P.H. Corson, IV v. UCBR ( 2018 )


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  •        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Paul H. Corson, IV,                     :
    Petitioner      :
    :
    v.                          :   No. 818 C.D. 2017
    :   Submitted: March 9, 2018
    Unemployment Compensation               :
    Board of Review,                        :
    Respondent          :
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE SIMPSON                        FILED: April 17, 2018
    Paul H. Corson, IV (Claimant) petitions for review from an order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that upheld a referee’s
    decision dismissing as untimely Claimant’s appeals from three notices of
    determination issued by an unemployment compensation (UC) service center.
    Claimant argues the Board erred in finding his appeals untimely where it credited
    his testimony that he attempted to file his appeals by email before the appeal
    deadline. Upon review, we affirm.
    I. Background
    The Board made the following findings. On December 20, 2016, the
    Erie UC Service Center (service center) sent three notices of determination to
    Claimant’s last known mailing address. The first notice found Claimant ineligible
    for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Pennsylvania UC Law (UC Law)
    (relating to willful misconduct).1 The second notice found Claimant received an
    overpayment of UC benefits, and it assessed a fault overpayment. See Section
    804(a) of the UC Law, 43 P.S. §874(a). The third notice was a Notice of Penalty
    Weeks and 15% Penalty Determination that assessed penalties against Claimant.
    See Sections 801(b), (c) of the UC Law, 43 P.S. §871(a), (b). The three notices
    contained appeal instructions, which stated that the last day to file a timely appeal
    was January 4, 2017.
    Claimant received the notices and was or should have been aware that
    the last day to file a timely appeal was January 4, 2017. Claimant did not file an
    appeal on or before January 4, 2017. Instead, he filed an appeal over the internet,
    which the service center received on February 22, 2017. A hearing ensued before a
    referee.
    At the hearing, Claimant, representing himself, and a service center
    representative testified. Claimant’s former employer did not appear.
    After the hearing, the referee issued a decision determining that
    Claimant’s appeal of the three notices of determination was untimely. In so doing,
    the referee explained, Section 501(e) of the Law, 43 P.S. §821(e), states that unless
    a claimant files an appeal of a notice of determination within 15 calendar days after
    it is mailed to his last known address, the notice is final. The 15-day appeal period
    is mandatory. In order for a referee to have jurisdiction to consider an appeal filed
    after the 15-day period, the petitioner must show either fraud or a breakdown in the
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S.
    §802(e).
    2
    administrative process caused the late appeal, or the non-negligent conduct of the
    party, the party’s representative or the party’s attorney caused the late appeal.
    The referee further explained, pursuant to 
    34 Pa. Code §101.82
    (b)(4),
    an appeal may be filed by email. However, the filing date for such an appeal is
    determined by the date recorded by the Department of Labor and Industry
    (Department) or the Board’s system. Further, a party is responsible for any delay if
    the email is not sent in the correct format or if there is an interruption in the electronic
    signals. 
    Id.
    Here, the referee determined, the competent documentary evidence
    established that the service center mailed a notice of determination, a notice of
    determination of overpayment, and a notice of determination assessing penalties to
    Claimant’s last known mailing address. Claimant received these notices and knew
    or should have known that the final date to file timely appeals was January 4, 2017.
    Claimant was not misled or misinformed as to his appeal rights.
    The referee further explained that, at the hearing, Claimant testified he
    attempted to file an appeal from the notices of determination over the internet in
    December 2016. However, he was unable to provide the specific date he filed the
    appeal, and he did not present documentation to establish his appeal was successfully
    filed at that time. Further, a service center representative testified that the only
    appeal received from Claimant was over the internet on February 22, 2017.
    Although the referee found Claimant credible that he attempted to file
    an appeal over the internet in December 2016, the referee determined the record
    3
    lacked competent evidence to establish the Department received an appeal from
    Claimant in December 2016. Therefore, the referee was constrained to find that
    Claimant filed his appeal over the internet, and the Department received it on
    February 22, 2017.
    Further, the referee stated, the notices of determination expressly warn
    claimants that if they file their appeals electronically, they are responsible for any
    delay, disruption, or interruption of electronic signals and the readability of the
    appeal, and claimants accept the risk that their appeals may not be properly or timely
    filed.
    As such, the referee stated, he was required to conclude Claimant filed
    his appeal beyond the 15-day appeal period; therefore, the referee lacked jurisdiction
    to consider the appeal. Thus, the referee dismissed Claimant’s appeal. Claimant
    appealed to the Board.
    The Board adopted and incorporated the referee’s findings and
    conclusions, and it affirmed the referee’s decision. Claimant petitions for review to
    this Court.
    II. Issue
    4
    On appeal,2 Claimant, now through counsel, asserts the Board erred in
    deeming his appeal untimely where it credited his testimony that he attempted to file
    his appeal by email prior to the appeal deadline.
    III. Discussion
    In UC cases, the Board is the ultimate fact-finder and is empowered to
    resolve all conflicts in evidence, witness credibility, and weight afforded to the
    evidence. Ductmate Indus., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    949 A.2d 338
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).          Unchallenged findings are conclusive on appeal.
    Campbell v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    694 A.2d 1167
     (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1997). Additionally, we are bound by the Board’s findings so long as the record,
    taken as a whole, contains substantial evidence to support them. Ductmate.
    A. Contentions
    Claimant asserts this Court should reverse the Board’s decision
    dismissing his appeal as untimely. He contends he should be permitted to file an
    appeal “now for then” or nunc pro tunc because an unknown error caused the service
    center not to receive his December 2016 appeal.
    Claimant argues he attempted to file an appeal by email in December
    2016, well before the January 4, 2017 appeal deadline. He maintains both the referee
    and the Board credited this testimony, but ruled against him based on a lack of
    competent evidence supporting the service center’s receipt of an email appeal.
    2
    Our review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, whether
    constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary findings of fact were supported by
    substantial evidence. Rock v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    6 A.3d 646
     (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2010).
    5
    Claimant asserts when he became aware of the issue with his first attempt at an
    appeal, he sought to rectify it by contacting the service center by phone. However,
    he argues, he was unsuccessful in his attempts to do so as he could not reach anyone
    from the office. Claimant contends he then sent a second attempt at an email appeal,
    which the service center received on February 22, 2017.
    Because the Board credited his testimony regarding his December
    appeal attempt and did not find a delay, disruption, or interruption of electronic
    signals in his December appeal, other than the service center’s non-receipt of an
    email appeal, Claimant asserts, this Court should reverse the Board’s decision. In
    support, he relies on this Court’s decision in Wright v. Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, 
    41 A.3d 58
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (en banc).
    Alternatively, Claimant contends, this Court should remand for further development
    of a record on the circumstances regarding his December appeal.
    The Board responds that, based on this Court’s holding in Roman-
    Hutchinson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
    972 A.2d 1286
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2009), it properly dismissed Claimant’s untimely appeal under Section
    501(e) of the Law and the Board’s regulations.
    B. Analysis
    Section 501(e) of the Law states, as relevant:
    Unless the claimant … files an appeal with the
    [B]oard, from the determination contained in any notice
    required to be furnished by the [D]epartment … within
    fifteen calendar days after such notice … was mailed to
    his last known post office address, and applies for a
    6
    hearing, such determination of the [D]epartment, with
    respect to the particular facts set forth in such notice, shall
    be final and compensation shall be … denied in
    accordance therewith.
    43 P.S. §821(e).
    “The requirement that an appeal be filed within fifteen days is
    jurisdictional, precluding either the Board or a referee from further considering the
    matter.” Gannett Satellite Info. Sys., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review,
    
    661 A.2d 502
    , 504 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (citation omitted). The time for taking an
    appeal cannot be extended as a matter of grace or mere indulgence. Russo v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    13 A.3d 1000
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
    However, the Board may consider an untimely appeal in limited
    circumstances. Hessou v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    942 A.2d 194
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2008). The burden to establish the right to have an untimely appeal is a
    heavy one as the statutory time limit established for appeals is mandatory. Roman-
    Hutchinson.
    A petitioner may satisfy this heavy burden in one of two ways. Hessou.
    First, he can show administrative breakdown or fraud. Cook v. Unemployment
    Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    671 A.2d 1130
     (Pa. 1996); Hessou. Second, he can show
    non-negligent conduct beyond his control caused the delay. Cook; Hessou.
    “[F]ailure to file an appeal within fifteen days, without an adequate excuse for the
    late filing, mandates dismissal of the appeal.” Hessou, 
    942 A.2d at 198
     (quoting
    7
    U.S. Postal Serv. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    620 A.2d 572
    , 573 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1993)).
    Further, Section 101.82 of the Board’s regulations states, in pertinent
    part (with emphasis added):
    (a) A party seeking to appeal a Department determination
    shall file an appeal … on or before the 15th day after the
    date on which notification of the decision of the
    Department was delivered personally to the appellant or
    mailed to him at his last known post office address.
    (b) A party may file a written appeal by any of the
    following methods:
    ****
    (4) Electronic transmission other than fax transmission.
    The date of filing is the receipt date recorded by the
    Department appeal office or the Board’s electronic
    transmission system, if the electronic record is in a form
    capable of being processed by that system. A party filing
    by electronic transmission shall comply with Department
    instructions concerning format. A party filing an appeal by
    electronic transmission is responsible for using the proper
    format and for delay, disruption, interruption of electronic
    signals and readability of the document and accepts the
    risk that the appeal may not be properly or timely filed.
    This same language appears in the instructions for filing an appeal included with the
    notices of determination. Certified Record (C.R.), Item #5.
    Our decision in Roman-Hutchinson is controlling here. There, the
    claimant received a referee’s decision denying her UC benefits, which informed the
    claimant that the appeal deadline was July 2, 2008. The claimant asserted she
    8
    appealed the referee’s decision by email prior to the appeal deadline. However, the
    UC authorities did not receive the emailed appeal; rather, they received a faxed
    appeal after the expiration of the appeal period. The Board found the claimant was
    not misled or misinformed as to her appeal rights, and her untimely appeal was not
    caused by fraud, administrative breakdown or non-negligent conduct. Thus, it
    dismissed the claimant’s appeal as untimely.
    On appeal to this Court, the claimant argued the Board erred in
    dismissing her appeal as untimely because there was a breakdown in the
    administrative process. Specifically, she asserted, something in the email system
    went awry and led to the UC authorities’ failure to receive her timely-sent email
    appeal. Relying on the “mailbox rule,” the claimant also argued that she overcame
    the assertion that the UC authorities did not receive her appeal by submitting a copy
    of the email she sent before the expiration of the appeal period, with proof it was
    sent to the correct email address. This Court disagreed, stating:
    Although the ‘mailbox rule’ applies to mailings via
    the post office, the Department’s regulation at 
    34 Pa. Code § 101.82
    (b)(4) controls emailed appeals. … Thus, even if
    [the] [c]laimant emailed her appeal before the appeal
    deadline, it was untimely because it was not received by
    the UC authorities until after the deadline. McClean v.
    [Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    908 A.2d 956
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2006)].         Consequently, [the] [c]laimant’s
    argument fails.          Further, the regulation clearly
    contemplates malfunction in the email delivery system and
    places the resulting risk of an untimely filing on the
    [c]laimant.
    Claimant next asserts that she is entitled to nunc pro
    tunc relief based on our [sic] decisions in Bass v.
    Commonwealth, [
    401 A.2d 1133
     (Pa. 1979)] and Perry v.
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 459
    
    9 A.2d 1342
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983), wherein we held that nunc
    pro tunc relief is appropriate where the untimeliness of an
    appeal is due to non-negligent conduct. However, because
    the regulation expressly provides that [the] [c]laimant
    assumed the risk of an untimely filing when she chose to
    file her appeal by email, the rationale in Bass and Perry is
    inapplicable here.
    Roman-Hutchinson, 
    972 A.2d at 1289
     (emphasis added).
    Similar to the facts presented in Roman-Hutchinson, the UC service
    center mailed Claimant three notices of determination, which informed him that the
    final day to appeal was January 4, 2017. Referee’s Dec., 3/22/17, Finding of Fact
    (F.F.) No. 4; Referee’s Hr’g, Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/21/17, at 8; C.R., Item
    #5. Claimant received the notices of determination and was or should have been
    aware that the last day to timely file appeals was January 4, 2017. F.F. No. 5; N.T.
    at 6. At some point prior to the expiration of the 15-day appeal period, Claimant
    attempted to file his appeal electronically. Referee’s Dec. at 2 (emphasis added);
    N.T. at 6-7. However, Claimant was unable to provide the specific date on which
    he attempted to file his appeal electronically, and he did not submit any
    documentation to establish he successfully filed his appeal before the appeal period
    expired. Referee’s Dec. at 2; N.T. a 7. Claimant did not successfully transmit his
    appeal prior to the appeal deadline; instead, he filed an appeal over the internet which
    the service center received on February 22, 2017. F.F. No. 6; C.R., Item #6; N.T. at
    8. Claimant was not misled or misinformed as to his appeal rights. F.F. No. 7. As
    in Roman-Hutchinson, Claimant concedes “an unknown error caused the [s]ervice
    [c]enter not to receive his December appeal.”3 Pet’r’s Br. at 11. Thus, as in Roman-
    3
    This is consistent with Claimant’s testimony before the referee. See Referee’s Hr’g,
    Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/21/17, at 7, 8 (“I must have did something wrong. … I don’t know
    10
    Hutchinson, the Board properly dismissed Claimant’s appeal of the notices of
    determination as untimely.
    Further, as in Roman-Hutchinson, Claimant did not establish a right to
    proceed nunc pro tunc, or “now for then.” To that end, the Board’s supported
    findings reveal the service center did not receive Claimant’s appeal until seven
    weeks after the appeal deadline. F.F. No. 6; C.R., Item #6; N.T. at 8. As indicated
    above, a claimant filing an appeal by electronic transmission is responsible for any
    delay, disruption, or interruption of electronic signals and assumes the risk of an
    untimely filing. 
    34 Pa. Code §101.82
    (b)(4); Roman-Hutchinson. Thus, as we
    explained in Roman-Hutchinson, Claimant is not entitled to nunc pro tunc relief
    here.
    In addition, Wright, relied on by Claimant, is distinguishable. There,
    the claimant attempted to file an appeal of a notice of determination by fax prior to
    the appeal deadline. At a hearing, the claimant presented evidence that he timely
    faxed his appeal before the July 13, 2010 appeal deadline. In particular, he
    presented: his testimony; the testimony of his father, who faxed the appeal on his
    behalf (sender); and, an account log from the sender’s telephone carrier that showed
    the sender successfully transmitted a fax before the appeal deadline to the number
    listed on the notice of determination. Further, the sender testified he was certain the
    transmission was complete and confirmed. After learning the UC authorities did not
    receive his faxed appeal, the claimant sent a second faxed appeal, which was
    what I did, or it didn’t go through …. I don’t know what happened.”). In his appeal to the Board,
    Claimant also stated that in December 2016 his “email was compromised through Yahoo ….”
    Certified Record, Item #11.
    11
    received after the appeal deadline. No witness from the service center appeared at
    the hearing, and the employer offered no evidence as to the timeliness of the appeal.
    Ultimately, a referee deemed the appeal timely. On further appeal, the Board
    reversed. More particularly, because the claimant’s appeal purportedly faxed before
    the deadline was not of record, the Board determined the claimant faxed his appeal
    after the deadline, and it dismissed the appeal as untimely.
    On further appeal, this Court reversed the Board, explaining:
    The Board bases its legal conclusion that [the] [c]laimant’s
    appeal was untimely on Board finding of fact number 5, in
    which the Board found that [the] [c]laimant filed an appeal
    by fax, which the UC Center received on August 11, 2010.
    The document in the Board record with a receipt notation
    of August 11, 2010, however, is not the filing that the
    [r]eferee found timely. There is extensive and unrebutted
    testimony before the [r]eferee … that [the] [c]laimant
    faxed an appeal to the UC Center on July 9, 2010. It is
    that appeal—faxed days before the filing deadline of July
    13, 2010—that the [r]eferee found timely. …
    [T]he Board here utterly ignored [the] [c]laimant’s
    evidence. The Board’s decision does not recount the
    evidence before the [r]eferee or make any credibility
    findings with respect to the testimony, which the [r]eferee
    obviously found credible and persuasive. In essence, the
    Board completely ignored the entire evidentiary basis of
    the [r]eferee’s decision—i.e., that the [c]laimant filed his
    appeal on July 9, 2010, as reflected by both the testimony,
    the documents presented during the hearing before the
    [r]eferee, and the notation from the [s]ender’s office that
    accompanied the later-transmitted document in the
    Board’s record. Because the Board failed to address, let
    alone acknowledge, the uncontroverted evidence before
    the [r]eferee on the timeliness issue that supported the
    [r]eferee’s decision, the Board capriciously disregarded
    competent evidence.
    
    12 Wright, 41
     A.3d at 62-64 (emphasis added).                   Ultimately, we concluded the
    claimant’s appeal was timely, and we remanded for a determination on the merits.4
    Here, unlike in Wright, Claimant did not provide “extensive and
    unrebutted testimony” to establish he successfully transmitted his appeal prior to the
    appeal deadline, and the Board did not capriciously disregard Claimant’s evidence.
    
    Id. at 62
    .     Indeed, although the Board credited Claimant’s testimony that he
    attempted to file his appeal electronically before the deadline,5 it determined “there
    is not competent evidence contained in the record to establish that the Department
    received an appeal from [Claimant] in December 2016.” Referee’s Dec. at 3.
    Indeed, unlike in Wright, Claimant offered nothing to corroborate his testimony that
    he transmitted his appeal prior to the deadline or that the service center received it
    prior to the deadline. Further, unlike in Wright, where the claimant’s evidence was
    unrebutted, a service center representative appeared here and testified the service
    center did not receive an appeal from Claimant until February 22, 2017, several
    4
    Accord Bennett v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    33 A.3d 133
     (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2011) (en banc) (where claimant presented testimony and documentary evidence that he emailed
    his appeal and the Board received it prior to appeal deadline, and the Board’s decision ignored that
    evidence, the Board capriciously disregarded evidence, necessitating a remand).
    5
    While Claimant argues the Board credited his testimony that he filed his appeal in
    December 2016, the Board actually stated:
    Although the [r]eferee finds [Claimant] credible, that he attempted
    to file an appeal via the internet in December 2016, there is not
    competent evidence contained in the record to establish that the
    Department received an appeal from the Claimant in December
    2016. Therefore, the [r]eferee is constrained to find that [Claimant]
    filed his appeal via the internet, which was received by the
    Department on February 22, 2017.
    Referee’s Dec., 3/22/17, at 3 (emphasis added).
    13
    weeks after the appeal period expired. N.T. at 8. Moreover, unlike in Wright,
    Claimant did not present evidence that the Board received his appeal prior to the
    appeal deadline such as a read receipt or other confirming information; indeed, he
    concedes the service center here did not receive his attempted appeal. Pet’r’s Br. at
    11.
    In addition, under these circumstances, we disagree with Claimant that
    a remand for further development of a record concerning the timeliness issue is
    appropriate. Indeed, based on our review of the record, there is no indication that
    Claimant was denied an opportunity to present any relevant evidence before the
    referee,6 or that Claimant’s evidence was not sufficiently considered by the referee
    or the Board, so as to necessitate a remand.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    6
    Indeed, in his brief to this Court, Claimant does not contend that he possesses proof that
    his purported December 2016 email appeal was received. Instead, he argues, “[h]ad [he] been
    allowed a few moments to check his mobile phone [at the referee’s hearing] it is entirely possible
    that [he] would have been able to produce evidence that he sent his appeal via email in December.”
    Pet’r’s Br. at 15 (emphasis added). To that end, Claimant asserts, during the hearing, the referee
    denied him an opportunity to check his email on his cell phone to see if he could find confirmation
    of the December 2016 appeal he purportedly sent to the service center. Contrary to this assertion,
    our review of the transcript of the referee’s hearing reveals that, when the referee asked Claimant
    if he received confirmation of his purported December 2016 emailed appeal, Claimant replied “I
    don’t even remember going on [my] e-mail and checking for confirmation.” N.T. at 7. Further,
    although Claimant indicated he could “go back and look[,]” it was not made clear to the referee
    that Claimant was seeking an opportunity to check his email on his cell phone or that Claimant
    had access to his email on his cell phone at that time. Additionally, Claimant did not raise this
    issue in his appeal to the Board. Thus, it is waived. Chapman v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
    Review, 
    20 A.3d 603
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (issues not raised before the referee or the Board are
    waived for purposes of appeal and will not be addressed for the first time by this Court).
    14
    15
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Paul H. Corson, IV,                  :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                       :   No. 818 C.D. 2017
    :
    Unemployment Compensation            :
    Board of Review,                     :
    Respondent       :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 17th day of April, 2018, the order of the
    Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is AFFIRMED.
    ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge