Rice, R. v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown ( 2021 )

[J-81-2020] [MO: Donohue, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
RENEE' A. RICE : No. 3 WAP 2020
:
: Appeal from the Order of the
v. : Superior Court entered June 11,
: 2019 at No. 97 WDA 2018,
: reversing the Order of the Court of
DIOCESE OF ALTOONA-JOHNSTOWN, : Common Pleas of Blair County
BISHOP JOSEPH ADAMEC (RETIRED), : entered December 15, 2017 at No.
MONSIGNOR MICHAEL E. SERVINSKY, : 2016 GN 1919, and remanding.
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BISHOP :
JAMES HOGAN, DECEASED, AND :
REVEREND CHARLES F. BODZIAK :
:
:
APPEAL OF: DIOCESE OF ALTOONA- :
JOHNSTOWN, BISHOP JOSEPH ADAMEC :
(RETIRED), MONSIGNOR MICHAEL E. :
SERVINSKY, EXECUTOR OF THE :
ESTATE OF BISHOP JAMES HOGAN, :
DECEASED : ARGUED: October 20, 2020
CONCURRING OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: JULY 21, 2021
I join the majority opinion in its entirety. As the majority cogently observes,
“Pennsylvania’s formulation of the discovery rule reflects the narrower of the two
overarching approaches to determining accrual for limitations purposes.” Wilson v. El-
Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 364 (Pa. 2009). Under this approach, which is based upon inquiry
notice, the commencement of the limitations period is tied to “actual or constructive
knowledge of at least some form of significant harm and of a factual cause linked to
another’s conduct, without the necessity of notice of the full extent of the injury, the fact
of actual negligence, or precise cause.” Id.Consistent with this jurisprudence, the majority concludes that the inquiry notice
approach to the discovery rule required Renee’ Rice “to investigate the Diocese as a
potential additional cause of her injuries during the limitations period.” Majority Opinion
at 29. The majority reaches this conclusion because Rice was aware at the time of each
alleged assault that Reverend Charles F. Bodziak caused her injury, and her complaint
does not allege that she made any inquiries of the Diocese relating to whether it was
aware of Bodziak’s alleged criminal conduct or monitored such conduct when placing
priests in parishes in the Diocese. Indeed, the majority observes that Rice concedes that
she did not make inquiries with the Diocese regarding the matter until the grand jury report
was published in 2016, decades after the alleged assaults. Id. at 21. Thus, the current
governing jurisprudence supports the majority’s conclusion that “[b]ecause [Rice’s] claims
for damages against the Diocese are based on Bodziak’s alleged conduct, she was on
inquiry notice regarding other potentially liable actors, including the Diocese, as a matter
of law.” Id.
I write separately, however, to reiterate my view that Pennsylvania would be better
served by the adoption of a less-restrictive formulation of the discovery rule. See Wilson,
964 A.2d at 371 (Baer J., dissenting) (stating, “I would align Pennsylvania with most other
jurisdictions adopting the view that equates the term ‘injury’ with ‘legal injury,’ and
commences the statute of limitations when the plaintiff has actual or constructive
knowledge, not of the harm, but of the cause of action associated with such harm”). I
believe that the facts of this case illustrate the unduly restrictive nature of our current
discovery rule paradigm, as a person in circumstances similar to Rice may not have
foreseen that the Diocese, to at least some extent, may have been complicit in the
atrocities that allegedly occurred, so as to alert that person to inquire about the Diocese’s
involvement.
[J-81-2020] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2
As recently as 2018, in Nicolaou v. Martin, 195 A.3d 880 (Pa. 2018), this Court
acknowledged the need for a litigant to advocate that we revise our discovery rule
jurisprudence by adopting the approach taken by most of our sister states, as suggested
by this author in Wilson, before the Court entertains the issue. Id., 195 A.3d at 892 n.14.
Echoing the sentiments set forth in Wilson, the Court in Nicolaou found that such a
“foundational change”’ to Pennsylvania’s discovery rule jurisprudence was outside the
scope of the grant of allocatur. Id. (citing Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364). We explained in
Nicolaou that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs did not preserve this foundational issue below and
failed to offer developed argument on appeal, we await a future case to examine whether
such a groundbreaking transformation of our discovery rule jurisprudence is warranted.”
Id. We further cautioned that addressing the issue in a case without advocacy and where
it was unnecessary to resolve the issue presented “would be unwise and antithetical to
principles of judicial restraint.” Id.
Regrettably, the instant case suffers from the same lack of issue preservation and
advocacy regarding whether to expand our discovery rule formulation to adopt the
prevailing view that equates the term “injury” with “legal injury,” and commences the
statute of limitations when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the cause
of action associated with such harm. Accordingly, the Court is again left to await a future
case where the issue is squarely before us.
[J-81-2020] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3