G.A. Reihner and J.A. Reihner v. The City of Scranton ZHB ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    George A. Reihner and                    :
    Judith A. Reihner, his wife,             :
    :
    Appellants            :
    : No. 256 C.D. 2017
    v.                          : Argued: September 11, 2017
    :
    The City of Scranton Zoning              :
    Hearing Board                            :
    BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
    HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION BY
    SENIOR JUDGE COLINS                                 FILED: December 8, 2017
    George and Judith Reihner appeal from an order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Lackawanna County that affirmed a decision of the City of
    Scranton (City) Zoning Hearing Board (Board). In its decision, the Board denied
    the Reihners’ appeal of a Notice of Violation (NOV) issued by the City’s Zoning
    Code Enforcement Officer for illegal operation of a Bed and Breakfast (B&B) at the
    Reihners’ home in violation of the City’s Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance). We
    conclude that the Reihners have demonstrated that ambiguity exists in the definition
    of “Bed and Breakfast Use” in the Ordinance such that we must interpret the
    language of the Ordinance in favor of the landowners. We therefore reverse the
    order of the Court of Common Pleas.
    The Reihners are husband and wife who own and reside in a single-
    family home located at 1010 Electric Avenue in the City (Property), which is in the
    R-1A district, the “Medium Low Density Residential District.” (Board Decision
    Finding of Fact (F.F.) ¶3; Ordinance § 301.A, Reproduced Record (R.R.) 228a.) The
    R-1A district permits various residential uses, including Single Family Detached and
    Semi-Detached Dwellings and Group Homes, and certain agricultural and
    commercial uses, but does not permit the “Bed and Breakfast Use.” (Ordinance §
    306 (Table of Permitted Uses).) The “Bed and Breakfast Use” is defined in Section
    202 of the Ordinance as follows:
    The use of a single family detached dwelling and/or
    accessory structure which includes the rental of overnight
    sleeping accommodations and bathroom access for a
    maximum of 10 temporary guests at any one time (except
    as otherwise provided for in this Ordinance), and which
    does not provide any cooking facilities or provision of
    meals for guests other than breakfast. This use shall only
    include a use renting facilities for a maximum of 14
    consecutive days to any person(s) and shall be restricted
    to transient visitors of the area.
    (Ordinance § 202, R.R. 201a.)
    On or about May 18, 2016, Jack Sweeney, the Zoning Code
    Enforcement Officer, issued the NOV to the Reihners following the receipt of
    complaints from several of the Reihners’ neighbors. (Board Decision F.F. ¶1; Aug.
    10, 2016 Board Hearing Transcript (H.T.) at 26-27, R.R. 34a-35a; Joint Ex. 1, R.R.
    141a.) The NOV stated that the Reihners were operating a B&B in the R-1A district
    in violation of Section 306 of the Ordinance and they were required to eliminate the
    offending activity within ten days of receipt of the order. (Joint Ex. 1, R.R. 141a.)
    The Reihners promptly appealed the NOV, and a hearing was held before the Board
    on August 10, 2016. At the hearing, Sweeney testified that he spoke to the Reihners
    after receiving the complaints and they admitted that they were receiving guests at
    2
    their house who had booked through the Airbnb website,1 but they maintained that
    they were not offering breakfast to the guests. (H.T. at 26-27, R.R. 34a-35a.)
    Judith Reihner testified that she and her husband, along with the
    youngest of their four children, live in a three-story Victorian house on the Property.
    (H.T. at 36, R.R. 44a.) Mrs. Reihner testified that she started using Airbnb for
    lodging when visiting her son while he attended Stanford University and continued
    using it for her visits to California over the course of several years. (Id. at 38-39,
    R.R 46a-47a.) After renovating the third floor of their house, the Reihners began
    offering rooms for rent on Airbnb in March 2016. (Id. at 39-40, R.R. 47a-48a.) The
    Reihners offer three bedrooms on the third floor for rent through Airbnb; the third
    floor has three bedrooms and one shared bathroom with a door separating the second
    and third floors that can be closed to offer privacy. (Id. at 36-37, 53, R.R. 44a-45a,
    61a.) The Reihners also occasionally offer one bedroom for rent on the second floor
    to return guests whom they already know well. (Id. at 53, R.R. 61a.) All bedrooms
    are offered for a maximum four-night stay. (Id. at 72, R.R. 80a.) Mrs. Reihner stated
    that she does not serve food and she does not consider her home to be a B&B. (Id.
    at 63-64, 80, R.R. 71a-72a, 88a.) Mrs. Reihner testified that an occupancy tax is
    deducted from each one of her guests’ bills and is remitted directly to the
    Commonwealth pursuant to a policy that went into effect on July 1, 2016. (Id. at 51-
    52, R.R. 59a-60a; Appellants Ex. 3, R.R. 148a.) Mrs. Reihner testified that the City
    has not enacted a tax applicable to Airbnb stays and therefore she does not pay a tax
    to the city, nor has she registered with Lackawanna County as a hotel. (H.T. at 53-
    54, 86-87, R.R. 61a-62a, 94a-95a.)
    1
    https://www.airbnb.com (last visited, October 11, 2017).
    3
    At the hearing, several neighbors, including members of the Greenridge
    Neighborhood Association (Greenridge), which intervened below and filed a brief
    in this appeal, testified in opposition to the Reihners’ use of the Property as an
    Airbnb establishment. The neighbors cited concerns related to the presence of
    strangers in the neighborhood, parking in front of neighbors’ houses, a potential
    reduction in the value of nearby homes, and the safety of the children who play in
    the neighborhood. (H.T. at 90-127, R.R. 98a-135a.)
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted to uphold the NOV.
    In an undated decision, the Board stated its conclusion that “the activities described
    by Judith Reihner as to what was taking place at her house through AIRBNB fit the
    Ordinance definition of a Bed and Breakfast Use.” (Board Decision, Conclusion of
    Law ¶17.) The Reihners appealed the Board’s decision to the Court of Common
    Pleas, which heard the appeal without taking additional evidence. The lower court
    determined that the testimony that the Reihners use their single-family dwelling to
    rent accommodations to overnight guests for a maximum four-night stay clearly
    meets the definition of a “Bed and Breakfast Use.” (Court of Common Pleas
    Opinion at 4-5.) Though the testimony was uncontroverted that the Reihners do not
    offer breakfast at their house, the lower court concluded that there is no requirement
    in the Ordinance that breakfast be served and instead the definition of “Bed and
    Breakfast Use” states only that no other meal can be provided besides breakfast. (Id.
    at 4.)
    Where, as here, the trial court has not taken additional evidence, this
    Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the zoning hearing board
    committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Larsen v. Zoning Board of
    Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 
    672 A.2d 286
    , 288-89 (Pa. 1996); Nowicki v.
    4
    Zoning Hearing Board of Borough of Monaca, 
    91 A.3d 287
    , 291 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2014). When construing local zoning ordinances, courts are guided by the principles
    of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991, which provides
    that “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and
    according to their common and approved usage.” Patricca v. Zoning Board of
    Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 
    590 A.2d 744
    , 747-48 (Pa. 1991) (citing 1 Pa.
    C.S. § 1903(a)).
    The traditional rule of deference to zoning hearing board interpretations
    of their ordinances, however, is balanced by the principle that any ambiguity and
    conflict in the language of the ordinance must be resolved in favor of the landowner
    and the least restrictive use of the land. Latimore Township v. Latimore Township
    Zoning Hearing Board, 
    58 A.3d 883
    , 888 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); see also Section
    603.1 of the Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, added by
    the Act of Dec. 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10603.1 (“In interpreting the language
    of zoning ordinances to determine the extent of the restriction upon the use of the
    property, the language shall be interpreted, where doubt exists as to the intended
    meaning of the language written and enacted by the governing body, in favor of the
    property owner and against any implied extension of the restriction.”). Moreover,
    “[w]hile the legislative intent of the governing body which enacted the ordinance is
    of primary concern when interpreting a zoning ordinance, the letter of the ordinance
    is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Borough of
    Fleetwood v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Fleetwood, 
    649 A.2d 651
    ,
    656 (Pa. 1994); see also Riverfront Development Group, LLC v. City of Harrisburg
    Zoning Hearing Board, 
    109 A.3d 358
    , 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). This Court has held
    that it is an abuse of discretion for a zoning hearing board to narrow the terms of an
    5
    ordinance and further restrict the use of a property. Riverfront Development 
    Group, 109 A.3d at 366
    ; Church of the Saviour v. Tredyffrin Township Zoning Hearing
    Board, 
    568 A.2d 1336
    , 1338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).
    The Reihners argue that the Board and the Court of Common Pleas
    determined that the Reihners operate a B&B simply based on the name of the Airbnb
    website.2 The Reihners argue that the lower tribunals ignored the language in the
    definition that the establishment “does not provide any cooking facilities or
    provision of meals for guests other than breakfast.” (Ordinance § 202, R.R. 201a.)
    The Reihners contend that the holding by the Court of Common Pleas that the
    Ordinance does not require that breakfast be served to fall under the “Bed and
    Breakfast Use” definition ignores the conjunctive “and” in “Bed and Breakfast Use”
    which signifies that the two nouns “bed” and “breakfast” must both be present in
    order for an establishment to be considered a B&B. The Reihners assert that their
    guests had access to their kitchen to prepare any meal or snack at any time of day
    and that the Reihners did not prepare breakfast, or any other meal, for their guests.
    Because they did not serve breakfast and instead offered cooking facilities to their
    guests throughout the day, the Reihners maintain that they did not engage in a “Bed
    and Breakfast Use” on their Property and therefore the NOV was issued in error.
    The Board argues that the Reihners’ interpretation of the Ordinance to
    require that the purveyor of a B&B serve breakfast is contrary to the definition of a
    “Bed and Breakfast Use” which does not mandate that breakfast is served to guests
    and instead only permits the service of breakfast but not any other meals. The Board
    further disputes the Reihners’ argument that it is not a B&B under the Ordinance,
    2
    The original name of the company was “AirBed & Breakfast.” Walter Isaacson, Resistance is
    Futile, New York Times, June 25, 2017, at BR1.
    6
    contending that the fact that rooms are booked through the Airbnb website shows
    that the Property is a B&B since Airbnb website was designed to market B&Bs.
    As noted in the parties’ briefs, this Court has ruled in several recent
    decisions that a zoning hearing board misconstrued the terms of its zoning ordinance
    to prohibit property owners from using online platforms to offer their homes as
    vacation or short-term rentals. In Marchenko v. Zoning Hearing Board of Pocono
    Township, 
    147 A.3d 947
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), the owner of a single-family dwelling
    in a low density residential district offered her entire home for rent on the
    HomeAway website3; during the rental periods, which constituted 71 of the first 185
    days that the house was listed on the website, the owner would stay at a friend’s
    house in New 
    Jersey. 147 A.3d at 948-49
    ; 
    id. at 952
    (Pelligrini, J., dissenting). The
    zoning hearing board found that the house was being used for commercial purposes
    as a “lodge” in violation of the zoning ordinance. 
    Id. at 949.
    This Court held that
    the primary use of the property was as a single-family residence for the owner, and
    the ordinance’s definition of “single-family residence” did not prohibit the type of
    rental activity on the property. 
    Id. at 950.
    As the zoning ordinance did not prohibit
    short-term rentals in the definition of single-family dwelling and the property did
    not satisfy the dictionary definition of a “lodge,” which required that the purpose of
    the lodge was as a base for outdoor activities, the Court reversed the notice of
    violation. 
    Id. at 950-51.
                    In Shvekh v. Zoning Hearing Board of Stroud Township, 
    154 A.3d 408
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), the property owner bought a single-family home with the
    intention of using it as a primary residence but was unable to because she could not
    sell her other house; other than the approximately one week per month that the owner
    3
    https://www.homeaway.com (last visited October 11, 2017).
    7
    stayed at the house and visits by other family members, she offered out the entire
    house for rent through websites for minimum stays of two 
    nights. 154 A.3d at 410
    -
    11. The zoning hearing board determined that the property was a “tourist home”
    under the zoning ordinance, which was not permitted within the special and
    recreational district in which the property was located. 
    Id. at 411.
    This Court held
    that the property was not being used as a “tourist home,” defined to include rentals
    of individual rooms on a nightly basis, because the owner was periodically renting
    out the entire home, which “bears no relation to the bedroom-by-bedroom rental that
    is the hallmark of the tourist home.” 
    Id. at 414-15.
    The Court explained that
    AirBnB has expanded the possible uses of a single-family
    dwelling, and the Township can address these new uses in
    the Zoning Ordinance. However, amendments cannot be
    effected by shoe-horning a use that involves renting an
    entire single-family home to vacationers into the definition
    of “tourist home.”
    
    Id. at 415.
    Furthermore, the Court concluded that the property fell within the
    definition of a “single-family dwelling” of “a detached building designed for or
    occupied exclusively by one family” – though the property was not exclusively
    occupied by one family, the property did satisfy the alternative condition of having
    been designed for one family. 
    Id. Thus, the
    Court reversed the zoning hearing
    board’s affirmance of the enforcement notice against the property owner.
    In Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Township Zoning Hearing Board, 
    164 A.3d 633
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), the property owner, who lived in New York City,
    owned the subject property through a limited liability company and rented the
    property for short-term stays as part of a larger business enterprise involving
    multiple other properties. 
    Id. at 635,
    641. The property was located in a zoning
    district that only permitted single-family residential uses, and the property owner
    8
    was issued an enforcement notice for use of the property as a “Hotel and/or other
    types of transient lodging, Rental of Single Family Residential Dwelling for transient
    tenancies.” 
    Id. at 635-37.
    The “hotel” use was defined in the ordinance but was
    ruled inapplicable because it required that at least ten rooms were offered for rent
    and the property only contained six rooms, while the terms “transient lodging” and
    “transient tenancies” were undefined in the ordinance. 
    Id. at 637,
    640, 642. This
    Court followed the “controlling law” of Shvekh and Marchenko, and the bar on
    zoning hearing boards “shoe-horning” a new, unanticipated use into an existing
    defined term of the ordinance, stating that “the Board here was required to apply the
    terms of the Ordinance as written, rather than deviating from those terms based on
    unexpressed policies of the Township regarding permitted uses.” 
    Id. at 641-42
    (quoting 
    Shvekh, 154 A.3d at 415
    ) (emphasis in original). Because the property
    owner demonstrated that ambiguity existed in the language of the ordinance, the
    Court concluded that it was required to interpret the language of the ordinance in
    favor of the landowner and against any implied extension of a restriction on the use
    of the landowner’s property. 
    Id. at 642.
                 This case is factually distinguishable from Marchenko, Shvekh and
    Slice of Life. In those three cases, the property owners rented out the entirety of their
    home, either during periods when they were not present at the house or exclusively
    as in Slice of Life, while here the Reihners continually reside in their home during
    Airbnb guest stays. Furthermore, unlike Marchenko, Shvekh and Slice of Life, only
    the present matter before this Court presents the issue of whether the property owners
    have engaged in a “Bed and Breakfast Use.” Nevertheless, the controlling law in
    this trio of cases also applies here. Like the present case, each of Marchenko, Shvekh
    and Slice of Life concerns an attempt by a zoning hearing board to apply the zoning
    9
    ordinance to a new form of economic activity occurring in single-family homes that
    was facilitated and expanded by internet services like Airbnb. However, in each of
    those cases, this Court ruled that the zoning board overstepped its authority under its
    ordinance, “advance[ing] a new and strained interpretation of its zoning ordinance
    in order to effect what it would like the ordinance to say,” “shoe-horning” the use in
    question into an unsuitable existing category of uses in the ordinance. 
    Shvekh, 154 A.3d at 414-15
    .
    Our review of the present case accordingly requires that we determine
    whether the Ordinance unambiguously prohibits the type of rental activity occurring
    on the Property that would allow the City to constrain the Reihners’ use of their
    Property. We conclude that it does not. Pursuant to the definition of a “Bed and
    Breakfast Use” in the Ordinance it is clear that the Property is a single-family
    dwelling in which the Reihners rent out rooms, with bathroom access, to no more
    than 10 overnight guests at a time. Therefore, the sole question is whether the
    Reihners’ use of the Property satisfies the remaining requirement of the “Bed and
    Breakfast Use” that the Property “does not provide any cooking facilities or
    provision of meals for guests other than breakfast.” (Ordinance § 202, R.R. 201a.)
    The Reihners assert that this statement means that the establishment must provide
    either breakfast or access to cooking facilities at which the guest can prepare her
    own breakfast. The Board argues that the interpretation of this definition by the
    Court of Common Pleas is correct that a “Bed and Breakfast Use” does not require
    service of breakfast or access to cooking facilities to prepare breakfast, but instead
    only prohibits the purveyor of a B&B from serving any other meal besides breakfast.
    We conclude that the Reihners’ interpretation of the Ordinance is more reasonable
    than that of the Board. Quite simply, the Court of Common Pleas reads the term
    10
    “breakfast” out of the Ordinance. Moreover, we disagree with the argument by the
    Board that the Reihners’ use of a website called “Airbnb” supports the case that they
    were operating a B&B. As this Court explained in Shvekh, Airbnb and similar
    “sharing economy” websites have expanded the possible uses of a single-family
    dwelling and have created new types of economic activity that bear similarities to
    but do not entirely fit within traditional categories of lodging uses set forth in zoning
    ordinances. Furthermore, Mrs. Reihner testified at the Board hearing that Airbnb is
    different than a normal hotel or lodging reservation website that does not permit
    anonymous listings but instead requires that each user is verified by Airbnb with
    driver’s license, passports, credit cards or other identifying documents. (H.T. at 41-
    42, 67-68, R.R. 49a-50a, 75a-76a; Appellants Ex. 1, R.R. 142a.) In addition, Mrs.
    Reihner explained that Airbnb users have created a welcoming community focused
    on “building relationships” and “exchange,” established on a “system of trust” and
    reinforced by the reviews that guests and hosts leave for each other on the website.
    (H.T. at 39, 41-42, 84, R.R. 47a, 49a-50a, 92a.)
    Because the Reihners have proven that ambiguity exists in the language
    in the Ordinance, we are required to interpret the language of the Ordinance in favor
    of the landowner’s “widest use of the land” and against any implied extension of the
    Ordinance’s restrictions on the use of property based on the policy preferences of
    the Board. Fidler v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Upper Macungie Township, 
    182 A.2d 692
    , 695 (Pa. 1962); see also Slice of 
    Life, 164 A.3d at 640
    . The record is
    devoid of any indication that the Reihners served breakfast to any of their guests or
    did not provide cooking facilities for them to prepare their own breakfast and
    therefore we must conclude that the NOV alleging that the Reihners operated an
    illegal B&B was issued in error. Despite our ruling here, we note that the City may,
    11
    through its legislative authority, fill in the gap in the Ordinance to address the
    complained of activity occurring on the Reihners’ property. As the Court cautioned
    in Slice of Life, “there is nothing to constrain the [City] from enacting amendments
    to the Ordinance which would protect property owners’ constitutional rights while
    providing the specific definitional guidelines where they are now 
    lacking.” 164 A.3d at 646
    .
    The Board and Greenridge present several additional arguments in this
    appeal to support the validity of the NOV apart from the conclusion that the Reihners
    were operating a B&B under the Ordinance. The Board argues that, even accepting
    that Airbnb rental does not qualify as operation of a B&B, the Reihners would still
    be operating a prohibited use in the R-1A district pursuant to Section 105.B of the
    Ordinance, which provides:
    If a use clearly is not permitted by right, by condition or
    by special exception by this Ordinance within any Zoning
    District in the City, the use is prohibited in the City, except
    the applicant may apply to the Zoning Hearing Board [for
    a permit to engage in such use].
    (Ordinance § 105.B (emphasis in original).) Greenridge argues that the Reihners’
    rental of rooms through Airbnb is an economic activity which is an “incompatible
    intrusion[]” in a desirable residential neighborhood of the City, contrary to the stated
    purposes and objectives of the Ordinance.4 Greenridge further argues that the use of
    the Property as an Airbnb does not fall within the definition of a “Single Family
    Detached Dwelling” under the Ordinance, which is a permitted use in the R-1A
    district, because the Reihners are continually renting out rooms to other individuals
    4
    Section 101 of the Ordinance provides that “[t]his Ordinance is hereby adopted...to protect
    property values and protect existing residential neighborhoods from incompatible intrusions.”
    (Ordinance § 101.)
    12
    who are not a part of their family unit so more than one family resides at the Property
    any time a room is rented.5
    None of these other provisions of the Ordinance, however, was cited as
    being the basis for the NOV, and neither the Board nor the Court of Common Pleas
    ruled that the Reihners violated any other portion of the Ordinance except the
    prohibition on the operation of a B&B in the R-1A district. Indeed, while there was
    discussion at the Board hearing regarding whether the Reihners would be permitted
    under the Ordinance to rent out rooms as a lodging house for up-to-four students at
    a nearby university as some other residents in the neighborhood have done, the City
    Solicitor made clear that the only issue to be addressed at the hearing was whether
    the activities occurring at the Property qualified it as a B&B under the Ordinance.
    (H.T. at 55-57, 77-78, R.R. 63a-65a, 85a-86a.)                Accordingly, the additional
    arguments made by the Board and Greenridge are outside of the scope of this appeal.
    The order of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed.
    __________ ___________________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    5
    A “Single Family Detached Dwelling” is defined as “[o]ne dwelling unit in 1 building
    accommodating only 1 family and having open areas on all sides.” (Ordinance § 202, R.R. 206a.)
    A “Family” is defined as “[o]ne or more persons living in a single dwelling unit and functioning
    as a common household unit sharing household expenses and sharing joint use of the entire
    dwelling unit... A family shall not include more than 4 persons who are not ‘related’ to each
    other....” (Id., R.R. 207a.)
    13
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    George A. Reihner and                  :
    Judith A. Reihner, his wife,           :
    :
    Appellants          : No. 256 C.D. 2017
    :
    v.                        :
    :
    The City of Scranton Zoning            :
    Hearing Board                          :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 8th day of December, 2017, the order of the Court of
    Common Pleas of Lackawanna County is hereby REVERSED.
    __________ ___________________________
    JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 256 C.D. 2017

Judges: Jubelirer, Cosgrove, Colins

Filed Date: 12/8/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/26/2024