R. Rearick v. UCBR ( 2019 )


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  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Ruth Rearick,                      :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                            :               No. 704 C.D. 2018
    :               SUBMITTED: December 21, 2018
    Unemployment Compensation Board of :
    Review,                            :
    Respondent :
    BEFORE:       HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                  FILED: January 31, 2019
    Ruth Rearick (Claimant) petitions for review, pro se, of the May 3, 2018 Order
    of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming the Referee’s
    decision to deny Claimant unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. The Board
    concluded that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the
    Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 because she was discharged from work for
    willful misconduct. We affirm the Board’s Order.
    Background
    Claimant worked as a full-time store manager for Dollar General (Employer)
    from May 23, 2013 through January 10, 2018. Bd.’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 1.2
    1
    Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(e).
    Section 402(e) of the Law states that an employee shall be ineligible for UC benefits for any week
    “[i]n which his unemployment is due to his discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful
    misconduct connected with his work.” 43 P.S. § 802(e).
    2
    The Board adopted and incorporated the Referee’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
    in their entirety. Bd.’s Order at 1.
    Employer has a written policy that provides for an employee’s immediate termination
    for the use of profane or abusive language in the workplace, including gender, racial,
    ethnic, and religious slurs. 
    Id. No. 2.3
    Claimant was aware of Employer’s policy. 
    Id. No. 3.
             On or about November 21, 2017, Employer’s district manager was informed that
    Claimant had uttered a gender slur in the workplace. 
    Id. No. 4.
    Employer began
    investigating the incident, and the human resources department directed the district
    manager to interview other employees in the store. 
    Id. No. 5.
    On November 30, 2017,
    as part of the investigation, Claimant was required to provide a written statement. 
    Id. No. 6.
    In that statement, Claimant described an unrelated incident in which Claimant
    had placed condoms inside a co-worker’s purse. The statement did not mention
    Claimant’s use of profanity in the workplace. Id.; Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/7/18,
    at 6; see R. Item No. 7.
    In early January 2018, Employer’s human resources department advised the
    district manager that Claimant needed to provide an additional written statement
    regarding her use of profanity in the workplace in November 2017. Bd.’s F.F. No. 7;
    N.T., 3/7/18, at 6. On January 5, 2018, Claimant prepared and signed a second written
    statement, in which she admitted to previously stating to a co-worker, “I’m sick of that
    cunt and if he wanted he could talk to a lawyer also. This statement is to the best of
    my knowledge because it has been so long ago.” Bd.’s F.F. No. 8. On January 10,
    2018, Employer discharged Claimant for her use of profanity in the workplace. 
    Id. No. 9.
    Employer’s written policy states: “[Employer] has listed below a number of the offenses that
    3
    we consider to be serious enough to result in discipline, up to and including termination, even for a
    single offense.” Record (R.) Item No. 7. One offense in that list is “[u]se of profane or abusive
    language in the workplace including, but not limited to, use of racial, gender, ethnic or religious slurs.”
    
    Id. 2 Claimant
    filed a claim for UC benefits with the local Service Center. The
    Service Center found that Employer did not provide sufficient information to show that
    Claimant had used profanity in the workplace. Notice of Determination, 2/5/18, at 1.
    Because Employer failed to satisfy its burden of proof, the Service Center determined
    that Claimant was not ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. 
    Id. Employer timely
    appealed to the Referee, who held a hearing on March 7, 2018.
    At the hearing, Claimant appeared with counsel and testified on her own behalf.
    Claimant also presented the testimony of her former co-worker, Lon Goldstrohm, who
    was present when Claimant allegedly uttered the profanity. Employer appeared with a
    tax consultant representative and presented the testimony of Kasey Smith, Employer’s
    district manager who investigated the incident. Following the hearing, the Referee
    reversed the Service Center’s decision, concluding:
    [E]mployer has shown the existence of [its] policy and [C]laimant’s
    knowledge and violation of that policy. [C]laimant contends that she did
    not violate [E]mployer’s policy and that she wrote the statement only
    because she was being coerced to do so by her district manager. The
    Referee does not find [C]laimant’s testimony to be credible. The Referee
    finds that [C]laimant violated [E]mployer’s policy when she used a
    derogatory gender slur resulting in her termination.
    Ref.’s Order at 2. Therefore, the Referee concluded that Claimant was ineligible for
    UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. 
    Id. at 3.
           Claimant timely appealed to the Board, which affirmed the Referee’s decision.
    The Board adopted the Referee’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
    determined that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the
    Law. Bd.’s Order at 1. Claimant now petitions for review of that decision.4
    4
    Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the necessary findings of fact are
    supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether constitutional
    rights were violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.
    3
    Analysis
    Our Court has defined “willful misconduct” as a wanton or willful disregard of
    the employer’s interests, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, a disregard of
    the standards of behavior that the employer has a right to expect of its employees, or
    negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the employer’s interests or of the
    employee’s duties and obligations. Miller v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    83 A.3d 484
    , 486-87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). An employer seeking to prove that a claimant
    committed willful misconduct by violating a work policy “must demonstrate the
    existence of the policy, its reasonableness, and its violation.”             Klampfer v.
    Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    182 A.3d 495
    , 500 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). If the
    employer satisfies its burden of proving “the existence of a reasonable work rule and
    its deliberate violation, [then] the burden shifts to the claimant to demonstrate good
    cause for violating the rule.” Chester Cmty. Charter Sch. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
    of Review, 
    138 A.3d 50
    , 54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
    Here, Employer credibly established, through Ms. Smith’s testimony, that it had
    a policy prohibiting the use of profanity and vulgarity in the workplace and that
    Claimant knew of that policy.        Bd.’s F.F. Nos. 3, 7. The policy provided that a
    violation could result in an employee’s immediate termination from employment. 
    Id. No. 2;
    see R. Item No. 7. Employer also established that Claimant violated its policy
    by stating to a co-worker, “I’m sick of that cunt . . . .” Bd.’s F.F. No. 8; see R. Item
    No. 7.
    At the hearing, Ms. Smith testified that: she did not coerce or threaten Claimant;
    she was complying with the directive from human resources in requesting the second
    written statement; and Claimant did not object to writing the statement. N.T., 3/7/18,
    at 6-7, 14. In contrast, Claimant testified that Ms. Smith threatened and coerced her
    into preparing the statement and admitting to the use of profanity. 
    Id. at 9-11.
    The
    4
    Board, however, specifically discredited Claimant’s testimony that she was coerced
    into writing the statement. Bd.’s Order at 1; Ref.’s Order at 2. It is well settled that
    the Board is the ultimate factfinder in UC cases and empowered to determine the
    credibility of witnesses. Curran v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    752 A.2d 938
    ,
    940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Notably, although Claimant argues that her entire written
    statement was coerced, Claimant testified that the only portion of the statement that
    was untrue was her use of the word “cunt.” N.T., 3/7/18, at 10.
    Where the Board’s factual findings are supported by substantial, credible
    evidence, those findings are conclusive on appeal. Brandt v. Unemployment Comp.
    Bd. of Review, 
    643 A.2d 78
    , 79 (Pa. 1994). Based on Claimant’s written admission
    and Ms. Smith’s testimony, we conclude that the record contains substantial evidence
    to support the Board’s finding that Claimant deliberately violated Employer’s policy
    by using profane language in the workplace.
    Because Employer satisfied its burden of proof, the burden then shifted to
    Claimant to establish good cause for violating Employer’s policy. Claimant testified
    that she did not use the word “cunt” in the workplace, and Mr. Goldstrohm testified
    that he did not recall Claimant using that word during the conversation in question.
    N.T., 3/7/18, at 10, 13. Because Claimant simply denied that she had uttered a vulgarity
    in the workplace, we conclude that she failed to demonstrate good cause for violating
    Employer’s policy.5
    5
    In her appeal to the Board, Claimant also argued that Employer failed to comply with the
    disciplinary procedures in its Internal Investigations Policy and its People Management Policy before
    terminating her employment. See Pet. for Appeal, 3/22/18, at 1; Claimant’s Br. at 7-9. However,
    because Claimant did not raise this issue before the Referee, it is waived. See Dehus v. Unemployment
    Comp. Bd. of Review, 
    545 A.2d 434
    , 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988).
    In her appellate brief, Claimant also challenges Employer’s failure to admit into evidence Mr.
    Goldstrohm’s written statement regarding the incident. Claimant’s Br. at 4-5, 10. However, Claimant
    5
    Conclusion
    Based on the evidence of record, we conclude that Claimant was discharged for
    willful misconduct under Section 402(e) of the Law and is, therefore, ineligible for UC
    benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.
    _______________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    did not object to the record exhibits identified at the outset of the hearing. See N.T., 3/7/18, at 3.
    Furthermore, Mr. Goldstrohm was present at the hearing and testified to his recollection of the
    incident and to the content of his written statement.
    6
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Ruth Rearick,                      :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                            :     No. 704 C.D. 2018
    :
    Unemployment Compensation Board of :
    Review,                            :
    Respondent :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 31st day of January, 2019, the Order of the Unemployment
    Compensation Board of Review, dated May 3, 2018, is hereby AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 704 C.D. 2018

Judges: Ceisler, J.

Filed Date: 1/31/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024