J.C. Collaso v. BPOA, State Board of Social Workers, Marriage and Family Therapists and Professional Counselors ( 2016 )


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  •            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Jane C. Collaso,                        :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                          :   No. 1118 C.D. 2015
    :   Submitted: February 19, 2016
    Bureau of Professional and              :
    Occupational Affairs, State             :
    Board of Social Workers,                :
    Marriage and Family Therapists          :
    and Professional Counselors,            :
    Respondent     :
    BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
    HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge
    OPINION NOT REPORTED
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    BY JUDGE BROBSON                            FILED: July 1, 2016
    Petitioner Jane C. Collaso (Collaso) petitions for review of an order of
    the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Board of Social
    Workers, Marriage and Family Therapists and Professional Counselors (Board),
    revoking Collaso’s license to practice clinical social work. We affirm the Board’s
    order.
    By way of background, on July 13, 2010, Collaso pleaded guilty to
    two counts of simple assault, which is a grade 2 misdemeanor. The criminal
    charges against Collaso arose as a consequence of Collaso’s assault of a former
    client (K) and the client’s husband (T). The criminal complaint alleged that
    Collaso had engaged in an affair with the former client and that she went to the
    former client’s home, where she attacked K and T. According to the Board’s
    brief,1 on May 3, 2011, as a result of the convictions, the Board, in a separate
    proceeding, issued an Immediate Temporary Suspension order (ITS). Ultimately,
    Collaso and the Board agreed to a resolution of Collaso’s challenge to the ITS,
    resulting in a 180-day temporary suspension of Collaso’s license.
    During that period of temporary suspension, on July 12, 2011, the
    Pennsylvania Department of State (Department) issued an Order Compelling the
    Mental and Physical Examination of Collaso. Although Collaso attended two
    examinations, the examiner concluded that he could not render an opinion
    regarding Collaso’s mental or physical condition, because Collaso had not
    provided all requested records and responses to direct questions. Based upon the
    examiner’s conclusion, on September 13, 2011, the Department filed a motion to
    deem facts admitted and for entry of default. The Department’s motion also
    sought an order of the Board suspending Collaso’s license until such time that she
    complied with the July 12, 2011 order to submit to the mental and physical
    examination. On October 20, 2011, the Board issued a final memorandum order:
    (1) granting the Department’s motion to the extent it sought to deem facts admitted
    and entry of default; but (2) dismissing without prejudice the Department’s motion
    to the extent it sought to compel Collaso to submit to a mental and physical
    examination. (R.R. at 51a.)
    The Board’s October 20, 2011 order deemed facts admitted indicating
    that Collaso failed to comply with the July 2011 order directing her to submit to an
    evaluation. Included in those facts deemed admitted were: (1) Collaso failed to
    1
    Respondent’s Brief at 10 n.14.
    2
    provide the examiner with her medical records; (2) Collaso failed to provide the
    examiner with a copy of her curriculum vitae in advance of the examination;
    (3) during the examiner’s interview of Collaso, she refused to discuss the incident
    involving her former patient and the patient’s husband; and (4) upon the second
    examination, Collaso again refused to provide the examiner with her medical
    records and refused to discuss the triggering patient incident. The Board accepted
    as a fact that, because Collaso did not cooperate with the examinations, the
    examiner was unable to provide an opinion regarding Collaso’s emotional state or
    psychiatric condition. (R.R. at 49a-50a.)
    Despite those findings and the Board’s conclusion that Collaso was in
    default for failing to submit to the examination, the Board elected not to exercise
    its authority to suspend indefinitely Collaso’s license until she complied with the
    provisions of the initial examination order. (R.R. at 50a-51a.) The Board reasoned
    that the Department’s request for an order compelling Collaso to submit to another
    exam did not specify whether the Respondent was seeking an examination
    regarding potential drug addiction or for mental incompetence.                   On
    November 1, 2011, the Board issued an order reinstating Collaso’s license.
    Although Collaso’s participation in/or submissions to the mental and physical
    examinations are pertinent to the petition for review, the proceedings involving the
    ITS are not at issue in this matter.
    On November 11, 2011, a prosecutor with the Department issued a
    notice to Collaso advising her that the Department had initiated formal disciplinary
    proceedings against her and informing her of her rights to respond to and defend
    against the proceedings. The Department initiated the proceedings in an order
    directed to Collaso to show cause (Order to Show Cause) why the Board should
    3
    not impose a disciplinary sanction against her based upon her actions leading up to
    her two criminal convictions. The Order to Show Cause identified Collaso’s
    alleged violations of the Social Workers, Marriage and Family Therapists and
    Professional Counselors Act (Social Workers Act)2 and the Criminal History
    Records Information Act (CHRIA)3 as grounds for the potential imposition of
    sanctions.
    The Order to Show Cause referred to the criminal complaint upon
    which Collaso’s two criminal convictions were based, which, as indicated above,
    described Collaso’s forcible entry in the home of K and T, her actions that night,
    and her guilty pleas to two counts of simple assault. The Department claimed that
    it was empowered to suspend, revoke, or restrict Collaso’s license under the
    following:
     Section 11(a)(1) of the Social Workers Act,4 63 P.S. § 1911(a)(1), based
    upon Collaso’s misdemeanor assault convictions. (Count One)
     Section 9124(c)(2) of the CHRIA,5 18 Pa. C.S. § 9124(c)(2), based upon
    Collaso’s guilty plea to the two assault charges. (Count Two)
     Section 11(a)(2) of the Social Workers Act,6 63 P.S. § 1911(a)(2), for
    alleged violations of:
    2
    Act of July 9, 1987, P.L. 220, as amended, 63 P.S. §§ 1901-1922.
    3
    Act of July 16, 1979, P.L. 116, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 9101-9183.
    4
    Section 11(a)(1) of the Social Workers Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he board
    may . . . suspend, revoke, limit or restrict a license . . . for any of the following: (1) Being
    convicted of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude in any state . . . court.”
    5
    Section 9124(c)(2) of the CHRIA provides, in pertinent part, that “[b]oards,
    commissions or departments of the Commonwealth authorized to license, certify, register or
    permit the practice of . . . professions may . . . suspend or revoke any license . . . ‘[w]here the
    applicant has been convicted of a misdemeanor which relates to the . . . profession for which the
    license . . . is sought.’”
    4
    (a) Section 1.01 of the National Association of Social
    Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics (Code), which
    provides that social workers have a primary
    responsibility to promote the wellbeing of clients.
    (Count Three)
    (b) Section 1.06(c) of the NASW Code, which prohibits
    social workers from engaging in dual relationships with
    clients or former clients when such a relationship poses a
    risk of exploitation or harm to a client. (Count Four)
    (c) Section 1.10 of the NASW Code, which prohibits
    social workers from engaging in physical contact with
    clients when there is a possibility of psychological harm
    to the client as a result of such contact. (Count Five)
    (d) Section 4.05(a) of the NASW Code, which prohibits
    social workers from allowing personal problems and
    psychosocial distress, inter alia, to interfere with
    professional judgments and performance or to jeopardize
    the best interests of people to whom they have a duty of
    professional responsibility. (Count Six)7
     Section 11(a)(7) of the Social Workers Act,8 63 P.S. § 1911(a)(7), for failure
    to obey the Board’s order directing her to submit to a mental and physical
    examination and to submit medical and mental health records to the
    examining physician. (Count Seven).
    (continued…)
    6
    Section 11(a)(2) of the Social Workers Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he board
    may refuse, suspend, revoke . . . or restrict a license . . . for . . . [b]eing found guilty of immoral
    or unprofessional conduct.” Section 11(a)(2) defines the term “unprofessional conduct” to
    “include any departure from or failure to conform to the standards of acceptable and prevailing
    practice.” In proceeding under this provision, the Department need not establish that a licensee
    caused actual injury to a client. Id.
    7
    Count Six of the Rule to Show Cause was mistakenly numbered as Count Five.
    8
    Section 11(a)(7) of the Social Workers Act provides that the Board may revoke or
    suspend a license for “violat[ion of] an order of the board previously entered in a disciplinary
    proceeding.”
    5
    The Department also asserted that it was empowered to impose a civil penalty for
    any of these alleged violations pursuant to Section 17(b) of the Social Workers
    Act, 63 P.S. § 1917(b), or Section 5(b)(4) of the law commonly referred to as the
    Licensing Boards and Commissions Law (Act 48),9 63 P.S. § 2205(b)(4), and that
    it had the power to impose costs of investigation upon Collaso under
    Section 5(b)(5) of Act 48, 63 P.S. § 2205(b)(5).
    On February 12, 2013, the Board conducted a formal hearing on the
    Order to Show Cause. During the hearing, the Department presented the testimony
    of one of the officers called to the house where Collaso assaulted K and T. The
    Department also presented the testimony of Vincent J. Gioe, Ph.D., a licensed
    clinical psychologist and licensed marriage and family therapist, who the Board
    qualified as an expert regarding the ethical standards set forth in the NASW.
    Collaso testified on her own behalf. She refuted the description of the
    conduct that gave rise to the criminal charges. Collaso testified that K came to
    counseling on her own, without her husband; that K called her the night of the
    altercation; that she, Collaso, went to the home and entered without conflict; that
    she did not strike T or K; that although K had been her client, a personal
    relationship did not arise until after she referred K to other therapists; and that she
    had not engaged in a sexual relationship, but rather that “feelings” existed between
    K and herself. The Board concluded that Collaso’s attempt to re-characterize the
    scenario that was described in the criminal complaint constituted an impermissible
    collateral attack on her convictions.
    9
    Act of July 2, 1993, P.L. 345, as amended, 63 P.S. §§ 2201-2207.
    6
    On May 8, 2015, the Board issued a final adjudication and order. The
    Board rendered the following pertinent factual findings:
    8. [Collaso] pled guilty to two (2) counts of Simple
    Assault, Grade two misdemeanor offenses, in violation of
    18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(1).
    10. The incident that resulted in [Collaso]’s guilty plea
    involved [Collaso] forcibly entering the home of a former
    client/patient, K, and the client’s husband, T, and
    physically assaulting K and T causing injury.
    13. As a result of [an altercation between Collaso and K
    and T at K and T’s home] K’s face was red and irritated
    with small scratches on her lips. T also had a scratch by
    his left eye.
    14. T and K had gone to [Collaso] for marital counseling.
    After one session together, [Collaso] asked to see K
    alone.
    15. [Collaso] and K began seeing each other outside of
    counseling and began a personal/sexual relationship.
    16. After two or three counseling sessions with K alone,
    [Collaso] referred her to other therapists for therapy.
    17. K ended the relationship with [Collaso] when she
    deciding to work on her marriage.
    20. The mental and physical examination was conducted
    on August 7, 2011.
    22. [Collaso] refused to answer questions from Dr.
    Voskanian relative to the criminal complaint of
    February 15, 2010.
    23. Because [Collaso] refused to comply fully with the
    Board’s order, Dr. Voskanian was unable to formulate an
    opinion as to [Collaso]’s emotional state or psychiatric
    condition.
    24. After being informed of Dr. Voskanian’s inability to
    render an opinion on her fitness to practice social work,
    [Collaso] attended a re-examination with Dr. Voskanian
    on September 2, 2011.
    25. [Collaso] again failed to provide Dr. Voskanian with
    her medical records as required by the Board’s Order.
    7
    26. During the September 2, 2011, examination, [Collaso]
    again refused to discuss the incident which led to the
    Criminal Complaint of February 15, 2010.
    27. Because [Collaso] refused to comply fully with the
    Board’s Order, Dr. Voskanian was unable to offer an
    opinion as to [Collaso]’s emotional state or psychiatric
    condition.
    The Board concluded that Collaso’s guilty pleas established: (1) the commission
    of crimes of moral turpitude for the purpose of Section 11(a)(1) of the Social
    Workers Act; (2) the commission of crimes relating to Collaso’s profession for the
    purpose of Section 9124(c)(2) of the CHRIA; (3) violations of Section 11(a)(2) of
    the Social Workers Act based upon the provisions of the NASW Code cited in the
    Order to Show Cause; and (4) Collaso’s violation of Section 11(a)(7) of the Social
    Workers Act, based upon her failure to submit as ordered to a physical and mental
    examination.
    Collaso, pro se, petitions for review of the Board’s order,10 raising the
    following issues in her brief:11 (1) Whether substantial evidence supports the
    Board’s findings pertinent to the legal question of whether the Board erred with
    regard to its conclusion that Collaso engaged in unprofessional or immoral conduct
    where, she claims: (a) the evidence does not indicate that she failed to promote a
    client’s well-being; (b) the Board erroneously referred to other initial charges that
    10
    Our review in this matter is limited to considering whether necessary factual findings
    are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the Board erred as a matter of law, and, if
    properly raised, whether any constitutional rights were violated. 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.
    11
    Collaso raises the following questions in her statement of questions involved:
    (1) whether the Board issued a well-reasoned decision revoking Collaso’s license; and
    (2) whether the Board erred in its assessment of the evidence, such that the sanction the Board
    imposed was harsh. As described below, Collaso raises more specific questions in the discussion
    section of her brief, and we glean the pertinent issues therefrom.
    8
    the prosecutor eventually dropped; and (c) the Board did not consider whether the
    assaults were remote in time to her treatment of K; (2) whether the Board’s notice
    failed to provide sufficient notice of the nature of the charges and, thereby, violated
    Collaso’s due process rights; (3) whether the Board erred in concluding that the
    grade two misdemeanor simple assault convictions constitute crimes of dishonesty
    or moral turpitude; (4) whether the sanction the Board imposed is
    unconstitutionally harsh; and (5) whether collateral estoppel applies to preclude the
    Department’s prosecution as set forth in the Order to Show Cause based upon the
    earlier temporary license suspension proceeding.        Because Collaso sometimes
    addresses these arguments in a somewhat random manner and because some of
    these arguments are addressed only to certain of the Counts in the Order to Show
    Cause, we will first address Collaso’s arguments regarding specific Counts and
    address common arguments thereafter.
    COUNT I
    Crime of Moral Turpitude
    With regard to Count I, which asserts that Collaso’s license is subject
    to revocation based upon conviction for a crime of moral turpitude under
    Section 11(a)(1) of the Social Workers Act, the Board considered whether the
    misdemeanor simple assault convictions constituted crimes of moral turpitude.
    Citing Foose v. State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and
    Salespersons, 
    578 A.2d 1355
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), the Board opined that this Court
    defined crimes of moral turpitude as “anything done knowingly contrary to justice
    or good morals,” Foose, 
    578 A.2d at 1357
    , and that Collaso’s assault convictions
    fell within that definition because assaults “are inconsistent with the definition of
    good moral character [and they] involve a reprehensible state of mind.” (Board
    9
    Opinion at 15.) The Board wrote that “the reprehensible state of mind” at issue
    with the misdemeanors of which Collaso was convicted “is the knowing or
    reckless attempt to cause or causing bodily injury to another, or engaging in
    conduct which constitutes a physical menace intended to put another in fear of
    serious bodily injury.” 
    Id.
     The Board distinguished third-degree misdemeanor
    simple assault, which involves conduct that may be lacking in a “reprehensible
    state of mind” that could arise in a situation such as “a fight or flight scuffle by
    mutual consent.”     
    Id.
       The Board was persuaded that Collaso’s intentional
    appearance at the home of K and T and her assault constituted a crime of moral
    turpitude.
    We conclude that the Board did not err in concluding that Collaso’s
    two assault convictions constitute crimes of moral turpitude for the purpose of
    Section 11(a)(1) of the Social Workers Act.        In Bowalick v. Department of
    Education, 
    840 A.2d 519
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), this Court, in considering whether
    the Pennsylvania Department of Education had sufficient grounds to revoke a
    teaching certificate, addressed the question of whether the crime of simple assault
    always constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. In Bowalick, a teacher was arrested,
    convicted, and sentenced on a simple assault charge involving his wife. The
    Department of Education sent him a notification that it was seeking to revoke his
    certificate based upon its belief that simple assault is a crime of moral turpitude.
    We noted in Bowalick that the governing regulations in that case provided that the
    only relevant inquiry when questioning whether a crime is one of moral turpitude
    relates to the particular elements of the crime committed, not to the facts
    underlying the particular commission of the crime. The regulatory provision at
    issue, 
    22 Pa. Code § 237.9
    (a), provided guidance, defining “moral turpitude” as
    10
    including “reckless conduct causing bodily injury to another.”                 Although the
    definition in the regulation also included “conduct done knowingly contrary to
    justice, honesty or good morals,” we opined that the term “moral turpitude” as
    defined in the regulation, as well as the definitions arising in other statutory
    contexts
    requires a reprehensible state of mind or mens rea. Thus,
    it may be an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity,
    contrary to the accepted customary rule of right and duty
    between two human beings.” Such an act requires at
    least knowledge of private impropriety or the potential
    for social disruption. Also an act of moral turpitude may
    consist of intentional, knowing or reckless conduct.
    Bowalick, 
    840 A.2d at 523-24
     (internal citations omitted).
    The Court considered the elements of the crime “simple assault,” but
    noted that the crime of simple assault “can lack a reprehensible state of mind when
    arising in the context of a fight or scuffle by mutual consent.” 
    Id. at 524
    . The
    Court concluded that, because the possibility existed that the teacher and his wife
    entered into the altercation under such “mutual consent,” the Professional
    Standards and Practices Commission,12 was required to conduct a hearing to
    determine whether the teacher had pleaded guilty to facts involving moral
    turpitude, i.e., facts indicating that the “mutual consent” type of assault was not at
    issue. That rationale is consistent with this Court’s decisions holding that the
    question of whether a particular crime is one involving moral turpitude depends on
    12
    The Professional Standards and Practices Commission (Commission) was established
    by the Educator Discipline Act, Act of December 12, 1973, P.L. 397, as amended, 24 P.S.
    §§ 2070.1-.18c, which authorizes the Commission, in part, to direct the Department of Education
    to discipline any educator in accordance with the act, including revoking an educator’s teaching
    certificate.
    11
    the elements of the crime rather than an independent examination of the details of
    the behavior underlying the crime. See Startzel v. Dep’t of Educ., 
    562 A.2d 1005
    ,
    1007 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989), appeal denied, 
    574 A.2d 76
     (Pa. 1990). In this matter,
    the convictions were graded as misdemeanors of the second degree. Assaults that
    arise from a fight involving mutual consent are graded lower than second degree
    misdemeanors.     18 Pa. C.S. § 2701.        It appears, therefore, that Collaso’s
    convictions, which were graded more severely than those that might arise from
    “mutual consent,” fall within this Court’s holdings regarding crimes of moral
    turpitude. Consequently, we conclude that the Board did not err in concluding that
    Collaso’s simple assault convictions are for crimes of moral turpitude.
    Sufficiency of Notice
    Collaso asserts that the Board’s notice was insufficient and violated
    her due process rights. This argument appears to relate to the charges contained in
    Count One. In her brief, Collaso asserts that the Department charged her vaguely
    with “lacking good moral character.” (Petitioner’s Brief at 19.) Collaso, however,
    does not reference the particular charge in which the Department used the phrase
    “moral character.” Our review of the Order to Show Cause, however, indicates
    that the Department alleged that Collaso’s convictions constituted crimes of moral
    turpitude, which under Section 11(a) of the Social Workers Act provides grounds
    for revocation of a license. Thus, the precise challenge Collaso is seeking to raise
    is unclear, because the charges do not use the phrase “moral character.” Even if
    Collaso had more clearly articulated the question, she did not raise before the
    Board a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the notice. Thus, we believe
    that this issue has been waived. McGrath v. State Bd. of Dentistry, 
    632 A.2d 1027
    ,
    12
    1031 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (constitutional challenge to agency proceedings generally
    must be timely raised and preserved for purposes of appellate review).
    COUNTS THREE AND FIVE
    Violations of NASW Code Sections 1.01 and 1.10
    Collaso contends there is a lack of evidence to support the Board’s
    findings regarding the alleged violations of Sections 1.01 and 1.10 of the NASW
    Code. Section 1.01 provides that a social worker’s primary responsibility is the
    well-being of a client. Section 1.10 provides that social workers should not engage
    in physical contact with a client if such contact has the potential to cause
    psychological harm to a client. Collaso claims that there is insufficient evidence to
    support a finding that she failed to promote the well-being of a client. Collaso also
    asserts that the Board improperly referred to certain charges (presumably in the
    criminal complaint) against her that were eventually dropped. Collaso does not
    specify which particular factual findings are not supported by evidence. It would
    appear that Collaso intended to argue that the findings do not support the Board’s
    legal conclusions that Collaso violated the NASW Code-based charges against her.
    Collaso has presented no legal arguments or provided any pertinent legal citations
    in support of her claim that the factual findings do not support the Board’s legal
    conclusions. Accordingly, we conclude that Collaso has waived this issue by
    failing to brief the issue adequately.13 In re: Condemnation of Land for S.E. Cent.
    13
    Collaso follows this argument with a reference to Blake v. State Board of Funeral
    Directors, 
    770 A.2d 380
     (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    786 A.2d 990
     (Pa. 2001), but Collaso has
    not explained how our holding in that decision bears upon this matter. Additionally, Collaso
    asserts that a reasonable mind could view the evidence in this case as sufficient to support a
    finding that she is capable of engaging in her profession. Without any sufficient argument in
    (Footnote continued on next page…)
    13
    Bus. Dist. Redevelopment Area #1: (405 Madison St., City of Chester), 
    946 A.2d 1154
    , 1156 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    968 A.2d 233
     (Pa. 2008), cert. denied,
    
    556 U.S. 1208
     (2009) (“[a]rguments not properly developed in a brief will be
    deemed waived”).
    COUNT SEVEN
    Collaso also asserts that the Board erred in determining that she failed
    to provide requested medical documentation to the examiner, arguing that the
    Board failed to consider that she attended two examinations, that she sat in an
    examination room for four hours, and that she orally provided information to the
    examiner regarding her history and credentials.               (Petitioner’s Brief at 8-10.)
    Collaso further relies upon the fact that the Board, in its October 20, 2011 order
    resolving the Department’s motion to the extent it sought to deem facts admitted
    and for a default judgment, concluded that it did not “believe that the facts as
    alleged in the [motion] rise to the level of establishing that a medical condition
    may exist that would render [Collaso] unable to practice with reasonable skill and
    safety.”   (R.R. at 50a.)      As we noted above, when the Board expressed that
    opinion, it did so based upon its view that the portion of the motion seeking to
    compel an indefinite suspension of Collaso’s license due to her failure to comply
    was insufficient, because that motion did not specifically indicate whether the
    examination would address potential drug addiction or mental incompetence.
    Although the Board’s order appears inconsistent in some respects, the Board did
    (continued…)
    support of her imprecise challenge to factual findings and legal conclusions, we are bound by the
    Board’s factual findings.
    14
    affirmatively find that Collaso failed to comply with the initial July 2011 order,
    directing her to submit her medical records to the examiner.
    Although Collaso does assert that the Board’s comment supports her
    claim that she complied with the initial July 2011 order to submit to an
    examination, the thrust of Collaso’s argument is that she complied with the
    direction in part, by attending the examinations.     Collaso, however, does not
    contest that she failed to provide the examiner with her medical records as required
    by the July 2011 order. The July 2011 order also directed Collaso to answer
    questions the examiner posed to her. (R.R. at 34a.) Collaso makes no claim that
    she did answer all of the examiner’s questions. Thus, the record appears to contain
    substantial evidence that supports the Board’s findings that Collaso did not comply
    with the July 2011 order to submit to a mental and physical examination.
    Based upon the Board’s findings regarding Collaso’s noncompliance,
    we conclude that the factual findings support the Board’s conclusion that Collaso
    failed to comply with the Board’s order, because her refusal to provide the records
    rendered the examiner’s task of producing an accurate evaluation impossible.
    REMAINING ARGUMENTS
    Abuse of Discretion in Revoking Collaso’s License
    Collaso asserts generally throughout her brief that the Board abused
    its discretion in imposing the sanction of license revocation. Collaso contends that
    the penalty is too harsh for the conduct at issue.      As the Department notes,
    however, the Board may impose sanctions to the extent authorized by the
    applicable law. Slawek v. State Bd. of Med. Educ. and Licensure, 
    586 A.2d 362
    ,
    365 (Pa. 1991). Collaso, relying upon our decision in Ake v. State Board of
    Accountancy, 
    974 A.2d 514
     (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    987 A.2d 162
     (Pa.
    15
    2009), argues that the Board’s revocation constitutes an abuse of discretion. In
    Ake, we concluded that the Board of Accountancy abused its discretion in revoking
    a certified public accountant’s license, based upon a conviction for harassment in a
    different state. We reversed the Board’s sanction, concluding “that where prior
    convictions do not in any way reflect upon the [licensee]’s present ability to
    properly discharge the responsibilities required by the position, the convictions
    cannot provide a basis for the revocation of a . . . license.” Ake, 974 A.2d at 520.
    Rather, licensing agencies must consider “the nature of the offending conduct and
    its remoteness in time must be considered where an agency seeks to revoke a
    professional license on the basis of a conviction.” Id. We conclude that Ake is
    distinguishable from this matter, because the Board correctly determined that
    Collaso’s convictions reflected upon her ability to discharge the responsibilities of
    a social worker and the timing of convictions, as compared to our holding in Ake,
    is not remote to the Board’s revocation action.
    Collateral Estoppel
    Collaso also argues that the Board was collaterally estopped from
    considering the charges in the Order to Show Cause based upon the earlier
    proceeding involving the ITS. The Department contends that Collaso waived this
    issue by failing to present it in her petition for review. Our Supreme Court
    amended Pa. R.A.P. 1513(d) to provide that, when a party fails to raise an issue in
    a petition for review, but presents sufficient argument in a brief to enable this
    Court to address the issue, such an omission is not grounds to find waiver.
    Winchilla v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Nexstar Broad.), 
    126 A.3d 364
    , 368 (Pa.
    Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 
    130 A.3d 1293
     (Pa. 2015). The Department is correct,
    however, in relying upon waiver, because it appears that Collaso did not raise the
    16
    issue before the Board. Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a);              Laundry Owners Mut. Liab. Ins.
    Assn. v. Ins. Comm’r of Pennsylvania, 
    91 A.3d 747
    , 753 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (issue
    waived where party fails to raise it before governmental unit). Therefore, we agree
    with the Department that Collaso waived this issue.
    Accordingly, we conclude that Collaso has not established any
    grounds for reversal of the Board’s decision, and, therefore, we will affirm the
    Board’s order.14
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
    14
    Collaso mentions CHRIA, which was the basis of Count Two of the Order to Show
    Cause, only in passing. Although we note the Court’s recent holdings that suggest that CHRIA
    may only be applicable in the context of a licensee’s criminal conviction and professional
    disciplinary proceedings where a licensing board’s statutory provisions are silent as to the
    authority of a board to impose a sanction for a criminal conviction, see Garner v. State Board of
    Optometry, 
    97 A.3d 437
     (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), appeal denied, 
    112 A.3d 655
     (Pa. 2015), Collaso
    has not adequately challenged the Board’s conclusion that CHRIA provides sufficient legal
    grounds independently to impose a sanction based upon her convictions. Consequently, we will
    not proceed to consider whether the Board erred in concluding it could do so.
    17
    IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    Jane C. Collaso,                       :
    Petitioner     :
    :
    v.                         :   No. 1118 C.D. 2015
    :
    Bureau of Professional and             :
    Occupational Affairs, State            :
    Board of Social Workers,               :
    Marriage and Family Therapists         :
    and Professional Counselors,           :
    Respondent    :
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this 1st day of July, 2016, the order of the Bureau of
    Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Board of Social Workers, Marriage
    and Family Therapists and Professional Counselors is AFFIRMED.
    P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge