A. Patterson v. K. Shelton, Individually and President of the Board of Trustees ( 2015 )


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  •              IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Anthonee Patterson,                     :
    Appellant             :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    Kenneth Shelton, individually and       :
    in his capacity as President of the     :
    Board Of Trustees, of the Church        :
    of the Lord Jesus Christ of the         :   No. 2147 C.D. 2014
    Apostolic Faith, Inc.                   :   Submitted: July 2, 2015
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE McGINLEY                           FILED: December 18, 2015
    Anthonee Patterson (Patterson) appeals from the order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which granted Bishop Kenneth
    Shelton’s (Shelton) motion to dismiss on the trial court’s determination that it
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    This procedural and factual history is recounted in this Court’s
    memorandum opinion in the case of Patterson v. Shelton, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2396
    C.D. 2011, filed March 6, 2013), slip opinion, appeal denied, 
    78 A.3d 1092
     (Pa.
    2013).
    This marks the [fifth] time this Court has been called
    upon to review action by the [trial court] in the
    underlying tangle of controversies involving a religious
    schism which has spanned over two decades. In all,
    seven lawsuits were instituted by various parties against a
    church, its corporate trustee and various officials in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Court of
    Common Pleas of Delaware County, and United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.1
    The key players involved in the present offshoot of the
    controversy are: (1) the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ
    of the Apostolic Faith (the “Church”), an
    unincorporated association, founded in 1919; (2) the
    “Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the
    Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc.”, (the
    “Corporate Trustee”), a Pennsylvania nonprofit
    corporation formed in 1947 to act as the trustee and
    hold property in trust for the Church2; (3) Patterson, a
    life-long member, elder, and minister of the Church; and
    (4) Shelton, the current “Bishop” and/or “Overseer” of
    the Church and “President” of the Corporate Trustee.
    The dispute began in 1991 when then-Bishop S.
    McDowall Shelton, died, leaving vacancies in the offices
    of “Overseer” of the Church and “President” of the
    Corporate Trustee.      Immediately upon Bishop S.
    McDowall Shelton’s death, Shelton and his “faction”
    took control of the accounts, trusts and properties of the
    1
    These lawsuits are recounted in more detail in this Court’s previous opinion in Church of
    the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton, (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 376 C.D. 2000
    and 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 2001). See also Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the
    Apostolic Faith, Inc., et al, v. Roddy Shelton, II, 
    740 A.2d 751
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), for an
    insightful history of this complex and protracted dispute. See also Joseph Askew v. Trustees of
    the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 
    644 F.Supp. 2d 584
     (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“Askew I”) and Joseph Askew v. Trustees of the General
    Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 
    776 F.Supp. 2d 25
    (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“Askew II”).
    2
    The Corporate Trustee’s Charter provided that the purpose for which it was formed was
    to “take, receive, have and hold and manage real and personal property in trust for the uses and
    purposes specified by the General Assembly of the Church” and that said purposes did “not
    contemplate pecuniary gain or profit incidental or otherwise to its members.” Charter, June 27,
    1947, at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 266a.
    2
    Church and Corporate Trustee. After extensive litigation
    initiated by two other dissident factions of the Church
    congregation[3] over the leadership of the Church and
    Corporate Trustee, the trial court ultimately determined,
    and this Court later affirmed, that Shelton and his Board
    of Trustees were in control.4
    [II. Patterson’s Prior Appeal To This Court]
    On July 24, 1995, Patterson, as life-long member, elder
    and minister of the Church, commenced an action in
    equity against Shelton, in Shelton’s individual capacity
    and as the President of the Board of Trustees of the
    Corporate Trustee.5 Patterson alleged that since taking
    control of the Church and Corporate Trustee in 1991,
    Shelton and his Board of Trustees have misappropriated
    funds, “looted the Church’s assets,” paid themselves
    salaries in contravention of Church By-Laws, and funded
    private expenditures, lavish vacations, lingerie, cars,
    homes and other personal incidentals with assets which
    were donated and designated for Church religious and
    charitable missions.6
    Patterson requested, inter alia: (1) the appointment of a
    receiver to take control of the assets of the Church held
    3
    Patterson was the leader of one such faction.
    4
    See Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton, (Pa.
    Cmwlth. Nos. 376 C.D. 2000 and 559 C.D. 2000, filed April 10, 2001).
    5
    Erik Shelton was also named as a Defendant but on November 30, 2005, he was
    voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit.
    6
    Specifically, Patterson alleged that Shelton took physical possession of cash offerings
    designated for the Church from churches throughout the Eastern United States and converted
    them to his own use; converted $111,537 from the Gresham Trust, a fund held for the benefit of
    Church members in need of social services; converted $111,533 from a Church account held at
    Fidelity National Bank; converted $10,585 from the Church’s “Bus Rally Money Account;”
    converted $64,000 from a Church account at Commonwealth Federal and Loan which was
    dedicated for youth studies; and converted $8,000 from two accounts at Mid Atlantic Bank
    donated by Church members for the purpose of financially assisting the Church’s international
    missions. Complaint, ¶¶12(a)-(f) at 5-7; R.R. at 127a-129a.
    3
    by the Corporate Trustee; (2) an order requiring Shelton
    to issue annual financial reports for the years 1991, 1992,
    1993, and 1994; and (3) an accounting.
    The parties engaged in discovery. Patterson retained
    James A. Stavros, CPA (Stavros), a forensic financial
    investigator, to analyze the finances and expenditures of
    the Church and the Corporate Trustee. Stavros authored
    a report which detailed his findings that Shelton and his
    Board of Trustees withdrew hundreds of thousands of
    dollars from Church accounts with no accounting of
    where the funds went and that they expended Church
    funds on a significant amount of “personal” items and
    expenditures that appeared to be outside the normal
    course of business and outside Church laws and
    customs.7 He concluded that Church accounts had
    declined by nearly $1 million under Shelton’s control.8
    In January 2006, the parties agreed to submit to binding
    arbitration. The Arbitrator concluded that the credible
    evidence established that Shelton had engaged in various
    acts of fraud, mismanagement, conspiracy, breach of
    fiduciary responsibilities, [and] violations of By-laws and
    the Articles of Incorporation in seizing corporate funds
    and assets and depleting bank accounts designated for
    Church-related purposes. The Arbitrator concluded that
    Shelton had diverted Church funds and assets to himself
    and others for his and their benefit. The Arbitrator
    appointed a receiver and directed Shelton to account for
    all Church funds removed by him or those acting with
    him.
    Shelton filed a motion to vacate the award which the trial
    court denied. On appeal, this Court overturned the
    arbitration award because the arbitrator went beyond the
    7
    This included vacations all over the world including, but not limited to: Cannes, France,
    Disney World, Switzerland, and purchases from stores such as Victoria’s Secret.
    8
    Shelton did not retain a financial expert to counter Patterson’s report.
    4
    scope of his authority in fashioning relief. See Shelton v.
    Patterson, 
    942 A.2d 967
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). This Court
    remanded the matter to the trial court to determine
    whether Patterson was entitled to relief under the
    [Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988, 15 Pa. C.S. §§
    5101-5997] NCL.
    On remand, Shelton moved for summary judgment on the
    ground that Patterson lacked “statutory standing” under
    Section 5782 of the NCL, 15 Pa.C.S. §5782. Shelton
    argued that only an officer, director, or member of a
    nonprofit corporation has “statutory standing” to enforce
    a right of a nonprofit corporation through a derivative
    action. Section 5782 of the NCL, 15 Pa. C.S. § 5782,
    which is contained in Subchapter F governing “derivative
    actions,” provides:
    Actions against directors, members of an other body
    and officers
    (a) General rule – Except as provided in subsection (b),
    in any action or proceeding brought to enforce a
    secondary right on the part of one or more members
    of a nonprofit corporation against any present or
    former officer, director or member of an other body of
    the corporation because the corporation refuses to
    enforce rights that may properly be asserted by it, each
    plaintiff must aver and it must be made to appear that
    each plaintiff was a member of the corporation at the
    time of the transaction of which he complains.
    (Emphasis added.)
    15 Pa. C.S. § 5782.
    Shelton pointed to the Corporate Trustee’s Articles of
    Incorporation which limited its membership in the
    nonprofit corporation to its Board of Trustees. Shelton
    asserted that because Patterson was never a member of
    the Board of Trustees he was never a “member” of the
    Corporate Trustee, and thus, he had no “statutory
    standing” to bring claims that are derivative of the
    Corporate Trustee’s rights.
    5
    The trial court agreed that under Section 5782 of the
    NCL, Patterson could only bring suit if he was a member
    of the Corporate Trustee at the time of the alleged events
    outlined in the Complaint. The trial court looked to
    Article IX of the Articles of Incorporation which states:
    “membership in the corporation [Corporate Trustee] shall
    consist of those persons serving as members of the Board
    of Trustees.” The trial court concluded that because
    Patterson had never been a member of the Board of
    Trustees he was not a member of the Corporate Trustee.
    The trial court reasoned that because the NCL created the
    cause of action and designated who may sue; standing
    was a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action. Grom v.
    Burgoon, 
    672 A.2d 823
     (Pa. Super. 1996). The trial
    court “finding no possible way to affirm that [Patterson]
    has standing” granted the motion for summary judgment
    and dismissed the case. Trial Court Opinion, January 25,
    2012, at 3.
    Patterson, slip opinion at 1-6.
    III. This Court’s Analysis And Disposition Of Patterson’s Prior Appeal
    [This Court rationalized in Patterson]:
    An example of derivative claims previously asserted
    against the Corporate Trustee and Shelton (and others) is
    found in the related case commenced by Joseph Askew
    (Askew) in the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2009. See footnote 1
    In Askew I, Askew, who claimed to be a member of the
    Church, brought an eight-count complaint against
    Shelton, the Corporate Trustee and the other managers of
    the Corporate Trustee (collectively “Defendants”). In
    Count II, Askew alleged breach of fiduciary duty owed
    to the Corporate Trustee. In Count IV, Askew alleged
    that the Board of Trustees failed to present the members
    of the Corporate Trustee with an annual report containing
    specific financial information under Section 5553 of the
    6
    NCL. In Count V, Askew sought the removal of Shelton
    as President of the Corporate Trustee.
    Defendants moved to dismiss these counts because
    Askew lacked standing under the NCL to bring
    derivative claims.
    The [United States] District Court agreed that these
    claims were derivative because any alleged failure to
    satisfy a supposed duty of loyalty and care owed to the
    Corporate Trustee would “injure[] only that
    corporation.” Askew I, 
    644 F.Supp. 2d at 590
    . The
    United States District Court determined Count IV was
    also a derivative claim because that section guarantees a
    nonprofit corporation “the right to self-knowledge” and
    that “[a]ny right that Section 5553 may confer is a right
    of the corporation, and a claim to encore [sic] this
    section necessarily falls within the ambit of Section
    5782.” Askew I, 644 F.Supp 2d at 590 (Emphasis
    added.) As for Count V, the [United States] District
    Court found that under Section 5726 of the NCL, a court
    is only empowered to remove a director “upon petition of
    any member or director” of the nonprofit corporation. 
    Id.
    ....
    The [United States] District [C]ourt concluded that since
    Askew was not a member or director of the Corporate
    Trustee, he did not have “statutory standing” to seek
    these kinds of relief.
    Even though the [United States] District Court found that
    Counts II, IV and V were derivative claims, the [United
    States] District Court explained that Askew’s claims in
    Counts I and VI for breach of fiduciary duty to the
    Church and unjust enrichment for misappropriation of
    Church funds were not derivative of the Corporate
    Trustee’s rights. Therefore, they were not claims “that
    only the Corporation’s [Corporate Trustee] members
    directors or officers can bring.” Askew I, 644 F.Supp. at
    590.
    ....
    7
    Similarly, in Askew I, the [United States] District Court
    determined, and this Court concurs, that the members of
    a Church’s congregation suffer injury when the Church’s
    assets, which were held in trust, are misused. Askew I,
    
    644 F.Supp. 2d at 591
    . The [United States] District
    Court clarified that only through Askew's membership in
    the Church was he qualified to bring an action on behalf
    of the Church under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1 (governing
    standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of
    unincorporated associations).[9]
    Here, there is no question that Patterson was a member of
    the Church when he instituted the action.[10] As a
    member of the Church congregation, Patterson was part
    of the beneficiary class for which the Corporate Trustee
    held the Church’s assets in trust. As such, he has
    standing to bring this action to enforce his own rights and
    the rights commonly held by all beneficiaries to obtain
    restoration to the Church of its full losses. Thus, the
    action should not have been dismissed due to lack of
    standing under the NCL.
    As noted, the Church is an unincorporated association.
    This Court notes that its conclusion that Patterson has
    standing is also wholly consistent with principles
    governing standing to sue on behalf of an unincorporated
    association.   See Pa.R.C.P. No. 2152 (action by
    unincorporated association must be brought in name of
    member as trustee ad litem).[11]
    9
    In Askew II, the District Court went on to find that Askew was not a “member” of the
    Church because he was expelled through the procedures in Article XIII of the Church’s By-
    Laws.
    10
    Shelton argues that Patterson was not a member of the Church congregation because he
    “abandoned” the Church. However, the record demonstrates that the Church never took any
    action to remove Patterson. Article XIII of the Church By-laws provided a method for the
    expulsion or suspension of members. The Church could have used those procedures to remove
    Patterson who Shelton alleges abandoned the Church, but it did not do so.
    11
    To hold otherwise would, as a practical matter, insulate these most serious allegations
    from judicial review.
    8
    Patterson, slip opinion at 9-10 and 16-17.
    This court reversed the order of the trial court and remanded to the
    trial court to conduct a trial on the remaining factual and legal issues raised in
    Patterson’s complaint.
    IV. Patterson’s Present Appeal
    On July 15, 2014, the trial court commenced a non-jury trial.
    Patterson offered the following proof regarding Rita Bolognese’s (Bolognese)
    testimony, a senior paralegal and records custodian for BNY Mellon. “She will
    testify to bank records which we have in our possession, that they’re authentic, and
    that from there, certain transactions we will be questioning with other witnesses
    once we’ve established that they are true and correct copies of those records.”
    Trial Transcript, July 15, 2014, (T.T. 7/15/14) at 29; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at
    694a. The trial court responded “[s]o your argument is that she is going to testify
    about these records . . . [a]nd I assume it’s the operative time of 91 to 94?” T.T.
    7/15/14 at 30; R.R. at 695a. Patterson’s attorney12 responded “[t]hat’s correct.”
    T.T. 7/15/14 at 30; R.R. at 695a.
    Bolognese recounted that she was authorized to serve as records
    custodian for the bank. T.T. 7/15/14 at 34; R.R. at 699a. Bolognese was provided
    with an affidavit from Susan McGivern, her supervisor, as to the scope of what she
    could testify to as custodian of records for BNY Mellon. T.T. 7/15/14 at 35-36;
    R.R. at 700a-71a. Following a lunch break, the trial court stated that “[t]his case
    12
    In order to avoid confusion between Bishop Kenneth Shelton and Fincourt B. Shelton,
    this Court will refer to Fincourt B. Shelton as Patterson’s attorney.
    9
    has a real problem in that plaintiff’s attorney [Patterson] has not produced all of the
    records recently to the defendant [Shelton]. This is a 20-year-old case. This case is
    going slowly.” T.T. 7/15/14 at 40-41; R.R. 705a-06a. The trial court adjourned
    for the day and ordered the parties “to provide to the other side copies of every
    single document that party intends to introduce into evidence, as well as a list of
    every single witness that attorney intends to call in this case. Failure to provide
    copies of the document today to opposing counsel will result in my precluding the
    document from being introduced into evidence.” T.T. 7/15/14 at 41; R.R. at 706a.
    On July 16, 2014, before the commencement of Bolognese’s
    testimony, the trial court issued the following order, “I’m denying the motion to
    deem the admissions admitted for a variety of reasons, including the fact that . . .
    [y]ou [Patterson’s attorney] did not include in this motion even what the request
    for admissions of the third set were, you included the second set.” Trial Transcript,
    July 16, 2014, (T.T. 7/16/14) at 12; R.R. at 720a. At that time, Bolognese again
    took the stand and stated that “[w]hen we [took] over the bank [Mellon PSFS], we
    took over the records of PSFS . . . [a]nd in course of . . . changing over the
    accounts, we had possession of the PSFS documents.” T.T. 7/16/14 at 23; R.R. at
    23a. In response to the trial court’s query, Bolognese admitted that she was unable
    to testify that “this document was prepared in the course of business of PSFS.”
    T.T. 7/16/14 at 24; R.R. at 732a.
    On cross-examination, defense counsel, Danielle Banks (Banks) asked
    the following question:
    Q: So with regard to this particular document - -
    A: Right.
    10
    Q: This particular document was not - - you don’t have
    knowledge yourself that it was kept in the normal course,
    correct?
    A: No.
    Q: And did someone else tell you that it was kept, in the
    normal course?
    A: Well, it would be someone from legal support that
    would tell me. Someone did tell me, yes.
    T.T. 7/16/14 at 41-42; R.R. at 749a-50a.
    At the conclusion of Bolognese’s testimony, the trial court ruled:
    And everyone is in agreement that the testimony from
    Mrs. Bolognese would be that she does not have any
    direct knowledge regarding how these documents were
    made or whether the record was made at or near the time
    or from information transmitted by someone with
    knowledge. So based on her inability to provide that
    testimony, I’m sustaining the objection to any questions
    or the introduction into evidence of those documents.
    (Emphasis added.)
    T.T. 7/16/14 at 76-77; R.R. at 784a-85a.
    Joseph Sweeny (Sweeny), an employee of Firstrust Bank, testified
    that he was familiar with financial transactions at Firstrust Bank. Sweeny stated
    that the withdrawal process for removal of funds from an account “would be where
    an individual or individuals would sign a withdrawal order and it would be
    processed at the teller station and they would either get cash or a check.” T.T. at
    86; R.R. at 794a.
    11
    On cross-examination, Sweeny testified that he had personal
    knowledge concerning Exhibit B “because my initials are on there.” T.T. 7/16/14
    at 90; R.R. at 798a.
    The trial court ruled that “I’m going to allow the document [Exhibit 9
    was ‘copies of two withdrawals, two different account numbers’] to be introduced
    into evidence. It’s not relevant for him to read what’s in there. It’s already into
    evidence.”   T.T. 7/16/14 at 93-95; R.R. at 801a-03a.          At the conclusion of
    Sweeny’s testimony, the trial court directed Patterson’s attorney to proceed with
    his next witness. Patterson’s attorney was unable to call his next witness because
    none of his witnesses responded to the subpoenas.       The trial court adjourned for
    the day and stated that “[s]o what we’re going to do tomorrow, we’ll start court at
    10:15 . . . [a]nd Mr. Shelton you’ll tell us who your next witnesses are.” T.T.
    7/16/14 at 121-22; R.R. at 829a-30a.
    On July 17, 2014, Patterson’s attorney called Bishop Kenneth Shelton
    to the stand. At that time, Banks stated to the trial court that “I have two objections
    . . . [o]ne a procedural argument, and one a Constitutional one.” Trial Transcript,
    July 17, 2014, (T.T. 7/17/14) at 3; R.R. at 832a. More specifically, Banks stated
    that Pa. R.C.P. No. 234.2 “says the notice shall be served reasonably in advance of
    the date upon which attendance is required.” T.T. 7/17/14 at 4; R.R. at 832a.
    “And here, Your Honor, when we have posed a subject matter jurisdiction
    challenge to the Bishop being here - - this is not just any trial. This is about a
    church and the goings-on in the church.” T.T. 7/17/14 at 4-5; R.R. at 832a-33a.
    The trial court responded that “[a]s an initial matter, I need to make a decision
    whether or not I have subject matter jurisdiction in this case . . . .”     (Emphasis
    added.) T.T. 7/17/14 at 25; R.R. at 838a. Again, the trial court adjourned and
    12
    reiterated “let me just say this one more time.          We’ll get an e-mail from
    [Patterson’s attorney] by 7:00 tonight whether or not he’ll be calling any factual
    witnesses to establish subject matter jurisdiction.”      (Emphasis added.)      T.T.
    7/17/14 at 33; R.R. at 840a.
    On July 28, 2014, the trial court entertained arguments concerning
    two motions, the “first with the defendant’s [Shelton’s] motion to strike the portion
    of the caption that identifies the plaintiff [Patterson] in the capacity as the
    corporate trustee . . . .” Trial Transcript, July 28, 2014, (7/28/14) at 3, R.R. at
    847a. After argument, the trial court ordered that “I will grant the motion to strike
    the caption. The plaintiff [Patterson] did not ask leave of court, and it could
    potentially make a difference. However, I will grant leave to amend the caption at
    this point.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 21; R.R. at 852a. The trial court then addressed “the
    motion for subject matter jurisdiction.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 22; R.R. at 852a. After
    argument, the trial court stated “I’m going to defer my decision on this issue . . .
    [a]t this point, I’m still struggling, and I think I’m struggling because I don’t have
    that much evidence, at which point I’ll let counsel know that I want to hear further
    argument on this issue.” T.T. 7/28/14 at 55; R.R. at 860a.
    On July 29, 2014, the trial court continued to hear argument on
    whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Patterson argued:
    I think there’s more than enough here for you to find that
    there’s a neutral principle, that you can look at the bank
    records, that you can look at what the title on the account
    is, and if it says bus rally and you find that three or four
    trustees personally went to the bank, took it out as cash,
    whatever and however they did it, and the records reflect
    that, then you would have to, I think, come to the
    decision that not only did Kenneth Shelton, but those
    13
    trustees serving under him were all involved in
    misappropriation of church funds during those years.
    Trial Transcript, July 29, 2014, (T.T. 7/29/14) at 20; R.R. at 891a.
    Banks responded:
    I want to make sure also that the record is clear . . . . It is
    Article 18, wherein the bylaws specifically say . . . ‘[t]he
    tithes and offerings of whatever kind, nature or collection
    by any elder, local minister, or any officer or member is
    the property of the general elder, who is the general
    overseer, and that all tithes and love offerings are the
    personal property of the general overseer.’. . . .
    Here, Your Honor, even without the bylaws, the Court
    wouldn’t have jurisdiction. With the bylaws there can be
    no question, the Court has no jurisdiction. Under these
    bylaws, Bishop Shelton as the general overseer is the
    church’s highest adjudicatory body. I submit to you that
    by denying the allegations, he has spoken to them and
    that is the end of this matter.
    T.T. 7/29/14 at 27; R.R. at 893a.
    The trial court concluded:
    Based upon the arguments, based upon the case, I am
    granting the motion to dismiss. I do not have subject
    matter jurisdiction.   In order for me to make a
    determination in this case, I would have to interpret
    religious doctrine of [sic] this court and the First
    Amendment prohibits me from doing so.
    T.T. 7/29/14 at 40; R.R. at 896a.
    14
    V. Issues
    Before this Court, Patterson essentially argues13: 1) that the trial court
    failed to follow this Court’s express directive and conduct a trial on the merits; 2)
    that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined it lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction to address Patterson’s claim of mismanagement and diversion
    of Church assets and funds by Shelton; 3) that the trial court erred when it denied
    admission of various financial records and documents as business records under
    Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 803 (Exception to the Rule against Hearsay); 4)
    that the trial court erred when it denied Patterson’s motion in limine “to deem
    [Patterson’s] request as admitted based upon [Shelton’s] inadequate answers”; and
    5) that the present matter should be remanded back to the trial court.14 Brief of
    Appellant, Statement of Questions Presented at 5-6.
    13
    This Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its
    discretion or erred as a matter of law. Mid Valley Taxpayers v. Mid Valley School, 
    416 A.2d 590
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Furthermore, the decision of the trial court will stand “if there exists
    sufficient evidence to justify the findings and logically sound, reasonable inferences and
    conclusions derived therefrom.” Groff v. Borough of Sellersville, 
    314 A.2d 328
    , 330 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1984).
    14
    The trial court made the following rulings on the evidentiary motions presented by both
    parties:
    Evidentiary Motions
    1.The court denied the Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Motion in Limine to
    Deem as Admitted Plaintiff’s Requests for Admissions.
    2. The court granted the Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine
    to preclude any evidence regarding expenditures beyond the time
    period of 1991-1994.
    3. The court granted Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to
    Preclude any Evidence Regarding the Vacated Arbitration in this
    Matter.
    4. The court deferred until trial its decision in the Defendant’s
    [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to Preclude the Presentation of
    Testimony by Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Expert. The court now
    dismisses without prejudice the motion because it is moot.
    5. The court deferred until trial its decision in Defendant’s
    [Shelton’s] Motion in Limine to Preclude Irrelevant Witness
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    15
    The issue of subject matter jurisdiction was raised and argued before
    the trial court and ably disposed of in the opinion of the Honorable Alice Beck
    Dubow, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia First District of
    Pennsylvania Civil Trial Division. Therefore, this Court shall affirm on the basis
    (continued…)
    Testimony. The court now dismisses without prejudice the motion
    because it is moot.
    6. The court deferred until trial its decision in the Plaintiff’s
    [Patterson’s] Motion in Limine Seeking an Adverse Inference
    against Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Due to Spoliation of Evidence.
    The court now dismisses without prejudice the motion because it is
    moot.
    7. The court denies without prejudice the Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s]
    Motion for Reconsideration it [sic] ruling on the Records of
    Regularly Conducted Business Exception to the Hearsay Rule as
    moot.
    Motions Regarding The Caption
    8. The court granted Defendant’s [Shelton’s] Motion to Strike the
    Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Unilateral Caption Change and struck the
    portion of the Caption that refers to the Defendant [Shelton] as the
    President of the Board of trustees of the General Assembly of the
    Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apolistic [sic] Faith, Inc.
    9. The court granted Plaintiff’s [Patterson’s] Motion for Leave to
    Amend the Caption to include the Defendant [Shelton] in his
    capacity as the President of the Board of Trustees of the General
    Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apolistic
    [sic] Faith, Inc.
    Motions Regarding Subpoenas
    10. All subpoenas served for these proceedings and any findings of
    contempt are hereby vacated.
    11. The court dismisses without prejudice the Motion to Quash the
    subpoena duces tecum of Nathaniel Shelton-Bailey as moot.
    Order of the Trial Court, July 31, 2014, at 1-2.
    16
    of Judge Dubow’s opinion.15 Patterson v. Shelton, (July Term, 1995, No. 2945),
    filed November 10, 2014.
    ____________________________
    BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge
    15
    Because the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
    Patterson’s remaining arguments are moot.
    17
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Anthonee Patterson,                     :
    Appellant             :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    Kenneth Shelton, individually and       :
    in his capacity as President of the     :
    Board Of Trustees, of the Church        :
    of the Lord Jesus Christ of the         :   No. 2147 C.D. 2014
    Apostolic Faith, Inc.                   :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 18th day of December, 2015, the order of the Court
    of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned matter is
    affirmed.
    ____________________________
    BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge