Brooks v. Cole; Apl of: Family Court ( 2021 )

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
WANDA BROOKS : No. 4 EAP 2021
:
: Appeal from the Order of
v. : Commonwealth Court entered on
: July 9, 2020 at No. 912 CD 2018,
: quashing the Order entered on July
EWING COLE, INC., D/B/A EWING COLE : 3, 2018 in the Court of Common
AND CITY OF PHILADELPHIA AND : Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil
FAMILY COURT OF THE COURT OF : Division at No. 00680 December
COMMON PLEAS OF THE FIRST : Term 2016.
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT :
: ARGUED: May 18, 2021
:
APPEAL OF: FAMILY COURT OF THE :
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE :
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT :
OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: September 22, 2021
We granted allowance of appeal to consider whether the Commonwealth Court
erred in quashing the notice of appeal filed by the Family Court of the Court of Common
Pleas of the First Judicial District (the Family Court) on the basis that the trial court’s order
was not an appealable collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
313. Because we conclude the trial court’s order denying summary judgment on
sovereign immunity grounds is a collateral order, appealable as of right under Rule 313,
we reverse the Commonwealth Court and remand to the Commonwealth Court for further
proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of personal injuries Appellee Wanda Brooks allegedly
sustained when she walked into an unmarked glass wall while she was attempting to exit
the Family Court building in Philadelphia on January 8, 2015. Second Am. Compl.,
2/8/17, at 2, ¶ 7. On December 8, 2016, Brooks commenced this action with claims for
negligence against Ewing Cole, Inc., the architectural firm that designed and constructed
the building; the City of Philadelphia (City), as a lessor of the building; and the Family
Court, as a leasee of the building. Id. at 1-4, ¶¶ 2-6, 8, 10. Brooks also asserted a claim
of professional liability against Ewing Cole. Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 12-13. After the Family Court
filed preliminary objections to the complaint, Brooks filed an amended complaint. The
Family Court again raised preliminary objections to the amended complaint, arguing it is
a Commonwealth entity, not a municipal entity, and it did not design or construct the
building. Family Court’s Prelim. Objections to Plaintiff’s Am. Compl., 2/6/17, at 2, ¶ 5-7
(citing 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 102, 301(4); Russo v. Allegheny Cty., 125 A.3d 113 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2015), aff’d per curiam, 150 A.3d 16 (Pa. 2016)). Brooks then filed a second amended
complaint on February 8, 2017, rendering moot the Family Court’s preliminary objections.
See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(1).
Relevant to this appeal, the second amended complaint averred that the Family
Court “is an entity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . and is subject to liability
under the real estate exception to sovereign immunity, [42] Pa.C.S.A. § 8522(b).” Second
Am. Compl., 2/8/17, at 2, ¶ 4. In its answer to the second amended complaint, the Family
Court admitted that it was “a Commonwealth entity.” Family Court’s Answer to Second
Am. Compl. with New Matter and Cross-Claim, 3/10/17, at 2, ¶ 4. The Family Court
further asserted in its new matter that the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-
8527, barred Brooks’s negligence action against it. Id. at 4, ¶ 14.
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Following the completion of discovery, the Family Court moved for summary
judgment. Relying on Russo, the Family Court contended it “is subject to sovereign
immunity and is immune from tort claims.” Mot. for Summ. J., 4/5/18, at ¶ 17. The Family
Court explained that Section 8522 of the Sovereign Immunity Act provides that “‘acts by
a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and
the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages’” in
enumerated circumstances. Id. at ¶ 10 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)). The Family
Court, however, argued that Section 8522 was inapplicable as it was not a
“Commonwealth party” based on Russo, in which the Commonwealth Court determined
that “‘the courts of the unified judicial system are not ‘Commonwealth parties’ within the
meaning of the Sovereign Immunity Act.’” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Russo, 125 A.3d at 118(holding “the courts of the unified judicial system retain their sovereign immunity as
related to tort claims”)). Accordingly, the Family Court argued it was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 18. In response, Brooks contended that summary judgment
was improper because courts are Commonwealth entities, entitled to sovereign immunity
and also subject to the waivers of sovereign immunity listed in Section 8522(b). Answer
to Mot. for Summ. J., 4/25/18, at ¶ 11. Brooks asserted that the real estate exception to
sovereign immunity in Section 8522(b)(4) applied in this case. Id. at ¶¶ 21-23. The real
estate exception, in context of Section 8522, provides:
§ 8522. Exceptions to sovereign immunity
(a) Liability imposed.—The General Assembly, pursuant to
section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, does
hereby waive, in the instances set forth in subsection (b) only
and only to the extent set forth in this subchapter and within
the limits set forth in section 8528 (relating to limitations on
damages), sovereign immunity as a bar to an action against
Commonwealth parties, for damages arising out of a negligent
act where the damages would be recoverable under the
common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury
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were caused by a person not having available the defense of
sovereign immunity.
(b) Acts which may impose liability.—The following acts by
a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability
on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity
shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:
...
(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and
sidewalks.—A dangerous condition of
Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks,
including Commonwealth-owned real property,
leaseholds in the possession of a Commonwealth
agency and Commonwealth-owned real property
leased by a Commonwealth agency to private persons,
and highways under the jurisdiction of a
Commonwealth agency, except conditions described
in paragraph (5)[, relating to potholes and other
dangerous conditions of highways].
42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a), (b)(4).
On June 4, 2018, the trial court denied the Family Court’s motion for summary
judgment. Trial Ct. Order, 6/4/18. On June 28, 2018, the Family Court filed a motion for
reconsideration, requesting that the trial court amend its June 4, 2018 order to include a
statement specified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b), which would permit the Family Court to take
an interlocutory appeal. Mot. for Recons., 6/28/18, at 3. That same day, the Family Court
filed a notice of appeal to the Commonwealth Court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313, which
provides that collateral orders are appealable as of right. Notice of Appeal, 6/28/18. On
July 2, 2018, the trial court vacated its June 4, 2018 order pending reconsideration. Trial
Ct. Order, 7/2/18. On July 3, 2018, the trial court entered an order denying summary
judgment and further denying the Family Court’s request to certify the case for an
interlocutory appeal. Trial Ct. Order, 7/3/18.
On July 5, 2018, the Family Court filed a second notice of appeal to the
Commonwealth Court pursuant to Rule 313. Notice of Appeal, 7/5/18. On July 9, 2018,
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the Commonwealth Court issued an order staying the trial court proceedings pending
appeal and directing the trial court to issue an opinion in support of its June 4, 2018 and
July 3, 2018 orders denying summary judgment and reconsideration. Cmwlth. Ct. Order,
7/9/18. Thereafter, on August 28, 2018, Brooks discontinued her case against Ewing
Cole, and the parties agreed that the cross-claims against Ewing Cole, asserted by the
City and the Family Court, were outstanding and unaffected by the partial discontinuance.
Consent & Stipulation to Discontinue per Rule 229(b)(1), 8/28/18.
Revising its position on appealability, the trial court stated in its November 5, 2018
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that it now considered its July 3, 2018 order denying summary
judgment immediately appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1312(a)(2). Trial Ct. Op.,
11/5/18, at 2 n.2. The trial court explained that it had previously denied the Family Court’s
request to certify the matter for an interlocutory appeal because at that time Brooks had
outstanding claims against Ewing Cole and the City. Id. However, because Brooks had
subsequently discontinued her claims against Ewing Cole, and because the City’s
defense was that it was immune as a landlord out of possession, the trial court opined
that the Family Court’s sovereign immunity defense “‘involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the Order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
matter.’” Id. (quoting Pa.R.A.P. 1312(a)(2)). Based on this analysis, the trial court
concluded “review now is legally appropriate, [and] it is no longer necessary at this stage
to address the appealability of this [c]ourt’s [o]rder denying summary judgment.” Id. The
trial court did not opine on the issue of whether its order denying summary judgment was
a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.
On the merits of the Family Court’s sovereign immunity defense, the trial court
stated it denied summary judgment because it concluded the General Assembly intended
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to include Commonwealth courts in the definition of “Commonwealth party” for purposes
of the Sovereign Immunity Act. Id. at 8-9. The trial court explained that the Act waived
governmental immunity in nine specific areas in actions against “Commonwealth parties,”
and the Act defined a “Commonwealth party” as “‘[a] Commonwealth agency and any
employee thereof, but only with respect to an act within the scope of his office or
employment.’” Id. at 3 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501). The trial court noted that the Act
does not specify that immunity is waived for certain branches of government but not
others. Id. The trial court disagreed with the Russo Court’s holding that Commonwealth
courts are excluded from the Act because the Judicial Code’s definition of
“Commonwealth agency” does not include courts. Id. at 6 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 102;
Russo, 125 A.3d at 118-19). Instead, the trial court reasoned that “[i]t would be surprising
for the General Assembly to create a special exemption allowing for the judicial branch of
government to enjoy a higher level of immunity than the General Assembly provided to
itself and the executive branch without any explicit language or legislative history of such
intention.” Id. at 8. Accordingly, the trial court concluded a trial was necessary on the
issue of whether the glass wall was a dangerous condition under the real estate exception
to sovereign immunity. Id. at 9.
The Commonwealth Court consolidated the Family Court’s notice of appeal of the
June 4, 2018 trial court order and its notice of appeal of the July 3, 2018 order. In a
unanimous unpublished memorandum decision, a panel of the Commonwealth Court
struck the Family Court’s first notice of appeal, explaining it was inoperative following the
trial court’s reconsideration of its June 4, 2018 order, and further quashed the Family
Court’s appeal of the July 3, 2018 order because it was not a collateral order. Brooks v.
Ewing Cole, Nos. 911 & 912 C.D. 2018, 2020 WL 3866647, at *1, n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jul.
9, 2020). The Commonwealth Court observed that generally orders denying summary
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judgment are not appealable as of right because they are not final orders. Id. at *4.
Further, the court noted that although the trial court’s opinion contained the operative
language from Pa.R.A.P. 1312(a)(2), it had not amended its July 3, 2018 order to allow
the Family Court to file a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
Rule 1311. Id. at *2, n.5. Therefore, the Commonwealth Court proceeded to analyze
whether the Family Court properly asserted a right to appeal under the collateral order
doctrine set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 313, which gives appellate courts jurisdiction to consider
collateral orders prior to final judgment. See Pa.R.A.P. 313; Commonwealth v. Kennedy,
876 A.2d 939, 943 (Pa. 2005). Rule 313 provides:
Rule 313. Collateral Orders
(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a
collateral order of a trial court or other government unit.
(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from
and collateral to the main cause of action where the right
involved is too important to be denied review and the question
presented is such that if review is postponed until final
judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
Pa.R.A.P. 313.
The Commonwealth Court recognized that Rule 313 contains three criteria that an
order must satisfy to meet the definition of a collateral order: separability, importance, and
irreparable loss. Brooks, 2020 WL 3866647, at *4. The court found the July 3, 2018
order met the first two of those requirements. Id. at *5-7. To decide whether an order is
separable and collateral to the main cause of action, the Commonwealth Court observed
the question is whether review of the order involves the merits of the underlying cause of
action. Id. at *5. Further, it recognized that this Court “‘has adopted a practical analysis
recognizing that some potential interrelationship between merits issues and the question
sought to be raised in the interlocutory appeal is tolerable.’” Id. (quoting Pridgen v. Parker
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Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 433 (Pa. 2006)). Here, the order was separable from the
underlying negligence action, according to the Commonwealth Court, because the issue
of whether the Family Court was a “Commonwealth party” under the Sovereign Immunity
Act is able to be resolved independent of a consideration of the negligence claim. Id.Thus, the sovereign immunity issue was “separable and distinct” from the negligence
action, in the Commonwealth Court’s view, because it “centers on the terms of the
Sovereign Immunity Act and does not necessitate a factual inquiry into the extent of the
Family Court’s liability.” Id. at *6.
Next, the Commonwealth Court noted the inquiry into the importance of the right
involves weighing the interests that immediate appellate review protects against the
interest of efficiency in avoiding piecemeal litigation represented by the final judgment
rule. Id. An important interest under Rule 313 will typically “‘involve rights deeply rooted
in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.’” Id. (quoting Geniviva v.
Frisk, 725 A.2d 1209, 1214 (Pa. 1999)). Applying this standard, the Commonwealth Court
concluded the right involved, sovereign immunity, “implicates public policy concerns that
extend beyond the parties to the instant litigation, as its resolution will dictate whether a
member of the general public may maintain a negligence action against the courts.” Id.
at *7.
Although it found the order satisfied the first two prongs of the collateral order
doctrine, the Commonwealth Court concluded the order did not meet the third prong
because the Family Court’s claim to sovereign immunity would not be irreparably lost if
appellate review was postponed until final judgment. Id. To define irreparable loss, the
Commonwealth Court explained its precedent dictates “‘a claim will be ‘irreparably lost’ if
review is postponed only if it can be shown the issue involved will not be able to be raised
on appeal, if appeal is delayed.’” Id. (quoting Brophy v. Phila. Gas Works & Phila.
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Facilities Mgmt. Corp., 921 A.2d 80, 87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)). Because the Family Court
retained the ability to seek appellate review of its claim after final judgment, the
Commonwealth Court held its sovereign immunity defense would not be irreparably lost.
Id. The Commonwealth Court bolstered its conclusion by observing that this Court’s
precedent requires it to narrowly construe the collateral order doctrine to yield to the final
order doctrine. Id. at *8 (relying on Shearer v. Hafer, 177 A.3d 850, 858 (Pa. 2018)).
Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to address the
Family Court’s appeal because the July 3, 2018 order was not a collateral order
appealable as of right under Rule 313, and it consequently quashed the appeal. Id.II. ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court granted the Family Court’s petition for allowance of appeal to address
the following issue:
Should this Court review the Commonwealth Court's
conclusion that an order denying a summary judgment motion
based on sovereign immunity does not satisfy the collateral
order doctrine of Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure
313, which conflicts with statutory law and case law that this
immunity is “immunity from suit” and presents a matter of first
impression for this Court on a substantial legal and policy
issue involving absolute immunities?
Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 243 A.3d 970 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam).
The appealability of an order under the Pa.R.A.P. 313 collateral order doctrine
presents a question of law, over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. Shearer, 177 A.3d at 855; see also Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co. v.
Johnson Matthey, Inc., 188 A.3d 396, 398 (Pa. 2018) (recognizing de novo standard of
review and plenary scope of review over jurisdictional issue).
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III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE
A. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
The Family Court argues that this Court should reverse the Commonwealth Court
because an order denying summary judgment on the issue of sovereign immunity is a
collateral order. The Family Court highlights that sovereign immunity is an absolute
immunity, in that it is a complete defense to a cause of action even if a plaintiff can
otherwise prove the elements of the underlying cause of action. Family Court’s Brief at
10, 13 (citing Stackhouse v. Pa. State Police, 892 A.2d 54, 62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)
(recognizing sovereign immunity is absolute)). Further, the Family Court emphasizes the
statutory scope of sovereign immunity protects government officials and entities “‘from
suit,’” not merely from judgment or damages. Id. at 9-10 (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310).
Due to the nature of the sovereign immunity defense, the Family Court contends
that a decision denying the defense to a governmental entity qualifies as a collateral order
under Rule 313’s three criteria. First, the Family Court agrees with the Commonwealth
Court that the immunity issue is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action
because the defense applies regardless of whether the plaintiff establishes the elements
of negligence. Id. at 12-13. Second, the Family Court also concurs with the
Commonwealth Court that the sovereign immunity issue is too important to be denied
review because it applies to all branches of government and dictates the circumstances
in which government entities must defend their actions, which also implicates the
expenditure of the public fisc. Id. at 13-14.
Turning to the third prong, which is at the core of this appeal, the Family Court
criticizes the Commonwealth Court for construing the irreparable loss requirement too
narrowly. Id. at 14. The protection from suit that sovereign immunity confers, according
to the Family Court, “is irreparably lost if public officials and entities have to engage in
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litigation, including discovery and trial” before they can obtain appellate review of an
adverse decision on the question of sovereign immunity. Id. at 11. Because the scope
of the immunity is from all aspects of a lawsuit, the Family Court argues the
Commonwealth Court erred in concluding the issue of sovereign immunity is not
irreparably lost because it can be raised on appeal following final judgment. Id. at 15. In
contrast to the Commonwealth Court’s framing of the issue, the Family Court asserts
“[t]he proper question is not whether the defense can be raised after trial, however. It is
whether absolute sovereign immunity’s protections – the protection of immunity from
suit – are irreparably lost if the Commonwealth and its officials are forced to go through
discovery, trial, and judgment.” Id. Explaining that the purpose of sovereign immunity is
to protect “‘government policymaking prerogatives’” and “‘the public fisc,’” the Family
Court contends the Commonwealth Court’s holding forces governmental entities and
officials to engage in discovery, prepare for trial, and try a case, which requires the
government to expend the public fisc even though it may ultimately be immune. Id. at 15-
16 (quoting Sci. Games Int’l, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 66 A.3d 740, 755 (Pa. 2013)). Thus,
the Family Court’s position is that the protections of sovereign immunity are irreparably
lost when a governmental entity is precluded from invoking the defense and cannot obtain
appellate review until after final judgment. Id. at 15.
In support of its position, the Family Court analogizes this case to Pridgen, in which
this Court permitted an interlocutory appeal as of right under Rule 313 because the
defendant would suffer an irreparable loss if it had to incur a “‘substantial cost’” in
defending complex litigation when it asserted an immunity defense under the federal
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994. Id. at 16 (quoting Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433).
The Family Court argues the rationale in Pridgen applies to its appeal because forcing it
to defend this lawsuit without immediate appellate review of the denial of its sovereign
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immunity defense would both irreparably injure the public fisc and additionally expose
governmental entities to defending their actions in litigation and undermine the public
interest in the unfettered discharge of governmental obligations.1 Id. at 17. Similarly, the
Family Court notes that in Yorty v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 79 A.3d 655 (Pa. Super.
2013), the Superior Court, relying on Pridgen, held that an immunity defense under the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission met Rule 313 because the defendant would
undergo an irreparable loss in defending the negligence action. Id. (discussing Yorty, 79
A.3d at 662). Further, the Family Court points out that the Superior Court has held that a
statute of repose defense represents “‘immunity from suit, not just immunity from liability,’”
and the costs in defending the litigation would be irreparably lost if appellate review was
not permitted before final judgment.2 Id. at 17-18 (quoting Osborne v. Lewis, 59 A.3d
1109, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2012)). Based on this precedent, the Family Court maintains a
sovereign immunity defense “is vitiated once an official or entity has to defend their
actions in a suit.” Id. at 17.
The Family Court questions the Commonwealth Court’s omission of Pridgen and
Yorty from its discussion of the irreparable loss requirement, despite the court’s reliance
1 Amici Curiae, County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania
State Association of Township Supervisors, and the Pennsylvania Municipal League,
agree that Pridgen controls the outcome of this case because it concluded that the cost
of defending a lawsuit at trial constitutes an irreparable loss. Amici Brief at 11 (discussing
Pridgen, 905 A.3d at 433).
2 Amicus Curiae, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, faults the
Commonwealth Court for failing to recognize that absolute immunity is a protection from
suit, not only from liability. Amicus Brief at 26. The General Assembly points out that this
Court, in the context of the absolute immunity of legislative speech or debate, has
explained that immunity from suit is the protection from defending a case at trial, which
would be irreparably lost if review is postponed until final judgment. Id. (relying on
Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323, 331 (Pa. 1986), abrogated on
other grounds, Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2005)).
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on those cases in discussing the first two prongs of Rule 313. Id. at 18. The Family Court
also notes the Commonwealth Court did not discuss its previous cases holding that the
“‘purpose of absolute immunity is to foreclose the possibility of suit.’” Id. at 19 (quoting
Osiris Enters. v. Borough of Whitehall, 877 A.2d 560, 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (discussing
high public official immunity)); see also id. (citing Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394, 405 n.11
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (stating “judicial immunity is not only immunity from damages, but
also immunity from suit”); Stackhouse, 892 A.2d at 62 (explaining “[t]he purpose of
absolute sovereign immunity [is] to insulate state agencies and employees not only from
judgments but also from being required to expend the time and funds necessary to defend
suits”)). Further, the Family Court criticizes the cases the Commonwealth Court included
in its analysis of irreparable loss as distinguishable. Id. at 19. For instance, the Family
Court contends that in Sylvan Heights Realty Partners, L.L.C. v. LaGrotta, 940 A.2d 585(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), the court addressed the irreparable loss requirement in dicta only,
after holding the issue of legislative immunity was not separate and collateral based on
the facts of the case. Family Court’s Brief at 19-20 (citing Sylvan Heights, 940 A.2d at
588-89, and noting this Court has held that legislative immunity includes immunity from
defending litigation, see Consumer Party of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323, 331
(Pa. 1986), abrogated on other grounds, Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion
Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2005)). The Family Court distinguishes
the other cases upon which the Commonwealth Court relied because those cases did not
involve Rule 313’s irreparable loss requirement. Id. at 20-21 (citing Aubrey v. Precision
Airmotive LLC, 7 A.3d 256, 262 (Pa. Super. 2010) (omitting discussion of irreparable
loss); Bollinger v. Obrecht, 552 A.2d 359, 363 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (declining to
address irreparable loss); Gwiszcz v. City of Phila., 550 A.2d 880, 882 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)
(holding the issue was not separable and not discussing irreparable loss)).
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In additional support of its position, the Family Court discusses a number of United
States Supreme Court cases stating the federal rule is to permit immediate appeal of an
adverse decision on immunity from suit. Id. at 21-24. As the Family Court notes, the rule
in federal court is that “‘the denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order
appealable before final judgment, for the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor’s
entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.’” Id. at 22
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (holding the denial of a claim of
qualified immunity is immediately appealable)); see also id. at 21 (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (stating a qualified immunity defense is “effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial”)); id. at 22 (citing Plumhoff v. Rickard,
572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014) (holding that qualified immunity “cannot be effectively reviewed
on appeal from a final judgment because by that time the immunity from standing trial will
have been irreparably lost”)). The Family Court indicates that the Supreme Court has
stated the purpose of absolute immunity is to alleviate public officials’ “‘fear of
consequences,’” in the form of not only monetary damages but also “‘the general costs of
subjecting officials to the risks of trial – distraction of officials from their governmental
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public
service.’” Id. at 21 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). The Family Court finds the federal
court model persuasive because the note to Rule 313 indicates that it is a “codification of
existing case law” and cites to Pugar v. Greco, 394 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1978), in which this
Court relied on federal case law concerning appealable interlocutory orders. 3 Id. at 23-
3 The Governor and Attorney General of Pennsylvania, in a joint amicus curiae brief,
agree that Rule 313 was a codification of the United States Supreme Court’s collateral
order rule, and they contend we should follow the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence holding
that a government defendant claiming immunity is entitled to an immediate appeal of a
pretrial decision denying its immunity defense. Joint Amicus Brief at 8 (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009)). They further argue that sovereign immunity’s protection
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24 (noting the Pugar Court cited Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546 (1949)). Lastly, the Family Court notes that many other states have concluded that
immunity from suit is irreparably lost if the issue is not immediately appealable. Id. at 24
n.11 (collecting cases).
In contrast, Brooks argues that this Court should affirm the Commonwealth
Court’s decision that the order denying summary judgment was not a collateral order.
Brooks’s Brief at 17. Brooks contends that the Family Court’s delay in seeking resolution
of its sovereign immunity defense until summary judgment, when it could have filed
preliminary objections or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, shows that the immunity
defense is not a “‘substantial legal and policy issue’” warranting a departure from the final
judgment rule. Id. at 6-7 (quoting Brooks, 243 A.3d at 970 (granting allocatur), and citing
Renner v. Court of Common Pleas, 234 A.3d 411, 417 (Pa. 2020) (reviewing an order
sustaining preliminary objections on the basis of sovereign immunity and separation of
powers but resolving the case based on separation of powers); Sutton v. Bickell, 220 A.3d
1027, 1035 (affirming order sustaining preliminary objections on sovereign immunity
grounds); Cagey v. Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 458, 468 (Pa. 2018) (reversing order
granting motion for judgment on the pleadings on sovereign immunity grounds)).
Additionally, in assessing the importance of the right the Family Court asserts,
Brooks contends that her interest in having her case resolved expeditiously instead of
through piecemeal litigation surpasses the Family Court’s interests. Id. at 9. She argues
that the Family Court will not lose anything because the issue of sovereign immunity can
be reexamined after the jury renders its verdict, and if the jury returns a defense verdict,
the issue is moot. Id. Recognizing that sovereign immunity is absolute immunity, Brooks
from litigation is lost if the government cannot immediately appeal an adverse decision
on its sovereign immunity defense. Id. at 10.
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asserts that the Commonwealth Court’s decision to deny the Family Court’s interlocutory
appeal is not fatal to its claim of sovereign immunity. Id. at 12. Brooks maintains that this
Court has narrowly construed the collateral order doctrine and posits that we “can expect
the floodgate of sovereign immunity appeals to open wide” if we deem that sovereign
immunity satisfies Rule 313. Id. at 9-10 (discussing Rae v. Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass’n, 977
A.2d 1121, 1126 (Pa. 2009) (explaining that we narrowly construe the collateral order
doctrine because “[p]arties may seek allowance of appeal from an interlocutory order by
permission, and we have concluded that discretionary process would be undermined by
an overly permissive interpretation of Rule 313’s limited grant to collateral appeals as of
right.”)).
Brooks claims the Family Court’s interest in obtaining an immediate appeal is
solely pecuniary but notes that the Family Court did not incur any expenses defending
this lawsuit because its trial attorney acted as counsel for both the Family Court and the
Co-defendant City. Id. at 13. Further, Brooks dismisses the concerns that sovereign
immunity protects public officials because she did not sue any public officials in this case.
Id. For these reasons, Brooks contends that this case is an inappropriate vehicle to hold
that sovereign immunity satisfies the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 15. Because
sovereign immunity is an absolute defense that is not waivable, Brooks argues “[a]n
immunity defense does not, in and of itself, entitle a litigant to appellate review of an
interlocutory order.” Id. at 15-16 (citing In re Upset Sale of Props., 560 A.2d 1388, 1389
(Pa. 1989)).
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B. ANALYSIS
We granted review to determine whether an order denying summary judgment
based on a sovereign immunity defense is a collateral order, appealable as of right under
Rule 313, which, as previously noted, provides:
Rule 313. Collateral Orders
(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a
collateral order of a trial court or other government unit.
(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from
and collateral to the main cause of action where the right
involved is too important to be denied review and the question
presented is such that if review is postponed until final
judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
Pa.R.A.P. 313.
Rule 313 codified the three-part collateral order doctrine first formulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Cohen, as an exception to the final order rule in cases
where lower courts’ decisions do not terminate the case, yet “finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546;
see also Shearer, 177 A.3d at 855-58 (tracing the evolution of the collateral order doctrine
in Pennsylvania). Pennsylvania followed the reasoning of Cohen in Bell v. Beneficial
Consumer Discount Co., 348 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1975), which recognized that “a finding of
finality must be the result of a practical rather than a technical construction” and concluded
that “orders denying class action status possess sufficiently practical aspects of finality to
make them appealable.” Bell, 348 A.2d 735-36. This Court followed its decision in Bell
by expressly adopting the three-part Cohen formulation of the collateral order doctrine:
an order is considered final and appealable if (1) it is
separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2)
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the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3)
the question presented is such that if review is postponed until
final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably
lost.
Pugar, 394 A.2d at 545. In 1992, the Pugar Court’s articulation of the collateral order
doctrine was codified in Rule 313. Compare id., with Pa.R.A.P. 313. “[W]here an order
satisfies Rule 313's three-pronged test, an appellate court may exercise jurisdiction even
though the order is not final. If the test is not met, however, and in the absence of another
exception to the final order rule, there is no jurisdiction to consider an appeal of such an
order.” Shearer, 177 A.3d at 857. Due to the jurisdictional nature of the collateral order
doctrine, this Court has concluded it may raise it sua sponte. Dougherty v. Heller, 138
A.3d 611, 627 n.9 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam).
Because Pennsylvania adopted the collateral order doctrine from the United States
Supreme Court, we continue to look to that Court’s decisions for guidance in defining the
contours of Rule 313. Rae, 977 A.2d at 1128. However, this Court has not remained in
lockstep with the United States Supreme Court’s recently imposed limitations on the
collateral order doctrine in attorney-client privilege cases grounded in the High Court’s
determination that privilege claims are not irreparably lost as they are reviewable after a
final judgment. Shearer, 177 A.3d at 857 (describing this Court’s departure from Mohawk
Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108-09 (2009)). Instead, we have explained that
our jurisprudence recognizes a privilege would be irreparably lost upon the disclosure of
allegedly privileged material, and thus, a privilege claim is an immediately appealable
collateral order. Id. (discussing Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243, 249 (Pa. 2011)
(“[o]nce putatively privileged material is in the open, the bell has been rung, and cannot
be unrung by a later appeal.”). “In sum, then, while our Court has diverged from the
federal approach in some regards, we nonetheless construe the collateral order doctrine
narrowly, and insist that each one of its three prongs be ‘clearly present’ before collateral
[J-32-2021] - 18
appellate review is allowed.” Id. at 858 (recognizing a narrow construction of the collateral
order rule reinforces the final order doctrine and preserves interlocutory appeals by
permission under Pa.R.A.P. 312).
Additionally, as this appeal requires us to determine whether a decision denying
the government’s sovereign immunity defense meets the collateral order doctrine, we
next examine the general principles of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is
enshrined in Article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides, in
relevant part, that “[s]uits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in
such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.” PA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 11. The General Assembly has declared its intent “that the Commonwealth, and its
officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the
General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. The
Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8501-8564, contains the legislative waiver of the
sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth, local governments, and public officials in
certain enumerated circumstances. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522 (listing ten exceptions to
Commonwealth parties’ sovereign immunity); 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542 (specifying nine
exceptions to local agencies’ immunity); 42 Pa.C.S. § 8545-46 (defining the scope of
official immunity).
This Court has characterized the constitutional protection of sovereign immunity
as “fundamental.”4 Frazier v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bayada Nurses, Inc.), 52 A.3d
241, 247 (Pa. 2012); see also Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. Lewis, 169 A. 571, 571 (stating “[t]hat
4 In Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978), this Court
abolished sovereign immunity. However, the General Assembly promptly enacted 1
Pa.C.S. § 2310, which “unequivocally reaffirmed the absoluteness of sovereign and
official immunity under Article 1, Section 11, except as provided by statute.” Bayada
Nurses, 52 A.3d at 247 n.9.
[J-32-2021] - 19
the state may not be sued without its consent is fundamental.”). Sovereign immunity is
an absolute defense that is not waivable. Upset Sale of Props., 560 A.2d at 1389;
McShea v. City of Phila., 995 A.2d 334, 341 (Pa. 2010) (“Tort immunity is a non-waivable,
absolute defense.”). Further, this Court has held that courts must strictly construe the
legislatively specified exceptions to sovereign immunity. Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d
307, 311 (Pa. 1989); see also Kiley v. City of Phila., 645 A.2d 184, 185-86 (Pa. 1994).
“The constitutionally-grounded, statutory doctrine of sovereign immunity obviously serves
to protect government policymaking prerogatives and the public fisc.” Sci. Games Int’l,
66 A.3d at 755; see also McShea, 995 A.2d at 341 (stating the “clear intent” is “to insulate
the government from exposure to tort liability”).
Against this background, we must decide whether an adverse decision on the
government’s assertion of sovereign immunity constitutes a collateral order, immediately
appealable as of right under Rule 313. To do so, we must determine whether the order
denying the Family Court’s motion for summary judgment on its sovereign immunity
defense satisfies each prong of Rule 313. See Shearer, 177 A.3d at 855 (explaining that
this Court independently evaluates the collateral order doctrine due to its jurisdictional
nature). As set forth above, an order is collateral under Rule 313 if: (1) the order is
separable from the underlying cause of action; (2) it involves a right too important to be
denied review; and (3) it presents an issue that will be irreparably lost if appellate review
is postponed until after final judgment. Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
Regarding the first prong, “an order is separable from the main cause of action if
‘it can be resolved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying dispute’ and if it is
‘entirely distinct from the underlying issue in the case.’” Shearer, 177 A.3d at 858 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 A.3d 306, 312 (Pa. 2015)). “[T]his Court has adopted a
practical [separability] analysis recognizing that some potential interrelationship between
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merits issues and the question sought to be raised in the interlocutory appeal is tolerable.”
Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433. We agree with the Commonwealth Court that in this case, the
trial court order denying summary judgment is separable from Brooks’s underlying
negligence action. The issue that the Family Court sought to raise on appeal was whether
it was a “Commonwealth party” subject to the Sovereign Immunity Act’s waiver of
immunity. Brooks, 2020 WL 386647, at *6. This issue is a purely legal question that can
be resolved by focusing on the Act and does not necessitate an examination of the merits
of Brooks’s negligence claim. Accord id.; Trial Ct. Op. at 8 (stating “[t]he only dispute is
a question of law”). It does not require a court to find any facts regarding the Family
Court’s alleged negligence nor does it require a court to determine the scope of the Family
Court’s potential liability. In fact, sovereign immunity would provide the Family Court with
an absolute defense to Brooks’s claims, regardless of whether Brooks is able to prove
negligence. Further, neither Brooks nor the Family Court presently dispute this aspect of
the Commonwealth Court’s decision. Accordingly, we conclude the order meets Rule
313’s separability requirement.
Turning to the second prong, this Court has examined the importance of the right
involved by weighing the interests that immediate appellate review would protect against
the final judgment rule’s interests in efficiency through avoiding piecemeal litigation. Ben
v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 552 (Pa. 1999); see also Shearer, 177 A.3d at 858-59;
Blystone, 119 A.3d at 312. Further, we require that “the order involves rights deeply
rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand” because “it is not
sufficient that the issue is important to the particular parties involved.” Commonwealth v.
Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 782 (Pa. 2014). We agree with the Commonwealth Court that the
right to a sovereign immunity defense is too important to evade review before final
judgment. As noted above, the protection of sovereign immunity is deeply rooted in public
[J-32-2021] - 21
policy, as it is both secured by the Constitution and has been preserved by the legislature.
See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. Additionally, the implications of the Family
Court’s ability to invoke sovereign immunity are wide-ranging, extending beyond this
particular case. The protection of sovereign immunity extends to each of our three
branches of government. See General Assembly’s Amicus Brief at 9 (explaining that the
issue in this case impacts all types of absolute immunity). Moreover, the resolution of the
scope of sovereign immunity also has implications for other individuals’ ability to sue the
Commonwealth’s courts by invoking an exception to immunity in Section 8522(b) of the
Sovereign Immunity Act. These deeply rooted and far-reaching implications outweigh the
final judgment rule’s efficiency interests. Therefore, we conclude the right involved meets
Rule 313’s importance requirement.
Regarding Rule 313’s third prong, we must inquire into whether the Family Court’s
claim of sovereign immunity will be irreparably lost if appellate review is postponed until
final judgment. Pa.R.A.P. 313; see also Ben, 729 A.2d at 552. As provided by both the
Constitution and statute, sovereign immunity is the protection from suit. PA. CONST. art.
1, § 11 (declaring “suits” against the Commonwealth must be legislatively authorized); 1
Pa.C.S. § 2310 (stating that the Commonwealth and its officials “remain immune from
suit” unless waived). Thus, the protection is from a lawsuit itself not simply a mere shield
from judgment or liability, as Pennsylvania courts have recognized. See McShea, 995
A.2d at 341 (stating sovereign immunity “insulate[s] the government from exposure to tort
liability”); Montgomery v. City of Phila., 140 A.2d 100, 103 (Pa. 1958) (“absolute immunity
is designed to protect the official from the suit itself, from the expense, publicity, and
danger of defending the good faith of his public actions before a jury.”); Commonwealth
v. Berks Cty., 72 A.2d 129, 130 (Pa. 1950) (recognizing “a State may not be sued without
its consent”); Stackhouse, 892 A.2d at 62 (explaining sovereign immunity’s purpose is to
[J-32-2021] - 22
protect state agencies and employees “not only from judgments but also from being
required to expend the time and funds necessary to defend suits”); accord Mitchell, 472
U.S. at 526 (stating qualified public official immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than
a mere defense to liability”) (emphasis in original).
Because sovereign immunity protects government entities from a lawsuit itself, we
conclude that a sovereign immunity defense is irreparably lost if appellate review of an
adverse decision on sovereign immunity is postponed until after final judgment.
Subjecting a governmental entity, which claims it is immune, to the legal process
undermines the purposes of sovereign immunity. See Sci. Games Int’l, 66 A.3d at 755;
Mullin v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 870 A.2d 773, 779 (Pa. 2005) (stating the
purpose of immunity is to protect government revenues from “unnecessary depletion”);
Montgomery, 140 A.2d at 104 (“the purpose of absolute immunity is to foreclose the
possibility of suit”). Engaging in litigation requires a governmental entity to expend
taxpayer dollars on its defense and to divert employees’ time from conducting government
business. Further, forcing governmental entities to litigate claims from which they may
be immune has a chilling effect on government policymaking. See Sci. Games Int’l, 66
A.3d at 755; see also Dorsey v. Redman, 96 A.3d 332, 343, 345 (Pa. 2014) (stating “[t]he
underlying purpose [of official immunity] is to allow those in governmental policy making
positions to have the ability to act without fear of litigation and unlimited damages” and
concluding official immunity is immunity from suit not merely liability). These protections
of sovereign immunity are irreparably lost if a governmental entity must litigate a case to
final judgment before it can obtain appellate review of an adverse ruling on its invocation
of sovereign immunity.
The conclusion that the protections of immunity are irreparably lost when a party
goes to trial is supported by this Court’s decision in Pridgen. In Pridgen, this Court
[J-32-2021] - 23
concluded that an order denying summary judgment based on the defendant’s statute of
repose defense pursuant to the federal General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 was
a collateral order appealable as of right under Rule 313. Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 424, 434.
After finding the order met the first two prongs of Rule 313, the Pridgen Court concluded
it also satisfied the irreparable loss requirement because “the substantial cost that
Appellants will incur in defending this complex litigation at a trial on the merits comprises
a sufficient loss to support allowing interlocutory appellate review as of right, in light of the
clear federal policy to contain such costs in the public interest.” Id. at 433. This is
consistent with our conclusion in this case that the depletion of the public fisc and
employee resources represent an irreparable loss, particularly when the policies
underlying sovereign immunity are intended to preserve the government’s revenue, time,
and policymaking prerogatives.
Further, our decision is consistent with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
holding that orders denying immunity defenses are immediately appealable collateral
orders. The Supreme Court has concluded that orders denying immunity are reviewable
collateral orders because “[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (emphasis in original)
(discussing qualified public official immunity). The Court has explained that “such orders
conclusively determine whether the defendant is entitled to immunity from suit; this
immunity issue is both important and completely separate from the merits of the action,
and this question could not be effectively reviewed on appeal from a final judgment
because by that time the immunity from standing trial will have been irretrievably lost.”
Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 772 (concluding qualified immunity generally falls within the
collateral order doctrine). It has been the Supreme Court’s consistent view that “immunity
[J-32-2021] - 24
ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 228 (1991) (discussing qualified immunity); see also, e.g., Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-
32 (declaring that a qualified immunity defense is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial.”); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (holding “[s]tates and state entities that claim to be ‘arms of the
State’ may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order
denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,
742 (1982) (stating “orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable under the
Cohen criteria” in analyzing absolute presidential immunity). The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has followed this precedent and held that “the denial of a defense of sovereign
immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc.
v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 273 F.3d 337, 343 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Fowler-Nash v.
Democratic Caucus of Pa. House of Representatives, 469 F.3d 328, 330 n.1 (3d Cir.
2006) (asserting its jurisdiction to review an order denying absolute immunity pursuant to
the collateral order doctrine); In re Montgomery Cty., 215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding it had interlocutory jurisdiction to review an implied denial of qualified immunity
claims).
Further, we are not persuaded by Brooks’s arguments that the order denying
summary judgment does not satisfy the collateral order doctrine. Regarding Brooks’s
attacks on the Family Court’s litigation strategy of waiting until summary judgment to seek
to have the suit dismissed, we note that the case-specific litigation strategy does not alter
the legal issue of whether an adverse decision on sovereign immunity, at any stage of
litigation, is immediately appealable under Rule 313.5 Likewise, we reject Brooks’s
5 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030 dictates that “immunity from suit” must be
raised as an affirmative defense and pled in a new matter. Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a).
Nonetheless, some intermediate appellate court decisions have concluded that immunity
[J-32-2021] - 25
suggestion that this case is not an appropriate vehicle to decide this issue because the
Family Court did not incur any expenses in defending this case, as the interests sovereign
immunity protects are not entirely pecuniary and this case presents an adequate
opportunity to decide the question of law presented. We acknowledge Brooks’s concern
that our decision may open “the floodgate of sovereign immunity appeals,” and we
recognize the potential applicability of our decision here to other forms of absolute
immunity. Brooks’s Brief at 10; see also General Assembly’s Amicus Brief at 9 (asserting
this case affects all types of immunity). Notwithstanding, we have concluded that the
claim involved in this case meets Rule 313’s collateral order doctrine, and we note that
our courts are well-suited to address purely legal issues such as this one.
We also disagree with the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning that an appeal
following final judgment will adequately protect the Family Court’s claim of sovereign
immunity. The Commonwealth Court’s decision undermines the purposes of sovereign
immunity and transforms it from a protection from suit into a mere shield against damages.
This is against the express intention of the legislature as stated in 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310.
While it is accurate that the issue of immunity may be reviewed after final judgment, by
that time the government’s monetary resources and employees’ time will have been
subject to unnecessary depletion. Further, subjecting the government to unnecessary
litigation has potentially deleterious effects on its policymaking decisions. Once the
government litigates a case to final judgment, “the bell has been rung, and cannot be
unrung by a later appeal.” Harris, 32 A.3d at 249. Immediate appellate review of the
may be raised in preliminary objections. See, e.g., R.H.S. v. Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 936 A.2d 1218, 1228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Wurth by Wurth v. City of Phila.,
584 A.2d 403, 407 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). However, “[t]his Court has not expressly stated
whether sovereign immunity may be raised in a demurrer,” and that issue is not before us
in this case. Sutton, 220 A.3d at 1035 n.4 (Pa. 2019) (affirming a Commonwealth Court
order sustaining preliminary objections based on sovereign immunity).
[J-32-2021] - 26
adverse decision on sovereign immunity under Rule 313 is the only means by which the
Family Court may vindicate its rights in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the order of
the Commonwealth Court and remand to the Commonwealth Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Commonwealth Court decision reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Chief Justice Baer and Justices Saylor, Todd, Donohue and Wecht join the
opinion.
Justice Dougherty did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
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