D.R. Grooms v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB) ( 2023 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Deborah R. Grooms,                               :
    Petitioner                       :
    :
    v.                                :
    :
    City of Philadelphia (Workers’                   :
    Compensation Appeal Board),                      :   No. 42 C.D. 2022
    Respondent                    :   Submitted: August 19, 2022
    BEFORE:        HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
    HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                              FILED: January 23, 2023
    Deborah R. Grooms (Claimant) petitions for review of the December
    22, 2021 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the
    decision of the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) to deny her claim petition.
    Upon review, we affirm.
    I. Background
    In July 2019, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that she sustained
    injury to her back and neck on January 10, 2019 while working for the City of
    Philadelphia (Employer).1 WCJ Decision & Order, 3/30/21 (WCJ Decision) at 3,
    1
    On January 22, 2019, the City of Philadelphia (Employer) filed a notice of denial refusing
    to accept liability for the alleged work injury. WCJ Decision & Order, 3/30/21 (WCJ Decision) at
    3, Certified Record (C.R.) at 21.
    Certified Record (C.R.) at 21.2 Claimant provided the following testimony in
    support of her claim at a hearing held in December 2019. WCJ Decision at 5,
    Finding of Fact (F.F.) 1, C.R. at 23.
    Claimant began working for Employer as a police officer in November
    2008. F.F. 1.a. Claimant sustained injury to her neck and back in a non-work-related
    car accident in July 2018, after which Employer limited Claimant to restricted-duty
    work. F.F. 1.b. Claimant treated with Dr. Frances Hunter (Dr. Hunter) following
    the off-duty accident. F.F. 1.e. Claimant was still treating for these injuries at the
    time of the alleged work injury. F.F. 1.c.
    On January 10, 2019, Claimant was performing a restricted-duty
    assignment for the court liaison unit when an elevator she was using came to a stop
    with a “jolt” after going “up several floors.” F.F. 1.c. (quoting Transcript of
    Testimony (T.T.), 12/10/19 at 11, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 11a). Claimant
    testified that the elevator thereafter dropped and then suddenly stopped, “shift[ing
    her] body up and down” in the process. Id. (quoting T.T., 12/10/19 at 11, R.R. at
    11a). Claimant did not fall to the floor, but immediately felt pain in her neck and
    back. Id. Claimant was unsure of the number of floors the elevator had travelled in
    either direction. Id. Claimant informed her supervisor that she was experiencing
    some pain following the work incident, and she treated with a panel physician at
    Worknet Occupational Medicine (Worknet) at around 12:00 p.m. the same day. F.F.
    1.h; T.T., 12/10/19 at 16, R.R. at 16a; City of Philadelphia, Heart and Lung Act
    Board of Arbitration Decision, 12/18/19 at 2, C.R. at 403. Claimant acknowledged
    that she did not mention the elevator dropping in the accident report, explaining that
    2
    Citations to the certified record reference the page numbers of the PDF document, as the
    record is not internally paginated.
    2
    she was “being very brief at that moment.” F.F. 1.d. (quoting T.T., 12/10/19 at 42,
    R.R. at 42a).
    Claimant treated with Dr. Richard Mandel, her primary care doctor, on
    January 10, 2019 following the work incident. F.F. 1.f. When questioned regarding
    the absence of any mention of the elevator incident from documentation of this visit,
    Claimant stated that she “[did not] know what [she] told [the doctor] that day.” Id.
    (quoting T.T., 12/10/19 at 33, R.R. at 33a). Claimant was not aware that she
    consistently identified her pain as either a seven or eight out of ten prior to the work
    incident during office visits with Dr. Hunter. F.F. 1.e. Claimant had received
    physical therapy with Dr. Hunter just three days prior to the disputed work accident
    and conceded that she “might’ve had a bad day” on January 10, 2019. Id.; T.T.,
    12/10/2019, R.R. at 34a.
    Claimant worked on restricted duty until August 2019, at which time
    Employer provided notice that her ability to work in this capacity was ending and
    that her continued work as a police officer would become contingent on obtaining
    medical leave. F.F. 1.g. Despite believing herself unfit to return to full duty,
    Claimant maintained she was able to continue performing restricted-duty work as a
    court liaison. Id.; F.F. 1.j. Claimant did not request medical leave and has been “out
    of work” since this time. F.F. 1.g; T.T., 12/10/19 at 19, R.R. at 19a.
    Claimant also provided the following testimony by means of telephonic
    deposition in December 2020.3 Claimant had treated with Dr. Randall Smith (Dr.
    R. Smith) and Dr. Richard Kaplan (Dr. Kaplan) but was unsure of the number of
    times she had been examined by Dr. R. Smith. F.F. 2.f.; see also Medical Report at
    3, R.R. at 246a. Claimant did not recall complaining to Dr. Hunter of radiating pain
    3
    Although the hearing was conducted telephonically, the WCJ stated that “Claimant [was]
    present to testify.” T.T., 12/4/20 at 5, C.R. at 142.
    3
    in her left leg prior to the work incident. F.F. 2.g. Claimant maintained that she
    identified her pain as an 8 out of 10 to Dr. Hunter on January 7, 2019 and in the days
    leading up to January 10, 2019, because those were just bad days and that, presently,
    her pain is always more than a 10 out of 10. F.F. 2.h.
    In June 2020, Dr. R. Smith, a board-certified orthopedist with
    professional experience in orthopedic surgery and orthopedic pain management,
    provided testimony by means of a telephonic deposition. F.F. 3.a; Dr. R. Smith
    Deposition, 6/22/20 at 1, R.R. at 57a.4 Dr. R. Smith provided diagnoses of herniated
    discs, radiculopathy5 of the lumbar spine and cervical, thoracic and lumbar sprain,
    following an examination of Claimant in May 2019. F.F. 3.b. & 3.e. Dr. R. Smith
    did not examine Claimant’s cervical spine during the May 2019 evaluation. F.F. 3.e.
    Dr. R. Smith acknowledged that magnetic resonance imaging studies (MRIs)
    performed on Claimant in July 2018 and March 2019 “showed similar findings,”
    including at the L5-S1 level. Dr. R. Smith Deposition, 6/22/20 at 16, R.R. at 72a;
    see also F.F 3.f. However, Dr. R. Smith opined that a May 2019 electromyography
    study (EMG) of Claimant indicated L5-S1 radiculopathy, whereas a December 2018
    EMG had been within normal limits. F.F. 3.g. Although he reviewed a note from
    Dr. Mark Avart dated April 2019, Dr. R. Smith did not review any records of
    Claimant’s treatment related to the 2018 car accident. F.F. 3.o; see also T.T.,
    4
    The June 22, 2020 deposition was conducted remotely as a safety precaution due to the
    COVID-19 pandemic. See Dr. R. Smith Deposition, 6/22/20 at 5, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at
    61a.
    5
    The term “radiculopathy” refers to “irritation of or injury to a spinal nerve root (as from
    being compressed) that typically causes pain, numbness, or muscle weakness in the part of the
    body which is supplied with nerves from that root,” such as “a pinched nerve of the cervical,
    thoracic, or lumbar region of the spinal column.”                MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY:
    Radiculopathy, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radiculopathy (last
    visited Jan. 20, 2023).
    4
    12/10/19 at 18, R.R. at 18a. Dr. R. Smith reviewed a note from Worknet, but did
    not review a note provided by Dr. Nathanial Evans (Dr. Evans) of Concentra Medical
    Center on January 15, 2019 releasing Claimant to full-duty work. Id.; Dr. R. Smith
    Deposition, 6/22/20 at 35, R.R. at 91a; see also Dr. Harvey Smith (Dr. H. Smith)
    Deposition, 8/25/20 at 27, at R.R. at 146a.
    Dr. H. Smith, an orthopedic surgeon with specialized training in spinal
    surgery, provided the following testimony during a telephonic deposition in August
    2020. F.F. 4.a; Dr. H. Smith Deposition, 8/25/20 at 1 R.R. at 120a. In June 2019,
    Dr. H. Smith performed an independent medical examination of Claimant. F.F. 4.b.
    Dr. H. Smith reviewed numerous records of treatment and diagnostic studies
    performed both before and after the elevator incident, including the January 15, 2019
    note from Dr. Evans at Concentra. See F.F. 4.f-4.g. Dr. H. Smith opined that
    Claimant did not sustain any injury or exacerbation as a result of the January 10,
    2019 elevator incident; rather, Claimant suffered from preexisting lumbar
    spondylolisthesis6 and degenerative disc disease. F.F. 4.h. Dr. H. Smith explained
    that the grade one spondylolisthesis, associated with spondylolysis, noted in
    Claimant’s March 2019 MRI was a chronic finding that was not affected by the
    January 10, 2019 elevator incident. F.F. 4.i. Further, the EMG findings of acute or
    chronic L5-S1 left-sided radiculopathy did not correlate with the MRI findings,
    6
    “Spondylolisthesis is [a] condition in which one vertebral body is slipped forward over
    another. Spondylolisthesis is most likely caused by an underlying condition of spondylolysis.”
    SPINE-health: Spondylolisthesis Definition, available at https://www.spine-health.com/glossary/
    spondylolisthesis (last visited Jan. 20, 2023).
    “Spondylolysis is a condition in which there is a defect in a portion of the spine called the
    pars interarticularis (a small segment of bone joining the facet joints in the back of the spine).”
    SPINE-health: Spondylolysis and Spondylolisthesis, available at https://www.spine-health.com/
    conditions/spondylolisthesis/spondylolysis-and-spondylolisthesis (last visited Jan. 20, 2023).
    Spondylolysis occurs most commonly at level L5-S1 of the spine. Id. “[S]pondylolysis is the
    most common cause of spondylolisthesis.” Id.
    5
    because a spondylolisthesis at L5-S1 would only relate to the L5 nerve, not the S1
    nerve. Id.
    Based on Claimant’s demeanor and comportment during the hearing,
    the WCJ accepted her testimony only to the extent that Claimant may have been
    trapped inside the elevator on January 10, 2019. F.F. 5. The WCJ rejected as neither
    credible nor persuasive Claimant’s testimony regarding the injuries allegedly
    sustained during the work incident and her claimed inability to return to work. Id.
    The WCJ acknowledged that Claimant’s testimony that she was jolted while riding
    the elevator at work was not contradicted by any factual testimony or evidence
    proffered by Employer.         F.F. 5.a.      However, highlighting Claimant’s
    acknowledgement that she could not recall mentioning to her doctor any injuries
    allegedly sustained on January 10, 2019, the WCJ reasoned that Claimant’s
    testimony regarding her purported injuries was not consistent with the medical
    history she had provided to her primary care doctor. F.F. 5b. Further, Claimant’s
    statements regarding the elevator incident were inconsistent and contradictory. F.F.
    5.c. For instance, Claimant’s testimony that her pain following the January 2019
    elevator incident was significantly more debilitating than the pain she experienced
    as a result of the 2018 car accident was rendered less credible by her admission that
    she worked on restricted duty until August 2019 and her belief that she would have
    been able to continue working in this capacity, if permitted by Employer. F.F. 5.d.
    Moreover, the WCJ determined that Claimant’s testimony was not forthright. F.F.
    5.e.
    The WCJ rejected as neither credible nor persuasive the medical
    testimony of Dr. R. Smith for the following reasons: Dr. R. Smith’s diagnostic
    conclusions were not consistent with the findings from Claimant’s physical
    6
    examination, there were no objective changes in the MRI diagnostic studies
    performed before and after the work incident, Dr. R. Smith did not review many of
    Claimant’s medical records pertaining to treatment sought following the 2018 car
    accident and Dr. R. Smith’s opinions were neither medically well reasoned nor
    logical. F.F. 6.a-6.d. By contrast, the WCJ accepted as “credible, convincing and
    worthy of belief” the medical opinions of Dr. H. Smith on the following bases: Dr.
    H. Smith’s opinions were supported by the findings from his physical examination
    of Claimant and by the objective diagnostic studies, Dr. H. Smith was able to
    reconcile the findings from the EMG study, Dr. H. Smith had the opportunity to
    review medical records and reports documenting Claimant’s treatment following the
    2018 car accident and Dr. H. Smith’s opinions were medically well reasoned and
    logical. F.F. 7.d.
    Based on the evidentiary record as a whole, the WCJ concluded that
    Claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving that she suffered a compensable
    work-related injury on January 10, 2019. F.F. 8; WCJ Decision at 9, Conclusion of
    Law (C.L.) 2, C.R. at 27. Thus, the WCJ denied Claimant’s claim petition. WCJ
    Decision at 10, C.R. at 28. Further, the WCJ found that Employer had a reasonable
    basis for its contest. F.F. 9; C.L. 3.
    The Board affirmed, and Claimant petitioned this Court for review. See
    Board Opinion & Order, 12/22/21 at 7, C.R. at 45.
    II. Issues
    Before this Court,7 Claimant argues that the Board erred in affirming
    the WCJ’s denial of her claim petition, because her testimony and that of Dr. R.
    7
    This Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s necessary
    findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or
    whether constitutional rights were violated. Russell v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Volkswagen
    7
    Smith proved that she “sustained an aggravation of her non-work-related injuries,
    and potentially, even a new injury[.]” Claimant’s Br. at 26. Claimant contends that
    the WCJ “capriciously disregarded substantial, competent evidence of record in
    finding that [her] testimony was not credible, and that [she] had not sustained an
    aggravation injury,” maintaining that the May 30, 2019 EMG ordered by Dr. R.
    Smith revealed nerve damage not evident in Claimant’s December 13, 2018 EMG.
    Id. at 26-27 (emphasis omitted).8
    III. Discussion
    “With respect to a claim petition, the claimant bears the initial burden
    of proving that [an] injury arose in the course of employment and was related
    thereto.” Frankiewicz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kinder Morgan, Inc.), 
    177 A.3d 991
    , 995 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). “In the event there is no obvious causal
    connection between the alleged disability and the accident, the claimant can only
    establish the requisite connection by unequivocal medical testimony.” Fotta v.
    Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (U.S. Steel/USX Corp. Maple Creek Mine), 
    626 A.2d 1144
    , 1146 (Pa. 1993). A work-related aggravation of a prior non-work-related
    condition is also compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act).9
    of America), 
    550 A.2d 1364
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). We must view the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prevailing party and give it the benefit of all inferences reasonably deduced
    therefrom. Edwards v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Epicure Home Care, Inc.), 
    134 A.3d 1156
    ,
    1161-62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). The appellate role in a workers’ compensation case is not to reweigh
    the evidence or review the credibility of the witnesses; rather, the Court must simply determine
    whether, upon consideration of the evidence as a whole, the factual findings have the requisite
    measure of support in the record. Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd.
    (Skirpan), 
    612 A.2d 434
     (Pa. 1992).
    8
    Employer filed an appellate brief, countering that Claimant’s arguments are frivolous and
    requesting an award of attorney fees and costs. See Employer’s Br. at 21-27. For the reasons
    discussed infra, we decline Employer’s request.
    9
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4; 2501-2710.
    8
    Am. Contracting Enterprises, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hurley), 
    789 A.2d 391
    , 396 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
    It is well established that the WCJ, as fact finder, “has exclusive
    province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight.”          Greenwich
    Collieries v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Buck), 
    664 A.2d 703
    , 706 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    1995). The WCJ is “free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including
    a medical witness, in whole or in part.” 
    Id.
     A credibility determination will be
    overturned “only if it is arbitrary and capricious or so fundamentally dependent on
    a misapprehension of material facts, or so otherwise flawed, as to render it
    irrational.” Casne v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (STAT Couriers, Inc.), 
    962 A.2d 14
    , 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Moreover, “the WCJ is entitled to draw reasonable
    inferences from the testimony.” 
    Id. at 20
    .
    A. Claim Petition
    As an initial matter, we observe that Claimant failed to challenge the
    credibility determinations of the WCJ before the Board and, thus, waived any such
    challenge. See On-line Appeal, 4/15/21 at 2, C.R. at 31; see also Section 703(a) of
    the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 703(a) (a “party may not raise upon
    appeal any other question not raised before the agency . . . unless allowed by the
    court upon due cause shown”); Pa.R.A.P. 1551(a) (with regard to review of quasi-
    judicial orders, “[n]o question shall be heard or considered by the court which was
    not raised before the government unit”); Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (the statement of the case
    shall confirm that issues were raised or preserved below, and shall include specific
    supporting references to the record); Riley v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
    (DPW/Norristown State Hosp.), 
    997 A.2d 382
    , 388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing
    9
    Section 111.11(a)(2) of the Board’s Regulations, 
    34 Pa. Code § 111.11
    (a)(2))10 (“An
    issue is waived unless it is preserved at every stage of the proceedings.”).11
    10
    Section 111.11(a)(2) of the Board’s Regulations provides that “an appeal form submitted
    to the Board “must contain . . . [a] statement of the particular grounds upon which the appeal is
    based, including reference to the specific findings of fact which are challenged and the errors of
    the law which are alleged.” 
    34 Pa. Code § 111.11
    (a)(2). Further, “[g]eneral allegations which do
    not specifically bring to the attention of the Board the issues decided are insufficient.” 
    Id.
    11
    We also observe that Claimant omitted any challenge to the WCJ’s credibility
    determinations from her petition for review. See Petition for Review, 1/20/22 at 2-3. Although
    “the omission of an issue from the [general statement of the objections to the order or other
    determination in a petition for review] shall not be the basis for a finding of waiver if the court is
    able to address the issue based on the certified record,” Pa.R.A.P. 1513(d)(5), we nevertheless
    deem Claimant’s challenge waived for the reasons discussed supra.
    Further, in the ‘Statement of Questions Involved’ portion of her appellate brief, Claimant
    poses the sole question of “[w]hether the WCJ and the [Board] err[ed] as a matter of law and
    evidence[] in denying [her] [c]laim [p]etition by holding that [she] failed to sustain her burden on
    the [c]laim [p]etition[.]” Claimant’s Br. at 8. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 2116(a),
    [t]he statement of the questions involved must state concisely the
    issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of
    the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement will be
    deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised
    therein. No question will be considered unless it is stated in the
    statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.
    Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). None of the issues raised by Claimant concerning credibility or the capricious
    disregard of evidence are articulated in this portion of her appellate brief. See Williams v. Workers’
    Comp. Appeal. Bd. (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 
    862 A.2d 137
    , 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (citing
    Pa.R.A.P. 2116) (holding that the claimant waived her assertion that the WCJ did not render a
    reasoned decision by “fail[ing] to raise [the] issue anywhere within his [s]tatement of the
    [q]uestions [p]resented” portion of his appellate brief). We further note Claimant’s noncompliance
    with Appellate Rule 2119(a), which provides that
    [t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
    questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part--in
    distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed--the particular
    point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of
    authorities as are deemed pertinent.
    10
    Regardless, we conclude that Claimant’s attempt to overturn the WCJ’s
    credibility determinations lacks merit. Claimant contends that the WCJ’s conclusion
    that her testimony was not credible constitutes a capricious disregard of substantial
    competent evidence. See Claimant’s Br. at 26. This Court has rejected similar
    arguments conflating these two distinct legal concepts. In Williams v. Workers’
    Compensation Appeal Board (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 
    862 A.2d 137
     (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 2004), we deemed meritless a claimant’s assertion that the WCJ
    capriciously disregarded unrebutted evidence in deeming the testimony of the
    claimant’s treating psychologist not credible, reasoning that a WCJ’s “express
    consideration and rejection [of evidence], by definition, is not capricious disregard.”
    Williams, 
    862 A.2d at 145
    . Rather, “[a] capricious disregard of evidence occurs only
    when the fact-finder deliberately ignores relevant, competent evidence.” 
    Id.
     Thus,
    we “emphasize[d] our Supreme Court’s pronouncement that, where there is
    substantial evidence to support an agency’s factual findings, and those findings in
    turn support the conclusions, it should remain a rare instance in which an appellate
    court would disturb an adjudication based upon the capricious disregard of material,
    competent evidence.” 
    Id.
     (citing Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp.
    Appeal Bd. (Marlowe), 
    812 A.2d 478
    , 490 (Pa. 2002)). Accordingly, we cannot
    conclude that the WCJ capriciously disregarded substantial competent evidence of
    record in rejecting Claimant’s testimony as not credible.
    Claimant further asserts that in deciding credibility, the WCJ erred in
    overlooking Dr. R. Smith’s testimony that Claimant’s 2019 EMG study indicated
    nerve damage which was not evident in the 2018 EMG study. See Claimant’s Br. at
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Here, the dual subdivision of Claimant’s argument does not align with the
    single question identified in the ‘Statement of Questions Involved’ portion of her appellate brief.
    See 
    id.
    11
    30. However, the WCJ deemed credible Dr. H. Smith’s explanation that the 2019
    EMG findings of acute or chronic L5-S1 left-sided radiculopathy did not correlate
    with the MRI findings, because a spondylolisthesis at L5-S1 would only relate to the
    L5 nerve, not the S1 nerve. See F.F. 3.g., 4.i & 7.b. Further, the WCJ credited Dr.
    H. Smith’s opinion that the MRI diagnostic studies showed Claimant did not sustain
    an injury on January 10, 2019, but rather, suffered from preexisting lumbar
    spondylolisthesis and degenerative disc disease. See F.F. 4.h & 7.b. The WCJ also
    deemed credible Dr. H. Smith’s opinion that the grade one spondylolisthesis,
    associated with spondylolysis, noted in Claimant’s March 2019 MRI was a chronic
    finding that was not affected by the January 10, 2019 elevator incident. See F.F. 4.i
    & 7.b. “[T]he authority of the WCJ over questions of credibility, conflicting medical
    evidence, and evidentiary weight is beyond question.” Taulton v. Workers’ Comp.
    Appeal Bd. (USX Corp.), 
    713 A.2d 142
    , 144 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
    For these reasons, the Board correctly affirmed the WCJ’s
    determination that Claimant failed to meet her burden of establishing that she
    sustained a compensable work-related injury. See Frankiewicz, 
    177 A.3d at 995
    .
    B. Request for Attorney Fees and Costs
    Employer maintains that Claimant’s arguments are frivolous, as they
    lack any basis in law or fact. Employer’s Br. at 26. Accordingly, Employer requests
    that this Court award Employer attorney fees and costs totaling $1,000. 
    Id.
     at 27
    (citing Pa.R.A.P. 274412).
    12
    Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2744,
    [a]n appellate court may award as further costs damages as may be
    just, including . . . a reasonable counsel fee . . . if it determines that
    an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the conduct of
    the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory,
    12
    Here, Claimant’s ability to prevail on appeal hinged on overturning the
    WCJ’s credibility determinations. This Court has previously awarded counsel fees
    for frivolous appeals by employers which sought to overturn credibility
    determinations or reweigh evidence.13 See, e.g., Bryn Mawr Landscaping Co. v.
    Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cruz-Tenorio), 
    219 A.3d 1244
    , 1256-57 (Pa. Cmwlth.
    2019) (awarding reasonable counsel fees to the claimant where the employer’s
    frivolous appeal “consisted solely of a challenge to the reasoning underlying the
    WCJ’s determinations of credibility and evidentiary weight”); Newcomer Prods. v.
    Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Irvin), 
    826 A.2d 69
    , 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (deeming
    the employer’s appeal frivolous and awarding the claimant counsel fees, where the
    “[e]mployer’s appeal consisted of nothing more than an invitation to this Court to
    reassess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the
    evidence”).       However, this Court cannot impose counsel fees on workers’
    compensation claimants under such circumstances. See Phillips v. Workmen’s
    Comp. Appeal Bd. (Century Steel), 
    721 A.2d 1091
    , 1094 (Pa. 1999) (citing Callahan
    v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bethlehem Steel Corp.), 
    571 A.2d 1108
    , 1111 (Pa.
    Cmwlth. 1990)) (explaining that awarding fees to an employer would “inhibit the
    employee from pursuing an administrative action in his own behalf for fear he would
    be assessed heavy costs if he lost,” and reasoning that “the statute’s purpose [was]
    obdurate or vexatious. The appellate court may remand the case to
    the trial court to determine the amount of damages authorized by
    this rule.
    Pa.R.A.P. 2744.
    13
    Moreover, as noted above, Claimant failed to raise before the Board and, thus, waived
    any challenge to the WCJ’s credibility determinations. See supra pages 9-10 and notes 10-11.
    13
    clearly to further the interests of claimants”).     Thus, we are unable to grant
    Employer’s request for attorney fees and costs. See id.
    IV. Conclusion
    Claimant failed to raise credibility challenges before the Board and,
    accordingly, they are waived. Further, Claimant failed to establish that the WCJ’s
    credibility determinations were “arbitrary and capricious[,] . . . fundamentally
    dependent on a misapprehension of material facts, or so otherwise flawed, as to
    render [them] irrational.” Casne, 
    962 A.2d at 19
    . For these reasons, we discern no
    error in the Board’s affirmance of the denial of her claim petition.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s order.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
    14
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Deborah R. Grooms,                  :
    Petitioner          :
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    City of Philadelphia (Workers’      :
    Compensation Appeal Board),         :   No. 42 C.D. 2022
    Respondent       :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 23rd day of January, 2023, the December 22, 2021
    order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.
    __________________________________
    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge