Exeter Township v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Exeter Township,                   :
    :
    Petitioner :
    :
    v.                : No. 316 C.D. 2017
    : Argued: October 17, 2017
    Pennsylvania Labor Relations       :
    Board,                             :
    :
    Respondent :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
    OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                           FILED: January 12, 2018
    Exeter Township (Township) petitions for review from a final order of
    the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Board), which dismissed the Township’s
    exceptions to the proposed decision and order of a Hearing Examiner and held that
    the position of Zoning Officer/Assistant Code Enforcement Officer (Zoning Officer)
    is not a management-level employee subject to exclusion from the collective
    bargaining unit under the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA).1 Upon review, we
    reverse.
    The Township is a township of the second class and is located in Berks
    County, Pennsylvania. The Township and Teamsters Local Union No. 429 (Union)
    filed a joint request for certification under Section 602(a) of PERA, 43 P.S.
    §§1101.602(a), with the Board to certify a unit of employees for collective bargaining
    1
    Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§1101.101-1101.2301.
    purposes. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 16a. The Board certified the following
    positions as included in the bargaining unit:
    All full-time and regular part-time nonprofessional
    employes including but not limited to highway employes,
    sewer plant employes, secretarial employes, truck drivers,
    heavy equipment operators, bid plant operators,
    mechanics, assistant operators, collection crew, light
    equipment operators, secretaries, clerk-typist, laborers,
    and code enforcement personnel . . . .
    R.R. at 16a.    The Board specifically excluded “management level employes,
    supervisors, first level supervisors, confidential employes and guards as defined by
    [PERA].” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
                 In March 2016, the Township filed a petition for unit clarification with
    the Board, which it subsequently amended. R.R. at la-16a. The Township’s petition
    sought to remove three positions from the unit certification, namely the Zoning
    Officer, the Building Code Official, and the Code Enforcement/Assistant Zoning
    Officer (Code Enforcement Officer).
    In July 2016, the Board’s Hearing Examiner held a hearing. In support
    of its position, the Township offered the testimony of Township Manager John
    Granger.   Granger is the Chief Administrative Officer of the Township and
    supervisor of all Township employees, except those employed by the Police
    Department. R.R. at 79a. Granger began his employment in June 2016. Granger
    testified that the Zoning Officer position had been vacant since April 2016 and the
    position remained unfilled at the time of the hearing. He testified as to the actual
    duties performed by the Building Code Official and the Code Enforcement Officer.
    However, Granger testified that “[t]he zoning officer duties and responsibilities are
    2
    pretty well set out in the [Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)2].
    They are universal across the state, regardless of the community in which the zoning
    officer is working.” R.R. at 86a. The Township offered the Zoning Officer’s job
    description and Township Ordinances regarding the duties of the position, which the
    Board admitted into evidence. The Union did not offer any evidence in response.
    The Union conceded that the Building Code Official and Code Enforcement Officer
    were management-level employees, but it argued that the Township did not meet its
    burden regarding the Zoning Officer. The parties presented briefs in support of their
    respective positions.
    The Hearing Examiner determined that the Township did not meet its
    burden of proving its Zoning Officer was a management-level employee because it
    could not offer testimony regarding the actual duties performed by the Zoning
    Officer.     By proposed order dated October 19, 2016, the Hearing Examiner
    dismissed the Township’s petition for unit clarification.
    The Township filed exceptions to the proposed order with the Board,
    and the parties submitted additional briefs. The Township asserted that evidence of
    actual duties performed by its Zoning Officer was not required because all zoning
    officers are required to implement policy under the MPC and, thus, are management-
    level employees as a matter of law. In the alternative, the Township requested a
    remand to introduce evidence of the actual duties of its Zoning Officer.
    By final order dated February 21, 2017, the Board dismissed the
    Township’s exceptions and made the Hearing Examiner’s proposed decision and
    order absolute and final. The Board denied the Township’s request for a remand,
    noting that any evidence of the duties of the prior Zoning Officer was not after-
    2
    Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§10101-11202.
    3
    discovered evidence and any evidence regarding the duties of a currently employed
    Zoning Officer would be inadmissible post-petition evidence. The Board advised
    the Township that it could obtain a new hearing by filing a new unit clarification
    petition once the Zoning Officer position is filled.
    From this decision, the Township petitions this Court for review.3 The
    Township contends that the Board’s decision that the Zoning Officer position is not
    a management-level position is contrary to the law and is not supported by
    substantial evidence.
    First, the Township maintains that the Board’s decision is contrary to
    the law because the duties of the Zoning Officer are set forth by statute. Specifically,
    the MPC requires municipalities with a zoning ordinance to appoint a zoning officer
    to administer and enforce the zoning ordinance. The MPC directs that zoning
    officers “shall administer the zoning ordinance in accordance with its literal terms.”
    Section 614 of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10614. The Board and this Court consistently
    have held that the duty of administering or implementing policy constitutes a
    management duty for purposes of unit clarification. In light of the statutory mandate,
    3
    “[G]enerally speaking, an appellate court's review of an agency decision is limited to a
    determination of whether there has been a violation of constitutional rights, an error of law, [or] a
    procedural irregularity, or whether the findings of the agency are supported by the substantial
    evidence of record.” Lancaster County v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 
    94 A.3d 979
    , 986
    (Pa. 2014). “[A] decision of the Board must be upheld if the Board's factual findings are supported
    by substantial evidence, and if conclusions of law drawn from those facts are reasonable, not
    capricious, arbitrary, or illegal.” 
    Id. (quoting Borough
    of Ellwood City v. Pennsylvania Labor
    Relations Board, 
    998 A.2d 589
    , 594 (Pa. 2010)).
    However, where the issues concern statutory interpretation, our review is highly
    deferential. 
    Id. “An administrative
    agency's interpretation is to be given ‘controlling weight unless
    clearly erroneous.’” 
    Id. (quoting Ellwood
    City, 998 A.2d at 594
    . “However, when an
    administrative agency's interpretation is inconsistent with the statute itself, or when the statute is
    unambiguous, such administrative interpretation carries little weight.” 
    Id. 4 evidence
    regarding whether or not the Zoning Officer actually performed his
    statutory duties was not necessary.
    Under PERA, the Board possesses wide latitude to determine the
    appropriateness of a bargaining unit. Section 604 of PERA, 43 P.S. §1101.604.
    Lancaster County v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 
    94 A.3d 979
    , 983 (Pa.
    2014). “The purpose of a unit clarification procedure under the PERA is to
    determine whether certain job classifications are properly included in a bargaining
    unit, based upon the actual functions of the job.” School District of City of Erie v.
    Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 
    832 A.2d 562
    , 566-67 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
    Unit clarification is a means to ensure “flexibility in the composition of the
    bargaining unit as new positions are created or existing positions are changed.” 
    Id. at 567.
    A party seeking to exclude a position from a bargaining unit has the burden
    of proving by substantial evidence that the statutory exclusion applies.
    Westmoreland County v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 
    991 A.2d 976
    , 980
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), appeal denied, 
    17 A.3d 1256
    (Pa. 2011).
    Section 301(2) of PERA expressly excludes “management level
    employes” from inclusion in collective bargaining units. 43 P.S. §1101.301(2).
    PERA defines a “management level employe” as “any individual who is involved
    directly in the determination of policy or who responsibly directs the implementation
    thereof and shall include all employes above the first level of supervision.” Section
    301(16) of PERA, 43 P.S. §1101.301(16) (emphasis added). “If employees meet
    only one part of the test, they will be considered managerial.” Municipal Employees
    of Borough of Slippery Rock v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 
    14 A.3d 189
    ,
    192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (quoting Westmoreland 
    County, 991 A.2d at 985
    ).
    5
    “An employee is directly involved in the implementation of policy if he
    or she ensures that the policy is fulfilled by concrete measures.” Slippery 
    Rock, 14 A.3d at 192
    ; accord Westmoreland 
    County, 991 A.2d at 985
    . “However, an
    employee's decisions are not managerial if they are part of the employee's routine
    discharge of professional duties.” Slippery 
    Rock, 14 A.3d at 192
    . “[I]n order to be
    considered a management level employee, the employee must be responsible for not
    only monitoring compliance with a policy, but also for taking action in situations
    where noncompliance is found.” 
    Id. Generally, the
    Board must analyze the duties of an employee's position
    to determine whether the employee is a management-level employee. PSSU, Local
    668, AFL-CIO v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 
    740 A.2d 270
    , 276 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1999), appeal denied, 
    740 A.2d 270
    (Pa. 2000). “The Board reviews actual
    job duties and will only consider written job descriptions to corroborate testimony
    of actual duties.” 
    Westmoreland, 991 A.2d at 980
    . “Moreover, job titles, such as
    supervisor or manager, are not sufficient to overcome the actual duties performed
    . . . .” Id.; accord West Perry School District v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations
    Board, 
    752 A.2d 461
    , 465 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    795 A.2d 984
    (Pa. 2000).
    However, where the General Assembly designates a particular
    profession as a management-level position, an examination of actual job duties is
    not necessary. 
    PSSU, 740 A.2d at 276
    . In PSSU, this Court considered whether
    workers’ compensation judges (WCJs) were properly excluded from the bargaining
    unit.   We observed that the General Assembly designated the WCJs to be
    “management level employes” under Section 1403 of the Workers’ Compensation
    6
    Act (Act).4 We recognized that, “in most circumstances, an examination of the duties
    of an employee's position” must be made prior to a determination of whether or not
    such employee is a “management level employe.” However, “because the General
    Assembly chose to designate WCJs as management level employees under the
    provisions of [S]ection 1403 of the Act, it obviated the need to examine the particular
    duties of the position as both the Board and this Court are powerless to alter this
    designation.” 
    Id. at 276-77.
    Thus, this Court determined that the Board properly
    adopted the General Assembly's designation that WCJs were management-level
    employees for purposes of PERA. 
    Id. The analysis
    in PSSU is equally applicable here. Although the General
    Assembly did not designate zoning officers as “management-level employees,” it
    assigned them management-level duties under the MPC. Specifically, Section 614
    of the MPC provides:
    For the administration of a zoning ordinance, a zoning
    officer, who shall not hold any elective office in the
    municipality, shall be appointed. . . . The zoning officer
    shall administer the zoning ordinance in accordance with
    its literal terms, and shall not have the power to permit any
    construction or any use or change of use which does not
    conform to the zoning ordinance. Zoning officers may be
    authorized to institute civil enforcement proceedings as a
    means of enforcement when acting within the scope of
    their employment.
    53 P.S. §10614 (emphasis added).
    4
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §2503 (WCJs “shall be management
    level employes”).
    7
    In accord thereto, Township’s Zoning Ordinance5 provides the
    Township shall appoint a Zoning Officer to “administer and enforce” the Zoning
    Ordinance. R.R. at 151a. The Zoning Officer’s duties “shall” include, inter alia:
    accept or deny permits applications, examine applications for compliance, issue
    permits, issue citations for violations, and present enforcement actions. 
    Id. In Slippery
    Rock, this Court examined similar duties and held that such
    duties constitute the administration of policy, which is a management-level duty.
    Slippery Rock. The issue in Slippery Rock was whether a code enforcement officer
    was a managerial position for purposes of the PERA. We opined that “in order to
    be considered a management level employee, the employee must be responsible for
    not only monitoring compliance with a policy, but also for taking action in situations
    where noncompliance is 
    found.” 14 A.3d at 192
    . “The administration of a policy
    involves basically two functions: (1) observance of the terms of the policy and (2)
    interpretation of the policy both within and without the procedures outlined in the
    policy.” 
    Id. (quoting Employes
    of Derry Township, 36 PPER ¶166 (Final Order,
    2005). We also noted the Board has consistently held that code enforcement officers
    implement policy and, therefore, satisfy the second part of the test set forth in Section
    301(16) of PERA. 
    Id. at 192
    (citing Derry Township, 36 PPER ¶166; Horsham
    Township, 9 PPER ¶9151 (Order and Notice of Election, 1978)).6 Applying this
    analysis, we examined the code enforcement officer’s actual duties. “[T]he evidence
    establishe[d] that the code enforcement officer accepts or denies permit applications,
    conducts inspections, issues citations and presents enforcement actions to the local
    5
    Last amended on December 23, 2013.
    6
    This Court considers Board opinions interpreting PERA to be persuasive authority, and,
    as long as substantial evidence supports the Board's findings, we defer to the Board's conclusions
    if they are reasonable, and not arbitrary or capricious. Slippery 
    Rock, 14 A.3d at 192
    .
    8
    magistrate.” 
    Id. at 193.
    In so doing, the code enforcement officer administers or
    implements policy, which is reflective of managerial responsibility. 
    Id. Thus, we
    concluded that the Board properly excluded the code enforcement officer from the
    bargaining unit. 
    Id. at 193.
                    Here, the General Assembly vested the power to “administer the zoning
    ordinance” to the zoning officers. Section 614 of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10614. By
    prescribing this management-level duty, the General Assembly has, in essence,
    designated the job classification of zoning officer as a managerial position. See
    Slippery Rock; PSSU. Although a mere description of job duties, without testimony
    regarding actual duties performed, is generally insufficient to establish duties for
    purposes of PERA, see Westmoreland, such is not the case here because the zoning
    officer’s job duties are mandated by law. See PSSU. Just as the Board and this Court
    are powerless to alter this statutory mandate, so too are the Township and the Union.
    See 
    id. This statutory
    mandate obviates the need to examine the Zoning Officer’s
    actual duties. See PSSU. For these reasons, we conclude that the job classification
    of Zoning Officer does not belong in the bargaining unit as a matter of statutory law.
    To conclude otherwise would contravene this clear legislative directive.
    Accordingly, we reverse.7
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    7
    In light of this disposition, we need not reach the Township’s substantial evidence claim.
    9
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Exeter Township,                   :
    :
    Petitioner :
    :
    v.                : No. 316 C.D. 2017
    :
    Pennsylvania Labor Relations       :
    Board,                             :
    :
    Respondent :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 12th day of January, 2018, the order of the
    Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, dated February 21, 2017, is REVERSED.
    __________________________________
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Exeter Township,                    :
    Petitioner         :
    :
    v.                      : No. 316 C.D. 2017
    : Argued: October 17, 2017
    Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, :
    Respondent         :
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
    DISSENTING OPINION BY
    SENIOR JUDGE PELLEGRINI                             FILED: January 12, 2018
    The majority holds that Exeter Township (Township) was not required
    to follow the general rule that to exclude the Exeter Township Zoning
    Officer/Assistant Code Enforcement Officer (Zoning Officer) from a bargaining unit
    as a “management level employee” evidence of actual job duties had to be offered.
    The majority did so because it found that the Zoning Officer was made a
    “management level employee” by Section 614 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities
    Planning Code (MPC).1
    I agree that if a statute provides that a position is not part of the
    bargaining unit or defines the position’s duties as managerial in nature, then the
    1
    Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. § 10614.
    position is excluded from the bargaining unit. I dissent because the description of the
    job duties contained in Section 614 of the MPC does not make the position
    automatically a management level employee.
    In 1994, the Board certified a bargaining unit for collective bargaining
    under the Public Employe Relations Act2 (PERA). Since that time, the Zoning
    Officer has been part of the bargaining unit. In March 2016, the Township filed with
    the Board a request for unit clarification seeking to exclude certain positions from the
    collective bargaining unit, including the Zoning Officer position,3 because they were
    management level employees.
    There is no dispute that for a position to be removed from a bargaining
    unit, the general rule is that substantial evidence of actual job duties is necessary to
    determine if a position should be excluded from a collective bargaining unit.
    Westmoreland County v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 
    991 A.2d 976
    (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2010).         There is also no dispute that the Township did not offer any
    competent evidence at the unit clarification hearing as to the actual duties performed
    by a Zoning Officer in the Township. Instead, the Township contended that Section
    614 of the MPC provided that the Zoning Officer was statutorily excluded from the
    2
    Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101 - 1101.2301.
    3
    The Proposed Order of Unit Clarification also requested that the Board remove the
    Building Code Official and Code Enforcement/Assistant Zoning Officer positions from the
    collective bargaining unit because they were managerial in nature. The Board granted that request
    because evidence of the actual job duties for those positions was provided and, therefore, those
    positions are not before us on appeal.
    DRP - 2
    bargaining unit because that provision described job duties that made it a
    management position.
    Section 301(16) of PERA defines the term “management level
    employe[e]” as “any individual who is involved directly in the determination of
    policy or who responsibly directs the implementation thereof and shall include all
    employe[e]s above the first level of supervision.” 43 P.S. § 1101.301(16). To be
    excluded from a bargaining unit as a “management level employe[e]” who
    responsibly directs the implementation of policy, the employee “must either engage
    in meaningful participation in the development of the employer’s policy or must
    ensure fulfillment of that policy by concrete measures.” Westmoreland 
    County, 991 A.2d at 985
    -86.
    Because Section 614 of the MPC does not specifically exclude a Zoning
    Officer from the bargaining unit, the question then is whether that section describes
    the Zoning Officer’s position as someone who meaningfully participates in the
    development of the employer’s policy or ensures fulfillment of that policy by
    concrete measures necessary to be a management level employee. An examination of
    that provision shows that it does not.
    Section 614 of the MPC provides that a Zoning Officer:
    [S]hall administer the zoning ordinance in accordance with
    its literal terms, and shall not have the power to permit any
    construction or any use or change of use which does not
    conform to the zoning ordinance. Zoning officers may be
    authorized to institute civil enforcement proceedings as a
    DRP - 3
    means of enforcement when acting within the scope of their
    employment.
    53 P.S. § 10614.
    As can be seen, all that the provision expresses is what a zoning officer
    cannot do and what he or she may be authorized to do. It does not give the zoning
    officer any independent discretion to determine policy. All that Section 614 provides
    is that he or she shall administer the terms of a zoning ordinance in compliance “with
    its literal terms,” and shall not have the power to vary the terms of the zoning
    ordinance. 53 P.S. § 10614.
    To fill in its argument, the majority also points to Section 390-82(B) of
    the Township’s Zoning Ordinance, which provides, in relevant part, the duties of the
    Zoning Officer as follows:
    It shall be the duty of the Zoning Officer to enforce the
    provisions of [the Zoning Ordinance] . . . and the Zoning
    Officer shall have such duties and powers as are conferred
    [by the Zoning Ordinance].
    (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 151a.)4
    4
    These powers include, among other things:
          Receiv[ing] applications for zoning and/or building and sign
    permits and issu[ing] zoning and/or sign permits as set forth in [the
    Zoning Ordinance]. . .
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    DRP - 4
    While the Zoning Ordinance describes in detail the job duties of the
    Zoning Officer, because it is within the Township’s control to both write and change
    its terms as it sees fit, it is nothing more than a more formal job description. Like all
    job descriptions, it requires corroborative evidence that the actual duties match that
    description. As we stated in Westmoreland County:
    In determining supervisory status, Section 604(5) of PERA
    authorizes the Board to “take into consideration the extent
    to which supervisory and nonsupervisory functions are
    performed.” . . . It is therefore appropriate for the Board to
    consider such factors as frequency, duration and importance
    of the various supervisory duties performed. . . .
    Moreover, job titles, such as supervisor or manager, are
    not sufficient to overcome the actual duties performed
    as evidence of being a supervisor under PERA. . . .
    (Emphasis 
    added). 991 A.2d at 980
    .
    (continued…)
         Mak[ing] inspections as required to fulfill the duties of the
    Zoning Officer. . .
            Issu[ing] permits for buildings, structures and land uses for
    which subdivision and land development approval is required only
    after all necessary approvals have been secured and plans recorded. . .
           Serv[ing] a notice of violation on any person, firm,
    corporation, partnership or other entity responsible for violating any
    of the provisions of [the Zoning Ordinance], or any amendment
    thereto, or in violation of a statement or a plan approved under [the
    Zoning Ordinance].
    (R.R. at 151a.)
    DRP - 5
    Because Section 614 of the MPC does not set forth in any detail the
    actual job duties of a zoning officer, the general rule that there be evidence of actual
    job duties is necessary for the Board to determine whether the position is a
    “management level” under PERA and must be followed.
    Accordingly, because I would affirm the Board, I respectfully dissent.
    __________________________________
    DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
    DRP - 6