W. Carmack v. WCAB (PJ Dick, Inc./Trumbull Corp.) ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William Carmack,                         :
    Petitioner           :
    :
    v.                          : No. 1093 C.D. 2015
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal             :
    Board (PJ Dick, Inc./Trumbull            :
    Corporation),                            :
    Respondent             :
    :
    :
    PJ Dick, Inc./Trumbull Corporation       :
    and Zurich American Insurance,           :
    Petitioners            :
    :
    v.                          : No. 1172 C.D. 2015
    : Submitted: November 25, 2015
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal             :
    Board (Carmack),                         :
    Respondent              :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge1
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE LEAVITT                                              FILED: March 15, 2016
    William Carmack (Claimant) and PJ Dick, Inc./Trumbull Corporation
    (Employer) have each petitioned for this Court’s review of an adjudication of the
    1
    This case was assigned to the opinion writer before January 4, 2016, when Judge Leavitt
    became President Judge.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board amended Claimant’s
    work injury to include an aggravation injury and suspended benefits upon
    Claimant’s medical release to return to his pre-injury job. In doing so, the Board
    affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) in all respects
    except for the WCJ’s termination of Claimant’s compensation; the Board replaced
    the termination with an ongoing suspension. Employer challenges the amendment
    to the accepted work injury and denial of the termination; Claimant challenges the
    suspension of his disability benefits. We affirm.2
    Claimant worked as an elevator operator at a site where Employer was
    constructing a hospital. On October 29, 2011, the elevator suddenly fell 10 to 15
    feet and stopped abruptly, jamming Claimant’s knees. Claimant sought medical
    treatment but continued working. On February 2, 2012, Claimant had surgery to
    his left knee and returned to work four days later. Claimant continued working at
    the construction site until May 3, 2012, when his job ended. On August 13, 2012,
    Claimant had surgery to his right knee.
    On August 17, 2012, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that he
    injured both knees in the October 29, 2011, incident. Claimant sought payment of
    his medical expenses and total disability benefits as of August 13, 2012, and
    ongoing. In response, Employer issued a medical-only Notice of Compensation
    Payable (NCP) that described the work injury as a bilateral knee strain. Employer
    agreed to pay medical compensation but not wage loss benefits.
    Employer filed a termination petition alleging that Claimant had fully
    recovered from his work injury as of January 7, 2013, the date of an independent
    2
    By order dated July 28, 2015, this Court consolidated the cross-petitions for review and
    designated Claimant as petitioner.
    2
    medical examination (IME). Claimant denied Employer’s allegation that he had
    fully recovered and filed a petition to review, alleging that the work injury listed on
    the NCP was incorrect. The petitions were consolidated and assigned to a WCJ.
    Both Claimant and Employer presented evidence.
    Claimant testified that Employer hired him from the hiring hall of the
    union in which he has been a member for 40 years. Claimant’s position required
    him to operate a freight elevator, taking workers and equipment to different floors
    in the hospital building under construction. Claimant could do the job sitting on a
    stool if he wished. When the elevator malfunctioned, jolting Claimant’s knees,
    Claimant went to MedExpress, which did x-rays and an MRI. Gregory Altman,
    M.D., treated Claimant and on February 2, 2012, did surgery on his left knee.
    Claimant returned to his regular job four days later3 and continued to work until the
    job ended on May 3, 2012. Claimant then treated with Michael B. Gaffney, M.D.,
    who did surgery on his right knee on August 13, 2012. Claimant testified that the
    surgeries improved his knees, but both knees were still painful, particularly the
    right knee. Given this continued pain, Claimant was not sure he could do his pre-
    injury job. Claimant stated that he would defer to his doctor’s opinion on the
    matter, and he expressed the desire to return to work.
    Claimant’s case included medical evidence.                In the record of
    Claimant’s February 2012 surgery, Dr. Altman reported cartilage changes in the
    left knee joint and a meniscus tear. Dr. Altman opined that these articular cartilage
    changes resulted from Claimant’s pre-existing arthritis that was likely aggravated
    3
    Claimant stated that his surgery was on a Thursday and he returned to work on Monday.
    3
    by the work injury. Reproduced Record at 68a (R.R. ___). Dr. Altman treated the
    meniscus tear in the surgery.
    Claimant also presented the deposition of Dr. Gaffney, the orthopedic
    surgeon who began treating Claimant on May 11, 2012.             Claimant reported
    persistent bilateral knee pain that began with the elevator incident. Dr. Gaffney did
    not see swelling in either knee; however, he noted that the left knee had limited
    range of motion. Dr. Gaffney diagnosed arthritis in both knees, which he treated
    with injections, medication and physical therapy. Claimant’s left knee improved
    over time, but the right knee did not. Accordingly, on August 13, 2012, Dr.
    Gaffney did arthroscopic surgery on the right knee. Dr. Gaffney observed worn
    articular cartilage, loose fragments of cartilage and a meniscus tear. Dr. Gaffney
    debrided the loose cartilage and removed the torn portion of the meniscus.
    Dr. Gaffney opined that the elevator incident aggravated Claimant’s
    pre-existing arthritis by making it more painful and likely doing more damage to
    the articular cartilage. Dr. Gaffney based his opinion on Claimant’s statement that
    his knees had not bothered him before the accident but did so afterward. Dr.
    Gaffney had to rely on Claimant’s subjective reports of pain to diagnose an
    aggravation because he had no pre-injury x-rays or MRIs available for a post-
    injury comparison.
    Dr. Gaffney characterized Claimant’s pre-injury job as sedentary,
    which Claimant was able to do in May 2012. After his surgery in August 2012,
    Claimant was totally disabled for a time. On November 9, 2012, Dr. Gaffney
    released Claimant to do a sedentary job with no lifting over ten pounds. His pre-
    injury job fit those restrictions. When Dr. Gaffney last saw Claimant on February
    4
    1, 2013, his knee pain had improved but continued to persist. For this reason, Dr.
    Gaffney felt that Claimant continued to suffer from the aggravation of his arthritis.
    Employer presented the deposition testimony of Jeffrey N. Kann,
    M.D., a board certified orthopedic surgeon who did an IME of Claimant on
    January 7, 2013. Claimant complained of pain in both knees, and Dr. Kann
    observed grinding in the knees that was consistent with arthritis. X-rays and an
    MRI done after the elevator incident showed moderately advanced osteoarthritis in
    both knees, which was a long-standing, pre-existing condition. Dr. Kann opined
    that the work injury consisted of a minor strain or contusion of both knees from
    which Claimant had fully recovered. Dr. Kann opined that the elevator incident
    had not been severe enough to aggravate or materially affect Claimant’s pre-
    existing osteoarthritis.     Accordingly, Dr. Kann opined that Claimant’s knee
    surgeries were not related to the work injury.
    The WCJ credited the testimony of Claimant, Dr. Gaffney and Dr.
    Altman.4 Based on their testimony, the WCJ found that the elevator incident on
    October 29, 2011, caused an aggravation of Claimant’s pre-existing osteoarthritis,
    necessitating surgery. The WCJ also found that Claimant was totally disabled
    from August 13, 2012, until November 9, 2012, when Dr. Gaffney released him to
    do his pre-injury job. The WCJ rejected Dr. Kann’s opinion that Claimant did not
    sustain an aggravation but did credit his opinion that Claimant had fully recovered
    as of the date of the IME. Accordingly, the WCJ amended the NCP by deleting the
    strain and adding an aggravation of Claimant’s pre-existing osteoarthritis. The
    4
    The WCJ has complete authority over questions of credibility, conflicting medical evidence and
    evidentiary weight. Sherrod v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Thoroughgood, Inc.),
    
    666 A.2d 383
    , 385 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
    5
    WCJ awarded Claimant total disability benefits for the period of August 13, 2012,
    to November 9, 2012; suspended disability benefits as of November 10, 2012; and
    terminated benefits effective January 7, 2013.
    Both Claimant and Employer appealed.                 The Board affirmed the
    WCJ’s amendment to the NCP and suspension of benefits. However, the Board
    reversed the termination because Dr. Kann did not opine that Claimant had fully
    recovered from the adjudicated work injury, namely Claimant’s aggravation of his
    pre-existing osteoarthritis. Accordingly, the Board ordered Claimant’s disability
    benefits suspended but not terminated. Claimant and Employer then petitioned for
    this Court’s review.5
    On appeal, Employer argues that Claimant’s medical evidence did not
    establish an aggravation of his pre-existing arthritic condition. Employer also
    argues that the Board erred in reversing the termination because the record
    contains substantial and competent evidence that Claimant was fully recovered
    from the work injury as of January 7, 2013. For his part, Claimant argues that his
    benefits should not have been suspended as of November 10, 2012, because he is
    not fully recovered from his work injury and his time-of-injury employment was
    no longer available.
    We first address the description of the work injury. Under Section
    413(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as
    5
    This Court’s review of an order of the Board is to determine whether the necessary findings of
    fact are supported by substantial evidence, Board procedures were violated, constitutional rights
    were violated or an error of law was committed. Cytemp Specialty Steel v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Crisman), 
    39 A.3d 1028
    , 1033 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
    Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
    accept as adequate to support a finding. Mrs. Smith’s Frozen Foods Company v. Workmen’s
    Compensation Appeal Board (Clouser), 
    539 A.2d 11
    , 14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988).
    6
    amended, 77 P.S. §771, the WCJ may amend an NCP if it is shown that the NCP is
    in any material respect incorrect, including the injury description.6 The party
    seeking to modify the NCP has the burden to prove that it was materially incorrect
    when it was issued.       Cinram Manufacturing, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation
    Appeal Board (Hill), 
    975 A.2d 577
    , 582 (Pa. 2009).
    A claimant must prove through unequivocal medical evidence that his
    injury is work-related.      Cromie v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board
    (Anchor Hocking Corporation), 
    600 A.2d 677
    , 679 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).                    An
    aggravation of a pre-existing degenerative condition constitutes a compensable
    work injury. SKF USA, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Smalls),
    
    728 A.2d 385
    , 387 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). To establish a compensable aggravation
    “the medical evidence [must] establish that the injury materially contributed to the
    disability rather than the disability resulted from the natural progress[ion] of a pre-
    existing condition.” Miller v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Pocono
    Hospital), 
    539 A.2d 18
    , 20-21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (citing Halaski v. Hilton Hotel,
    
    409 A.2d 367
    (Pa. 1979)). Whether an incident has materially contributed to the
    disabling injury “is a question of fact to be determined by the WCJ.” 
    SKF, 728 A.2d at 388
    .
    Employer argues that Dr. Gaffney did not prove an aggravation
    because there was no objective medical evidence that the underlying pathology of
    6
    Section 413(a) states, in relevant part, as follows:
    A workers’ compensation judge of the department may, at any time, review and
    modify or set aside a notice of compensation payable and an original or
    supplemental agreement … if it be proved that such notice of compensation
    payable or agreement was in any material respect incorrect.
    77 P.S. §771.
    7
    Claimant’s knees was changed by the work injury.          By contrast, Dr. Kann’s
    testimony, which was consistent with Claimant’s medical records, proved that the
    injury was limited to bilateral knee strains. Claimant responds that the WCJ’s
    finding that Claimant sustained an aggravation of his arthritis is supported by the
    record. We agree with Claimant.
    The WCJ credited Dr. Gaffney’s testimony that the elevator incident
    aggravated Claimant’s underlying osteoarthritis by making it more painful. Dr.
    Gaffney based his opinion on Claimant’s statement to him that the incident
    increased his knee pain and decreased his function. In finding that Claimant’s
    work injury caused an aggravation, the WCJ explained:
    Dr. Gaffney is of the opinion that, while the claimant had a
    significant pre-existing osteoarthritis in both knees, the elevator
    drop of October 29, 2011, which was not insignificant, caused
    an aggravation of the claimant’s pre-existing osteoarthritis. The
    fact that the claimant suffered an aggravation at that time is
    supported by the claimant’s testimony that he had significant
    pain and discomfort in his right and left knee following the
    incident of October 29, 201[1]. The pain was so significant that
    the claimant sought treatment at Med-Express Urgent Care in
    Monroeville, a few days following the incident…. I also find as
    a fact that the need for the surgeries performed by Dr. Altman
    and Dr. Gaffney, surgeries that may have been necessary at
    some later time under the normal course of claimant’s
    advancing osteoarthritis[,] were accelerated by this incident in
    that the significant pain triggered by the October 29, 2011
    incident did not alleviate until Dr. Altman’s surgery on the
    claimant’s left knee on February 2, 2012 and, upon Dr.
    Gaffney’s surgery on August 13, 2012. Specifically notable is
    the need for Dr. Altman’s surgery which was performed
    slightly over 3 months after the work injury. Certainly nothing
    has been presented to the undersigned to show that the claimant
    was going to have arthroscopic surgery in the normal course of
    8
    the degenerative condition only 3 months subsequent to this
    incident.
    The undersigned is not unaware of Dr. Kann’s opinion that the
    claimant did not suffer an acceleration or aggravation of his
    underlying osteoarthritis as a result of the October 29, 2011
    work injury. … However, I cannot accept Dr. Kann’s opinion
    given the claimant’s credible testimony that the pain in his right
    and left knee was significantly aggravated by the drop in the
    elevator on October 29, 2011[,] testimony[] which is supported
    by the claimant’s treatment soon after on November 2, 2011 [at
    Med-Express].
    WCJ Decision, 2/27/14, at 11-12; Finding of Fact No. 12.7
    The WCJ’s finding is supported by the record.                    Dr. Gaffney
    acknowledged that he had to rely on Claimant’s subjective reports of pain in his
    diagnosis because there were no pre-injury diagnostic tests. However, pre-injury
    and post-injury diagnostic tests are not necessary to an aggravation diagnosis.
    Were this the case, then a claimant whose pre-existing condition did not necessitate
    diagnostic tests prior to the work injury could never prove an aggravation. In
    short, the WCJ’s finding that the elevator incident materially aggravated
    Claimant’s pre-existing condition is supported by competent medical testimony.
    Employer also argues that the Board erred in reversing the termination
    of Claimant’s disability benefits. Dr. Kann opined that Claimant fully recovered as
    of the IME date, and his opinion is supported by Dr. Gaffney’s testimony that
    Claimant could perform his pre-injury job. Employer asserts that these opinions
    warrant a termination.
    7
    This Court may not disturb this determination because the WCJ is the ultimate fact finder and
    has complete authority over questions of credibility. Davis v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
    Board (City of Philadelphia), 
    753 A.2d 905
    , 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).
    9
    A termination of benefits requires the employer to prove that the
    claimant is fully recovered from the work injury or that any remaining disability is
    not related to the work injury. Campbell v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Antietam Valley Animal Hospital), 
    705 A.2d 503
    , 506-07 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). An
    employer does this by presenting unequivocal, competent medical evidence that
    the claimant has fully recovered from the work injury. Koszowski v. Workmen’s
    Compensation Appeal Board (Greyhound Lines, Inc.), 
    595 A.2d 697
    , 699 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1991). An employer does not satisfy this burden with a medical opinion
    that the injury was not actually work-related. GA & FC Wagman, Inc. v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Aucker), 
    785 A.2d 1087
    , 1091 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
    If the employer’s medical expert fails to acknowledge the work injury, then his
    opinion will not support a termination of benefits.          Gillyard v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board), 
    865 A.2d 991
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). A medical expert need not believe that the work injury
    actually occurred, but he must opine that, assuming an injury existed, it had
    resolved by the time of the IME. To v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Insaco, Inc.), 
    819 A.2d 1222
    , 1225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
    Employer argues that Claimant “sustained only bilateral knee strain as
    a result of the October 29, 2011 work injury.” Employer’s Brief at 21. However,
    the WCJ found that Claimant suffered an aggravation of his pre-existing
    osteoarthritis. Dr. Kann, who did not accept this diagnosis, opined that Claimant
    had fully recovered from bilateral knee strain, but not from the aggravation. His
    testimony did not establish a full recovery from the adjudicated work injury. Nor
    did Dr. Gaffney’s testimony support a termination.         Although Dr. Gaffney
    10
    acknowledged Claimant could do his pre-injury job, he specifically opined that
    Claimant had not fully recovered from the aggravation of arthritis in his knees.
    We turn next to Claimant’s appeal of the suspension of his benefits.
    Claimant argues that even though Dr. Gaffney opined that Claimant could perform
    his pre-injury job as of November 9, 2012, there was no job available for Claimant.
    Employer rejoins that a suspension was warranted because Claimant’s job had
    ended and Claimant could not prove his work injury caused his loss of earnings
    through the pendency of the litigation. We agree with Employer.
    Under workers’ compensation law, the term “disability” is
    synonymous with “the loss of earning power attributable to the work-related
    injury.” Landmark Constructors, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Costello), 
    747 A.2d 850
    , 854 (Pa. 2000) (emphasis added). Employer issued a
    medical only NCP, but it did not accept liability for wage loss. Accordingly,
    Claimant had the burden to prove a connection between his work injury and a loss
    of earning power. Ingrassia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Universal
    Health Services, Inc.), 
    126 A.3d 394
    , 401-02 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Claimant also
    had to show that his work injury continued to cause disability throughout the
    pendency of the claim petition proceeding.       Innovative Spaces v. Workmen’s
    Compensation Appeal Board (DeAngelis), 
    646 A.2d 51
    , 54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
    Where the claimant is not fully recovered from his work injury, the
    employer must show job availability in order to obtain a suspension, even if the
    claimant has been medically cleared to return to his pre-injury job without
    restrictions. Landmark 
    Constructors, 747 A.2d at 855
    , 858. However, there are
    unique factual circumstances where job availability need not be shown. 
    Id. at 855.
    11
    Claimant testified that he obtained the elevator operator job with
    Employer out of the union hall and performed that job until it ended in May 2012.
    His job was one of limited duration, entitling Claimant to unemployment
    compensation when the job ended. Claimant was totally disabled by his August
    2012 knee surgery, however, his surgeon released him to do the elevator operator
    job on November 9, 2012. At that point, his position with Employer had ended, as
    scheduled, six months earlier.    After November 9, 2012, Claimant’s loss of
    earnings was not attributable to his work injury but to the fact that his job with
    Employer had ended and he had not yet obtained another job through the union
    hall. The award of a closed period of disability benefits made Claimant whole and
    left him in the same position he would have been in had he not been injured.
    Because Claimant did not establish that his work injury caused a loss of earnings
    throughout the pendency of the litigation, the Board correctly suspended his
    disability benefits as of November 10, 2012.
    For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the order of the Board.
    ______________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge
    12
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    William Carmack,                      :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                        : No. 1093 C.D. 2015
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal          :
    Board (PJ Dick, Inc./Trumbull         :
    Corporation),                         :
    Respondent          :
    :
    :
    PJ Dick, Inc./Trumbull Corporation    :
    and Zurich American Insurance,        :
    Petitioners         :
    :
    v.                        : No. 1172 C.D. 2015
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal          :
    Board (Carmack),                      :
    Respondent           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 15th day of March, 2016, the order of the Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board dated May 28, 2015, in the above-captioned matter is
    hereby AFFIRMED.
    ______________________________
    MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge