D. Mackley v. WCAB (Pathmark Stores) ( 2018 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Diane Mackley,                                   :
    :
    Petitioner               :
    :
    v.                              :   No. 1187 C.D. 2017
    :   Submitted: December 22, 2017
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal                     :
    Board (Pathmark Stores),                         :
    :
    Respondent               :
    BEFORE:          HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    SENIOR JUDGE COLINS                                             FILED: January 31, 2018
    Diane Mackley (Claimant) petitions for review of an order of the
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed decisions of a
    Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) in consolidated proceedings under the
    Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act)1 denying claim petitions filed by Claimant
    and granting termination and utilization review petitions filed by Pathmark Stores
    (Employer). We affirm.
    On February 22, 1998, Claimant sustained a work-related injury to her
    lower back when she fell in a walk-in freezer in the course of her work for Employer
    as a bakery clerk. (2016 WCJ Decisions Finding of Fact (F.F.) ¶¶1, 5a.) Following
    1
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2708.
    the injury, Claimant continued to work at her pre-injury job with no loss of earnings.
    (Id. F.F. ¶5a; 10/20/15 Hearing Transcript (H.T.) at 9, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at
    152a.) Employer accepted this injury in a stipulation that described the work injury
    as a non-disabling injury to the low back with no wage loss. (WCJ Decision F.F.
    ¶1; Employer Ex. 1, 2011 WCJ Decision F.F. ¶1, R.R. at 4a.) Claimant continued
    to work without work restrictions for over 16 years following the work injury and
    was promoted to bakery manager during that period. (10/20/15 H.T. at 9-10, 15-16,
    R.R. at 152a-153a, 158a-159a; Employer Ex. 5, Claimant Dep. at 21-22, R.R. at 72a-
    73a; Employer Ex. 1, 2011 WCJ Decision F.F. ¶9, R.R. at 5a.)
    In 2010, while she continued to work without restrictions, Claimant
    filed a review petition seeking to expand the description of her work injury to include
    depression and Employer filed a termination petition. (Employer Ex. 1, 2011 WCJ
    Decision at 1, R.R. at 4a.) On June 15, 2011, a WCJ issued a decision granting
    Claimant’s review petition and denying Employer’s termination petition. (2016
    WCJ Decisions F.F. ¶1; Employer Ex. 1, 2011 WCJ Decision, R.R. at 1a-13a.)
    Although the WCJ did not order that the description of Claimant’s back injury be
    amended, the WCJ, in ruling on the termination petition, found credible and accepted
    as fact the diagnosis of the 1998 work injury as “lumbosacral sprain and strain,
    lumbar radiculopathy on right side, and facet pathology with a sacroiliac
    dysfunction.” (Employer Ex. 1, 2011 WCJ Decision F.F. ¶¶17, 37, R.R. at 7a, 11a.)
    Employer appealed only the amendment of the work injury to include depression,
    and this Court reversed that portion of the 2011 WCJ Decision on the ground that
    the expert opinion that Claimant’s depression was the result of her work injury
    lacked an adequate foundation and was therefore not competent evidence.
    (Employer Ex. 2 Pathmark Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    2
    (Mackley), (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 129 C.D. 2014, filed October 22, 2014), R.R. at 24a-
    33a.)
    On August 23, 2014, Claimant stopped working. (2016 WCJ Decisions
    F.F. ¶4a; 10/20/15 H.T. at 10, R.R. at 153a.) On March 27, 2015, Employer filed a
    termination petition, asserting that Claimant had recovered from her work injury as
    of March 11, 2015. On May 14, 2015, Employer also filed a petition for review of
    a utilization review determination concerning the treatment provided by Claimant’s
    physician, Dr. Sofia Lam, contending that Dr. Lam’s treatment of Claimant from
    October 28, 2014 on was not reasonable and necessary. Claimant filed claim
    petitions on May 14, 2015 and October 23, 2015 asserting that she suffered a
    disabling aggravation of her lower back pain on August 23, 2014 from her continued
    work for Employer.2 The WCJ to whom the termination petition, utilization review
    petition and claim petitions were assigned held an evidentiary hearing at which
    Claimant testified and also received testimony by trial deposition of Claimant and
    four other witnesses: Dr. Lam, an anethesiologist with a subspecialty in
    interventional pain management who had treated Claimant for her work injury since
    1999; Drs. Jeffrey McConnell and Neil Kahanovitz, orthopedic surgeons who
    examined Claimant on behalf of Employer; and the store manager of the store where
    Claimant worked.
    Claimant testified that she stopped work on August 23, 2014 because
    her back pain “was getting really bad” and she felt that she could not do her job
    anymore, and that Dr. Lam gave her a note that she could not return to work.
    (10/20/15 H.T. at 10, 13, 17, R.R. at 153a, 156a, 160a; Employer Ex. 5, Claimant
    2
    The two claim petitions asserted the same claim, that Claimant suffered an aggravation of her
    lower back pain from her continued work that became disabling on August 23, 2014. The second
    claim petition was filed to correct the February 22, 1998 date of injury stated at the top of the first
    claim petition and state the date of injury as August 23, 2014.
    3
    Dep. at 4-7, 13-14, 23-25, R.R. at 55a-58a, 64a-65a, 74a-76a.) Claimant testified
    that her job as bakery manager required her to be on her feet, to bend and to lift
    heavy bowls, although the size of the bowls had decreased in recent years.
    (Employer Ex. 5, Claimant Dep. at 21-23, R.R. at 72a-74a; 10/20/15 H.T. at 9, 13,
    18, R.R. at 152a, 156a, 161a.) Claimant admitted that no accident or specific
    incident had occurred that caused increased pain or affected her ability to work.
    (10/20/15 H.T. at 18, R.R. at 161a.) Claimant also testified that her pain was not
    limited to her lower back and included neck pain. (Id. at 11-12, R.R. at 154a-155a.)
    Claimant admitted that her back pain did not prevent her from going on a planned
    vacation to Paris, France shortly after she stopped working.         (Employer Ex. 5,
    Claimant Dep. at 18-20, R.R. at 69a-71a.)
    Dr. Lam opined that Claimant continued to have lower back pain from
    the 1998 work injury and had not recovered from that injury. (Claimant Ex. 1,
    7/30/15 Lam Dep. at 7-11, 14-15, R.R. at 78a-80a; Claimant Ex. 4, 4/5/16 Lam Dep.
    at 9-13, 16-18, R.R. at 234a-236a.) Dr. Lam further opined that the standing,
    bending, lifting, and carrying in Claimant’s work had caused an aggravation of her
    low back pain and aggravation of preexisting degenerative disc disease, opined that
    Claimant was no longer able to work as a result of the worsening of her pain, and
    testified that she advised Claimant to stop working. (Claimant Ex. 1, 7/30/15 Lam
    Dep. at 11-14, R.R. at 79a-80a; Claimant Ex. 4, 4/5/16 Lam Dep. at 13-14, 16-17,
    27-29, 32, 40-42, R.R. at 235a-236a, 238a-239a, 241a-242a.) Dr. Lam admitted that
    Claimant also had pathology in her cervical spine that “has nothing to do with her
    work injury.” (Claimant Ex. 1, 7/30/15 Lam Dep. at 21-23, R.R. at 82a.) Dr. Lam
    testified that her treatment of Claimant’s back injury consists of facet joint
    injections, epidural injections, transforaminal injections, sacroiliac joint injections,
    4
    and neuroplasty, and that those procedures and Percocet, which she has prescribed
    for Claimant, are needed to reduce Claimant’s pain and radicular symptoms.
    (Claimant Ex. 1, 7/30/15 Lam Dep. at 7, 16-18, R.R. at 78a, 80a-81a; Claimant Ex.
    4, 4/5/16 Lam Dep. at 14-16, R.R. at 235a.)
    Dr. McConnell opined, based on his examination of Claimant and his
    review of Claimant’s medical records, that Claimant had recovered from all of her
    accepted work injuries, lumbosacral sprain and strain, lumbar radiculopathy on the
    right side, and facet pathology with a sacroiliac dysfunction, that Claimant was able
    to work at her job with Employer without restrictions, and that Claimant had not
    suffered a work-related aggravation of her back condition. (Employer Ex. 4,
    McConnell Dep. at 12-30, 38, 44, 46-47, R.R. at 106a-124a, 132a, 138a, 140a-141a.)
    Dr. McConnell testified that the report of a 2013 magnetic resonance imaging scan
    (MRI) of Claimant’s lumbar spine found no nerve compression or narrowing of the
    spinal canal and only slight disc bulging that was consistent with mild age-related
    degenerative changes and was not from any traumatic injury. (Id. at 19-22, R.R. at
    113a-116a.) Dr. McConnell further opined that Dr. Lam’s treatments of Claimant
    were not reasonable, given Claimant’s lack of nerve compression or spinal stenosis
    and the lack of objective evidence of sacroiliac and facet joint pain, and that
    Claimant required no further medical treatment for her work injury. (Id. at 27, 31-
    38, R.R. at 121a, 125a-132a.)
    Dr. Kahanovitz opined, based on his examination of Claimant and his
    review of Claimant’s medical records, that Claimant’s 1998 injury was a
    lumbosacral sprain, that Claimant had recovered from that injury and had not
    suffered an aggravation of that injury or any new injury, and that Claimant was able
    to work at her job with Employer without restrictions. (Employer Ex. 7, Kahanovitz
    5
    Dep. at 12-26, R.R. at 178a-192a.) Dr. Kahanovitz testified that the 2013 MRI and
    a 2007 MRI of Claimant’s lumbar spine found no nerve compression or any
    significant condition beyond normal, age-related, mild degenerative changes, and
    that a 2012 MRI of Claimant’s cervical spine showed disc bulging at the C5-6 level.
    (Id. at 18-19, 25-26, R.R. at 184a-185a, 191a-192a.) Dr. Kahanovitz further opined
    that there was no basis for Dr. Lam’s treatments of Claimant because there was no
    nerve compression or abnormality of the sacroiliac and facet joints and because
    Claimant reported no significant lasting improvement from the treatments. (Id. at
    21-22, 33, R.R. at 187a-188a, 199a.)
    On November 16 and 17, 2016, the WCJ issued two identical decisions
    denying Claimant’s claim petitions and granting Employer’s termination and
    utilization review petitions. In these decisions, the WCJ found that Claimant’s
    testimony concerning her reason for stopping work was not credible. (2016 WCJ
    Decisions F.F. ¶11.) The WCJ found Dr. McConnell’s opinion that Claimant had
    recovered from the 1998 work injury fully credible and found the testimony of Drs.
    McConnell and Kahanovitz more credible and persuasive than the testimony of Dr.
    Lam. (Id. ¶¶13-14.) The WCJ based these credibility determinations on the grounds
    that the opinions of Drs. McConnell and Kahanovitz were supported by physical
    examinations and objective diagnostic testing and that Dr. Lam’s opinions conflicted
    with the facts concerning Claimant’s behavior, her ability to perform her job duties
    for 16 years after the work injury and her ability to travel at the time that she claimed
    that she could not work. (Id. ¶13.) The WCJ also found that the utilization
    reviewer’s opinion that Dr. Lam’s treatments were reasonable and necessary was not
    credible because the utilization reviewer did not consider the lengthy history of those
    treatments and the lack of benefit from those treatments. (Id. ¶15.) The WCJ
    6
    accordingly held that Claimant had not met her burden of proof on her claim petition,
    and that Employer had satisfied its burden on the termination petition and utilization
    review petition. (Id. Conclusions of Law ¶¶2-4.) Claimant appealed, and on August
    16, 2017, the Board affirmed. This appeal followed.3
    Claimant argues that the WCJ erred in not finding that she had suffered
    a disabling aggravation of her back condition from her continued work for
    Employer, and that the WCJ erred in finding that she had recovered from the work
    injury and that Dr. Lam’s treatments were not reasonable and necessary. The
    evidence, however, was conflicting. Claimant testified that her back pain had
    increased and made her unable to work and presented unequivocal medical
    testimony from Dr. Lam that Claimant had not recovered from her 1998 work injury,
    that Claimant suffered a work-related aggravation of her injury and was unable to
    work as a result, and that the treatments were reasonable and necessary. Employer
    presented unequivocal medical testimony from Dr. McConnell that Claimant had
    recovered from her 1998 work injury and unequivocal medical testimony from Drs.
    McConnell and Kahanovitz that Claimant had suffered no new work injury, that
    Claimant was able to work without restrictions, and that Dr. Lam’s treatments were
    not reasonable and necessary. The WCJ found Dr. McConnell’s and Kahanovitz’s
    testimony credible and rejected Dr. Lam’s testimony as less credible and less
    persuasive. In addition, the WCJ rejected as not credible Claimant’s testimony that
    her low back pain made her unable to work and found the utilization reviewer’s
    opinion that Dr. Lam’s treatments were reasonable and necessary not credible.
    3
    Our review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, whether the WCJ’s
    necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence or whether constitutional rights
    were violated. Anderson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Penn Center for Rehab), 
    15 A.3d 944
    , 947 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
    7
    Determination of the credibility of witnesses is the prerogative of the
    WCJ, not the role of the Board or this Court. Furnari v. Workers’ Compensation
    Appeal Board (Temple Inland), 
    90 A.3d 53
    , 59-60, 70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); Gann v.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (MBS Management/Wellington East
    Development), 
    792 A.2d 701
    , 704 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). The WCJ has exclusive
    province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight, and may accept or
    reject the testimony of any witness, including medical experts, in whole or in part.
    Daniels v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Tristate Transport), 
    828 A.2d 1043
    , 1052 (Pa. 2003); Furnari, 
    90 A.3d at 59, 70
    ; Anderson v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Penn Center for Rehab), 
    15 A.3d 944
    , 949 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2010).
    The WCJ’s credibility determinations here were supported by the
    record and well within her discretion. Because Claimant testified in person before
    the WCJ and the WCJ therefore had the opportunity to observe Claimant’s
    demeanor, the WCJ was not required to state an explanation for her finding that
    Claimant was not credible. Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1052-53; Amandeo v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (Conagra Foods), 
    37 A.3d 72
    , 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
    Because Drs. McConnell, Kahanovitz and Lam and the utilization reviewer did not
    testify in person before her, the WCJ was required to explain the reasons for her
    credibility determinations concerning those witnesses. Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1053;
    Amandeo, 
    37 A.3d at 76
    . The WCJ fully and adequately explained her reasons for
    finding Drs. McConnell and Kahanovitz credible and for rejecting Dr. Lam’s
    testimony and the utilization reviewer’s report.     The fact that Dr. Lam was
    Claimant’s treating physician does not invalidate this credibility determination.
    While a WCJ may give greater credence to a treating physician’s testimony, that is
    8
    merely a factor that the WCJ may weigh in assessing credibility; the WCJ is not
    required to find a treating physician credible or more credible than a non-treating
    medical expert. Anderson, 
    15 A.3d at 945-46, 948-49
    ; Williams v. Workmen’s
    Compensation Appeal Board (Montgomery Ward), 
    562 A.2d 437
    , 441 n.6 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1989).
    It was Claimant’s burden on her claim petitions to prove both that she
    has suffered a work-related injury and that the injury caused the disability for which
    she seeks compensation. Amandeo, 
    37 A.3d at
    75-76 n.4; Reyes v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (AMTEC), 
    967 A.2d 1071
    , 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)
    (en banc). Moreover, because the injury was claimed to result from the cumulative
    effect of Claimant’s work rather than from a specific event or accident, Claimant
    was required to prove by credible, competent medical evidence that she suffered a
    work-related aggravation of her back pain. Calcara v. Workers’ Compensation
    Appeal Board (St. Joseph Hospital), 
    706 A.2d 1286
    , 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)
    (causation of a gradual, cumulative injury is not obvious and must be shown by
    medical evidence); Crenshaw v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Hussey
    Copper), 
    645 A.2d 957
    , 962-63 & n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (same). Given the WCJ’s
    credibility determinations, Claimant could not meet her burden of proof and denial
    of the claim petition was required regardless of any other evidence or factual or legal
    issues in the case.
    On the termination petition, the burden of proof was on Employer to
    show that Claimant had fully recovered from the work injury and could work without
    restrictions related to the work injury. Udvari v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal
    Board (USAir, Inc.), 
    705 A.2d 1290
    , 1293 (Pa. 1997); Hall v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (America Service Group), 
    3 A.3d 734
    , 740 (Pa.
    9
    Cmwlth. 2010). Claimant argues that Employer could not satisfy its burden because
    Drs. McConnell and Kahanovitz admitted that Claimant complained of continued
    pain and because they did not believe that all of Claimant’s accepted work injuries
    occurred and were work-related. Both of these arguments fail.
    The fact that a claimant continues to report subjective pain does not
    preclude a finding that the claimant has fully recovered from the work injury.
    Udvari, 705 A.2d at 1293; Schmidt v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (IATSE
    Local 3), 
    19 A.3d 1171
    , 1175-77 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).              “Testimony by the
    employer’s medical expert as to the existence of the claimant’s complaints of pain
    does not require the WCJ to find for the claimant.” Udvari, 705 A.2d at 1293
    (emphasis omitted). Medical expert testimony that the claimant is fully recovered
    and can return to work without restrictions and that there are no objective medical
    findings that substantiate the claims of pain or connect them to the work injury is
    sufficient to satisfy the employer’s burden on a termination petition, even if it is
    undisputed that the claimant complains of continued pain. Id.; Schmidt, 19 A.3d at
    1175-77. Here, both Dr. McConnell and Dr. Kahanovitz testified unequivocally that
    there were no objective medical findings that showed a basis for Claimant’s claims
    of pain or connected the subjective pain to any injury. (Employer Ex. 4, McConnell
    Dep. at 19-22, 34-37, R.R. at 113a-116a, 128a-131a; Employer Ex. 7, Kahanovitz
    Dep. at 18-19, 22-23, 25-26, R.R. at 184a-185a, 188a-189a, 191a-192a.)
    Because an employer may not re-litigate the claimant’s accepted work
    injuries, a medical expert’s testimony is not competent to support a termination
    petition if it does not address the accepted work injuries and opine that the claimant
    has recovered from those injuries. O’Neill v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (News Corp. Ltd.), 
    29 A.3d 50
    , 55 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Hall, 
    3 A.3d at 740
    ;
    10
    Westmoreland County v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Fuller), 
    942 A.2d 213
    , 218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). There is no requirement, however, that the medical
    expert believe that the claimant actually suffered the accepted work injuries or
    believe that the accepted work injuries were in fact work-related.                 It is well
    established that medical expert testimony that specifically addresses the accepted
    work injuries and unequivocally opines that the claimant has recovered from all of
    those injuries is competent and sufficient to support the termination of benefits, even
    though the expert does not believe that the injuries occurred or were the result of the
    work-place accident. O’Neill, 
    29 A.3d at 57
    ; Hall, 
    3 A.3d at 741
    ; Jackson v.
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Resources for Human Development), 
    877 A.2d 498
    , 502-03 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); To v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
    (Insaco, Inc.), 
    819 A.2d 1222
    , 1225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
    Although Dr. McConnell opined that he did not believe that one of the
    work injuries listed in the 2011 WCJ Decision, a facet pathology, was work-related,
    he specifically addressed all of Claimant’s accepted work injuries and testified
    unequivocally that Claimant has fully recovered from each of her accepted work
    injuries, including that facet pathology. (Employer Ex. 4, McConnell Dep. at 25-30,
    37, 44, R.R. at 119a-124a, 131a, 138a.) Dr. McConnell’s testimony was therefore
    competent to support Employer’s termination petition. Because the WCJ found that
    testimony credible, Employer sustained its burden of proof and the WCJ properly
    granted the termination petition. Hall, 
    3 A.3d at 740-43
    ; Jackson, 
    877 A.2d at
    502-
    03; To, 
    819 A.2d at 1225
    .4
    4
    Dr. Kahanovitz did not address all of the work injuries listed in the 2011 WCJ Decision and
    opined only that Claimant had fully recovered from a lumbar sprain and strain. (Employer Ex. 7,
    Kahanovitz Dep. at 23-24, R.R. at 189a-190a.) Because the WCJ found Dr. McConnell’s
    competent testimony credible, however, the insufficiency of Dr. Kahanovitz’s opinion cannot
    invalidate the WCJ’s ruling on Employer’s termination petition.
    11
    On the utilization review petition, the burden was on Employer to prove
    that Dr. Lam’s treatments were not reasonable and necessary. Bedford Somerset
    MHMR v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Turner), 
    51 A.3d 267
    , 272 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2012); Leca v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Philadelphia
    School District), 
    39 A.3d 631
    , 634 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Howrie v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (CMC Equipment Rental), 
    879 A.2d 820
    , 822 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2005). Both Dr. McConnell and Dr. Kahanovitz testified that Dr. Lam’s
    treatments were not reasonable and necessary based on objective medical evidence
    of MRIs of Claimant’s lumbar spine that showed no condition for which the
    treatments were appropriate.      The fact that these physicians were orthopedic
    surgeons, rather than anesthesiologists or pain management specialists like Dr. Lam,
    did not impair their competence to address the reasonableness and necessity of Dr.
    Lam’s treatments. Leca, 
    39 A.3d at 636
     (requirement of Section 306(f.1)(6)(i) of
    the Act, 77 P.S. § 531(6)(i), that utilization review be performed by a provider of the
    same profession and the same or similar specialty applies only to the initial
    utilization review by an authorized utilization review organization, not to medical
    opinion submitted to a WCJ on a petition to review the utilization review
    determination). Because the WCJ found the testimony of Dr. McConnell and Dr.
    Kahanovitz credible, Employer sustained its burden of proof and the WCJ properly
    granted the utilization review petition. Bedford Somerset MHMR, 
    51 A.3d at 273
    ;
    Leca, 
    39 A.3d at 636
    ; Howrie, 
    879 A.2d at 822-23
    .
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the WCJ committed no
    error in denying Claimant’s claim petitions or in granting Employer’s termination
    and utilization review petitions. As this Court aptly stated in Anderson, “Claimant
    12
    essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence. This Court will not do so.” 
    15 A.3d at 949
    . Accordingly, the order of the Board is affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    13
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Diane Mackley,                       :
    :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                        :   No. 1187 C.D. 2017
    :
    Workers’ Compensation Appeal         :
    Board (Pathmark Stores),             :
    :
    Respondent          :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 31st day of January, 2018, the order of the Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board in the above matter is AFFIRMED.
    ____________________________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge