R. Dougherty by Sayre Health Care Center v. DHS ( 2018 )


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  •          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Robert Dougherty by              :
    Sayre Health Care Center,        :
    :
    Petitioner :
    :
    v.              : No. 30 C.D. 2017
    : Submitted: September 15, 2017
    Department of Human Services,    :
    :
    Respondent :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                     FILED: February 15, 2018
    Robert Dougherty (Dougherty) by Sayre Health Care Center (Sayre)
    petitions for review of the December 8, 2016 final order of the Department of Human
    Services (Department), Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (BHA). The order affirmed
    the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissing Dougherty’s appeal
    from a determination by the Bradford County Assistance Office (CAO) as untimely.
    We affirm.
    The relevant facts are not disputed. In February 2015, Dougherty was
    admitted to Sayre, a long-term care facility. In May 2015, Dougherty’s son, who
    was also his power-of-attorney, submitted an application for long-term living
    Medical Assistance (MA) benefits.      In June 2015, the CAO issued letters to
    Dougherty, his son, and Sayre, advising them that the application was incomplete
    and requesting additional information to establish Dougherty’s financial eligibility
    for benefits. A Sayre representative contacted Dougherty’s son, who confirmed that
    he provided the information to the CAO. Contrary to his assurances, however, the
    son had not given the CAO the requested documentation. As a result, on July 8,
    2015, the CAO issued a notice to Dougherty, his son, and Sayre finding Dougherty
    ineligible for MA, and, specifically, for payment of long-term care (LTC) services,
    because the requested financial information was not submitted. No appeal was taken
    from the July 2015 Notice.
    Sayre eventually learned that Dougherty’s son was misappropriating
    Dougherty’s funds. On March 11, 2016, Sayre obtained a court order directing the
    son to provide financial documents, and Sayre filed a new application for MA
    services on Dougherty’s behalf on March 14, 2016. By notice dated April 11, 2016,
    the CAO approved the application and determined that Dougherty was eligible for
    LTC benefits retroactively to December 1, 2015. See 
    55 Pa. Code §181.12
    (a)
    (providing that the earliest possible date for retroactive MA benefits to begin is the
    first day of the third month preceding the month of application).
    Sayre appealed that determination on May 9, 2016, asserting that
    Dougherty’s eligibility for LTC benefits should be determined retroactively to May
    2015, because the denial of the initial application for benefits was due solely to the
    misconduct of his son. In a post-hearing brief, Sayre argued that the appeal should
    be considered a nunc pro tunc appeal of the July 8, 2015 denial notice. Sayre
    asserted that because the appeal stated that Dougherty was seeking to have the
    benefits retroactively applied, he had impliedly requested a nunc pro tunc appeal of
    the prior determination.
    2
    In a September 6, 2016 adjudication, the ALJ rejected that argument
    and concluded that the appeal only concerned the notice of April 11, 2016, which
    addressed Dougherty’s second (March 14, 2016) application. The ALJ observed
    that under 67 Pa. C.S. §1102,1 a request for a hearing before the BHA must be filed
    1
    Section 20.1 of the Act of December 3, 2002, P.L. 147 (Act 142-2002), amended Title 67
    (Public Welfare) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes by establishing the procedures to be
    followed in hearings before the BHA on MA program appeals. Those amendments are codified at
    67 Pa.C.S. §§1101-1106.
    In relevant part, the provisions at 67 Pa. C.S. §1102 state as follows:
    (a) General rule.-A provider that is aggrieved by a decision of the
    department regarding the program may request a hearing before the
    bureau in accordance with this chapter.
    (b) Filing:
    (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a provider must file a
    request for a hearing with the bureau in accordance with all of the
    following:
    (i) The request must be in writing.
    (ii) The request must be filed with the bureau:
    (A) within 30 days of the date of the notice of the departmental
    action; or
    (B) if notice was given by mail, within 33 days of the date of the
    notice of the departmental action.
    (iii) If the request was filed by first-class mail, the United States
    postmark appearing upon the envelope in which the request was
    mailed shall be considered the filing date. The filing date of a request
    filed in any other manner or bearing a postmark other than a United
    States postmark shall be the date on which the request is received in
    the bureau.
    (2) Paragraph (1) does not apply in the following cases:
    (i) In a nunc pro tunc hearing under subsection (c).
    (ii) To the extent set forth in the standing order of the bureau issued
    under subsection (g).
    3
    (iii) To the extent modified by regulations promulgated under
    section 1106 (relating to regulations).
    (c) Hearings nunc pro tunc-The bureau, upon written request and
    for good cause shown, may grant leave for the filing of requests for
    hearing nunc pro tunc pursuant to the common law standards
    applicable in analogous cases in courts of original jurisdiction.
    (d) Amendment.-A request for a hearing may be amended as of
    right within 90 days after the date of filing of the request.
    (e) Adjudication.-
    (1)The bureau shall hold hearings and conduct adjudications
    regarding timely filed requests for hearing in accordance with 2
    Pa.C.S. Ch. 5 Subch. A (relating to practice and procedure of
    Commonwealth agencies).
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), in holding hearings and
    conducting adjudications, the bureau shall do all of the following:
    (i) Act independently of employees or public officials of the
    department whose actions are subject to review before the bureau.
    (ii) Not engage in ex parte communications concerning a hearing
    with any party to the hearing.
    (iii) Promptly adjudicate timely filed requests for hearing.
    (iv) Establish deadlines for interim and final actions by the bureau
    and parties to any proceeding before the bureau.
    (v) Allow reasonable and necessary discovery in the form of
    interrogatories, requests for the production of documents, expert
    reports, requests for admissions and depositions of witnesses and
    designees of parties, subject to case management plans and
    limitations as necessary to facilitate the prompt and efficient
    issuance of adjudications.
    (vi) Consider and, when appropriate, grant applications by affected
    parties to consolidate hearings involving substantially similar or
    materially related issues of law or fact.
    (vii) Conduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised
    by a provider in the request for hearing based upon evidence
    presented to the bureau.
    67 Pa. C.S. §1102.
    4
    within 30 days of the decision appealed from. The ALJ denied the appeal, and the
    BHA affirmed by final order dated September 9, 2016. No further appeal was taken.
    Thereafter, on September 13, 2016, Sayre filed a motion on
    Dougherty’s behalf with the BHA, seeking permission to appeal the July 8, 2015
    denial of benefits nunc pro tunc and asserting that fraud committed by Dougherty’s
    son was a valid reason for granting nunc pro tunc relief. Reproduced Record (R.R.)
    at 3a-7a. An ALJ held a hearing on November 18, 2016.
    Lynn Evans, a CAO income maintenance caseworker, testified that the
    CAO received Dougherty’s initial application on June 4, 2015. She said that
    although requests for verification of Dougherty’s financial information were sent to
    Dougherty, his son, and Sayre, nothing was received by the due date, and the
    application was rejected on July 7, 2015. Evans stated that no appeal was filed, and
    no one called the CAO. Evans testified that Dougherty’s son contacted the CAO on
    November 24, 2015, asking what information was still needed, and a second
    application was received on March 14, 2016. Evans explained that the second
    application was approved on April 11, 2016, retroactively to December 1, 2015, in
    accordance with 
    55 Pa. Code §181.12
    (a). She noted that Dougherty filed an appeal
    from that April 11, 2016 eligibility determination and a hearing had been held, but
    the CAO did not receive the appeal from the July 2015 notice until September 13,
    2016.
    Debbie Scrivener, Sayre’s business manager, testified that while
    Dougherty’s initial application was pending, she repeatedly contacted Dougherty’s
    son asking for the documentation needed to establish Dougherty’s financial
    eligibility. She said that she relied on his representations that he had sent the
    information to the CAO and that by the time she realized that he was not being
    5
    truthful the time for filing an appeal had expired.                 Scrivener explained that
    Dougherty’s son was misappropriating Dougherty’s funds,2 and Sayre did not
    receive the financial documentation from Dougherty’s son until a March 11, 2016
    court order directed him to provide it. Scrivener testified that Sayre worked with
    Dougherty’s son to file a new application on March 14, 2016.
    By order dated December 8, 2016, the ALJ dismissed the motion for
    nunc pro tunc relief. The ALJ acknowledged that if Dougherty’s son had provided
    the requested information with the initial application in June 2015, Dougherty would
    have been eligible for payment of LTC services. However, the ALJ concluded that
    Dougherty and his representatives had the information necessary to file an appeal
    from the first decision in March 2016, and nothing prevented them from filing an
    appeal instead of, or along with, the second application for benefits. The BHA
    affirmed the ALJ’s order.
    On appeal to this Court,3 Dougherty first argues that the BHA erred by
    failing to treat the May 9, 2016 appeal and the September 13, 2016 motion as a
    timely nunc pro tunc appeal of the July 8, 2015 determination. Dougherty further
    asserts that the ALJ abused his discretion in denying the request for nunc pro tunc
    relief because the denial of the initial application was the result of fraud, the issue
    was raised at a hearing within 45 days of discovering the fraudulent conduct, and the
    Department would not be prejudiced by any delay.
    2
    December 8, 2016 Adjudication, Finding of Fact No. 16.
    3
    Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
    whether an error of law was committed, or whether findings of fact are supported by substantial
    evidence. The Manor at St. Luke Village v. Department of Public Welfare, 
    72 A.3d 308
    , 312 n.4
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
    6
    The Department responds that the failure to timely appeal an
    administrative agency’s action is a jurisdictional defect.                Falcon Oil Co. v.
    Environmental Resources, 
    609 A.2d 876
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). Nevertheless, the
    Department recognizes that it may permit an appeal nunc pro tunc where a delay in
    filing an appeal is caused by extraordinary circumstances involving fraud or some
    breakdown in the administrative process, or non-negligent circumstances related to
    the appellant, his counsel, or a third party. H.D. v. Department of Public Welfare,
    
    751 A.2d 1216
    , 1219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). The appellant must also establish that (1)
    the appeal was filed shortly after learning of and having an opportunity to address
    the untimeliness; (2) the untimeliness is of a short duration; and (3) the appellee will
    not be prejudiced by the delay. 
    Id.
    Sayre contends that the deliberate misrepresentations by Dougherty’s
    son establish the requisite extraordinary circumstances warranting nunc pro tunc
    relief. However, the Department argues that once Sayre learned that the basis of the
    denial was a lack of financial information, Sayre knew or should have known that
    the information had not been submitted to the CAO and did not act to protect its
    interest. Citing the regulation at 
    55 Pa. Code §275.4
    (e)(3) (relating to postponement
    or continuation of a hearing), the Department explains that Sayre’s inability to obtain
    information from Dougherty’s son did not prevent Sayre from filing a timely appeal
    or limit its ability to prepare for an appeal hearing.4 According to the Department,
    Sayre could have filed a timely appeal by August 7, 2015, but simply failed to do so.
    4
    The regulation states that an appellant “who wishes to postpone the hearing shall contact
    the hearing officer and provide a reason for the request. The hearing officer may approve the
    request for postponement or continuation of the hearing. The hearing will be rescheduled as soon
    as possible.” 
    55 Pa. Code §275.4
    (e)(3).
    7
    We agree that the misconduct of Dougherty’s son does not establish a basis for nunc
    pro tunc relief.
    The Department also notes that by March 2016, Sayre admittedly was
    aware of the alleged fraud by Dougherty’s son. Sayre does not argue that it was
    precluded from appealing the June 2015 notice at that time or otherwise explain its
    failure to do so. Although Sayre maintains that its second application, filed in March
    2016, should have been considered a request to appeal the initial denial notice nunc
    pro tunc, that argument was rejected by the ALJ, and Sayre did not appeal the BHA’s
    September 9, 2016 final order to this Court. As a consequence, Sayre’s arguments
    related to its March 2016 application are waived. Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a).
    We conclude that Sayre failed to establish that its delay in filing an
    appeal was caused by extraordinary circumstances involving fraud or some
    breakdown in the administrative process, or non-negligent circumstances, or that its
    appeal was filed shortly after learning of and having an opportunity to address the
    untimeliness. H.D., 
    751 A.2d at 1219
    . Therefore, the BHA did not err in denying
    Sayre’s September 13, 2016 request for nunc pro tunc relief.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    8
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Robert Dougherty by              :
    Sayre Health Care Center,        :
    :
    Petitioner :
    :
    v.              : No. 30 C.D. 2017
    :
    Department of Human Services,    :
    :
    Respondent :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 15th day of February, 2018, the December 8, 2016
    Final Administrative Action Order of the Department of Human Services, Bureau of
    Hearings and Appeals is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge