] compelling argument or
11
Notably, the Commonwealth was not suggesting placing D.C.D. in the older secure
Abraxas program as it now proposes in its briefing to this Court.
[J-12-2017] - 10
reason is one that convinces someone that something is true or should be done.” Order
of 5/12/14 at 4.
The court then synthesized the difficulties of finding a proper placement for
D.C.D. considering his treatment needs. The court observed that he was “undeniably in
need of specialized care [because] he has been both a victim and perpetrator of sexual
abuse; he functions at a low level and is socially immature; [and] he has exhibited fire-
setting behaviors.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 3. The court emphasized the
deficiencies in D.C.D.’s prior treatment. Specifically, it recognized that while Sarah
Reed was the only facility able to treat D.C.D. in the fall of 2013 due to his age and
treatment needs, it failed to provide the necessary treatment services. Order of 5/12/14
at 5. Indeed, the court found that “his immediate removal from Sarah Reed was
imperative.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 3.
The court reviewed the testimony regarding the referrals made to other treatment
facilities, observing that most were overtly inappropriate for D.C.D. or would not accept
him due to his history or their lack of space. The court narrowed the options to three
facilities. It first observed that Valley Youth House had accepted D.C.D., but the county
did not have a contract with that facility. Order of 5/12/14 at 7. Although not specifically
noted in the decision, testimony at the hearing suggested that the absence of a contract
could delay placement of D.C.D. while the parties negotiated an agreement. N.T.,
5/9/14, at 80. It is apparent from other portions of the juvenile court’s decision that
delayed treatment was unacceptable to the court given the paucity of proper treatment
provided to D.C.D. up to the date of the hearing.
Next, the court considered Abraxas Sexual Offender Open Program. The court
observed that the program aimed at younger offenders would not have a bed available
for D.C.D. until at least July or August. Order of 5/12/14 at 7. As the court later
[J-12-2017] - 11
explained in its 1925(a) opinion, it concluded that the three-month delay in treatment
would be contrary to D.C.D.’s best interest. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 4 n.1.
The court recognized that Southwood’s director testified that D.C.D. would be
unacceptable to the program so long as he was actively supervised as a delinquent
child, but would be acceptable if he was only a dependent child. Order of 5/12/14 at 8.
Considering all the factors, the court concluded that no compelling reason to terminate
delinquency supervision would have existed if a bed had been available in the
appropriate program at Abraxas. However, because there was no bed available until
August, the court concluded that the only alternatives were to transfer him to
Southwood or permit him to remain at Sarah Reed. The court had no hesitation in
rejecting continued placement at Sarah Reed. Emphasizing that he had received only
three sessions of outpatient sex offender therapy during his time at Sarah Reed, the
court concluded that the facility could not provide effective treatment for D.C.D. and
emphasized that it was “of grave concern to the [c]ourt that he remains in that facility
despite the [c]ourt’s ruling [in March] that it is not appropriate for his care.” Id. at 9.
The court opined that its decision to terminate delinquency supervision was
consistent with the purposes of the Juvenile Act, which provides for “balanced attention
to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses
committed[,] and the development of competencies to enable children to become
responsible and productive members of the community.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301. Although
the court did not specifically categorize its reasons for delinquency termination using the
BARJ terminology identified in Section 6301, its reasoning on each factor can be
discerned nonetheless. Indeed, the court recognized that competency development in
the near term leads to community protection in the future as it observed that its
“paramount concern” was to provide D.C.D. with the treatment needed to enable him to
[J-12-2017] - 12
become a responsible, law-abiding citizen upon completion of treatment. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 4-5.
Similarly, the court addressed both community protection and competency
development goals when it emphasized that D.C.D. would continue to be supervised by
CYF, which had been acting as the lead agency in his care and supervision. Moreover,
the court emphasized that it would continue to review the case on a regular basis to
determine if placement was appropriate, a review which would again serve both
protection and competency development functions. Order of 5/12/14 at 10-11.
Moreover, the court directed D.C.D. to pay restitution, which it had previously imposed
to satisfy the accountability prong of BARJ. Order of 5/12/14 at 11; see also Order of
1/28/12 at 5.
The court emphasized its concerns regarding the delay in providing D.C.D.
needed treatment and indicated that the determination of compelling reasons for early
termination hinged on the ability of D.C.D. to be transferred to Southwood within days of
the order. The court directed that if D.C.D. were not transferred into the facility that
same week, the court would reconsider its determination within the 30 days allowed for
appeal. The court further indicated that if D.C.D. was not able to be placed at
Southwood, then he should be transferred to Abraxas as soon as a bed became
available.12
12
Although not relevant to our review of the juvenile court’s decision to terminate
delinquency early, we observe that the final entry in the record provided to this Court
indicates that D.C.D. was placed at Southwood pursuant to the court’s order, where he
was adjusting and progressing moderately as of July 2014. N.T., 7/7/14, at 28-29.
Additionally, D.C.D.’s public defender in its brief to this Court states without record
evidence that D.C.D. has been “returned home and removed from dependency
supervision.” D.C.D. Brief at 13 n.6.
[J-12-2017] - 13
The Commonwealth appealed the termination of delinquency to the Superior
Court, raising the single assertion that the Juvenile Court erred in granting D.C.D early
termination of delinquency supervision. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement. The Superior
Court summarized the Commonwealth’s arguments as asserting that “the juvenile court
abused its discretion in granting D.C.D.'s motion when (1) other treatment options were
available under delinquency supervision, and (2) the court failed to adequately consider
the protection of the community” by focusing exclusively on D.C.D.’s rehabilitation. See
In the Interest of D.C.D., 124 A.3d 736, 737 (Pa. Super. 2015).
In considering the Commonwealth’s argument, the Superior Court recognized
that Rule 632 allows for early termination of delinquency for “compelling reasons,”
despite the juvenile’s failure to meet the usual requirements for termination of
delinquency supervision under Rule 631, which include the juvenile completing the
terms of his or her disposition order, paying restitution in full, and not committing any
new offenses. Pa.R.J.C.P. 631, infra at 21 n.17. It observed, however, the neither the
juvenile court rules nor caselaw have explained what constitutes “compelling reasons”
for early termination. In re D.C.D., 124 A.3d at 740.
After reviewing the testimony set forth above, the Superior Court opined that
compelling reasons existed to warrant the early termination of D.C.D.’s delinquency
supervision, given the limited placement options. The Superior Court rejected the
Commonwealth’s argument that the juvenile court insufficiently weighed the significance
of the community protection and accountability factors of BARJ. Instead, it concluded
that the juvenile court “considered all of the relevant factors before concluding that
D.C.D.'s need for the specialized treatment offered at Southwood outweighed the need
for his supervision by juvenile probation.” Id. at 744.
[J-12-2017] - 14
The Superior Court additionally accepted D.C.D.’s argument that transferring him
to Southwood to enable him to obtain appropriate treatment in fact benefitted the
community in contrast to letting him “languish for months waiting for a bed in a facility
that was not capable of treating his specialized issues.” Id. at 744 (quoting D.C.D. Brief
to the Superior Court at 12). Apparently addressing the consideration of community
protection, the Superior Court further observed that D.C.D. would continue to be
monitored by CYF and the juvenile court. The court, therefore, concluded that the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting early termination of delinquency
supervision because the court “adequately considered all the goals of the Juvenile Act,
including the protection of the community.”13 Id. at 744.
Upon the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal, this Court granted
review to consider whether the Superior Court erred by concluding that the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion in granting early termination of delinquency
supervision under Rule 632.14 Essentially, the Commonwealth maintains that the
13
The Superior Court cited long-standing precedent of that court holding that juvenile
courts are afforded “broad discretion in determining the appropriate disposition for a
delinquent child, which [appellate courts] will not disturb absent a manifest abuse of
discretion.” In re D.C.D., 124 A.3d at 739 (internal citations omitted). The parties do not
contest this standard of review, although they observe that appellate courts apply a de
novo standard of review in construing and interpreting the language of the Juvenile Act
and the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. See, e.g., In the Interest of M.W., 39 A.3d
958, 962 (Pa. 2012).
14
We granted review of the following issue as stated by the Commonwealth:
In interpreting Juvenile Court Rules 631 and 632; does a
Juvenile Court abuse its discretion when it terminates
delinquency supervision of a Juvenile Sex Offender early,
despite also making a contemporaneous finding that the
juvenile has a need for continued supervision and treatment
requiring placement at a residential treatment facility based
(continued…)
[J-12-2017] - 15
juvenile court’s finding of “compelling reasons” for delinquency termination did not
appropriately balance the three factors of BARJ - accountability, community protection,
and rehabilitation - which are incorporated into the Juvenile Act and the Juvenile Rules,
as detailed in our analysis below. The Commonwealth contends that the lower courts
weighed the rehabilitation factor too heavily and ignored the need for accountability and
community protection.
Moreover, the Commonwealth maintains that the juvenile court should have
considered the compelling reason for early termination in light of the factors relevant to
standard delinquency termination set forth in Rule 631(a), which require satisfaction of
the delinquency disposition order, payment of restitution, and no new offenses.
Commonwealth Brief at 16. As applied to D.C.D., the Commonwealth emphasizes that
D.C.D. had not met his treatment goals under the delinquency adjudication but instead
was in need of increasingly intensive residential treatment to protect other patients and
the community. Additionally, it observes that D.C.D. had not satisfied any of the
restitution costs imposed on him. Rather than having no new offenses as required by
Rule 631(a), the Commonwealth maintains that his progression of new offenses
necessitated continued delinquency supervision rather than early termination. The
Commonwealth emphasizes that terminating delinquency removed the District
Attorney’s Office and the Juvenile Probation Department from their role supervising
D.C.D., which had the effect of eliminating the voices advocating for community
protection and accountability. Id. at 12.
(…continued)
upon the escalating violations of sexually offending other
patients while in a different Residential Treatment Facility[?]
In the Interest of D.C.D., 134 A.3d 50 (Pa. 2016).
[J-12-2017] - 16
In contrast, D.C.D. argues that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in
granting D.C.D. early termination of delinquency supervision. He contends that the
Juvenile Act’s provision for “balanced attention” to the three BARJ factors does not
require equal attention to each of the factors but instead grants the juvenile court
discretion to fashion the appropriate disposition “to enable children to become
responsible and productive members of the community.” D.C.D. Brief at 35 (quoting 42
Pa.C.S. § 6301). He further recognizes that the three factors often overlap as the
development of a juvenile’s competencies through rehabilitation allows for their
development into law-abiding citizens benefitting community protection.
As applied to this case, he emphasizes that community protection would be
served by providing D.C.D. treatment for his special needs at Southwood, rather than
leaving him to languish untreated at Sarah Reed or transferring him to Abraxas, which is
geared to an older population. D.C.D. Brief at 16. D.C.D. further emphasizes that initial
placement at the secure facility of Abraxas would have violated another purpose
identified in Section 6301 of the Juvenile Act, which as noted below, requires courts to
place delinquent children in the least restrictive facility. D.C.D. Brief at 39 (quoting 42
Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(3)). He posits that, in granting termination of delinquency
supervision to allow the transfer to Southwood, the juvenile court gave balanced
attention to the protection of the community, accountability, and rehabilitation and
honored the other purposes of the Juvenile Act.15
15
The Defender Association of Philadelphia and the Juvenile Law Center file an amici
curiae brief in support of D.C.D. in which they recognize that rehabilitation and
community protection are not competing goals. They observe that allowing delinquent
children to develop competencies enables them “to become responsible and productive
members of the community, which in turn helps to protect the community from recurring
criminal behavior.” Amici Brief at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[J-12-2017] - 17
In considering the issue presented by the Commonwealth, we first explore the
structure of the delinquency provisions of the Juvenile Act and the related Rules of
Juvenile Court Procedure. To begin, the General Assembly instructed that the Juvenile
Act “shall be interpreted and construed as to effectuate” several purposes. 42 Pa.C.S
§ 6301. As relevant to the issues presented in this case, the Juvenile Act should be
construed:
Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to
provide for children committing delinquent acts programs of
supervision, care and rehabilitation which provide balanced
attention to [1] the protection of the community, [2] the
imposition of accountability for offenses committed and [3]
the development of competencies to enable children to
become responsible and productive members of the
community.
Id. at (b)(2). The General Assembly also directed that courts use the least restrictive
intervention consistent with community protection. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(3)(i).
As these two Juvenile Act purposes demonstrate, the General Assembly
incorporated “balanced and restorative justice”, or BARJ, into the Juvenile Act via Act
33 of 1995 to achieve these articulated goals. 42 Pa.C.S. §6301(b)(2), (3). Historically,
BARJ stemmed from the clashing methodologies of the retributive justice theory, which
prioritizes punishment, and an individual treatment philosophy, which focuses on the
rehabilitation of offenders. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Guide for Implementing the Balanced and Restorative Justice
Model 1 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/167887.pdf (hereinafter Guide); Gordon
Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court:
Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth Crime, 41 Crime & Delinq. 296, 297-98
(1995). BARJ was a compromise in this long debate which brought together aspects of
both systems by requiring consideration of community protection, accountability, and
competency development. Guide at 1-2.
[J-12-2017] - 18
First, community protection focuses on decreasing the risk to communities and
providing communities with tools to manage the behaviors of juvenile offenders. Id. at
27; see Patricia Torbet, Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Advancing Community Protection:
A White Paper for Pennsylvania 4 (2008),
http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/whitepaper_commprotection.pdf. BARJ aims to maintain
community safety through developing short-term and long-term goals of changing and
controlling juvenile offender behavior while developing mutual respect of citizens within
the community. Guide at 27. Next, accountability recognizes that a combination of
adhering to the rules of the legal system and accepting full responsibility for offensive
behavior facilitates positive moral development. Id. at 9; Valerie Bender et. al., Nat’l Ctr.
for Juvenile Justice, Advancing Accountability: Moving Toward Victim Restoration 4
(2006), http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/whitepaper_victimrestoration.pdf. The accountability
factor helps juvenile offenders to reduce their likelihood of re-offense through
acknowledging that their behavior affects other people and creating opportunities for
offenders to repair the harm. Id. Finally, competency development allows for juvenile
offenders to forge skills that will allow them to contribute positively to the well-being of a
community and ultimately allow offenders to gain a sense of belonging in a community.
Guide at 19; see Patricia Torbet & Douglas Thomas, Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice,
Advancing Competency Development: A White Paper for Pennsylvania 3 (2005),
http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/whitepaperfinal.pdf.
With these overarching goals of BARJ in mind, we consider the applicable
provisions of the Act in regard to delinquency supervision. We first observe that a
juvenile must be older than ten years old to be subject to a delinquency adjudication
and that the juvenile court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile
committed a delinquent act. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6302 (definition of “delinquent child” and
[J-12-2017] - 19
“delinquent act”); 6341(b). Additionally, an adjudication of delinquency is appropriate
only if the court concludes that the child is in “need of treatment, supervision or
rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341. See In the Interest of M.W., 39 A.3d 958 (Pa. 2012)
(providing extensive discussion of the requirements of delinquency adjudication).
Disposition of a delinquent child is governed by Section 6352 of the Juvenile Act,
which provides that a court’s disposition should be “consistent with the protection of the
public interest and best suited to the child's treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and
welfare.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352. Moreover, reiterating the incorporation of BARJ into the
Juvenile Act, Section 6352 additionally provides that the “disposition shall, as
appropriate to the individual circumstances of the child’s case, provide balanced
attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses
committed and the development of competencies to enable the child to become a
responsible and productive member of the community.” Id.
A juvenile court has a variety of options available for placement of a delinquent
child ranging from permitting the child to remain with his or her parents to committing
the child to an institution.16 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(a). However, “when confinement is
necessary, the court shall impose the minimum amount of confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public and the rehabilitation needs of the child.” Id.
Additionally, the court may impose “fines, costs, fees or restitution” upon the child. 42
Pa.C.S. § 6352(a)(5).
16
In contrast, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 provides for the disposition of a dependent child. As
emphasized by the Commonwealth, this provision does not allow dependent children to
be “committed to or confined in an institution or other facility designed or operated for
the benefit of delinquent children,” unless the child is also found to be delinquent. 42
Pa.C.S. § 6351(c).
[J-12-2017] - 20
The Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure, in turn, implement the
Juvenile Act and are “intended to provide for the just determination of every delinquency
proceeding.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 101. Moreover, the rules “shall be interpreted and construed
to effectuate the purposes stated in the Juvenile Act,” which as noted above,
incorporates the three goals of BARJ: community protection, accountability, and
rehabilitation. Id.
As relevant to the issues at bar, the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure provide
for termination of delinquency supervision in Rule 631.17 Rule 631 obligates the
17
Pa.R.J.C.P. 631 entitled “Termination of Court Supervision” provides:
A. Notice. The juvenile probation officer shall promptly notify
the court when the conditions of probation have been
satisfied. The court shall decide if supervision should be
terminated. The notice shall set forth:
(1) The juvenile has completed the terms of the
court's dispositional order;
(2) Restitution, fines, and costs have been paid in full;
and
(3) The juvenile has not committed any new offenses
in which a criminal proceeding or proceeding
governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et
seq., may be commenced.
B. Objection. Any party may object to the notice under
paragraph (A) and request a hearing. Such objection shall
be made within thirty days of receipt of the notice; otherwise,
objections are deemed waived.
C. Hearing. If objections have been made under paragraph
(B), the court shall hold a hearing and give each party an
opportunity to be heard before the court enters its final order.
(continued…)
[J-12-2017] - 21
juvenile’s probation officer to notify the court when a “juvenile has completed the terms
of the court’s dispositional order;” has paid restitution, fines and costs in full, and “has
not committed any new offenses.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 631. The court may then terminate
delinquency supervision if “the court is satisfied that the juvenile has carried out the
terms of the dispositional order.” Id.
As critical to the issues before this Court, however, the Juvenile Rules also
provide for early termination without meeting the requirements of Rule 631. Rule 632
instructs that any “party may move for early termination of court supervision” but must
“state with specificity why early termination is sought and why the requirements of Rule
631(A) have not been met.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 632, supra at 6 n.8. Upon satisfaction of
procedural requirements relating to notice and hearings, the court may order early
termination of delinquency supervision if “the court is satisfied that there are compelling
reasons to discharge the juvenile prior to the completion of the requirements of Rule
631(A).” Pa.R.J.C.P. 632(F). The comments to Rule 632 additionally reference Rule
515 which provides “procedures on the dispositional order.” Extending the theme
present in the Juvenile Act, Rule 515 again integrates BARJ by instructing that “the
court shall issue a written order, which provides balanced attention to the protection of
the community, accountability for the offenses committed, and development of the
juvenile's competencies to enable the juvenile to become a responsible and productive
member of the community.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 515.
(…continued)
D. Termination. When the requirements of paragraphs (A)
through (C) have been met and the court is satisfied that the
juvenile has carried out the terms of the dispositional order,
the court may discharge the juvenile from its supervision.
[J-12-2017] - 22
With these directives from the Juvenile Act and the Rules of Juvenile Court
Procedure in mind, we turn to the question at hand regarding whether the juvenile court
abused its discretion in granting D.C.D. early termination of his delinquency supervision.
As noted, the Commonwealth’s overarching argument is that the juvenile court “failed to
balance” the three factors of BARJ by granting excessive weight to D.C.D.’s
rehabilitation without properly considering the protection of the community or D.C.D.’s
accountability. Commonwealth’s Brief at 11.
In its first sub-argument, the Commonwealth faults the juvenile court for “failing to
weigh the ‘compelling reason’ [of Rule 632] against the factors implicated in Rule
631(a),” which the Commonwealth argues provide community protection by requiring
the juvenile to complete the terms of the dispositional order and accountability by
obligating the satisfaction of restitution. Commonwealth’s Brief at 16. We respectfully
disagree with this aspect of the Commonwealth’s argument based upon the plain
language of Rule 632. While a party’s motion for early termination must state “why the
requirements of Rule 631(A) have not been met,” the Rule specifically provides that the
court may “discharge the juvenile prior to the completion of the requirements of Rule
631(A).” Pa.R.J.C.P. 632(A), (F). Therefore, we reject the Commonwealth’s suggestion
to the extent it would necessitate a juvenile’s compliance with Rule 631 when seeking
early termination under Rule 632, which is applicable only when a juvenile has not met
the requirements for standard termination under Rule 631.
The Commonwealth additionally argues that a juvenile court should not grant
early termination of delinquency when the juvenile is still in need of “treatment,
supervision or rehabilitation,” which is the standard provided in the Juvenile Act for the
initial adjudication of delinquency, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341. We additionally decline to adopt
this standard for early termination as it imposes restrictions that are not included in Rule
[J-12-2017] - 23
632, which is intentionally broad in that it requires only “compelling reasons to discharge
the juvenile prior to completion of the requirements of Rule 631(A),” as discussed
below.
The Rules, however, do not define “compelling reasons.” We conclude that the
absence of a definition serves the purpose of Rule 632, which provides the proverbial
“safety-valve” necessary to allow juvenile courts to grant termination of delinquency for
juveniles who do not meet the requirements of Rule 631. Thus, leaving the term
“compelling reasons” undefined provides juvenile courts needed flexibility to address the
varied and unanticipated needs of juveniles and the community. Nevertheless, we
agree with the Commonwealth that “compelling reasons” should be viewed as
encompassing the three goals of BARJ given the repeated invocations in the Juvenile
Rules and the Juvenile Act of a balanced attention to community protection,
accountability, and rehabilitation, as detailed supra. Accordingly, we view it incumbent
upon this Commonwealth’s juvenile court judges to consider specifically the three
factors of BARJ when determining whether compelling reasons exist in the context of a
motion for early termination of delinquency supervision, as with all other dispositions
under the Juvenile Act.
Balanced attention to the three factors, however, does not require that the factors
themselves be equally weighted in the ultimate decision. Instead, balanced attention
merely requires the court to consider each factor. It may determine after consideration
that one factor predominates in regard to the disposition of a particular juvenile. See
Torbet, Advancing Community Protection: A White Paper for Pennsylvania at 2
(observing that “equal consideration is to be given to each goal at the beginning of [the
court’s] investigation,” but acknowledging “that as fact-finding and assessment proceed,
[J-12-2017] - 24
the weight given to each goal will be balanced so that responses can be
individualized.”)
Indeed, as convincingly observed by Amici, the Juvenile Act itself notes a
distinction in the weight attributable to the factors in Section 6352, which requires that a
juvenile’s delinquency disposition be “best suited to the child’s treatment, supervision,
rehabilitation and welfare” but merely “consistent with the protection of the public
interest.” Amici Brief at 9 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352). Additionally, Section 6352
provides that the “disposition shall, as appropriate to the individual circumstances of the
child’s case, provide balanced attention” to the three BARJ factors. Therefore, we
emphasize that juvenile courts are granted broad discretion in weighing the BARJ
factors as appropriate to the individual child. See generally Commonwealth v. Cotto,
753 A.2d 217, 222–23 (Pa. 2000) (finding constitutional the Juvenile Act’s provision of
“flexibility and discretion” rather than requiring “the rigid assignment of a specific weight
to each of the factors to be considered” by courts faced with a motion to transfer a
juvenile from adult court to juvenile court).
In the case at bar, we conclude that the juvenile court properly considered the
relevant factors for early termination. It is clear that the juvenile court primarily focused
upon the rehabilitation needs of D.C.D., given the failure of the “system” to provide
D.C.D. necessary sexual offender treatment in his first eighteen months in the
delinquency system. It is also apparent, however, that the court considered the need
for community protection as the court considered only those facilities which could
provide proper supervision, which would both protect D.C.D. from other patients as well
as protecting other patients and the community from D.C.D. Indeed, the court rejected
continued placement in the Sarah Reed facility because it “failed to appropriately
supervise him or appropriately provide for his care to address his needs
[J-12-2017] - 25
therapeutically.” Order of 5/12/14 at 9. We note that the two concepts are interrelated
as proper treatment not only provides for rehabilitation but also affords protection for the
community as it reduces the likelihood of re-offense. The juvenile court, additionally,
addressed the accountability prong by not absolving D.C.D. of the previously imposed
restitution requirements, which the court in its prior decisions had overtly imposed in
regard to accountability.
As succinctly stated by Amici, compelling reasons for early termination of
delinquency existed in this case because “D.C.D. needed a new placement immediately
that could meet his therapeutic needs, and the only placement available required
discharge of delinquency supervision.” Amici Brief at 12. Indeed, the juvenile court
emphasized that “[h]ad there been appropriate placement available at Abraxas … for
immediate placement, there would be no compelling reason to consider.” Order of
5/12/14 at 8. We conclude that the Superior Court properly determined that the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that compelling reasons existed to terminate
delinquency supervision of D.C.D. to allow him to obtain immediate treatment given the
absence of other facilities that could serve his needs. As time was of the essence in the
treatment of D.C.D., we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the
opinion.
Justice Mundy files a dissenting opinion.
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