Eagleview Corporate Center Ass'n v. Citadel Federal Credit Union , 2016 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 520 ( 2016 )


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  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Eagleview Corporate Center                 :
    Association                                :
    :
    v.                            : No. 547 C.D. 2016
    : Argued: October 20, 2016
    Citadel Federal Credit Union,              :
    Appellant               :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
    OPINION
    BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT                                 FILED: December 2, 2016
    Citadel Federal Credit Union (Citadel) appeals an order of the Court
    of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court) directing it to screen its roof-
    mounted air-conditioning equipment.         The trial court also ordered Citadel to
    reimburse Eagleview Corporate Center Association (Association) for the attorneys’
    fees and costs that it incurred to enforce a prior order of the trial court. Citadel
    contends that the trial court erred. It notes, first, that the prior order, which granted
    Citadel’s request for a declaration that its air-conditioning equipment could be
    placed on the roof, did not order Citadel to do anything. Citadel further notes that
    the trial court specifically found in the prior proceeding that the visual intrusion of
    Citadel’s equipment was de minimis, suggesting that separate screening was
    neither required nor necessary. We reverse and remand.
    Background
    In April 2010, Citadel purchased an office building located in the
    Eagleview Corporate Center, which center was developed pursuant to the Uniform
    Planned Community Act, 68 Pa. C.S. §§5101-5414. An “Amended and Restated
    Declaration of Easements and Protective Covenants and Restrictions for the
    Center” (Declaration) imposes duties upon, and creates rights in, property owners
    in the Center. The Association is charged with the management of the Eagleview
    Corporate Center and enforcement of the covenants in the Declaration.
    In September of 2010, Citadel installed air-conditioning condensing
    units that were necessary to cool its data processing equipment located inside the
    building.   The Association claimed that the equipment violated Article VIII,
    Section 8.3(c) of the Declaration, which states as follows:
    (c) Exterior Equipment. Exterior mechanical and electrical
    equipment, including, without limitation, air conditioning
    equipment, air handling equipment, transformers, transclosures,
    pump houses, communication towers, vents and fans, whether
    mounted on the roof or walls of any building or on the ground,
    shall be placed or screened so that the predominant design
    lines of the building or structure continue without visual
    distraction or interruption. If any such equipment is not
    screened from the view of any interior roadway, such
    equipment shall be separately screened as approved by the
    Committee. The height of any such screening shall be at least
    equal to the height of the equipment to be screened.
    Declaration, Art. VIII, §8.3(c) (emphasis added); Reproduced Record at 63a-64a
    (R.R. ___).    The Association contended that Citadel’s equipment presented a
    “visual distraction” and demanded that Citadel remove the equipment and place it
    on the ground. Citadel refused.
    In February of 2011, the Association initiated a suit in equity against
    Citadel seeking to have Citadel remove the equipment and to be enjoined from
    making any future alteration to its building without Association approval. Citadel
    counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Association had no
    2
    authority under the Declaration to require the placement of air conditioning
    equipment on the ground.
    On January 23, 2014, after a bench trial, the trial court denied the
    Association’s request for an injunction because it did not establish the requisite
    elements for an injunction. The Association did not establish a clear right to an
    injunction because the Declaration authorized the installation of equipment on the
    roof. Because the visual impact of the equipment was de minimis, the Association
    did not establish harm, let alone that greater harm would result from the denial of
    an injunction than from its grant.
    On these factual findings and legal conclusions, the trial court entered
    an order that stated as follows:
    1. Plaintiff’s Petition for Permanent Injunction is DENIED;
    2. Defendant’s        request   for   Declaratory   Judgment   is
    GRANTED;
    3. Declaratory Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant and
    against Plaintiff, and consistent therewith, Defendant’s
    existing roof-mounted mechanical equipment is hereby
    authorized and approved and is subject to the screening
    requirement found in the Declaration at Article VIII,
    §8.3(c);
    4. Defendant’s request for counsel fees is DENIED.
    Trial Court op., 1/23/2014, at 10.
    In May 2014, the Association asked Citadel about its plans for
    screening the rooftop equipment. When Citadel declined to discuss the matter, the
    Association filed a “petition to compel” Citadel’s compliance with the trial court’s
    January 23, 2014, order.      In connection therewith, the Association requested
    3
    attorney fees and costs. The trial court conducted a hearing on January 7, 2016, at
    which both parties presented evidence.
    The Association presented the testimony of Lance Hillegas, the vice-
    president of design at the Hankin Group, who provides consulting services to the
    Association’s Architectural Control Committee (Committee). Hillegas testified
    that after the entry of the January 23, 2014, order, Citadel did not send him
    proposed plans for screening its rooftop equipment. Carl Holden, an architect
    engaged by the Association to consider screening options for Citadel’s rooftop
    equipment, also testified.    Working with a structural engineer and a general
    contractor, Holden came up with several options with varying costs depending on
    whether the rooftop equipment remained in its current location or would be
    relocated. Were the rooftop equipment to be relocated, the cost would range
    between $169,081 and $176,021, depending on the type of screen. Were the
    rooftop equipment to remain in its current location, the cost would range between
    $196,000 and $204,000.
    Citadel presented the testimony of its architect, Lee Casaccio, who
    generally agreed with Holden’s cost estimates. However, he was uncertain about
    the cost to relocate the equipment, noting that it could be significant because of the
    need to re-route electrical and other utility services inside the building.        He
    doubted that “investing $200,000 would be a prudent decision” because the visual
    impact of the screening “could be greater than the de minimis impact of the
    individual units that are there now.” Notes of Testimony, 1/7/2016, at 83-85 (N.T.
    ___); R.R. 1265a-67a.
    On March 8, 2016, the trial court granted the Association’s petition to
    compel. The trial court was troubled that Citadel had adopted a “reversal of its
    4
    trial position” by asserting that the equipment should not be screened. Trial Court
    op., 3/8/2016, at 5. Accordingly, the trial court entered the following order:
    1. Defendant is directed to comply with the January 14, 2014
    Order in that the Equipment is subject to the screening
    requirements of §8.3(c) of the Declaration and must be
    separately screened as approved by the Architectural Control
    Committee consistent with Exhibits P-11, P-12 and D-1, and
    2. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs
    incurred in enforcing the screening requirement set out in
    §8.3(c) of the Declaration and as determined to be
    applicable to the Equipment in the January 24, 2014[,]
    Order, with a hearing to assess fees and costs to be
    scheduled.
    It is further ORDERED that Defendant’s cross-petition to
    strike Plaintiff’s petition and for counsel fees is DENIED.
    Trial Court op., 3/8/2016, at 6. Citadel appealed to this Court.1
    On appeal,2 Citadel raises four issues. First, it contends that the trial
    court erred because the trial court’s declaratory judgment in favor of Citadel did
    not order it to take any action. Second, it contends that the trial court erred and
    abused its discretion because in the initial proceeding neither party sought an order
    to require screening. Third, the trial court erred in concluding that Citadel’s pre-
    1
    Generally, this Court does not hear appeals in civil matters involving two private parties.
    Because the Association has not objected to our jurisdiction, it is perfected. 42 Pa. C.S. §704(a);
    Pa. R.A.P. 741(a) (“The failure of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdiction of an
    appellate court on or prior to the last day under these rules for the filing of the record shall,
    unless the appellate court shall otherwise order, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of
    such appellate court.”).
    2
    “The scope of review by [this Court] of a court of common pleas sitting in equity is severely
    restricted.... We will not reverse if apparently reasonable grounds exist for the relief ordered and
    no erroneous or inapplicable rules of law were relied on.” Jackson v. Hendrick, 
    456 A.2d 229
    ,
    233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (citations omitted).
    5
    trial settlement offer for separate screening of equipment was part of the
    Association’s request for relief in the initial proceeding. Fourth, the trial court
    erred in denying Citadel’s request for attorney fees and awarding them to the
    Association. The trial court lacked authorization in statute, in contract or in the
    Declaration that set up the planned development.
    I. Petition to Compel
    In its first issue, Citadel contends that the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction over the Association’s petition to compel Citadel to comply with the
    order of January 23, 2014, because that order did not require any action by Citadel.
    In support, Citadel offers several arguments.
    Citadel first contends that the Association’s petition to compel was
    actually a petition to modify the trial court’s order of January 23, 2014. As such,
    the Association’s petition was untimely. The Association responds, however, that
    it did not seek to modify the order of January 23, 2014, but only to enforce it.
    Section 5505 of the Judicial Code authorizes a trial court to modify or
    rescind an order, so long as it does so within 30 days of the order’s issuance. 42
    Pa. C.S. §5505.3 The trial court’s order of March 8, 2016, was far too late to
    modify its order of January 23, 2014. However, the trial court did not amend its
    order of January 23, 2014; rather, it issued a new order. The question, then, is
    3
    Section 5505 states as follows:
    Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the
    parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry,
    notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such
    order has been taken or allowed.
    42 Pa. C.S. §5505.
    6
    whether the trial court’s order of January 23, 2014, ordered Citadel to install
    screening, as asserted by the Association and denied by Citadel.
    In its injunction action, the Association requested an order:
    a.      [E]njoining Defendant from all further construction,
    alteration or improvements of any nature at the Property
    until Defendant has obtained approval for same from
    Plaintiff consistent with the requirements set out in the
    Declaration; and
    b.      [D]irecting Defendant to remove all exterior equipment
    placed or installed on the rooftop at the Property within 5
    days.
    Association Petition for Injunction at 2; R.R. 219a. The Association requested
    removal of the equipment, not its screening.              The trial court “DENIED” the
    Association’s “Petition for Permanent Injunction.”4 Trial Court op., 1/23/2014, at
    10.   On the other hand, it “GRANTED” Citadel’s “request for Declaratory
    Judgment.” Id. The order then stated:
    3.      Declaratory Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant
    and against Plaintiff, and consistent therewith,
    Defendant’s     existing     roof-mounted  mechanical
    equipment is hereby authorized and approved and is
    subject to the screening requirement found in the
    Declaration at Article VIII, §8.3(c)[.]
    Id. (emphasis added). In short, the trial court “approved” Citadel’s equipment
    because it was “authorized” in Section 8.3(c) of the Declaration and, as such, must
    be screened or placed so as not to be visually distracting under Article VIII, §8.3(c)
    of the Declaration. Id.
    4
    An injunction is a “court order that can prohibit or command virtually any type of action.” Big
    Bass Lake Community Association v. Warren, 
    950 A.2d 1137
    , 1144 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
    7
    A declaratory judgment declares the rights, status, and other legal
    relations “whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” 42 Pa. C.S. §7532.5
    It has been observed that “[d]eclaratory judgments are nothing more than judicial
    searchlights, switched on at the behest of a litigant to illuminate an existing legal
    right, status or other relation.” Doe v. Johns-Manville Corporation, 
    471 A.2d 1252
    , 1254 (Pa. Super. 1984).            Stated otherwise, “[t]he purpose of awarding
    declaratory relief is to finally settle and make certain the rights or legal status of
    parties.” Geisinger Clinic v. Di Cuccio, 
    606 A.2d 509
    , 519 (Pa. Super. 1992),
    appeal denied, 
    637 A.2d 285
     (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 
    513 U.S. 1112
     (1995). A
    declaratory judgment, unlike an injunction, does not order a party to act. This is so
    because “the distinctive characteristic of the declaratory judgment is that the
    declaration stands by itself; that is to say, no executory process follows as of
    course.” Petition of Kariher, 
    131 A. 265
    , 268 (Pa. 1925).
    The trial court’s order of January 23, 2014, settled the legal status of
    the air conditioning equipment Citadel installed on its roof. Consistent with the
    contours of a declaratory judgment, the trial court did not order action by Citadel
    or by the Association.6
    5
    The Declaratory Judgments Act states, in relevant part, as follows:
    Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to declare
    rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
    claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
    declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either
    affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the
    force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
    42 Pa. C.S. §7532.
    6
    The trial court could have issued an injunction narrower than the one requested by the
    Association; indeed, injunctions should be drawn narrowly. Big Bass Lake Community
    Association v. Warren, 
    23 A.3d 619
    , 626 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (holding that where the essential
    prerequisites of a permanent injunction are satisfied, the court must narrowly tailor its remedy to
    (Footnote continued on the next page . . . )
    8
    It is beyond cavil that a court of law may enforce its orders. Our
    Supreme Court has explained that “[w]here there is an unimpeachable final decree,
    contemplating the performance of a series of acts, the proceedings to enforce
    compliance with that decree must be through that proceeding.”                          Advanced
    Management Research, Inc. v. Emanuel, 
    266 A.2d 673
    , 676 (Pa. 1970) (quotation
    omitted). The order of January 23, 2014, was not such a decree. It did not order
    Citadel to perform a series of acts. It did not order the Association’s Architectural
    Review Committee to approve Citadel’s screening proposal. Nor did it establish a
    timetable for the implementation of such directives.
    Section 8.3(c) of the Declaration requires property owners to place or
    screen equipment so that it does not distract from the building’s appearance.
    Further, equipment must be placed in a way that it is “screened from the view from
    any interior roadway.” R.R. 64a. If placement does not meet this test, then the
    equipment must be “separately screened as approved by the Committee.” 
    Id.
     The
    trial court’s order did not use the term “separately screened as approved by the
    [Architectural Control] Committee,” as it is characterized by the Association.7
    Regardless, the trial court did not order action either by Citadel or by the
    Association.
    (continued . . . )
    abate the harm). Here, the trial court held that the Association did not meet the prerequisites for
    an injunction.
    7
    In its petition to compel, the Association requested the trial court to enter an order:
    (1) Compelling Defendant to comply with [the] January 23, 2014 Order in that
    the Equipment is subject to the screen requirement of Section 8.3(c) of the
    Declaration and must be separately screened as approved by the Architectural
    Control Committee[.]
    Petition to Compel, at 5; R.R. 1107a (emphasis added).
    9
    Because the trial court’s order of January 23, 2014, did not direct
    Citadel to install screening, there was no directive for the Association to “compel.”
    However, the Association was not left without a remedy. The Association could
    have initiated an injunction action against Citadel to enforce the covenants in the
    Declaration and used the trial court’s declaratory judgment to its advantage.
    However, because the January 23, 2014, order did not order action, the
    Association’s petition to compel lacked a foundation. Simply, it was premature.
    II. Screening Order
    Citadel also contends that the trial court lacked authority to order
    Citadel to screen its equipment. Neither the Association nor Citadel ever requested
    this relief in the initial proceeding, and pre-trial settlement proposals are irrelevant.
    The Association responds that Citadel’s counterclaim made screening an issue in
    the proceeding, and every witness at the trial in the prior proceeding testified that
    the equipment could be seen from at least one interior roadway.
    The Association requested a permanent injunction to order Citadel to
    remove the equipment from its roof.          In its counterclaim, Citadel requested
    approval “to install screening of the Exterior Equipment consistent with the
    predominant design lines of the building in accordance with Section 8.3(c) of the
    Declaration.” Citadel Counterclaim, ¶53; R.R. 234a. Citadel sought declaratory
    judgment because
    [a]n actual dispute and controversy exists between Citadel and
    the Association with respect to: (1) whether the Association
    abused and exceeded its authority by denying Citadel’s request
    for approval of the Exterior Equipment; and (2) whether
    Citadel’s request for approval of the Exterior Equipment should
    be approved based upon the plans and specifications from
    Casaccio Architects and drawings SD-43, SD57 and SD58
    which accompanied counsel’s letter of January 31, 2011
    10
    attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint as Exhibit “I” and in
    accordance with the relevant provisions of the Declaration and
    the Act.
    Citadel Counterclaim, ¶75; R.R. 237a. The plans referenced by Citadel were
    schematics showing screening of the rooftop equipment. Exhibits SD-43, SD-57
    and SD-58; R.R. 195a-99a, 237a-38a.
    As noted, Section 8.3(c) of the Declaration provides that exterior
    equipment “shall be placed or screened so that the predominant design lines of the
    building or structure continue without visual distraction or interruption.”
    Declaration, Art. VIII, §8.3(c); R.R. 63a-64a (emphasis added). The goal is that
    exterior equipment should not distract from the design of the building.            If
    equipment “is not screened from the view from any interior roadway” by reason of
    its placement, then it must be separately screened. Id.
    Citadel contends that the screening ordered by the trial court distracts
    from the building design and, thus, does not meet the standard in Article VIII,
    Section 8.3(c) of the Declaration. Although the equipment can be seen, with
    difficulty, from one interior roadway, it is, as the trial court found, “de minimis.”
    In other words, Citadel argues that the screening will create a visual distraction
    while the equipment itself is barely noticeable.          Citadel also contends that
    screening is simply inappropriate because the record shows that numerous
    buildings in the Eagleview Corporate Center have equipment on their roofs that
    can be seen from multiple points of view. By contrast, Citadel’s equipment cannot
    be seen, except with determination.
    In light of our holding that the Association’s petition to compel was
    improvidently filed, it is not necessary to rule on the merits of the trial court’s
    order of March 8, 2016. We decline to do so.
    11
    III. Equitable Estoppel
    Citadel argues that the Association is forever estopped from pursuing
    separate screening because it had informed Citadel that screening the rooftop
    equipment was unacceptable and then filed a lawsuit to compel Citadel to remove
    the equipment on its rooftop. Citadel relied on the Association’s statements that
    separate screening of the rooftop equipment was unacceptable. Indeed, Citadel
    incurred substantial costs and legal fees associated with the Association’s
    litigation.   Citadel argues that, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the
    Association’s reversal of its position, to Citadel’s detriment, bars the Association
    from now seeking separate screening. The Association responds that the doctrine
    of equitable estoppel has no application here because it did not make a promise on
    which Citadel relied.
    “[E]quitable estoppel recognizes that an informal promise implied by
    one’s words, deeds or representations which lead another to rely justifiably thereon
    to his own injury or detriment, may be enforced in equity.” Novelty Knitting Mills,
    Inc. v. Siskind, 
    457 A.2d 502
    , 503 (Pa. 1983). The two essential elements of
    equitable estoppel are inducement and justifiable reliance on that inducement. Our
    Supreme Court has explained:
    The inducement may be words or conduct and the acts that are
    induced may be by commission or forbearance provided that a
    change in condition results causing disadvantage to the one
    induced.
    Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added). “[T]he burden rests on the party asserting the
    estoppel to establish such estoppel by clear, precise and unequivocal evidence.”
    Blofsen v. Cutaiar, 
    333 A.2d 841
    , 844 (Pa. 1975).
    12
    The trial court did not find that Citadel was induced to abstain from
    screening its equipment based upon a promise, formal or informal, from the
    Association. Citadel characterizes the Association’s rejection of its proposal as a
    “promise” that Citadel would not be required to screen the equipment. Again, to
    the extent Citadel is setting up a future defense, its equitable estoppel claim is
    premature.
    IV. Attorney Fees and Costs
    In its final issue, Citadel argues that although the Association sought
    attorney fees and costs in its petition, it did not request them at the time of the
    hearing on January 7, 2016, or in its hearing memorandum. Thus, it waived its
    right to fees and costs.       Citadel further argues that neither statute nor the
    Declaration authorizes attorney fees. The Association responds that it could not
    request attorney fees until it prevailed and, further, these fees are authorized by the
    Declaration.
    Section 12.3 of the Declaration provides:
    ENFORCEMENT. The Association and/or Declarant shall
    have the right to enforce the covenants, restrictions and
    development standards set out in this Declaration and any
    subsequent amendment to this Declaration by an appropriate
    action at law or equity. In any such action, the Association
    and/or Declarant, as the case may be, may seek to either
    restrain a violation and/or to recover damages. If the
    Association’s enforcement action is successful, the Association
    shall be entitled to recover from the losing party all costs
    incurred by the Association’s prosecuting the violation,
    including, without limitation, all attorney’s fees and costs. The
    Association and/or Declarant shall have the right to levy any
    amount that becomes due under this Section as an Assessment
    against the violating party. The failure of the Association
    and/or Declarant to enforce any covenant, restrictions or
    development standard shall in no event be deemed a waiver of
    the right to do so thereafter.
    13
    R.R. 1415a (emphasis added).8 In short, Section 12.3 of the Declaration allows the
    Association to restrain a violation of the Declaration. Where the Association takes
    legal action to restrain a violation and is successful, it may recover costs and
    attorney fees.
    Citadel argues that Section 12.3 authorizes the recovery of attorney
    fees to enforce the Association’s Declaration but not to enforce a court order. We
    disagree with Citadel’s narrow construction of Section 12.3 of the Declaration.
    Any action instituted to correct a violation of the covenants in the Declaration
    triggers Section 12.3. However, because we reverse the trial court’s order, its
    award of attorney fees to the Association must be set aside.
    Lastly, Citadel argues that the trial court erred in not granting its
    request for attorney fees. Section 2503(9) of the Judicial Code authorizes the
    imposition of attorney fees where “the conduct of another party in commencing the
    matter or otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith.” 42 Pa. C.S. §2503(9).
    Our Supreme Court has set forth the factors to be considered in considering
    whether litigation was commenced arbitrarily, vexatiously or in bad faith:
    The statutory provision at 42 Pa. C.S. §2503(9) expressly
    permits a trial court to award reasonable counsel fees to a
    litigant when, inter alia, that litigant’s opponent initiated the
    action arbitrarily, vexatiously or in bad faith. [citation
    omitted]. An opponent’s conduct has been deemed to be
    “arbitrary” within the meaning of the statute if such conduct is
    based on random or convenient selection or choice rather than
    on reason or nature. Bucks County Board of Supervisors v.
    Gonzales, 158 Pa. Cmwlth. 664, 670–71, 
    632 A.2d 1353
    , 1356
    (1993), appeal denied, 
    538 Pa. 618
    , 
    645 A.2d 1321
     (1994).
    Accord Black’s Law Dictionary 104 (6th ed., reprinted 1993).
    8
    This section was added to the Declaration in June 2011, prior to the filing of the Association’s
    petition in June 2014.
    14
    An opponent also can be deemed to have brought suit
    “vexatiously” if he filed the suit without sufficient grounds in
    either law or in fact and if the suit served the sole purpose of
    causing annoyance. Id.; Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at
    1565. Finally, an opponent can be charged with filing a lawsuit
    in “bad faith” if he filed the suit for purposes of fraud,
    dishonesty or corruption. Frick v. McClelland, 
    384 Pa. 597
    ,
    600, 
    122 A.2d 43
    , 45 (1956) (quoting McNair’s Petition, 
    324 Pa. 48
    , 
    187 A. 498
     (1936)); Bucks County Board of
    Supervisors, supra, 158 Pa. Cmwlth. at 670–71, 632 A.2d at
    1356; Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at 139.
    Berg v. Georgetown Builders, Inc., 
    822 A.2d 810
    , 816 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing
    Thunberg v. Strause, 
    682 A.2d 295
    , 299–300 (Pa. 1996)). In short, a high burden
    falls upon the party seeking to show that litigation was instituted in bad faith,
    arbitrarily and for vexatious purposes.
    The trial court denied Citadel’s request for attorney fees without
    addressing any of Citadel’s contentions in support thereof. Given our reversal, we
    are constrained to remand the matter of Citadel’s request for attorney fees in
    defending against the Association’s “petition to compel” to the trial court to
    decide.
    Conclusion
    For all of the above-stated reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order
    of March 8, 2016, and remand the matter of Citadel’s claim for attorney fees.
    ______________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
    Judge Hearthway did not participate in the decision in this case.
    15
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Eagleview Corporate Center               :
    Association                              :
    :
    v.                           : No. 547 C.D. 2016
    :
    Citadel Federal Credit Union,            :
    Appellant             :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 2nd day of December, 2016, the order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Chester County, dated March 8, 2016, in the above-captioned
    matter is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings in
    accordance with the attached opinion.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    ______________________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge