L&S Partnership, LLC v. Philadelphia ZBA and Pennsport Civic Association ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •               IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    L&S Partnership, LLC,                   :
    Appellant      :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    Philadelphia Zoning Board               :
    of Adjustment and                       :     No. 1493 C.D. 2016
    Pennsport Civic Association             :     Argued: December 4, 2017
    BEFORE:     HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
    HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
    JUDGE COVEY                                   FILED: December 27, 2017
    L&S Partnership, LLC (L&S) appeals from the Philadelphia County
    Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) August 1, 2016 order affirming the Philadelphia
    Zoning Board of Adjustment’s (ZBA) October 13, 2015 decision granting Pennsport
    Civic Association’s (Protestant) challenge to a building permit issued by the City of
    Philadelphia (City), Department of Licenses and Inspections (Department) to the new
    owners of the property located at 1307 E. Moyamensing Avenue, Philadelphia
    (Property). There are four issues before this Court: (1) whether the ZBA had subject
    matter jurisdiction; (2) whether the ZBA erred when it concluded that a variance
    issued in 1960 (1960 Variance) permitting a three-family dwelling had been
    abandoned; (3) whether the Department properly issued the building permit to L&S
    based on the 1960 Variance; and, (4) whether the ZBA erred when it found the 1960
    Variance had been abandoned despite a lack of substantial evidence demonstrating
    intent to abandon. After review, we affirm.
    In December 2014, L&S purchased the Property, and on March 19, 2015
    applied to the Department for a permit to perform interior alterations to the building
    located at the Property. L&S described the use of the building as a three-family
    dwelling. The Department issued the permit on April 8, 2015. The permit identified
    the Property’s occupancy as a three-family dwelling and characterized the authorized
    work as “Level II alterations (no change of occupancy) to three (3)[-]family dwelling
    as per approved plans.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 25a.
    On May 8, 2015, Protestant appealed from the permit issuance to the
    ZBA alleging that the Department erred when it issued the permit because the
    Property had long been a single-family dwelling and the Philadelphia Zoning Code
    (Zoning Code) prohibits a three-family dwelling at the Property. Protestant also
    alleged that L&S had misrepresented the nature of the work in the building permit
    application, as alterations to an existing three-family dwelling.
    On August 19, 2015, the ZBA held a hearing on the appeal. Protestant’s
    president, Dr. James Moylan (Moylan), testified that he became aware of the matter
    from neighbors who reported seeing a permit authorizing the use of the Property as a
    three-family dwelling. Moylan stated that he contacted a City councilman who
    assisted him in gathering information about the Property. He discovered that the
    City’s Office of Property Assessment listed the Property as a single-family dwelling,
    and he found no other documents that demonstrate that the Property had been
    recently used as a multi-family dwelling. He also reviewed the Property’s multiple
    listing service (MLS) real estate listing that identified the home as a single-family
    home.
    Two of the Property’s neighbors also appeared as witnesses for
    Protestant. Pat Castineira (Castineira) testified that she has owned the house next
    door to the Property for twenty years and has resided there for the last twelve years.
    She explained that a man named Bill Wallace (Wallace) lived alone at the Property
    2
    during the time she owned her property. Wallace was in failing health and Castineira
    brought him food and cared for him. She further stated that she had been inside the
    Property on both the first and second floors and was unaware of any apartment units
    at the Property. She testified that she had last been in the Property approximately
    four years ago to care for Wallace, shortly before he died. According to Castineira,
    Wallace left the Property to another neighbor whose daughter and two children lived
    there until approximately one year before the hearing, when the Property was listed
    for sale.
    Margaret Ann Szczepanek (Szczepanek) also testified that she was born,
    raised and currently lives three doors down from the Property and has been there for
    48 years. Szczepanek stated that the Property has been used as a single-family home
    during the entire time she has lived in her home. She explained that she was in the
    Property as a child and that it was a single-family dwelling.
    The City presented the testimony of Andrew Kulp (Kulp), the
    Department plans examiner, who reviewed L&S’s application and issued the building
    permit. Kulp testified that prior to issuing the building permit, he checked the City’s
    zoning archives and found a “zoning permit or use registration permit . . . from 1960
    for a three-family dwelling that was granted by variance.” R.R. at 75a. Kulp
    explained: “When you’re doing a building review, if you’re just verifying that the
    existing use of the property is whatever they’re saying it is, the legal use, you don’t
    necessarily look into the zoning classification or anything.”        R.R. at 81a-82a.
    However, he did acknowledge that: “I do do zoning and building. So if I get a
    building permit application for a use that has no history . . . I can do a zoning review
    and look into it.” R.R. at 109a. He further clarified: “There’s nothing in the current
    [Z]oning [Code] that says that a variance [is] los[t] if it’s abandoned. If there was
    non[-]conforming, . . . I would have looked into the history of the property to make
    sure it was [a] continued use. But the current [Z]oning [C]ode does not say anything
    3
    about abandonment or zoning usage.” R.R. at 82a-83a. Kulp approved the building
    permit based upon his belief that the 1960 Variance permitted a three-family
    dwelling. Notably, Kulp did not consider whether the Property’s previous owner had
    abandoned the 1960 Variance under the prior Zoning Code (Prior Zoning Code).1
    John Chan (Chan), owner of L&S, appeared pro se, and testified that
    L&S purchased the Property in December 2014, but he denied seeing the MLS listing
    prior to the purchase. Chan described the first floor of the Property as follows:
    [O]n [the] left-hand side is [a] living room and in the back
    is [a] kitchen. Then in the middle is a room. It might be a
    bedroom. And there is a bathroom right next to the –
    behind the kitchen. . . . First floor is – when you walk in,
    you turn left. There’s a living room. In the middle room
    should be a bedroom.
    R.R. at 118a-119a. Chan, however, acknowledged that the middle room could be a
    dining room. He continued his description:
    In the back is a kitchen. On the right-hand side of the
    kitchen there is a shower. There is a bathroom. . . . Then
    on the left-hand side you go up to the second floor. In the
    middle is a bathroom. And then in the front is a bedroom.
    In the back, we don’t see the kitchen there, but we do see
    the pipe and the existing . . . sewage and stuff. . . . Third
    floor, apparently, somebody is building – putting up a closet
    on the right-hand side. So, they took steps off. [The
    previous owner was] doing some kind of cabinet.
    R.R. at 119a. Chan explained that to get to the third floor, “[t]here is a ladder that is
    an opening.” R.R. at 121a. According to Chan: “There’s a kitchen, a bathroom and
    one bedroom. Everything indicate[s] to us there is an apartment on the third floor.”
    
    Id. 1 The
    Prior Zoning Code was repealed and replaced by the provisions of Bill No. 110845,
    approved December 22, 2011 and effective August 22, 2012.
    4
    On October 13, 2015, the ZBA voted to grant Protestant’s appeal. The
    ZBA found that although a variance was granted in 1960 permitting the Property to
    be used as a three-family dwelling, “the three-family use was discontinued and . . .
    the Property ha[s] been used as a single[-]family dwelling for decades.” R.R. at 176a.
    The ZBA also found that “[t]he evidence of record establishes that the three[-]family
    use approved by variance was discontinued decades ago – long before the August 22,
    2012, effective date of the current [Zoning] Code.”                 R.R. at 177a.        The ZBA
    considered provisions of the Prior Zoning Code in effect before 2012 which provided
    that “any use authorized by the [ZBA], when discontinued for a period of three
    consecutive years, shall be considered abandoned and may not be resumed without
    further approval from the [ZBA].” R.R. at 177a. Based thereon, and the evidence
    presented at the hearing, the ZBA concluded, “the three-family use approved by the
    1960 [V]ariance was discontinued more than three years prior to the effective date of
    the new [Zoning] Code and that the old [Zoning] Code’s provisions regarding
    abandonment therefore applied.” 
    Id. On October
    27, 2015, L&S, through newly retained counsel, submitted a
    request for reconsideration and rehearing. On November 4, 2015, the ZBA denied
    L&S’s request.
    On November 12, 2015, L&S filed a notice of appeal to the trial court.
    On June 9, 2016, the trial court heard oral argument on L&S’s appeal, and on August
    1, 2016, the trial court affirmed the ZBA’s decision. L&S filed a timely appeal to
    this Court.2
    2
    This Court has explained:
    Where, as here, the trial court takes no additional evidence, our scope
    of review is limited to determining whether the [ZBA] committed an
    abuse of discretion or an error of law. An abuse of discretion is
    established where the findings are not supported by substantial
    evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
    reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
    5
    I. Jurisdiction
    L&S first argues that the ZBA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear
    Protestant’s appeal from the issuance of the building permit, and instead, Protestant
    should have filed its appeal with the Board of License and Inspection Review (L&I
    Review Board).
    Section 5-1002 of the Home Rule Charter provides:
    The Department . . . shall have the power and its duty shall
    be to perform the following functions:
    (a) Building Safety and Sanitation, Signs and Zoning. It
    shall, except as otherwise specifically provided in this
    charter, administer and enforce all statutes, ordinances
    and regulations for the protection of persons and property
    from hazards, in the use, condition, erection, alteration,
    maintenance,      repair,   sanitation    (including   the
    maintenance and condition of plumbing and drainage
    facilities and the maintenance of sanitary conditions in
    housing accommodations), removal and demolition of
    buildings and structures or any parts thereof and the
    grounds appurtenant thereto, in the operation of
    equipment therein, and of outdoor signs. Subject to the
    powers and duties of the [ZBA], the Department shall
    enforce compliance with zoning ordinances.
    (b) Issuance of Licenses.[3] The Department shall:
    (1) Issue all forms for applications and receive all
    applications for any license;
    (2)     Determine whether the applicant is properly
    entitled to the license which he seeks;
    ....
    Soc’y Created to Reduce Urban Blight v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 
    771 A.2d 874
    , 877 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (citations omitted).
    3
    Section 5-1001(a) of the Home Rule Charter defines “license” as “any license or permit
    required by statute, ordinance or regulation to be obtained from any officer, department, board or
    commission as a prerequisite to engaging in any activity or having possession of or using any
    property . . . .” Home Rule Charter, § 5-1001(a).
    6
    (4) If the application is refused, notify the applicant
    in writing of the refusal and the reasons therefor.
    ....
    The requirements and standards to be met by applicants for
    licenses shall be established by the Department in all cases
    in which the Department is responsible for the functions
    involved. In all other cases, the requirements and standards
    shall be certified to the Department by the officers,
    departments, boards or commissions for which the
    Department is acting. The Department, when in doubt
    concerning the interpretation to be placed on the certified
    requirements or standards, may consult the certifying
    officer, department, board or commission, but the
    Department shall make the decision whether the license
    should be granted.
    ....
    (d) Enforcement. The Department shall determine as
    the result of its inspections whether any person or the
    owner of any property is violating the conditions of any
    license, or whether or not any property owner is violating
    any statute, ordinance or regulation which it is the
    duty of the Department to enforce.
    Home Rule Charter, § 5-1002 (emphasis added). Further, Section 5-1005 of the
    Home Rule Charter describes the L&I Review Board appeal procedures:
    The [L&I Review Board] shall provide an appeal procedure
    whereby any person aggrieved by the issuance, transfer,
    renewal, refusal, suspension, revocation or cancellation of
    any City license or by any notice, order or other action as a
    result of any City inspection, affecting him directly, shall
    upon request be furnished with a written statement of
    the reasons for the action taken and afforded a hearing
    thereon by the [L&I Review Board]. Upon such hearing
    the Board shall hear any evidence which the aggrieved
    party or the City may desire to offer, shall make findings
    and render a decision in writing. The Board may affirm,
    modify, reverse, vacate or revoke the action from which the
    appeal was taken to it.
    Home Rule Charter, § 5-1005 (bold and italic emphasis added).
    7
    In contrast, Section 4-607 of the Home Rule Charter describes the
    ZBA’s powers and duties:
    (1) In accordance with any statute or ordinance as now or
    hereafter in force, the [ZBA] shall:
    (a)     Hear and decide appeals in zoning matters
    where error is alleged in any order,
    requirement, decision or determination made by
    an administrative official in the enforcement
    of zoning ordinances, regulations and maps;
    (b) Hear and decide special exceptions to any zoning
    ordinance upon which the Board is required to
    pass;
    (c) Authorize, upon appeal, in specific cases, such
    variance from the terms of any zoning ordinance
    as will not be contrary to the public interest,
    where, owing to special conditions, a literal
    enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance
    will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that
    the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and
    substantial justice done.
    (2) In the exercise of its powers, the [ZBA] may reverse or
    affirm, wholly or partly, or modify, the order, requirement,
    decision or determination appealed from, and make such
    order, requirement, decision or determination as ought to be
    made, and, to that end, it shall have all the powers of the
    officer from whom the appeal is taken.
    Home Rule Charter, § 4-607 (emphasis added). Further, Section 14-301(4) of the
    Zoning Code provides:
    (a) General Authority.
    The [ZBA] is established by § 3-911 of the
    Philadelphia Home Rule Charter and has those
    powers set forth in § 5-1006 [renumbered to § 4-
    607] of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter and
    § 14-103(4) ([ZBA]).
    (b) Authority for Final Action.
    8
    (.1)    The [ZBA] is responsible for final action
    regarding:
    (.a) Appeals pursuant to § 14-303(15)
    (Appeals).
    (.b) Variances. See § 14-303(8) (Zoning
    Variances).
    (.c) Special exceptions. See § 14-303(7)
    (Special Exception Approval).
    (.2) The [ZBA] may impose conditions consistent
    with § 14-303(9) (Conditions on Approvals)
    on items § 14-301(4)(b)(.1)(.a) through § 14-
    301(4)(b)(.1)(.c) above.
    Zoning Code Section 14-301(4) (emphasis added). Section 14-303(15)(a)(.1) of the
    Zoning Code states: “Any final order, requirement, decision, or determination made
    by [the Department] pursuant to this Zoning Code may be appealed to the
    [ZBA] by any person or organization affected by the decision or by any department
    or agency of the City.” Zoning Code Section 14-303(15)(a)(.1) (emphasis added).
    L&S contends that the L&I Review Board has exclusive jurisdiction
    over the appeal based upon Section 5-1005 of the Home Rule Charter because L&S
    sought and received a building permit from the Department.4                    In support of its
    position, L&S cites Berger & Montague, P.C. v. Philadelphia Historical
    Commission, 
    898 A.2d 1
    (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); East Hempfield Township v. Lancaster,
    
    273 A.2d 333
    (Pa. 1971); and Day v. School District of Darby Township, 
    252 A.2d 638
    (Pa. 1969). However, these cases are inapposite.
    4
    Section 5-1005 of the Home Rule Charter provides a right to appeal to the L&I Review
    Board from “the issuance, transfer, renewal, refusal, suspension, revocation or cancellation of any
    City license or . . . notice, order or other action as a result of any City inspection . . . .” Home
    Rule Charter, § 5-1005 (emphasis added). The instant appeal did not arise as the result of a City
    inspection, but rather from a challenge to the recognition of an arguably invalid variance. Thus,
    Section 5-1005 of the Home Rule Charter is not applicable.
    9
    In Berger & Montague, this Court held that an appeal from a
    Philadelphia Historical Commission decision, where no actual permit was issued, was
    properly brought before the L&I Review Board because the Philadelphia Code
    explicitly provided that any person aggrieved by the issuance or denial of any
    Commission issued permit may appeal to the L&I Review Board. Contrary to L&S’s
    contention, this case does not stand for the proposition that the L&I Review Board
    has exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from issuance of a building permit, but
    rather that the term “license” as used in the Home Rule Charter is to be construed
    broadly. See Berger & 
    Montague, 898 A.2d at 6
    .
    In East Hempfield, our Supreme Court considered whether a trial court
    had jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of water rates fixed by a city, for
    users outside the city, or whether the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC)
    had exclusive jurisdiction. Based on explicit statutory authority subjecting city-
    provided public utility service to the PUC’s regulation and control, and other
    statutory authority requiring that such service outside the city limits also be subject to
    the PUC’s regulation and control, the Supreme Court ruled that exclusive jurisdiction
    rested with the PUC. In the instant matter, there is no similar mandate directing that
    the Department or the L&I Review Board have exclusive control or jurisdiction. To
    the contrary, Section 5-1002(a) of the Home Rule Charter explicitly states: “Subject
    to the powers and duties of the [ZBA], the Department shall enforce compliance
    with zoning ordinances.” Home Rule Charter, § 5-1002(a) (emphasis added).
    Finally, Day involved a challenge to a school board resolution requiring
    integration of two elementary schools. There, the appellant argued that the trial court
    lacked jurisdiction because the Human Relations Commission had the exclusive right
    to hear the dispute pursuant to Section 12 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.5
    5
    Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. § 962(b).
    10
    In the present case, there is no similar provision mandating exclusive jurisdiction in
    the L&I Review Board.
    Here, the trial court found that the ZBA had jurisdiction, explaining:
    The Philadelphia Home Rule Charter Section 5-1006(1)(a)
    gives the ZBA the power to ‘hear and decide appeals in
    zoning matters where error is alleged in any order,
    requirement, decision or determination made by an
    administrative official in the enforcement of zoning
    ordinances, regulations and maps.’ Furthermore, [Section
    909.1 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
    (MPC),6] 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a), gives the ZBA ‘exclusive
    jurisdiction to hear and render final adjudications . . . (5)
    applications for variances from the terms of the zoning
    ordinance. . . .’ 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a) . . . .
    Trial Court Supplemental Opinion (February 7, 2017) at 2-3, R.R. at 251a-252a.
    While this Court agrees that the ZBA had jurisdiction to address the instant matter, its
    jurisdiction is not based upon the MPC.7 Our Supreme Court has held that “the MPC
    does not apply to the City of Philadelphia, which . . . is governed instead by the [First
    Class City] Home Rule Act[8] and the Zoning Code.” Scott v. City of Philadelphia
    Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    126 A.3d 938
    , 941 (Pa. 2015).
    Rather, the ZBA’s jurisdiction is founded in the Home Rule Charter and
    the Zoning Code.        Importantly, Section 4-607(1)(a) of the Home Rule Charter
    describes the ZBA’s jurisdiction as including “appeals in zoning matters where error
    is alleged in any order, requirement, decision or determination made by an
    administrative official in the enforcement of zoning ordinances, regulations and
    6
    Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202. Section 909.1 of the
    MPC was added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.
    7
    “This court may affirm the decision of the trial court on any grounds.” Slusser v. Black
    Creek Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 
    124 A.3d 771
    , 772 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Thus, “a correct
    decision will be sustained for any reason whatsoever, even though the reason given by the court
    below to sustain its decision was erroneous.” Keebler v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of
    Pittsburgh, 
    998 A.2d 670
    , 673 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
    8
    Act of April 21, 1949, P.L. 665, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 13101–13157.
    11
    maps[.]” Home Rule Charter, § 4-607(1)(a). Similarly, Section 14-303(15)(a)(.1) of
    the Zoning Code authorizes appeals to the ZBA from “[a]ny final order, requirement,
    decision, or determination made by [the Department] pursuant to [the] Zoning Code .
    . . .” Zoning Code, § 14-303(15)(a)(.1).
    Here, L&S placed the Property’s use in issue when it characterized the
    Property as an existing three-family dwelling in the Building Permit Application.
    Thus, the matter involved a zoning issue, one that the Department was authorized
    under Section 5-1002 of the Home Rule Charter to enforce, but a matter clearly
    within the jurisdiction of the ZBA.           Protestant appealed from the Department’s
    building permit; Kulp, a Department employee and civil engineer, based the building
    permit’s issuance upon his belief, in the exercise of his duties on behalf of the
    Department to “enforce compliance with zoning ordinances” under Section 5-1002(a)
    of the Home Rule Charter, that a variance existed which allowed the proposed
    building permit. Because Protestant’s appeal before the ZBA involved an alleged
    error in a zoning matter (i.e., whether the building permit was properly issued for a
    three-family dwelling in the absence of a new variance), it was properly before the
    ZBA.9
    II. Abandonment of the 1960 Variance
    Next, L&S contends that the ZBA erred when it considered the 1960
    Variance permitting the three-family dwelling as though it were a non-conforming
    9
    L&S inaccurately characterizes the instant action as an untimely appeal from the grant of
    the 1960 Variance. In fact, this appeal is based not on a challenge to the 1960 Variance’s original
    issuance, but on the assertion that the validly issued 1960 Variance was abandoned during the
    effective period of, and in accordance with, the Prior Zoning Code. The question of whether the
    1960 Variance had been abandoned did not become relevant until L&S sought the building permit
    to use the Property consistent with the 1960 Variance.
    12
    use and determined that the 1960 Variance was abandoned.10 Until August 22, 2012,
    the Prior Zoning Code provided: “Any use authorized by the [ZBA], when
    discontinued for a period of three consecutive years, shall be considered abandoned
    and may not be resumed without further approval from the [ZBA].” Prior Zoning
    Code § 14-104(5)(c) (repealed effective August 22, 2012) (emphasis added).11
    10
    Protestant contends that Section 14-305(3)(b) of the Zoning Code supports its position
    that the 1960 Variance was abandoned when it was not used. That Section provides:
    A nonconformity that would not be permitted by this Zoning Code but
    that has been authorized through a variance or other action of the
    [ZBA], or that has been authorized by court order, is not a
    nonconformity, so long as it complies with the terms of that
    authorization. This exception applies only to the portion of the
    property that was expressly approved by [ZBA] action or court order.
    If, for example, the [ZBA] granted a use variance on a lot that does
    not comply with applicable lot size requirements, the lot retains its
    non[-]conforming status despite the granting of the use variance.
    Zoning Code, § 14-305(3)(b) (emphasis added). Protestant argues that since the Property “no
    longer complie[d] with the terms of” the 1960 Variance, it lost its protected status. 
    Id. This court
    does not agree that Section 14-305(3)(b) of the Zoning Code mandates such an outcome. Instead,
    we interpret Section 14-305(3)(b) of the Zoning Code to mean that so long as the authorized use is
    not exceeded, the authorized use will not be considered a nonconformity. This Court rejects the
    interpretation that Section 14-305(3)(b) of the Zoning Code requires that if a property is used in a
    way that would be conforming absent the approval, the approved non-conforming use will be lost.
    11
    Although Section 14-104 of the Prior Zoning Code was titled “Non-Conforming
    Structures and Uses,” this Court concludes that subpart 5(c) addressed uses including those pursuant
    to a variance. Section 14-104(5) of the Prior Zoning Code, titled “Discontinued Use[,]” provided:
    (a) A non-conforming [use] when discontinued for a period
    of three consecutive years or less may be resumed as the same
    non-conforming use and no other.
    (b) A non-conforming use when discontinued for a period of
    more than three consecutive years shall be considered
    abandoned and may not be resumed . . . .
    (c) Any use authorized by the [ZBA], when discontinued for
    a period of three consecutive years, shall be considered
    abandoned and may not be resumed without further approval
    from the [ZBA].
    13
    However, the ZBA issued its decision on October 13, 2015, after the repeal of
    Section 14-104(5)(c) of the Zoning Code.12 Importantly, the current Zoning Code
    contains the following provision to address the transition from the Prior Zoning Code:
    Permits and approvals that are valid on the effective date of
    this Zoning Code shall remain valid until their expiration
    date. Projects with valid approvals or permits may be
    carried out in accordance with the development standards in
    effect at the time of approval, provided that the permit or
    approval is valid and has not lapsed[.]
    Zoning Code, § 14-110(2)(a) (emphasis added).
    Protestant presented evidence at the August 19, 2015 ZBA hearing
    demonstrating that the Property had long been used as a single-family home. Both
    Prior Zoning Code, § 14-104(5) (repealed effective August 22, 2012) (bold and italic emphasis
    added). Because Subparts (a) and (b) specifically addressed discontinued “non-conforming use[s,]”
    it is clear that the general reference to “[a]ny use authorized by the [ZBA]” in Subpart (c) pertained
    to uses authorized by the ZBA other than “non-conforming use[s.]” 
    Id. 12 Section
    14-303(10)(e) of the current Zoning Code, which pertains to the “[l]apse of
    [p]ermits and [a]pprovals,” and specifically addresses abandonment of variances was not approved
    until December 8, 2015, after the ZBA issued its October 13, 2015 decision. That Section is
    substantially similar to Section 104(5)(c) of the Prior Zoning Code and states:
    Any use authorized by the [ZBA] by variance or special exception,
    when discontinued for a period of three consecutive years, shall
    be considered abandoned and shall not resume unless a new
    permit is issued, either as of right under then-existing Zoning Code
    provisions or by a new variance or special exception.                 A
    discontinuation of such a use may be evidenced by any one of the
    following:
    (.1) Discontinuance of operations;
    (.2) Removal of improvements necessary to the use;
    (.3) Modifications to the property that make it unsuitable
    for the use;
    (.4) Lapsing of permits or licenses necessary to operate
    the use; or
    (.5) Failure to pay property taxes or taxes related to the
    use.
    Zoning Code, § 14-303(10)(e) (emphasis added). Although the trial court did not cite to Section 14-
    303(10)(e) of the Zoning Code, it was in effect at the time the trial court issued its opinion.
    14
    Castineira and Szczepanek testified that the Property had been used as a single-family
    dwelling for many years, and described their familiarity with the Property. Based on
    Protestant’s evidence, the ZBA found that during the period before August 22, 2012,
    the Property had not been used consistent with the 1960 Variance for three
    consecutive years, and thus in accordance with Section 14-104(5)(c) of the Prior
    Zoning Code, the 1960 Variance had been abandoned.
    This Court may not substitute its interpretation of the
    evidence for that of the [ZBA]. It is the function of a
    [ZBA] to weigh the evidence before it. The [ZBA] is the
    sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight
    afforded their testimony. Assuming the record contains
    substantial evidence, we are bound by the [ZBA’s] findings
    that result from resolutions of credibility and conflicting
    testimony rather than a capricious disregard of evidence.
    Tri-County Landfill, Inc. v. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 
    83 A.3d 488
    , 518 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2014) (citations omitted). After a thorough review, this Court concludes
    that the ZBA’s findings are based on substantial evidence and we discern no error in
    the ZBA’s analysis. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 14-110(2)(a) of the Zoning
    Code, the 1960 Variance was not valid under the current Zoning Code.13
    13
    Having found that the 1960 Variance was abandoned under the Prior Zoning Code, we
    need not further address L&S’s third argument that the Department properly issued the building
    permit to L&S based on the 1960 Variance.
    We also reject L&S’s assertion that the ZBA erred when it found that the 1960 Variance had
    been abandoned where there was no substantial evidence of an intent to abandon. This Court has
    explained that “[t]he effect of a zoning code provision . . . forbidding reestablishment after a period
    of discontinuance is that of the creation by discontinuance of a presumption of the owner or
    occupier’s intent to abandon that use.” Smith v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of City of Scranton, 
    459 A.2d 1350
    , 1352 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). Thus:
    Failure to use the property for a designated time provided under a
    discontinuance provision is evidence of the intention to abandon. The
    burden of persuasion then rests with the party challenging the claim of
    abandonment. If evidence of a contrary intent is introduced, the
    presumption is rebutted and the burden of persuasion shifts back to
    the party claiming abandonment.
    15
    For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
    Senior Judge Colins concurs in the result only.
    Latrobe Speedway, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Unity Twp., Westmoreland Cty., 
    720 A.2d 127
    ,
    132 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Pappas v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia, 589 A.2d,
    675, 678 (Pa. 1991) (Zappala, J., concurring)). The Prior Zoning Code § 14-104(5)(c) (repealed
    effective August 22, 2012) created the presumption of the previous owner’s intent to abandon the
    1960 Variance, and L&S did not present evidence to rebut the presumption.
    16
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    L&S Partnership, LLC,                 :
    Appellant     :
    :
    v.                  :
    :
    Philadelphia Zoning Board             :
    of Adjustment and                     :   No. 1493 C.D. 2016
    Pennsport Civic Association           :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 27th day of December, 2017, the Philadelphia County
    Common Pleas Court’s August 1, 2016 order is affirmed.
    ___________________________
    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge